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ABSTRACT	
 
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States and the Bali bombings in 
Indonesia the following year, Southeast Asia came under scrutiny for its role in the rise of 
militant Islamism. Generally, scholarship on militant Islamism in Southeast Asia branched 
into two approaches: terrorism experts tended to see the problem through the prism of al-
Qaeda, with Southeast Asian jihadists following orders from their leaders outside the region; 
Indonesia specialists, meanwhile, countered this al-Qaeda-centric approach by emphasising 
the local Indonesian factors driving Southeast Asian jihadism.   
 
In this thesis, by contrast, I focus on the regional scale. I find that Southeast Asia, for a time, 
emerged as one of the most important places in the world for the mobilization of global 
jihadist attacks against the West due to a historical and geographical process unique to the 
region. Drawing on the emerging field of assemblage theory, I argue that over time a regional 
jihadist assemblage formed in Southeast Asia—a cross-border constellation of networks, 
groups, and material elements—and that it was the mobilization opportunities presented by 
this assemblage that made Southeast Asia so attractive to global jihadists. Analysing a wealth 
of original interview and documentary material, I trace the gradual development of this 
regional assemblage over time and space, from its origins in the cycles of conflict between 
jihadists and the state in Indonesia in the late 1940s to the crucial role played by Southeast 
Asians in the attacks of 9/11.  
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GLOSSARY		
 
Abu Sayyaf Group Moro nationalist and jihadist group formed in 1991, based in the Sulu 
  Archipelago, Southern Philippines 
al-Qaeda  The Base; transnational jihadist organisation formed by Osama bin 
  Laden in 1988 
amir (emir)    chief or leader of an Islamic group 
assemblage  heterogeneous and temporarily stable formation of various   
  phenomena (actors, institutions, materials) 
bai’at    oath of loyalty  
bid’ah   heretical innovation 
dakwah (da’wah) proselytization, Islamic outreach  
Darul Islam  Abode of Islam; Indonesia-based movement for an Islamic state 
DDII   Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Propagation
  Council) 
fardu ‘ayn  a category of religious duty that must be performed by every Muslim 
fatwa   formal opinion given by an Islamic scholar  
GUPPI   Gabungan Usaha Perbaikan Pendidikan Islam (Islamic Education 
  Advancement League) 
Hadith   Report or account of the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad
  transmitted through a chain of narrators 
hijrah    literally “flight”; the migration of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina. 
  Connotes temporary strategic withdrawal 
i’dad   preparation; term used by jihadists to refer to military training  
imam   leader of Muslim community or congregation 
jahiliyya  “age of ignorance”; Arabic term referring to the pre-Islamic period 
jama’ah  community, congregation  
Jemaah Salafi  a group founded in the late 1990s in Southern Thailand by Muhammad
   Haji Jaeming 
JI   Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Community); a transnational offshoot of
  Darul Islam, founded in Malaysia in 1993 
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kafir   non-believer (in Islam) 
KMM   Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (Malaysian Mujahidin Group); a group 
  formed in 1996 by Malaysian veterans of Afghanistan-Pakistan.  
Kopkamtib   Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Command for the 
  Restoration of Security and Order).  
MILF   Moro Islamic Liberation Front; formed in 1978 in the Southern  
  Philippines 
mujahidin  holy warriors; those who engage in jihad 
New Order  Suharto regime in Indonesia (1966-1998) 
NII   Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia); state proclaimed 
  by Darul Islam in Indonesia on August 7, 1949 
Opsus   Operasi Khusus (Special Operations); Suharto-era Indonesian  
  intelligence organization run by presidential advisor Ali Moertopo 
pesantren   Islamic boarding school 
Salafism  puritanical movement to return to the teachings and example of the 
  early generations of Muslims 
sharia    Islamic law 
ulama    Islamic scholars 
umat   Islamic community encompassing all Muslims 
usroh    literally “family”; the term for a small study circle or organisational
  cell of the Muslim Brotherhood, adopted by Indonesian Muslim 
  activists in the 1980s 
ustad    Islamic teacher    
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Archipelagic Southeast Asia  
Global jihadists found Southeast Asia attractive due to its remoteness and the presence of a regional 
jihadist assemblage. Jemaah Islamiyah, the main organisation in the assemblage, was established in 
the Malacca hinterland, near the strategic and historical centre of the archipelago. (Google Earth & 
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INTRODUCTION	
 
The decade of the 2000s was one in which the long-held characterization of Southeast 
Asian Islam as “moderate” was challenged by the outbreak of religious conflict and acts 
of terrorism against civilians in the name of religion. In Indonesia, communal conflict 
between Muslims and Christians flared in 1999 in Ambon and in 2000 in Poso. In 
Thailand, an insurgency in the Muslim Malay south of the country developed in 2004 
and continues its slow burn. In the Southern Philippines, the largest and longest-running 
separatist insurgency in the region dragged on, but was now overshadowed, from an 
international perspective, by the brutal kidnap-for-ransom schemes of the jihadist Abu 
Sayyaf Group. But the most unanticipated development was the emergence of the 
transnational militant Islamist organization, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). With a network 
spanning Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Australia, and with a 
presence in Pakistan, JI was the first truly transnational terrorist group in the region. Its 
coordinated bombings of night spots in Bali in 2002, claiming 202 lives and injuring 
many others, changed the Southeast Asian security outlook almost overnight. Although 
the US-led “War on Terror” and local counterterrorism operations subsequently 
degraded the capacity of Jemaah Islamiyah to conduct attacks across the region, the 
network from which the group had emerged continued to produce militants capable of 
mass-casualty violence. During this period, Indonesia, the most populous Muslim 
nation in the region, saw a series of dramatic terrorist bombings and often equally 
dramatic police operations to capture the perpetrators. Indicating the regularity of these 
events towards the end of the year, the term “bombing season” (musim bom) entered the 
Indonesian vernacular. 
 
Although many aspects of Islamist militancy in Southeast Asia can be explained by 
local factors particular to individual conflicts, the Bali bombings suggested that the 
region had a new, much broader problem, which, following al-Qaeda’s attacks on the 
US on September 11, 2001, has been described as “global jihadism.” As a distinct 
ideology, jihadism is a violent form of Islamism that prioritizes armed jihad above 
peaceful forms of struggle in order to impose Islamic law and governance. Jihadists 
themselves use cognate terms to refer to their approach, such as the Arabic al-jihadiyya, 
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and the Arabic press regularly makes reference to them as an identifiable movement at 
the extreme fringe of Sunni Islam.1 Although jihadists have historically prioritized 
attacks against local regimes they consider to be “apostate”, global jihadists, a relatively 
recent subset of the movement, promote attacks against the US and its allies, including 
civilians—enemies often characterized as Christian and Jewish crusaders against 
Islam—not just in recognized conflict zones, but anywhere in the world. This variant of 
jihadist ideology, innovated by Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda in the mid- to late 
1990s, is evident in the Jemaah Islamiyah operative Imam Samudra’s “Istimata 
Declaration,” in which he claims responsibility for the 2002 Bali bombings: 
 
Let it be acknowledged that every single drop of Muslim blood, be it from 
any nationality and from any place will be remembered and accounted 
for. Thousands of Muslims have perished, notably in Palestine, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Kashmir, Gudjarat and in various places on the Asian 
continent. Elsewhere in Europe, Muslims were mercilessly persecuted in 
Bosnia and Kosovo. While in Africa, Muslims were brutally killed in the 
Sudan. The heinous crime and international conspiracy of the Christians 
also extends to the Philippines and Indonesia. This has resulted in 
‘Muslim cleansing’ in Moro [Southern Philippines], Poso, Ambon and 
surrounding areas [in Indonesia]. It is clearly evident the Crusade is 
continuing and will not stop…. We are responsible for the incident in 
Legian, Kuta, Bali.  
 
Kuta, 12-10-022 
 
This thesis seeks to answer a number of puzzling questions about the emergence of 
global jihadism in Southeast Asia. Yet, rather than a detailed study of relatively recent 
ideational factors emerging from militant Islamist thinkers in the Middle East, I have 
approached the topic by way of a historically informed analysis of the slower moving 
and less noticed structural processes that changed Southeast Asian jihadism, beginning 
in Indonesia, over several decades. The diffusion of global jihadist ideology from 
abroad to Southeast Asia in the late 1990s is key to explaining events like the Bali 
bombings. During the course of my research, however, I came to the view that such 
diffusion is not the most interesting aspect of the problem. It is no great revelation that 
                                                
1 Cole Bunzel, “Jihadism on Its Own Terms: Understanding a Movement” (Stanford: Hoover Institution 
Press, 2017), 1.    
2 Greg Fealy & Aldo Borgu, “Local Jihad: Radical Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia” (Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute, 2005), 30.  
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around the turn of the century al-Qaeda ideology influenced militant Islamists in 
Southeast Asia, to a greater or lesser extent, to array themselves against Western targets, 
when the same process influenced militants across the world, from Chechnya to 
Kashmir.3  
 
Considering global jihadism as it manifested in Southeast Asia, I was struck by two 
motivating questions. The first question arose from my earlier research on militant 
Islamism in Indonesia: why did a local Indonesian jihadist movement transform into a 
transnational movement, culminating in the rise of Jemaah Islamiyah?4 The second 
question, following from the first, came after discoveries I made during fieldwork in 
Malaysia about al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah operations in the region: why did 
Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda appear to enter into such close collaboration with one 
another, including in al-Qaeda’s most significant operation, the attack against the 
United States on September 11, 2001?  
 
Although the spread of global jihadist ideology is an important part of the story, this 
thesis focuses on these central questions of movement transnationalization and jihadist 
collaboration. It does so through the framework of political geography, an approach that 
developed naturally from my observations in the field of how flexibly Southeast Asian 
jihadists adapt to spatial opportunities and constraints. Indeed, an underlying theme in 
this study is the way that jihadism in Southeast Asia has been structured over time by 
geography: that is, by factors such as territory, topography, borders and scale. Much of 
the narrative of this thesis describes how jihadists responded fluidly and 
opportunistically to the opportunities presented by a multiplicity of diverse geographical 
spaces across the region.  
 
The	geography	of	jihadism	
Since September 11 there has been a growing literature on the geography of terrorism in 
general and jihadism in particular. Initially, in the aftermath of the attacks on New York 
and Washington, a US government-sponsored publication, The Geographical 
                                                
3 George Garner, “Chechnya and Kashmir: The jihadist evolution of nationalism to jihad and beyond,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 25, no. 3 (2013): 419–434.  
4 Quinton Temby, “Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah,” 
Indonesia 89 (April 2010).  
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Dimensions Of Terrorism, sought to explore what professional geographers might 
contribute to solving the problem of terrorism.5 In line with this initiative, some 
geographers worked on ways in which Geographical Information Systems (GIS) might 
be deployed in support of counterterrorism policy.6 In counterpoint to these efforts, 
many in the discipline were wary of becoming entangled with government responses to 
9/11 and, if concerned with terrorism at all, favoured critical geographical perspectives 
on US counterterrorism policies and the so-called “War on Terror”. Consequently, 
within the field of terrorism studies or, more particularly, within the multidisciplinary 
community of specialists working on militant Islamism, geographical approaches have 
remained rather marginal. Nevertheless, there is a growing body of literature that takes 
the spaces and places of post-9/11 terrorism and political violence seriously. 
 
In Terror & Territory, Stuart Elden issues a critique of the War on Terror but also an 
argument against the notion that al-Qaeda represents somehow a “deterritorialized 
network”. He observes that the jihadist concepts of the “near enemy” (local secular 
regimes in the Muslim world) and the “far enemy” (the United States) suggests the 
importance of geography to contemporary jihadism. “The proximity of ‘near’ and ‘far’ 
enemies and the spatial politics of jihad,” he argues, “indicate the geographical and 
territorial aspects of al-Qaeda's operations.”7 Indeed, the militant pan-Islamist vision to 
reclaim lost Muslim lands in order to establish a Caliphate, articulated most powerfully 
by Abdullah Azzam during the insurgency against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 
1980s, is a deeply territorial vision and one that is a direct challenge to the 
contemporary system of sovereign nation-states.  
 
In his chapter on the “Dynamic Metageographies of Terrorism,” Colin Flint argues that 
a geographical analysis can account for the multiple scales at which terrorists operate, 
noting that the latest wave of religiously inspired terrorism has transcended the nation-
state, with the conflict posited as a universal cosmic war between good and evil. Thus, 
                                                
5 Susan L. Cutter, Douglas B. Richardson, and Thomas J. Wilbanks, The Geographical Dimensions of 
Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2003). 
6 For a controversial example, see Richard A. Beck, “Remote sensing and GIS as counterterrorism tools 
in the Afghanistan war: A case study of the Zhawar Kili region,” The Professional Geographer 55, no. 2 
(2003): 170–179.  
7 Stuart Elden, Terror an Territory: The Spatial Extent of Sovereignty (Minnesota: Minesota University 
Press, 2009), 33.  
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“For the perpetrators, the motives are quite clear; they are just outside the paradigmatic 
boundaries of a social science that is still constrained by equating state with society.”8 
Flint is careful to maintain that states still constrain terrorist behavior. Yet it is US-led 
globalization, indeed “US hegemony”, which has led to a shift in scale from the national 
to the global. “Given that the flows of ‘globalization’ are part of the process of 
American hegemony, it is not surprising that religious terrorism utilizes and challenges 
these flows while at the same time negotiating the existing framework of sovereign 
states.”9 
 
The consequence of this is an asymmetry that Flint suggests is more problematic for 
states than for terrorists. He notes that, immediately after September 11, the war on 
terror began as a campaign to find and eliminate Osama bin Laden, the central node of a 
network. But soon the geographic focus of the war shifted to the Taliban regime, 
because it was harboring bin Laden, and then to the sovereign state of Afghanistan 
itself. Thus what began as a deterritorial, network-focused campaign ended in the 
traditional territorial politics of occupying space.10 It might be argued that only with the 
counterterrorism policies of the Obama administration, under which controversial cross-
border operations, often utilizing drone technology, came to the fore, did the US fully 
adapt to the networked reality of its adversaries.  
 
But there is a variety of different ways in which jihadists imagine territorial space. In 
“The Geographical Dimensions of al-Qaeda Rhetoric”, Joseph Hobbs argues that al-
Qaeda is fundamentally territorial in that it seeks control of “sacred space”, that is, the 
holy cities of Mecca and Media. Hobbs highlights how al-Qaeda rhetoric divides the 
world into two perceived geographical spaces: Dar al-Islam, the House of Islam, and 
Dar al-Harb, the House of War, in which jihad must be waged to turn the area over to 
the forces of Islam.11 An appreciation of al-Qaeda’s “perceived space”, he argues, might 
help us to anticipate the location of terrorist attacks.  
                                                
8 Colin Flint, “The Dynamic Metageographies of Terrorism: The Spatial Challenges of Religious 
Terrorism and the ‘War on Terrorism,’” in The Geography of War and Peace, ed. Colin Flint (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 205. 
9 Ibid., 209.  
10 Ibid., 210.  
11 Joseph J. Hobbs, “The Geographical Dimensions of al-Qa’ida Rhetoric,” Geographical Review 95, no. 
3 (2003), 308.  
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In a similar vein, Kilot and Charney contribute to a line of geographical analysis 
demonstrating that, despite terrorism often being seen as having a “random quality,” 
certain terrorist activity does exhibit a distinct spatial pattern.12 A geospatial approach to 
charting terrorist behavior, drawing on both Geographical Information Systems and 
Social Network Analysis, has been championed most prominently by George Hepner 
and Richard Medina.13 Of course, many government defense and security agencies 
around the world specialize in such analysis, often under the rubric of “geospatial 
intelligence”, but, for obvious reasons, their work is classified and not available to the 
general public.    
 
Perhaps the only previous study to apply an explicitly geographical framework to 
jihadism in Southeast Asia is found in the work of Justin V. Hastings, as part of his 
broader research on globalization and clandestine groups in the region. Hastings argues 
that, despite the age of globalization, clandestine groups like Jemaah Islamiyah find that 
when they are forced to operate in a world of hostile states, they are restricted by 
features of the physical landscape and topography. As Hastings puts it: 
 
Whenever it had the political openness to do so, JI behaved much like a 
small, multinational corporation, and benefited from the technologies and 
processes often associated with globalization: cheap plane trips, cell 
phone calls, e-mail, and generally lenient border controls. When increased 
hostility forced it to act more like the clandestine group that it was, those 
technologies and processes proved less helpful, and JI had to fall back on 
any geographic advantages, the presence or lack of which determined the 
success or failure of its attacks.14  
 
Such a nuanced analysis of the mobility of contemporary jihadists, one that qualifies 
notions of globalization and deterritorialization, echoes some of the work by other 
geographers in this space, most notably Elden, mentioned above. Indeed, the 
opportunities and constraints of geography in the global age is a central premise of this 
                                                
12 Nurit Kilot & Igal Charney, “The Geography of Suicide Terrorism in Israel,” GeoJournal 66 (August 
2006), 353–373. 
13 See, for example, their overview of the field in Richard M. Medina & George F. Hepner, The 
Geography of International Terrorism: An Introduction to Spaces and Places of Violent Non-State 
Groups (Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis/CRC Press, 2013).  
14 Justin V. Hastings, No Man’s Land: Globalization, Territory, and Clandestine Groups in Southeast 
Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 107.  
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thesis. What unfolds in the following chapters is how jihadists in the region adapted 
over time to these constraints and opportunities, working with the often-meager 
resources and openings that were available, and how this process of adaptation, traced 
from the post-War 1940s, explains the transformation from local to global jihadism. My 
findings support the view that what might be considered aspects of globalization 
(increased cross-border exchange, faster communications) facilitated the emergence of 
global jihadism in the region. In this study, however, I pose a more significant 
proposition: that there was something unique about Southeast Asia as a region that 
made it central to the rise of global jihadism. 
 
Regional	jihadism	
Although geographical approaches have been marginal in the literature on jihadism in 
Southeast Asia and beyond, the concept of scale has been highly influential. This 
influence is due to the broad ideological divide among jihadists since the rise of al-
Qaeda between those who prioritize attacking what they call the “near enemy” (situated 
at the local, nation-state, scale) and those who, like al-Qaeda, prioritize the “far enemy” 
(situated at the global scale). The discourse on jihad thus arranged itself around the 
concepts of local and global jihad, with these terms coming to reflect more than just 
targeting priorities but also organizational scale and territorial reach.  
 
This binary opposition of scales has had a profound effect on how the post-9/11 wave of 
jihadism in Southeast Asia has been interpreted by scholars and analysts alike, with a 
divide, paralleling the militants, between those researchers who prioritize the local scale 
of analysis and those who prioritize the global scale. Generally speaking, globalists 
argue that the best way to understand the rise of jihadism in Southeast Asia is to 
understand it as the consequence of al-Qaeda projecting its force into the region. 
Proponents of this hierarchical, al-Qaeda-centric approach include some of the most 
high-profile terrorism scholars in the field, such as Rohan Gunaratna, whose 2002 book 
Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, was an early primer for many alarmed 
observers. Gunaratna, however, was subsequently criticized for over-stating and under-
substantiating the extent of al-Qaeda links with, let alone control of, many Islamist 
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groups around the world, including in Southeast Asia.15 Other terrorism scholars, such 
as Zachary Abuza in his Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, limited the scope of their 
work to the regional scale, but also tended to adopt a globalist analysis, even if they 
brought more regional-level empirical detail to the argument. On the other side of the 
debate were analysts who approached Southeast Asian jihadism from a local, often 
country-specific, perspective. This approach drew heavily on the expertise of Indonesia 
scholars, with their detailed knowledge of national and local-level Muslim politics. 
Pioneered by Indonesia-based analysts Sidney Jones and Solahudin, this perspective 
emphasized the importance of local factors in driving jihadist recruitment and 
operations in the region, while serving as a critique of the globalist view that Southeast 
Asian jihadism emerged at the command and control of al-Qaeda. This localist 
framework was taken to its extreme by John Sidel, who argues that even jihadist attacks 
against Western targets in Indonesia are explicable in terms of local-level parliamentary 
politics.16   
 
In this thesis, in contrast to both the globalist and localist approaches, I give primacy to 
a regional scale of analysis. In emphasizing the regional scale, however, I do not mean 
to reject the existence of ideological differences between locally oriented versus 
globally oriented jihadists. Rather, I use regional in a standard geographical sense to 
trace the historical transformation of a local Indonesian jihadist movement into a 
transnational, regionally based movement. I show that only by tracing this process of 
scale shift can we understand the emergence, at the turn of the last century, of Southeast 
Asia as an important space for global jihad.  
 
By regional I mean the supranational geography of Southeast Asia, as it came to be 
exploited by jihadists themselves, stretching from the Philippines in the north to 
Australia in the south, with a particular focus on the Muslim-majority countries at the 
centre of the region—Malaysia and Indonesia. The phenomenon of jihadism, I argue, is 
inevitably structured by the geographic spaces in which it occurs. Thus, a multiplicity of 
different Southeast Asian spaces features in this thesis. These include territorial spaces, 
                                                
15 See, for example, Farish A. Noor, “Demonisation of Innocent Islamic Groups,” New Straits Times, 
October 30, 2002.   
16 John T. Sidel, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia (Singapore: NUS Press, 2007). 
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borderlands, cosmopolitan cities, rural areas, and translocal spaces. One of Jemaah 
Islamiyah’s founding objectives according to its constitution, for instance, was to 
establish its own territory based on an assessment of an area’s geographic and 
demographic qualities.17 Such territory was conceived of as a safe base (qoidah 
aminah), reflecting the Prophet’s term for the city of Madinah, to which he fled after 
leaving Mecca. The safe base would serve not just as a location for JI’s headquarters 
and leadership, but also as the first building block of an Islamic State. JI’s search for a 
safe base would go unfulfilled, but the dense jungle near Poso in Sulawesi has often 
featured in attempts to establish one due to its geographic isolation and impenetrable 
terrain. As senior JI figure Nasir Abbas has observed, some might say that peninsula 
Malaysia itself served as a safe base for the group, and indeed members avoided 
carrying out attacks there, preferring to strike in Indonesia.18 Borderlands, meanwhile, 
located at the margins of states where governance is weaker, presented opportunities to 
establish training facilities, as in the southern Philippines. The Malaysia-Indonesia-
Philippines tri-border area at the edge of the Sulu Sea remains the key convergence 
space of Southeast Asian jihadism in that it connects militants from different countries 
and localities at both the transnational and the regional scale, facilitating multi-scalar 
mobilizations. Due to the localized failure of the Philippines state, the tri-border area is 
also the prime ungoverned space of Southeast Asia, with the Sulu Archipelago hosting 
Abu Sayyaf and MILF militants, as well as illicit weapons markets. The Philippines 
side of the tri-border area, crucially, is the only space in the region in which jihadists 
can claim de facto control of their own territory. 
 
By applying a regional scale of analysis we might fully appreciate the significance of 
the fact that Jemaah Islamiyah, although led mostly by Indonesians, was founded not in 
Indonesia but in Malaysia. Its central command (markaziah) was located, for its 
formative years until the late 1990s, in an outward-looking part of Malaysia I call the 
Malacca hinterland. Accordingly, those jihadists close to the centre, like the senior 
Malaysian JI figure, Wan Min Wan Mat, saw one of the group’s primary objectives as 
                                                
17 Majilis Qiyadah Markaziyah al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyah, “Pedoman Umum Perjuangan al-Jama’ah al-
Islamiyah,” May 30, 1996. (Hereafter, PUPJI). 
18 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiayh: Pengakuan Mantan Anggota JI (Jakarta: Grafindo, 
2005), 137. 
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the establishment of an Archipelagic Islamic State (Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara).19 
Indeed, the last of the ten founding principles of Jemaah Islamiyah, according to its 
constitution, outlines a process of regional expansion, culminating in the establishment 
of a Caliphate.20   
 
Although global jihadists like to propagandize about their global reach, the reality rarely 
matches the rhetoric. Just as geographers have observed that economic globalization 
occurs within a high degree of regionalization, so they have observed the same for 
jihadism. As Karim Bahgat and Richard M. Medina illustrate in their survey of 
geographical perspectives on terrorism, mapping transnational terrorism reveals a 
pattern of “regional country-neighborhoods” or “regional hotspots,” of which Southeast 
Asia is just one.21 It is not a coincidence, then, that some of the best research on 
jihadism has focused on a particular region of conflict, such as the Caucuses, North 
Africa and the Sahel, and the cross-border Afghanistan-Pakistan region.22 The French 
scholar Jean-Pierre Filiu makes an explicit case for prioritizing the cross-border, 
regional aspects of jihadism in the Maghreb and elsewhere.23 Of course, in the case of 
certain groups, like “al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” the regional is embedded in the 
name.  
 
Regional	jihadist	assemblage	
In this thesis my main contribution to knowledge is twofold. First, drawing on original 
primary source material I demonstrate the historical–geographical process by which the 
seeds of local Indonesian jihadism spread to the region, culminating in the emergence of 
Southeast Asia’s first transnational jihadist organization, Jemaah Islamiyah. Second, 
drawing on original interview material and other sources, I explain the unique 
collaboration between Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda jihadists around the time of the 
attacks of September 11, a collaboration which came close to producing a Southeast 
                                                
19 Polisi Republik Indonesia, Berita Acara Pemeriksaan Wan Min bin Wan Mat, August 2, 2004, 10.   
20 PUPJI.   
21 Karim Bahgat & Richard M. Medina, “An Overview of Geographical Perspectives and Approaches in 
Terrorism Research,” Perspectives on Terrorism 7 (February 2013), 49–50.  
22 For an fine example focusing on Afghanistan-Pakistan, see Vahid Brown and Don Rassler, 
Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012 (London: Hurst & Co., 2013).   
23 Jean-Pierre Filiu, “The Local and Global Jihad of al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic Maghrib,” Middle East 
Journal 63, no. 2 (2009): 225.  
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Asian-based “second wave” attack to follow the operation on September 11. This thesis 
substantiates the extent of such collaboration, dramatically revising our understanding 
of the significance of Southeast Asia to the rise of global jihadism. I argue that due to its 
unique political geography, for a time Southeast Asia was the most important 
mobilization space for global jihad outside of Afghanistan-Pakistan.  
 
Furthermore, I present a novel theoretical framework through which to understand the 
rise of global jihadism in Southeast Asia. In doing so, I draw from the emerging 
literature of assemblage theory to coin the term regional jihadist assemblage, which I 
define as a distributed and heterogeneous formation of jihadist actors and materials 
cross-cutting both organizational and territorial boundaries. I adopt the approach of 
what is sometimes called “assemblage thinking”, borrowing analytical tools and 
perspectives from the assemblage literature, often via the discipline of human 
geography, in which assemblage has been used to describe a heterogeneous collection 
of elements (people, institutions, resources) that combine to produce contingent and 
emergent relationships within a certain space, at a certain time.24  
 
The concept of assemblage is compatible, but not interchangeable, with that of a 
network. In contrast to networks, assemblages encompass looser forms of emergent 
connectivity between elements that, taken as a whole, may transcend more than one 
social network. Thus actors in one social network may not be aware that they are 
connected to actors in another social network via a larger assemblage. By regional 
assemblage, in particular, I seek to capture not just one militant network (e.g., 
Indonesia’s Darul Islam network) but a larger formation for which there is otherwise no 
name but which might be described, somewhat awkwardly, as a loose social and 
material network of networks. In further contrast to the notion of a network, by 
assemblage I emphasise more than a networked set of relations that might be graphed 
according to the mathematical relationships between nodes and links. I emphasize 
relations that are very much located in, and shaped by, physical geographical space. 
                                                
24 For discussions on assemblage thinking, see Michele Acuto and Simon Curtis, Reassembling 
International Theory: Assemblage Thinking and International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2014), and Tom Baker and Pauline McGuirk, “Assemblage thinking as methodology: 
commitments and practices for critical policy research,” Territory, Politics, Governance (September 
2016). 
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That is to say, in this case, by the places, territories, landscapes and seascapes of 
Southeast Asia.  
 
It is important to define my use of the term assemblage not least because, in the field of 
human geography, it is used in a number of different ways. You could say there is an 
assemblage of definitions. Nevertheless, my usage here captures a number of common 
elements. As Ben Anderson and Colin McFarlane put it in their recent survey of the 
concept, “there is no single ‘correct’ way to deploy the term.” Yet they observe that  
 
the term is often used to emphasize emergence, multiplicity and indeterminacy, 
and connects to a wider redefinition of the socio-spatial in terms of the 
composition of diverse elements into some form of provisional socio-spatial 
formation. To be more precise, assemblages are composed of heterogeneous 
elements that may be human and non-human, organic and inorganic, technical 
and natural. In broad terms, assemblage is, then, part of a more general 
reconstitution of the social that seeks to blur divisions of social–material, near–
far and structure–agency.25 
 
Assemblage is a concept that can be traced to the philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari, and is a translation from the original French agencement.26 Agencement is a 
reminder that the term comes with a sense that it is not a static entity but an agency. As 
Martin Müller writes, “Assemblages are productive. They produce new territorial 
organizations, new behaviours, new expressions, new actors and new realities.”27 The 
term has a number of specialist uses in fields other than geography, in which it retains 
its sense of a heterogeneous collection of elements. For example, in ecology, where its 
precise usage has also varied, one suggested definition is “a taxonomically related group 
of species that occur together in space and time.”28 Similarly, in archaeology, the term 
generally refers to a collection of artefacts found at the same site at the same time. Here 
the term also retains its spatial and temporal senses, as it does in geography, as well as 
its sense that the nature of the relationship between elements is not pre-defined or fixed. 
                                                
25 Ben Anderson and Colin McFarlane, “Assemblage and Geography,” Area 43 (June 2011): 124. 
26 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian 
Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).  
27 Martin Müller, “Assemblages and Actor-networks: Rethinking Socio-material Power, Politics and 
Space,” Geography Compass 9, no. 1 (2015): 29. 
28 James T. Stroud et al., “Is a Community Still a Community?: Reviewing Definitions of Key Terms in 
Community Ecology,” Ecology and  Evolution 5 (November 2015): 4761.  
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In recent scholarship, the traditional archaeological definition of assemblage has been 
seen as broadly compatible with, as well as giving concrete expression to, the more 
elaborate apparatus of assemblage thinking descended from philosophy and political 
theory.29   
 
The first moves to elaborate a theory of assemblage were made by Manuel De Landa in 
his 2006 work A New Philosophy of Society.30 Applying the concept to a variety of 
entities (organizations, governments, cities) De Landa emphasizes the “relations of 
exteriority” between components in an assemblage, such that “a component part of an 
assemblage may be detached from it and plugged into a different assemblage in which 
its interactions are different.”31 Thus an assemblage has emergent properties in that the 
properties of the whole cannot be reduced to those of its parts. Among other 
applications, De Landa advances an assemblage analysis of social justice movements, 
drawing on the work of the eminent social movement theorist Charles Tilley. One of the 
implications of social movements as assemblages is that the whole is not just more than 
the sum of its parts but may even feature internal conflict between those parts, such as 
we sometimes see in the rivalry between social movement actors.32  
 
In this thesis, I propose assemblage thinking as a productive new way to analyze 
jihadism, with a view to its potential to be applied to other similar militant phenomena 
for which the default concept has typically been that of a “network”. I posit that the 
militant or jihadist assemblage, which is limited spatially and temporally, is a more 
useful unit of analysis for understanding the rise of global jihadism in Southeast Asia 
than “network,” if by “network” we think of a form that is global and stable 
(Gunaratna’s “Global Network of Terror”), but also if by “network” we think of a unit 
of analysis that is “flat”—that is to say, a topological structure of nodes and connections 
removed from its historical and geographical context. This is not to take anything away 
from the field of social network analysis, where the application of network analysis 
                                                
29 Yannis Hamilakis & Andrew Meirion Jones, “Special Section: Archaeology and Assemblage,” 
Cambridge Archaeological Journal 27, no. 1 (2017): 77–84; Chantal Conneller, “Commentary: 
Materializing Assemblages,” Cambridge Archaeological Journal 27, no. 1 (2017): 183–185. 
30 Manuel De Landa, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity. (London: 
Continuum, 2006). 
31 Ibid., 10.  
32 Ibid., 59ff. 
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techniques to so-called “dark” (covert) networks has enriched our understanding of 
jihadism.33 But for the purpose of answering my central questions in this thesis, I argue 
that only at the spatial-temporal scale of the assemblage can we understand the 
historical collaboration between “global” and “local” jihadists in Southeast Asia. 
Finally, an assemblage approach entails thick description of the phenomena under 
examination. Assemblages, as De Landa elaborates, following Deleuze, are found on a 
spatial continuum between the territorialized and the deterritorialized.34 Thus the 
networked relations between actors, locations, targets and weapons, in this analysis, are 
fleshed out by the geographical spaces and topographical landscapes of the region.   
 
I argue that it was the opportunity to exploit the resources of a historically formed 
Southeast Asian jihadist assemblage, characterized by recurrent interactions between 
transnationally mobile jihadists and the infrastructure, landscapes and territories of the 
region, that drew al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah militants into close collaboration in 
the 2000s, causing the geographically peripheral region of Southeast Asia to become 
central to the mobilization of global jihadism, second in importance only to 
Afghanistan-Pakistan. Global jihadist entrepreneurs and organizers mobilized resources 
from across the regional assemblage, defying organizational and territorial boundaries, 
in order to conduct attacks against Western targets. By accessing the regional 
assemblage, jihadists took advantage of geographical differences in the distribution of 
resources across Southeast Asia. By aggregating such resources, jihadists compensated 
for resource scarcity in individual locations. The invisible but very real mobilization 
possibilities of the regional jihadist assemblage explain why Southeast Asia played such 
a key role in the attacks of September 11, and a central role in follow-up operations 
such as the aborted “second wave” attacks. It is the same reason why, when much of the 
world was preoccupied with the spectre of the Y2K computer bug, jihadists from 
Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia and Australia could contemplate collaborating in a strike 
against the Sydney 2000 Olympics.35   
 
                                                
33 Daniel Cunningham, Sean Everton, and Philip Murphy, Understanding Dark Networks: A Strategic 
Framework for the Use of Social Network Analysis (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016).  
34 Manuel De Landa, Assemblage Theory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 19. 
35 Jack Roche, “My Notes for Abu Bakar Ba’asyir,” 2000. 
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Furthermore, a regional jihadist assemblage resolves one nagging tension between the 
globalist and localist perspectives on jihadism in Southeast Asia. My framework accepts 
the localist argument that al-Qaeda’s global jihadism was only ever a fringe ideology 
among jihadists in the region, who largely prioritized local targets, especially those who 
had not ventured much beyond Indonesia. Indeed, this view from Southeast Asia is 
consistent with the view from other parts of the jihadist universe. As Vahid Brown 
argues in his study of primary source materials on al-Qaeda and its relations with “peer 
organizations,”  “on balance, al-Qa’ida’s quest for influence has been in vain, and the 
scope of that influence has been greatly exaggerated.” As Brown summarizes it, in 
effect, al-Qaeda asks local jihadists to abandon their local agendas “in favour of its 
vision of globalized civilizational conflict, while couching such appeals in a framework 
of religious justifications that depart radically from traditional Islamic understandings of 
jihad.”  But, he concludes, although al-Qaeda converted many to its cause, it was 
largely unsuccessful in its appeal, rendering the organization, “a marginal actor in the 
larger drama of international Islamist militancy.”36  
 
According to a regional assemblage approach, however, not only did global jihadists not 
convert the majority of jihadists in Southeast Asia to their cause, they had no need to. 
Global jihadist entrepreneurs and activists were able to advance their agenda by 
“plugging into” an assemblage of actors, weapons, infrastructure, territories, and other 
elements in order to plan or execute attacks in the region and beyond. By mobilizing 
resources from across the assemblage, this collection of heterogeneous elements held 
together by recurrent interactions, global jihadists did not require a monolithic jihadist 
community with a uniform ideology in order to achieve at least some of their aims—to 
sometimes devastating effect. And so, an act such as the 2002 Bali Bombings is 
explicable as a product of the jihadist assemblage in that key figures in the attack, 
including the Sari Club suicide bomber Arnasan, were local followers of Indonesia’s 
Darul Islam movement, to which Arnasan, in point of fact, dedicated his sacrifice.37 
Similarly, certain figures key to the emergence to global jihadism in the region, such as 
the 2002 Bali field commander Imam Samudra and the 9/11 planner Khalid Sheikh 
                                                
36 Vahid Brown, “Classical and Global Jihad: Al-Qa’ida’s Franchising Frustrations,” in Fault Lines in 
Global Jihad, ed. Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman (Oxford: Routledge, 2011), 88–89.  
37 Temby, “Imagining an Islamic State,” 1. 
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Muhammad, were free agents within the assemblage more than formal members of 
Jemaah Islamiyah or al-Qaeda. As we shall see, an assemblage approach that assumes a 
loose heterogeneity of components accounts for the fact that even non-violent actors 
could be coopted into the regional assemblage.  
 
Indeed, there is a much lower threshold for being considered part of an assemblage than 
there is for a network, especially a “terrorist network” as it is conventionally imagined.  
Thus although the terms global jihad and terrorism in Southeast Asia evoke the name 
Jemaah Islamiyah more than any other, to be precise, all major jihadist attacks in 
Southeast Asia can be said to be the work not of Jemaah Islamiyah, but rather of ad hoc 
cells or teams of jihadists drawn from a regional assemblage of which JI was but one 
component part. Global jihadist organizers were successful in mobilizing such teams, 
despite the fact that many jihadists within the assemblage were critical of the attacks or 
might have opposed them in other ways.  
 
I have used the term “Southeast Asia” in this thesis to label the supranational cluster of 
interactions that I am calling a regional assemblage in the knowledge that a region by 
that name is a relatively recent construct, one that came to prominence only after it 
became an important theatre of war for the Allies against the Japanese in World War 
Two.38 Thus I use the term in a loose sense of a relational clustering of activity as 
opposed to a distinct geographical region in any fixed sense. As a relational construct, 
from the late 1980s to the early 2000s, the regional assemblage encompassed spaces not 
conventionally considered Southeast Asia, such as Australia, where several key Jemaah 
Islamiyah operatives were located. It also had components in Pakistan; for example, the 
al-Ghuraba group, a grouping of the sons and younger brothers of senior Jemaah 
Islamiyah figures who were sent for religious training in Karachi. And the assemblage 
featured operatives located mostly outside territorial Southeast Asia. For example, the 
9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheik Muhammad was connected to the assemblage through 
the al-Ghuraba group, but also through historical interpersonal interactions.  
 
                                                
38 Donald K. Emmerson, “Southeast Asia: What’s in a Name?,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 15, 
no. 1 (1984): 7–8.  
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The regional assemblage, however, was not merely relational.39 It was also territorial in 
an indeterminate and amorphous sense, influenced by a historically rooted sense of 
maritime Southeast Asia as a coherent space composed of the islands and littoral zones 
of Southeast Asia, which have long been connected by trade, commerce and the Malay 
language. The notion of such a space is captured in the Indonesian-Malaysian term of 
Javanese and Sanskrit derivation, nusantara—literally, “islands in between”, or, as it is 
usually translated, “archipelago.” A sense of shared maritime geography in this part of 
the world, as Anthony Reid has shown, can be traced as far back as the 13th century, 
prior to European colonization, when the islands, peninsulas and waterways of 
Southeast Asia first became linked by a pattern of intraregional exchange. “Maritime 
intercourse,” Reid concludes, “continued to link the peoples of Southeast Asia more 
tightly to one another than to outside influences down to the seventeenth century”.40 
Consequently, Jennifer L. Gaynor observes, “It has often been said that the seas in 
Southeast Asia, rather than an obstacle or hindrance, are a unifying factor for the 
peoples who live along the region’s rivers and coasts.”41 In their meditations on the 
Indonesian archipelago, Robert Cribb and Michele Ford also note the internally linked 
“natural unity” of archipelagos. “The fact that, once one can get off an island and 
aboard a vessel,” they write, “the sea offers the possibility of travel in almost any 
direction has a distinctly centrifugal effect.”42  
 
The very topography of the region, then—a vast archipelago within a seascape—is one 
that facilitates jihadist mobility and border transgression, just as it has connected the 
peoples of the region for centuries. An evolving regional consciousness among 
Southeast Asian jihadists can be roughly charted according to the deterritorializing and 
                                                
39 In his research on the Tibetan solidarity social movement, Andrew D. Davies argues it is precisely the 
concept of assemblage, with its flexibility to capture characteristics of both fixity and fluidity, that can 
reconcile the tension in geography between spatial notions of a fluid relational network versus a fixed 
territorial area. See Andrew D. Davies, “Assemblage and Social Movements: Tibet Support Groups and 
the Spatialities of Political Organisation,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 37, no. 2 
(2012): 283. 
40 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in an Age of Commerce, 1450-1680. Vol. 1: The Lands Below the Winds 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 6. 
41 Jennifer L. Gaynor, “Maritime Ideologies and Ethnic Anomalies: Sea Space and the Structure of 
Subalternity in the Southeast Asian Littoral,” in Seascapes: Maritime Histories, Littoral Cultures, and 
Transoceanic Exchanges, ed. Jerry H. Bentley et. al. (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007), 54. 
42 Robert Cribb and Michele Ford, “Indonesia as an Archipelago: Managing Islands, Managing the Seas,” 
in Indonesia at the Water’s Edge: Managing an Archipelagic State, ed. Robert Cribb and Michele Ford 
(Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2009), 4.  
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reterritorializing of their political imaginaries over the span of recent decades. Shifts in 
nomenclature indicate a course from Darul Islam’s highly territorialized Indonesian 
Islamic State (negara), to Jemaah Islamiyah’s deterritorialized community (jemaah) 
bound only by Islam, to regional jihadists’ Archipelagic Islamic State (nusantara), 
centred on the Malay world, but fanning out across maritime Southeast Asia. Most 
recently, the vision of an Archipelagic Islamic State has been adopted by Indonesians 
and Malaysians fighting for ISIS in Syria as members of the insurgency’s Malay-
speaking unit, known as Katibah Nusantara.43  
 
Highland areas of mainland Southeast Asia, in Vietnam and Laos for example, seem not 
to feature in the imagination, meanwhile other mainland areas with Muslim populations, 
such as southern Thailand and certain parts of Burma and Cambodia, historically the 
location of independent sultanates, do. Thus the assemblage is shaped not just by 
notions of nusantara but, also, by visions of pan-Islamism which seek to embrace 
disparate Muslim communities. In the tradition of the seminal jihadist ideologue of the 
war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Abdullah Azzam, areas such as these can 
be cast as “Muslim territory” that must be united under Muslim rule.   
 
From the perspective of explaining the emergence of global jihadism in Southeast Asia, 
one of the most striking aspects of the Southeast Asian assemblage is not so much its 
territory, but, rather, the vast spaces surrounding it. In other words, Southeast Asia’s 
isolation at the periphery of the Muslim world. Such distance from the centers of power 
in Islam makes Southeast Asia a unique place for a variety of expressions of Islam, 
militant Islamism being just one of these. As Robert Hefner has shown, Indonesian 
religious scholars have pioneered tolerant and pluralistic readings of the faith, making 
them world leaders in Islamic renewal and reform.44 Yet the theory of distance decay 
raises a problem in explaining the intensity of the global jihadist collaboration in 
Southeast Asia. Distance decay posits that, as a result of the costs involved in bridging 
time and distance, geographical processes lose force with distance from a central point. 
For example, Yasutaka Tominaga uses a Geographical Information Systems approach to 
                                                
43 Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Evolution of ISIS in Indonesia,” IPAC Report no. 13 
(September 2014), 1, 19. 
44 See Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), chap. 5.  
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show that that proximity predicts the diffusion of terrorist suicide attacks, positing that 
terrorists learn from adjacent geographical areas, which have similar conditions, as to 
whether such a tactic is likely to be effective. According to distance decay, the great 
distance between jihadists in Southeast Asia and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan-Pakistan 
should have reduced the probability of Southeast Asians adopting suicide tactics, yet it 
did not. Tominaga hypothesizes, quite validly it seems, that the density of the Jemaah 
Islamiyah-al-Qaeda network, built over a period of decades, might have compensated 
for the tyranny of distance.45 Indeed, a dense, historically informed and geographically 
based network would be another way of describing the regional jihadist assemblage.  
 
As far as its geographical location is concerned, although Southeast Asian Islam is 
peripheral, it is far from marginal. With some 240 million adherents, there are more 
Muslims in Southeast Asia than in the Arab world. Post-9/11 warnings that Southeast 
Asia had emerged as a “second front” in the war on terrorism were alarmist and 
misplaced. But if not a front, then perhaps a frontier, in the sense of a zone at the border 
or periphery. In the literature on borderlands, borders are sometimes seen as having hard 
edges but border zones as possessing what Benedikt Korf and Timothy Raeymaekers 
describe as a “tendency towards transgression”.46 This is especially true for borders of 
states in which the rule of law is weak. Thus, for global jihadists, Southeast Asia was 
appealing precisely because it is peripheral, akin to a border zone, and thus isolated 
from the high-profile conflicts and major-power scrutiny present in the Middle East, 
closer to the centre of the Muslim world.  
 
Finally, this thesis argues that it was the unique geography of Southeast Asia that made 
it a central mobilization space in the rise of global jihadism. Geopolitically peripheral 
but globally networked, cosmopolitan but home to a growing and undetected 
assemblage of regional jihadists, Southeast Asia was an ideal staging ground for large-
scale international terrorism. It was also the last place that the authorities would be 
looking. Even today it might come as a surprise to some to learn that the 9/11 plot was 
                                                
45 Yasutala Tominaga, “There’s No Place Like Home! Examining the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks 
Through Terrorist Group Locations,” Applied Spatial Analysis and Policy (January 2017): 22. 
46 Benedikt Korf and Timothy Raeymaekers, “Introduction,” in Violence at the Margins: States, Conflict, 
and Borderlands, ed. Benedikt Korf and Timothy Raeymaekers (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 
5. 
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conceived not in a dusky cave in Afghanistan but in the rapidly industrializing and 
globalizing cities of Manila and Kuala Lumpur of the mid-1990s. It was in the 
Philippines that Ramzi Yousef, the archetypal global jihadist, first plotted to turn 
hijacked planes into missiles, having established himself in the region in order to avoid 
capture by the US authorities who he believed were searching for him in Pakistan 
following his execution of the first World Trade Center attack in 1993.47 It was during 
this time that global jihadists like Yousef and his uncle, future 9/11 mastermind Khalid 
Sheikh Muhammad, learnt that by working in with Southeast Asian jihadists they could 
acquire an ability to operate across the entire region.  
 
According to assemblage theory, assemblages may be conceptualized at different  
scales. De Landa’s ontology sees the world ordered by assemblages everywhere, nested 
in sets at a multiplicity of scales—for example, the body, the city, the state.48 In this 
thesis, however, I restrict my analysis to the regional scale of Southeast Asia, where we 
otherwise do not have a term to describe the network of networks in which diverse 
jihadist actors, often with different priorities, interact across borders in complex ways 
that call to mind certain familiar tropes, such as the kaleidoscope. Yet Southeast Asian 
jihadists, taken together with their jihadist counterparts elsewhere in the world, can be 
considered part of a larger global assemblage of jihadists that formed around the 
experience of the jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s. In a fundamentally relational world, 
assemblages are connected to other assemblages at equal, higher, or lower scales. At the 
higher scale, Aihwa Ong and Stephen Collier have developed the concept of the global 
assemblage to analyze practices as diverse as stem cell research and international 
governance systems.49 Indeed, global assemblage may be preferable to the term 
commonly used to describe the community that emerged from the Afghanistan 
experience, “Arab Afghans,” a term that utterly fails to include Southeast Asians.  
 
Towards the end of this thesis I address the period, identified with the US-led global 
war on terror, in which the Southeast Asian jihadist assemblage was disrupted by both 
global and local counterterrorism measures. Consideration of this period is important 
                                                
47 FBI interrogation of Abdul Hakim Murad, FD-302, 12-13 April, 1995, 17. 
48 Manuel De Landa, Assemblage Theory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 20-21. 
49 See Aihwa Ong and Stephen J. Collier, eds., Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics As 
Anthropological Problems (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010). 
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for understanding the point that assemblages are not just spatial but temporal. 
Assemblages may go through a process in which elements gather and cohere, then, as 
the assemblage weakens, disperse.50  
 
Since the so-called war on terror, jihadism in Southeast Asia has been marked more 
than ever by fragmentation, the interplay of various actors, groups and organizations 
morphing from year to year, if not from operation to operation. As Kit Collier observed 
in 2006 by way of a critique of al-Qaeda-centric models of Southeast Asian jihadism, 
jihadism in the region is characterized by “a fluid pattern of alignment and realignment 
between autonomous jihadi factions.” “What knits these factions loosely together,” 
writes Collier, “[is] a shared world-view based on personal allegiances forged in exile, 
training camps on the Afghan border, or the conflict zones of Sulawesi, Maluku, and—
looking forward—Mindanao.”51  
 
In the harsher security climate of these years global jihadists found themselves more 
geographically restricted and less regionally mobile as parts of the regional assemblage 
disassembled or went into abeyance. I characterize this more circumscribed 
mobilization space as translocal. In the geographical literature, translocality is a way of 
conceptualizing both the mobility of actors across space and their fixity in local places. 
Katherine Brickell and Ayona Datta thus describe translocality as “simultaneous 
situatedness across different locales” and “‘groundedness’ during movement.”52 For the 
period following the 2002 Bali bombing especially, I use the term translocal jihad to 
characterize the nature of jihadist mobilization in Southeast Asia. At this time jihadists 
were capable of mobilizing cross-border attacks inspired by aspects of global jihadism, 
but, as a result of security pressures restricting their movements, they were no longer 
able to act extensively at the regional scale. 
 
                                                
50 Colin McFarlane, “Translocal Assemblages: Space, Power and Social Movements,” Geoforum 40, no. 
4 (2009): 562. 
51 Christopher Collier, “Terrorism: Evolving Regional Alliances and State Failure in Mindanao,” in 
Southeast Asian Affairs 2006, ed. Daljit Singh and Lorraine C. Salazar (Singapore: ISEAS Publications 
2006), 26.  
52 Katherine Brickell and Ayona Datta, Translocal Geographies: Spaces, Places, Connections (Surrey: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2011), 4. 
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Scope,	limitations	and	structure	of	the	thesis	
This thesis has been shaped by many boundaries. Rather than presenting a 
comprehensive historical account of jihadism in Southeast Asia, I narrow my focus to 
those aspects that explain my central questions regarding jihadist regionalization and 
global jihadist collaboration. This necessarily excludes many avenues of inquiry that are 
key to other questions regarding Southeast Asian jihadism. For example, I do not 
consider the crucial role of kinship networks and networks of jihadist-affiliated religious 
schools and mosques that are so important to questions of recruitment and social 
network endurance. Similarly, I do not look in great detail at individual agency, except 
in one case of charismatic leadership in which I consider the unique contribution of 
Jemaah Islamiyah founder Abdullah Sungkar. Finally, although I accept ideology, 
specifically global jihadist ideology, as a necessary causal factor in jihadism, I treat it as 
an a priori assumption and do not enter into any close analysis of the role of ideation in 
Southeast Asian jihadism.  
 
Other limitations of this thesis arose from the nature of the subject itself. The study of 
jihadism entails severe restrictions on who one can access to interview and what 
documentary material is available. Jihadists, as largely clandestine actors, seek to 
restrict and manipulate access to information about their actions. Due to secrecy and 
compartmentalization within jihadist groups, even the actors themselves are beset by 
problems of imperfect information. Thus the researcher must make do with fragmentary 
and sometimes contradictory sets of empirical data and accept that it is not possible to 
resolve every confusion or gap in the historical record.  
 
Often in this thesis I have used historical records that have emerged from unclear or 
questionable circumstances: court transcripts produced by a politicied legal system, 
interrogation transcripts by authorities implicated in abuse of detainees, literature from 
militants who are propagandists for their cause. My approach to these problems has 
been to analyse the data as forensically as possible, always seeking not just to 
crosscheck claims against multiple sources but also to actively look for disconfimatory 
evidence. Where sources contradicted each other, as they sometimes did, I sought to 
arrive at conclusions based on the preponderance of evidence while indicating the 
possibility of alternative conclusions.  
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The structure of the thesis is set out as follows. Following this introduction, in Chapter 
2 I trace the historical roots of the Southeast Asian jihadist assemblage from its origins 
in Indonesia’s local Darul Islam movement. I observe the territorial fixity of the 
movement in order to chart its subsequent military defeat, deterritorialization and then 
later reterritorialization at the regional scale over the following chapters. In Chapter 3 I 
account for the revival of Darul Islam as a clandestine movement under President 
Suharto’s New Order regime. I demonstrate how jihadists during this period attempted 
to mount attacks against the state but were comprehensively defeated by regime 
repression. This account of effective regime repression continues in Chapter 4, but is 
met with an analysis of the charismatic leadership of Jemaah Islamiyah founder 
Abdullah Sungkar, who deterritorialized Indonesian jihadist thought, aligning it with 
jihadist ideas emerging from the Middle East before it had even left its national 
confines. In Chapter 5, we see how, due to a combination of repression in Indonesia and 
new leadership in the form of Abdullah Sungar, Indonesian jihadism diffused to 
neighboring Malaysia, marking the origins of a process of transnationalization that 
culminated in regional assemblage. Chapter 6 traces the emergence of a regional jihadist 
assemblage from its origins in the transnational space of Malaysia. We then see how 
very early in the history of global jihadism, in the mid-1990s, foreign jihadists tapped 
into the Southeast Asian assemblage. Chapter 7 illustrates how global jihadists 
mobilized the Southeast Asian assemblage, including in the attacks of September 11. 
Chapter 8 analyzes global jihadist mobilization in the decade following 9/11 under the 
rubric of translocal jihad, in the context of the weakening of the regional assemblage. 
Finally, in the conclusion, I summarize my findings, elicit some of their implications, 
and consider future directions for research in the geography of jihadism.  
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2	
ORIGINS	
 
The greatest jihad Southeast Asia has ever seen was the jihad to end Dutch colonial rule 
and establish the newly proclaimed Republic of Indonesia. Indonesia’s independence 
marked, among many other things, the end to more than half a century of often brutal 
Dutch efforts to neutralise the perceived threat of political Islam. Similar to elsewhere 
in the post-colonial world, Indonesia’s new leaders, like Soekarno and Muhammad 
Hatta, were primarily secular-leaning nationalists, whose vision was to create a 
religiously neutral republic. Despite this goal, a large section of the independence 
movement hoped to see Indonesia, with its overwhelming Muslim majority, eventually 
become a state based on Islam. During Indonesia’s war of independence, from 1945-
1949, politicians from Islamic parties agreed to strategically postpone this goal for the 
sake of unity against the Dutch, all the while maintaining an aspiration to convert the 
republic to an Islamic State by constitutional means as soon as the republic was safe.53 
At the same time, at the grassroots level especially, many Muslim independence fighters 
saw their struggle through the prism of jihad. Local Islamic leaders, too, mobilized their 
followers with battle cries against infidel Christian Dutch colonisers.54  
 
At the national level, Masyumi, the Muslim umbrella organisation-cum-political party, 
from its founding in 1945, conceived of the independence struggle as a jihad in the way 
of God (jihad fisabilliah). The East Java branch of Nadhlatul Ulama, the preeminent 
traditionalist Islamic organisation, issued a fatwa on October 22, 1945, on the eve of 
one of the revolution’s decisive moments, the Battle of Surabaya, which declared that 
opposition to Dutch efforts to recolonise Indonesia was a requirement of its members. 
The fatwa declared: 
 
This requirement is a “jihad” that becomes mandatory for every Muslim 
(fardlu 'ain) who is within a radius of 95 Km, (that is, the distance within 
                                                
53 Harun Nasution, “The Islamic State in Indonesia: the rise of the ideology, the movement for its creation 
and the theory of the Masjumi” (Master’s thesis, McGill University, 1965), 77. 
54 For an account of this perspective, see Kevin William Fogg, “The Fate of Muslim Nationalism in 
Independent Indonesia” (PhD diss., Yale University, 2012).  
 
 25 
 
which a Muslim can pray congregational prayers and travelers’ prayers). 
Those who are outside of the defined radius are obligated to help those 
brothers who are within the aforementioned 94 Km radius.55 
 
The Battle of Surabaya itself was an important zone of jihad for many Indonesian 
fighters whose ranks were fortified by an irregular Muslim militia, Hizbullah, on the 
ground and by the cries of Allahu Akbar in the air. Indeed, all over the archipelago, 
religious scholars mobilized support for the independence fight by employing the 
rhetoric of jihad, in which the Dutch were cast as infidel, Christian oppressors. Thus it 
was the Dutch, who had sought to encourage cultural Islam while suppressing political 
Islam in their colony, who unintentionally did the most to revive Islam as a framework 
of political mobilization by refusing to accept that the age of colonization had come to 
an end. Such was the popularity of jihadist rhetoric that on October 17, 1945, the devout 
Muslim but secular nationalist Muhammad Hatta issued a government declaration 
prohibiting the declaring of holy war by any individual.56 The language of jihad, as he 
and other leaders were aware, was not likely to play well before the international 
community whose diplomatic support Indonesia sought in its dispute with the 
Netherlands.  
 
Although the question of the role of Islam in the state, by general consensus, had been 
postponed amid the crisis of war, Harun Nasution observes that as the fight against the 
Dutch dragged on, those in the independence movement who envisioned Indonesia as 
an Islamic State divided into broadly two wings. Nasution refers to the largest section as 
the “constitutional” wing of the movement, which sought to transform Indonesia into an 
Islamic state through a legal process by which the country would write Islamic law into 
a new constitution, which was set to replace the constitution of 1945, the latter having 
been adopted as a provisional document immediately after the declaration of 
independence. But towards the end of the 1940s, a smaller “revolutionary” wing of the 
movement began to lose patience with the secular nationalists and to agitate for an 
Islamic State by any means necessary.57 It is from this historical moment that we can 
trace the origins of Indonesian jihadism that would culminate in the emergence of Darul 
                                                
55 Fogg, “Fate of Muslim Nationalism,” 164. 
56 Ibid., 166.  
57 Nasution, “Islamic State in Indonesia,” 91.  
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Islam, a splinter from the Indonesian revolution that fought to replace the Republic with 
its own “Islamic State of Indonesia.”   
 
Rebellious	child	of	the	revolution58	
Just as the Indonesian revolution rose from the ashes of World War Two, Darul Islam, 
Indonesia’s seminal radical Islamist movement, was forged in the bitter struggle to 
prevent the Dutch from re-colonising the country. First emerging in West Java in the 
late 1940s under the leadership of the Muslim nationalist Sekarmaji Marijan 
Kartosoewirjo, Darul Islam is one of the oldest militant Islamist movements in the 
world. As a movement opposing both Western colonialism and post-colonial secular 
nationalism, it predates by at least a decade the more well-known Islamist movement 
that emerged in Egypt in the mid- to late 1950s out of the Muslim Brotherhood, in 
opposition to the secular nationalist regime of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel 
Nasser.59 That militant movement, which spread to Saudi Arabia and fused with that 
country’s puritanism, becoming identified by the term salafi jihadism, shared with 
Darul Islam a desire to emulate the prophet Muhammad’s flight from oppression, his 
establishment of the first Islamic polity in Madina in 622 AD, and his defense of that 
community through jihad. But Darul Islam, a child of the Indonesian revolution and 
rooted in local traditions, differed from Middle Eastern salafi jihadism in important 
respects. Darul Islam echoed Indonesia’s long tradition of rural millenarianism and thus 
emerged with a strong association with the particular agrarian territories in which it rose 
up as a rebellion, first in West Java, but also in Aceh, Sulawesi and East Kalimantan. 
During the course of the revolution, however, Darul Islam’s sense of territory became 
grafted onto the republic’s. Thus it was not a separatist movement, but one that stood to 
convert the republican territorial state into an Islamic State.   
 
The political journey of its leader, S.M. Kartosoewirjo, from Indonesian nationalist to 
Islamic revolutionary, offers much to explain the origins of the Darul Islam movement. 
By contemporary standards, Kartosoewirjo is an unlikely jihadi icon. The son of a well-
to-do opium trader in Central Java, he was educated in the Dutch school system that 
                                                
58 Parts of this chapter discussing Darul Islam’s revolutionary roots draw on historical research conducted 
for my Honours thesis and published in Quinton Temby, “Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia: From 
Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah,” Indonesia 89 (April 2010). 
59 Jarret M. Brachman, Global Jihadism: theory and practice (London: Routledge, 2008), 24-25. 
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was designated primarily for European or Eurasian children expected to achieve 
respected professional employment as doctors, lawyers or civil servants. In 1923, at the 
age of eighteen, he attended the Netherlands Indies Medical School (NIAS) in Surabaya 
which trained “Javanese doctors” (Dokter Jawa), a native class of physicians considered 
a level beneath their Dutch counterparts. But he never finished medical school, having 
been expelled for political reasons. One account has it that Kartosoewirjo had come 
under the influence of his uncle, Marco Kartodikromo, a communist and member of the 
“red” faction of the Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union). According to an early biography of 
Kartosoewirjo by Indonesian historian Pinardi, Kartosoewirjo had been caught on 
campus with communist literature.60 In 1927 he lived in the city of Surabaya, which had 
emerged as a hotbed of the nationalist movement, and such environs likely played a part 
in his radicalization against the Dutch. Indonesia’s future founding father, Soekarno, 
whom Kartosoewirjo came to know through their mutual mentor, the Muslim nationalist 
H.O.S Tjokroaminoto, had lived in Surabaya from 1916 to 1921; although he may have 
the year wrong, Soekarno recounted in his autobiography with Cindy Adams that “in 
1918 Kartosuwiryo was a dear friend. We worked side by side with Tjokro 
[Tjokroaminoto] for our country.”61  
 
Kartosoewirjo’s formal education, therefore, had exposed him to Dutch language and 
European thought. Conspicuously absent, however, was any training in Arabic language 
or Islamic scripture. It was only after his expulsion from medical school that he began 
to be influenced by Islamic politics under the mentorship of the founder of Sarekat 
Islam, H.O.S Tjokroaminoto, with whom he boarded and whose personal friend he 
became. Founded as a union to protect the economic interests of native Muslim traders 
against the Chinese, Sarekat Islam was an early manifestation of Indonesian 
nationalism. Tjokroaminoto’s success was in fusing socialism and Islam into a unifying 
ideology that would be inherited by his other protégé, Soekarno and under his 
presidency eventually become the state ideology known as NASAKOM, an Indonesian 
contraction of Nationalism, Religion and Communism. If Kartosoewirjo was influenced 
by his mentor’s sympathy for socialism, it did not last long. But he does appear to have 
                                                
60 Pinardi, Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo (Djakarta: Aryaguna, 1964). 
61 Cindy Adams, Soekarno: An autobiography (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 272.  
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inherited another of his mentor’s qualities: Tjokroaminoto had a proclivity to exploit in 
his followers what Van Der Kroef terms “messianic expectations.” Early Indonesian 
nationalist groups like Sarekat Islam, Kroef writes, “could include in their program 
among the Javanese the promise that the Ratu Adil was about to return….”62 The Ratu 
Adil, or Just King, a messianic figure from Javanese cosmology, is prophesised to 
return after a period of hardship, bringing prosperity to the people. Later, 
Kartosoewirjo, like Tjokroaminto before him, was not above letting his followers 
believe that he himself was the messiah, allowing Darul Islam to tap into a rich tradition 
of mobilizing peasants in millenarian revolt.    
 
In 1928 Kartosoewirjo became active in the Sarekat Islam party and a frequent 
contributor to its newspaper, Fadjar Asia. By this time, however, he appears to have 
been following the lead of Hadji Agoes Salim, a rival to Tjokroaminoto, who 
championed the Islamization of Sarekat Islam’s policies, invoked notions of pan-
Islamism, and addressed the debate over the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate, which had 
occurred in 1924 with the founding of modern Turkey. Tellingly, at this time 
Kartosoewirjo was an intemperate commentator in print, oftentimes just as scathing of 
the failings of his fellow revolutionaries as he was of the Dutch.63 Indeed, his polemics 
had brought him to the attention of the Dutch authorities who described him as “anti-
European” and marked by “religious fanaticism”.64 
 
In 1928 Kartosoewirjo joined in taking the Youth Pledge (Sumpah Pemuda) at a historic 
event in the annals of Indonesian nationalism, the second national youth congress, held 
in Batavia (present-day Jakarta). Kartosoewirjo himself addressed the congress, 
arguing, as did others, for Indonesian (Bahasa Indonesia) to become the national 
language. By Tjokroaminoto’s death in 1934 Kartosoewirjo was a leader in his mentor’s 
Indonesian Islamic Union Party (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia). By August 17, 1945, 
when Soekarno and Muhammad Hatta proclaimed Indonesia’s independence, 
Kartosoewirjo was a prominent nationalist in his own right. Despite credentials that 
                                                
62 Justus M. van der Kroef, “Javanese Messianic Expectations: Their Origin and Cultural Context,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 1, no. 4 (June 1, 1959): 311. 
63 Al-Chaidar, Pemikiran politik proklamator negara Islam Indonesia S.M. Kartosoewirjo: fakta dan data 
sejarah Darul Islam (Jakarta: Darul Falah, 1999), 21-22. 
64 Chiara Formichi, Islam and the making of the nation: Kartosuwiryo and political Islam in twentieth-
century Indonesia (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2012), 26.  
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were more revolutionary nationalist than Islamic, he advocated an Islamic state by 
democratic means, in line with the consensus among Muslim nationalists, represented 
by the Masyumi party, of which he became First Secretary. Yet, like his Masyumi 
colleagues, he supported the creation of the Republic. For this reason, perhaps 
counterintuitively, he and Islamists like him in Masyumi did not protest the eleventh 
hour dropping of the Jakarta Charter, a preamble to the 1945 constitution which 
included a line that would have required Muslims to follow Islamic law.65 
 
Such was Kartosoewirjo’s standing in nationalist politics that in 1947 he was offered a 
cabinet position, albeit a junior one, of Second Vice-Minister for Defence in the 
Republican administration of Amir Sjarifuddin. But Masyumi politicians, including 
Kartosoewirjo, rejected offers to join what they considered a “leftist” cabinet. 
Kartosoewirjo, meanwhile, chose to focus on his role within Masyumi, in which he was 
tasked to coordinate the campaign against the Dutch, who in July had occupied the key 
region of West Java in their first “Police Action.”66 There the nationalist resistence 
would be spearheaded by the Masyumi guerrilla units, Hizbullah and Sabilillah.  
 
Kartosoewirjo’s decision to help lead the fight in West Java rather than join the cabinet 
might be seen as a decisive moment along his path of “radicalisation.” But at the time 
he was far from alone in appearing to be driven towards political Islam as a result of 
Dutch aggression. The Islamization of the independence movement was most apparent 
in Masyumi, which called for jihad against the Dutch and the formation, through 
parliamentary procedures, of an Islamic state, dar al-Islam. As Formichi writes, 
“Masyumi’s dedication to establishing an independent Islamic state was constantly 
emphasised in the pages of its bulletin al-Djihad.”67 But even the more moderate 
Nahdlatul Ulama had made a “jihad resolution” at its congress in March 1946 that it 
was an individual religious duty for Muslims living near or in Dutch occupied areas to 
fight the European enemy.68 As Kevin Fogg observes, “For a brief window at the 
beginning of the revolution, the rhetoric of jihad and Islamic struggle seemed 
                                                
65 Nasution notes that the Islamists were also disorganized at the time of the proclamation and so could 
only exert limited influence on the proceedings. Nasution, “Islamic State in Indonesia,” 68.  
66 Formichi, Islam and the making, 97. 
67 Ibid., 87. 
68 Ibid., 86.  
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ubiquitous in Indonesia. Even the left-leaning paper Merdeka in Jakarta employed the 
rhetoric of jihad fi sabilillah.”69  
 
For the time being, however, Kartosoewirjo remained faithful to the cause of Indonesian 
unity against the Dutch, with the democratic establishment of an Islamic state to come 
later. Indeed, his political pragmatism on this point was a matter of public record. His 
Course of Political Islam (Haloean Politik Islam), a speech given in Garut in 1946 and 
published by Masyumi’s regional information office, had made the case for a 
constitutional Islamic State and envisioned a coming “Islamic revolution.” His 
emphasis, however, was very much on nationalism rather than Islamism. Kartosoewirjo 
argued that the Revolusi Nasional should be prioritised over the Revolusi Islam:  
 
We are sure, in all certainty, that there is not a place or sector or area of 
life for any ideology unless our Country is truly 100 per cent 
independent…. Because of this, whether they like it or not, every citizen 
must be obliged to help finish the Revolusi Nasional, fight all the 
occupying efforts of Imperialism wherever they are.70   
 
Once the revolution had been achieved, according to Kartosoewirjo, the gradual process 
of establishing a “Dar-oel-Islam” could be begun, meaning the application of Islamic 
law, starting with the individual. “If that strength is expanded, it’s enough for one 
neighbourhood or one village, thus to build up Dar-oel-Islam in that neighbourhood or 
village.”71 Furthermore, in accordance with official Masyumi policy, he declared the 
national revolution a jihad fi-sabilillah and an individual duty for all Muslims:  
 
Every Muslim must be sure that it is an individual duty that compels and 
pushes them to participate in rejecting colonisation, and to perform jihad 
in the way of God, conventional warfare, or battle, with heart and soul, 
and whatever else is required to be sacrificed on the path that is holy.72 
 
Kartoesoewirjo’s appeal for unity notwithstanding, in the same year—even before the 
Dutch invasion to retake Java in 1947—Islamic militias in West Java clashed with 
                                                
69 Fogg, “Fate of Muslim Nationalism,” 165.  
70 Kartosuwiryo, Haloean Politik Islam (Garut: Dewan Penerangan Masjoemi, 1946), 33. 
71 Ibid., 40.  
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Republican troops. In an early reminder that the militias were not under Republican 
control, in March 1946, after General Nasution was forced to abandon Bandung when it 
was attacked by the British who were tasked with returning the Netherlands Indies from 
Japanese to Dutch control on behalf of the Allies, he remarked that he had abided by the 
British demand to retreat but that he “could not be responsible for extremist 
elements.”73 Nasution was referring to the troops of the Hizbullah, Sabilillah and 
Pesindo militias, which had refused to be incorporated into the Republican army. 
Already, the militias, a precursor to Darul Islam, were being treated by the Republicans 
as a hostile force. Formichi observes that, “On many occasions, retreating TNI soldiers 
refused to hand their weapons over to Masyumi troops, preferring instead to destroy 
them as a precaution, since Islamic militias were being treated as enemies.”74 
 
The Linggadjati Agreement of November 1946, signed by the Netherlands and the 
Republic, further deepened the tensions within the independence movement. 
Linggadjati was a compromise with the Dutch in which Republican-held territories were 
federated under the United States of Indonesia, with the Dutch Queen as head of state. 
In response, Masyumi hardened its rhetoric against what it saw as the accommodationist 
stance of the Republican government, with Masyumi leaders Wahid Hasjim, Soekiman 
and Zainal Arifin writing to members in al-Djihad that they would “bring down the 
Indonesian government with arms.”75  
 
But Masyumi itself was split. According to Sjafruddin Prawiranegara there was, as 
Kevin Fogg relates it, 
 
a basic division in the Masjumi between Western-educated members, who 
generally favored Linggarjati (and other subsequent negotiated 
agreements with the Dutch), and the pesantren (Islamic boarding school) 
educated old guard who believed that physical struggle against the Dutch 
was the way to achieve their goal of an independent state.76  
 
                                                
73 Formichi, Islam and the making, 94.  
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Meanwhile, on the ground in West Java, amid the confusion resulting from the arrival 
of Dutch troops in March 1947, Masyumi, according to Formichi, was manoeuvring to 
establish itself as a local government, implementing a tax in an effort to finance 
weapons purchases. The republican police chief in Tasikmalaya, Said Soerianatanegara, 
warned that Masyumi forces aimed to establish a “New State” (Negara Baru).77 Soon, 
clashes took place between Islamic and Republican troops, sometimes over weapons, 
sometimes over politics. But a number of incidents reveal that there was as much 
opportunism as there was Islamism in Masyumi’s early bid for control of West Java. 
Sabilillah and Hizbullah troops were not above collaborating with the Dutch if it gave a 
tactical advantage over the Republicans. For example, when a Sabilillah commander, 
Endang, was executed at Blubur Limbangan for treason against the Republic, in 
retaliation Endang’s brother, another Sabilillah leader, Wiganda, joined forces with the 
Dutch to capture a Siliwangi commander. This led to Dutch and Sabilillah troops 
conducting a joint kidnapping operation against Republicans, which is said to have led 
to the deaths of all those captured.78 
 
During this fraught period of the revolution, as Formichi observes in her study of 
Kartosoewirjo’s writings, the narrowing and hardening of his use of the concept of jihad 
provides an index to his ideological radicalization.79 Even so, the Republican 
government in Yogyakarta showed some positive signs in response to the calls of 
Kartosoewirjo and Masyumi for holy war. One republican commander, Major Kasman 
Singodimedjo, who was also a member of Masyumi, wrote to the Vice Minister of 
Defence supporting Kartosoewirjo’s call for jihad, stating that the central government 
could not “do anything other than thanking Allah, the One and Only God of the 
Indonesian Republic, because among his sons are some men as brave and courageous as 
Kartosuwiryo.”80 
 
More than any other single event, it was the Renville agreement, signed by the Dutch 
and the Republic on January 17, 1948, that served as the trigger for the establishment of 
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the Islamic State of Indonesia. Renville sought to end the war by uniting Republican 
and Dutch held territory under a federal state, to be followed by a process of self-
determination. Under these terms West Java had to be surrendered to Dutch forces. On 
February 10-11, as Siliwangi troops were preparing for their withdrawal, five hundred 
Masyumi members from West Java convened at a conference in Cisayong in order to 
better coordinate their response to the Dutch. The outcome of the conference was that 
Masyumi party operations in West Java were suspended and its organisation converted 
to a Majelis Oemat Islam (Islamic People’s Council), with Kartosoewirjo to serve as 
imam (religious and political leader). Maysumi militias Sabilillah and Hizboellah were 
merged into an Islamic Army of Indonesia (Tentara Islam Indonesia) with Raden Oni as 
its commander in chief. Formichi, citing Dutch reporting from the time, notes that while 
some of these decisions were not implemented until another conference held in Cirebon 
the following March, “this [Cisayong] meeting had already stated the intention of 
establishing an Islamic state that would implement Islamic laws in the daerah istimewa 
(special region) between Pagerageung, Cikoneng and Mount Sawal. It also declared a 
holy war and transformed the Sabilillah into the Tentara Islam Indonesia.”81  
 
When the Republican Siliwangi Division finally vacated West Java under the terms of 
the Renville agreement, it was portrayed by Republican leaders as a strategic 
withdrawal. But for Kartosoewirjo and many independence fighters based in West Java 
it was a betrayal of the revolution. As a consequence, then, of the Republic’s effective 
abandoning of territory to the Islamic militias, Darul Islam emerged from the outset 
with a strong territorial attachment to its West Java heartland. And from its base of 
West Java it planned to take over the whole country. At the March 1, 1948 meeting the 
West Java former Masyumi leaders ordered the Islamic army to “come to power in a 
tactful way, succeed in taking control of the Republic, and include it[s territory] within 
the Islamic state”.82  
 
Kartosoewirjo proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia on August 7, 1949.  He could 
claim, with some legitimacy, that given the republican surrender of West Java to the 
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Dutch an Islamic State had been established in a vacuum of power. In a statement 
announcing the proclamation, he wrote:  
 
Praise be to God, at a moment that is vacant (vacuum), at a moment when 
there is no authority and no administration responsible ... thus at a critical 
moment ... the Muslim Community of the Indonesian Nation is so bold as 
to take a stand and position that is clear and explicit for the entire world: 
the proclamation of the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia, 7 
August 1949. 
 
Subsequently, the claim that the Islamic State established itself in 1949 in a “vacuum of 
power” would become the foundational myth of the movement. Drawing on this myth, 
Darul Islam rejects being characterised as a rebellion, opportunistically timed just prior 
to when Indonesia formally achieved its independence. Thus territory symbolised 
legitimacy. Meanwhile, successful Republican efforts to win independence through deft 
negotiation on the international stage were characterised by Darul Islam at the time as 
failures which justified the emergence of the Islamic State. Kartosoewirjo would later 
declare that the national struggle for independence of the last four years was over and 
that a holy war (perang suci) would take its place until the Islamic State is established 
“100% de facto and de jure over all of Indonesia.”83  
 
Towards the end of 1948, however, the Dutch had initiated their second military action, 
and, underscoring Kartoesoewirjo’s view of the Republic as weak and compromised, 
Sukarno and Hatta were captured. This development gave Kartosoewirjo the pretext to 
declare the Republic dead and assert his leadership of the revolution. But at the same 
time the Dutch action was considered a violation of Renville and thus justified the 
return of the Siliwangi Division to West Java. On its return, Siliwangi troops were 
surprised to meet armed resistance from Islamic Army troops who were loath to 
surrender control of West Java. Darul Islam refers to ensuing conflict as “triangular 
warfare,” with the Darul Islam troops arrayed against both Dutch and Republican 
forces. The role of defending the territory of a sovereign state, as they now saw it, only 
further galvanised the Muslim insurgents. Himawan Soetanto, a former Siliwangi 
commander who in his youth fought the Darul Islam in West Java, remembers the 
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determination of Darul Islam troops: “Fighting against them was tougher than if you 
compare it to fighting against the Dutch. [That was] because of their ideology—they 
were fighting for an Islamic state in Indonesia.”84 
 
As we can see, then, modern Indonesian jihadism has its origins in the very same 
revolutionary nationalist struggle that gave birth to the Republic. But what would Darul 
Islam’s Islamic State look like? Here, Darul Islam reveals itself as truly a child of the 
revolution. Referring to its constitution (Qanun Azasy), released on 27 August 1948, 
van Dijk observes, “Apart from the difference in terminology and the acknowledgement 
of the syari’ah, or Islamic Law, as the dominant legal system, the Qanun Azasy closely 
resembled the 1945 Constitution, which in fact was taken as its model, with some 
modifications.”85 According to the Qanun Azasy, the Islamic State would in fact be a 
“Republik”, although the document uses an equivalent Islamic term, “Djumhuryah”.  
 
Nevertheless, Formichi argues that we should not discount the importance of the Qanun 
in the annals of 20th century political Islam: 
 
Together with the 1949 criminal code, this text remains one of the very 
few attempts  to formally structure an Islamic state in the Sunni Muslim 
world in the twentieth century, possibly only equalled by Nabhani’s 
Nizam al-Islam, which was published in 1952 and is still today the 
blueprint for creating an Islamic state for the global Hizbut-Tahrir 
movement.86 
 
The Islamic State of Indonesia’s status as historical precedent and its anti-Dutch 
revolutionary pedigree are its twin sources of symbolic power within militant Islamist 
circles until today. Kartosoewirjo, even at the time, saw the importance Darul Islam’s 
revolutionary nationalist image, arguing that the Islamic state, as he put it in December 
1948, was “the continuation of the independence struggle, following on from and in line 
with the 17 August 1945 proclamation.”87 
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Seen from this perspective, the Darul Islam rebellion, far from an outburst of religious 
fundamentalism, was a part of the independence movement that had gone “off-strategy” 
in that, partly as a result of the pressure of Dutch aggression, it rejected the politics of 
diplomacy and compromise waged by the principal leaders of the revolution in favour 
of a more militant approach. In fact, there were legitimate reasons for both militant and 
diplomatic responses to the Dutch and it was common for revolutionaries on either side 
to blame the Dutch for the internecine fighting. Former prime minister Muhammad 
Natsir, for example, blamed the initial emergence of Darul Islam on the Dutch invasion 
of Java in July 1947.88 At the same time, as Formichi has shown, some Republicans 
expressed sympathy with the Darul Islam cause. As clashes between Republican and 
Darul Islam troops took place, Major Ardiwinata, the commander of the TNI’s  3rd 
division, based in West Priangan, sent a letter to Darul Islam troops stating:  
 
I am a member of TNI, but as a Muslim, I am proud of the Islamic spirit 
that burns in your hearts […] The goals of the TNI, to tell the truth, are 
not different from the goals of the DI’s fight, and it is not appropriate that 
we become each other’s enemies […] Don’t we all want a government 
blessed by Allah and endorsed by the people?89   
 
Nowhere was this ambivalence felt more keenly than in the ranks of Masyumi, of which 
Darul Islam was a militant offshoot. Although it is not the case that Masyumi supported 
the Darul Islam rebellion, it is fair to say that many members sympathised with its ends 
while rejecting its means of achieving them. Such sympathy was evident from the 
statements made by the Masyumi leadership, which, although keen to avoid being 
classified along with traitors to the republic, were rather forgiving of Darul Islam. For 
example, Kasman Singodimedjo, former republican military commander and, later, 
chairman of Masyumi, said in 1955: 
 
[The government] should not consider [the Darul Islam] an enemy, rather 
like a father his son. Regardless of how naughty the son, if taught a lesson 
he should not be beaten to death, rather given a lecture, or dealt just one 
blow, drenched in affection. It is similar with a domestic rebellious 
movement.90 
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Millenarian	revolt	
Darul Islam was a rebellion triggered by temporal disagreements within the Indonesian 
independence movement in the 1940s. But one cannot understand how Darul Islam 
mobilized its local supporters and established control of rural territory without 
considering the way it drew on a long tradition of agrarian-based Islamic millenarian 
movements in Java that had periodically risen up against Dutch colonisers. Such 
movements combined Islamic themes of jihad and justice with Javanese mysticism, 
often in combination with charismatic leadership, in order to reject the Dutch imposition 
of taxes or corvée labour. The movements were typically characterised by messianic 
expectations about a coming age of peace and prosperity, drawing on what historian 
Peter Carey has called “the power of prophecy.”91 The most well-known such 
movement was led by Prince Diponegoro, who rode his forces on horseback into the 
Java War of 1825–1830, in which as many as 200,000 Javanese died in fighting against 
Dutch counterinsurgency forces.92 Subsequently, Prince Diponegoro became an icon of 
Indonesian proto-nationalism. Darul Islam’s Kartosoewirjo was the inheritor the 
tradition carried forth by Diponegoro, a tradition seen in the way the rebellion’s support 
was localised in rural areas and its charismatic leadership intellectually “home 
schooled,” largely disconnected from the outside Muslim world.   
 
Following Indonesia’s tradition of millenarian revolt, it is not surprising that Darul 
Islam thought was rooted in Javanese mysticism, and that the movement never 
developed a sophisticated Islamist ideology or political vision to distinguish itself from 
the republic. The diary of a Dutch soldier who fought with Darul Islam, Van Kleef, 
which gives a rare glimpse into the mystical world inhabited by ordinary Darul Islam 
foot soldiers. The diary was discussed by Karl Jackson in his study of the Darul Islam 
rebellion:  
 
Van Kleef, a Dutchman who fought and died for the Dar’ul Islam, left 
behind a diary, and notably absent from this record of life in the rebel 
camps is any mention of the kind of intense political or religious 
socialization of recruits that has come to distinguish successful peasant 
revolutions in the twentieth century. Instead of attempting to instil 
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monolithic orthodoxy among peasant recruits, animist and syncretist 
beliefs and practises were rife among the Dar’ul Islam soldiery, and the 
movement never fostered among the rank and file a clear conception of 
how Indonesian life might be altered in the event that the rebels 
succeeded in superseding the Jakarta government.93  
 
Before it was a jihadist movement that would feed into the regional assemblage of the 
1980s and beyond, Darul Islam was an insurgency. From early on, it sought to control 
territory and embodied a strong sense of being rooted in certain areas. Even before it 
proclaimed itself a state and one that sought to inherit the territory of the republic, Darul 
Islam, sought to exert influence over certain populations localised in particular 
geographical areas. As Sartono Kartodirdjo observes of the history of agrarian rebellion 
that was “endemic” to 19th century Java, “most of the peasant uprisings were local and 
disconnected.”94 According to Kartodirdjo, their causes were also disparate: “Various 
grievances came to a head during such disturbances: economic and social as well as 
religious and political.” However, they often centred on a clash between Western and 
local culture, in which the fabric of traditional society was being undermined.95  
 
Darul Islam was able to leverage Islamic nationalism as a unifying theme and as a way 
to transcend its base in West Java, spreading itself eventually to parts of Aceh, South 
Sulawesi, South Kalimantan and Central Java. But even then, as Van Dijk demonstrates 
in his history of the various Darul Islam rebellions, the insurgency had different causal 
factors in different areas and subsequently followed different trajectories. He 
acknowledges that their separate histories mean that “it is even open to question 
whether in treating them all as part of a single movement we are not distorting 
reality.”96  
 
In his study of the Darul Islam movement in South Sulawesi, Hamdan Juhannis 
observes that the rebellion led there by Kahar Muzakkar, which had been triggered by 
grievances created among local militias who had been excluded from the professional 
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republican army, only entered the Darul Islam fold and pledged loyalty to 
Kartosoewirjo in 1953, some three years into the conflict. Even after this time, 
Muzakkar’s rebellion acted largely autonomously from Darul Islam in the other 
provinces, fashioning its own revolutionary symbols and language that was often at 
variance with those of Kartosoewirjo’s Islamic State in West Java.97 Undoubtedly, the 
isolation of the Darul Islam’s scattered and separated territories, distributed across the 
vast Indonesian archipelago, made it difficult to forge a unified insurgency against the 
Republican state. “Despite the formal joining of the South Sulawesi to the DI 
movement,” Juhannis concludes, “it cannot be said that there was an active coordination 
between the central NII and the South Sulawesi NII due to the difficulties of 
maintaining contact at the time.”98 
 
Considering the various Darul Islam rebellions, Van Dijk puts them in the same 
category as a number of other peasant revolts that have occurred in agrarian societies. 
According to Van Dijk, Darul Islam shared one of the contributing factors to such 
rebellions: a changing pattern of land ownership from one based on traditional kinship 
to a more individualised, commodified one pattern—what he calls a change in the 
“agrarian structure.”99 Without exploring, as Van Dijk does, the merits of this argument 
and how it applies to the different regions of the Darul Islam rebellion, suffice it to 
observe that although Darul Islam as an insurgency sought to establish itself as a state 
coterminous with the republic its activity has always clustered in certain geographical 
areas in which it is seen to have a natural constituency. Although tenuous now, these 
geographical associations continue to this day. None of these areas is more closely 
associated with Darul Islam than the mountainous region of West Java, centring on the 
city of Garut, a region known as the Priangan. The region, as a basis of support for the 
Islamic State from which its territorial control can extend outwards, is so central to 
Darul Islam ideology that it is repeatedly referred to in the group’s founding documents 
as the “state basis” (negara basis) and “Madinah Indonesia,” a reference to the early 
Islamic polity founded by Muhammad in Madinah after his hijrah from Mecca. In his 
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memoirs, in which he considers why West Java was the region in which the Islamic 
State was formed, Darul Islam veteran Kang Edi notes the favourable geography. “The 
city of Garut,” he writes, “is the only city that is surrounded by mountains, among them 
Mount Galunggung, Mount Cikuray, Mount Guntur, Mount Haruman, Mount Halimun 
and so on.” As such, it is fortified against an approach from the nearby regional capital 
of Bandung. “We feel,” he concludes, “that if Garut is under control it would be 
difficult to break [that control] because of the natural features that are very 
conducive.”100    
 
The pattern of Darul Islam, then, was one of a local millenarian revolt, rooted in local 
tradition and local territory. Not only was Darul Islam disconnected internally, it was 
completely disconnected from the major centres of the Muslim World, from which the 
movement might have gained material or intellectual support. As such Chiara Formichi 
concludes, “I see Kartosuwiryo’s radicalization as a development strictly correlated 
with domestic political and social dynamics.”101 There appears to be no trace of an 
influence on his thinking by contemporary Muslim revolutionaries such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood leader Hasan al-Banna or the founder of Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami, Abu 
Ala Maududi. This is not to say that Kartosoewirjo was unaware of Islamic revivalists 
elsewhere in the world, or that they were unaware of Darul Islam. In fact, the scholar 
C.A.O. Nieuwenhuijze recounted that when he met with Muslim Brotherhood leaders in 
Cairo in 1950 he was asked about the Darul Islam. Although he notes that they appear 
to have been well-informed about the movement, he suspects that there may have been 
no actual relations between the two movements, each being so locally rooted.102 
Consequently, Darul Islam, in terms of its ideology and worldview, had much more in 
common with Javanese millenarianism than it did with modernist Islamist movements 
in the Middle East.  
 
Negotiating	with	Darul	Islam	
Lack of Islamist intellectual credentials notwithstanding, the proclamation of a home-
grown Islamic state on the model of Madina had and continues to have great symbolic 
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power among Islamists in Indonesia.  Early on, Muhammad Natsir, tasked by prime 
minister Hatta in August 1949 to attempt peace negotiations with Kartosoewirjo, 
realised that it would be harder to stop the movement once Kartosoewirjo had 
proclaimed a state. In her political biography of Natsir, Audrey Kahin records that 
Natsir’s role was to negotiate on behalf of the republican government with both the 
Dutch puppet state of Pasundan in West Java and the Darul Islam, and specifically to 
get the latter to cease military operations against republican troops. Natsir was expected 
to draw on his personal acquaintance with Kartosoewirjo, and their mutual respect of 
Ahmad Hassan, the Bandung-based puritanical Islamist who had been a mentor to both. 
However, while staying overnight in Bandung, en route to making contact with 
Kartosoewirjo, Natsir got word that Kartosoewirjo was on the verge of proclaiming an 
Islamic state. Seeking to pre-empt any proclamation, Natsir tasked Ahmad Hassan to 
courier a note to Kartosoewirjo asking him not to go ahead with his plan. But, as Natsir 
recalled in an interview with Tempo, translated by Kahin, he was too late: 
 
This letter reached the hands of Kartosuwirjo three days later, just when 
DI/TII was proclaimed. Yes it was late. This is called fate [takdir Tuhan]. 
Why was it late? Kartosuwirjo was indeed well guarded. No one was 
allowed to meet him. The guards only recognized Tuan Hassan after he 
introduced himself, “I am Hassan, Hassan of Bandung,” after waiting 
three days. [Even] if it had not been late it would not have been easy to 
convince Kartosuwirjo. For him it was hard to eat his words [menjilat 
ludah kembali]. That’s difficult. I met with his organization and many of 
its leaders in Bandung. They said that if Kartosuwirjo accepted, they 
would submit. But Kartosuwirjo didn’t give the order to submit.103  
 
During the following years several attempts were made by the Republic to negotiate 
with Darul Islam, but all of these were rejected by Kartsoewirjo out of hand. The self-
styled Imam made it a condition that any negotiation would have to be preceded by the 
Republic acknowledging his Islamic state. From the 1950s the government’s policy 
oscillated between a military solution and compromise or amnesty, with the secularists 
favouring a military solution and the Islamists favouring more compromise. As 
Formichi argues, notwithstanding Darul Islam’s image as one of the greatest threats to 
the Indonesian state, there was in the early years many failed chances for a peaceful 
resolution to the conflict: 
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Archival sources clearly show that the scattered occurrences of 
cooperation that had dotted 1948 continued through 1949, and that, until 
the mid-1950s, military commanders and political leaders (mostly, but not 
exclusively, from Masyumi) suggested that the Republic should put its 
efforts into finding a political solution to the Darul Islam problem.104 
 
Between 1948 and 1949 Mohammad Hatta sent two letters to Kartosoewirjo seeking a 
negotiated settlement and a unified strategy against the Dutch. He also offered 
Kartosoewirjo a Republican medal of honour. Apparently both were ignored.105 In late 
1949, at the initiative of Masyumi, the Republik Indonesia Serikat formed the 
Commission for the Solution of the Darul Islam Problem (Panitia Penyelesaian Darul 
Islam), but by the middle of the following year the commission had faded into 
irrelevancy having achieved very little.106 In mid-1950 a mission to negotiate with 
Kartosoewirjo was led by the Masyumi leader Wali Alfatah on behalf of the Minister of 
the Interior. However, his efforts were undercut by a clash between Republican and 
Darul Islam troops, the result of which was that Alfatah was held captive by the latter, 
only to be found weeks later in a poor state and suffering from malaria. Alfatah later 
gave a press conference stating that the only way to end the Darul Islam problem is with 
military force even if it resulted in many casualties.107  
 
The impression that the start of the 1950s was the biggest missed opportunity to put an 
early end to Darul Islam is enhanced by a pair of ingratiating nota rahasia or secret 
letters addressed by Kartosoewirjo to Soekarno and copied to prime minister Natsir. 
Boland speculated that Kartosoewirjo may have hoped to receive a sympathetic hearing 
during the government of Natsir, a fellow Islamist. Indeed, aside from a rambling 
attempt to make common cause with the Republic against the menace of Communism, 
in which he describes the Islamic State and the Republic as “friends on the same path,” 
the letter goes on further to advise Soekarno that “there is no other ideology besides 
                                                
104 Formichi, Islam and the making, 146.  
105 Ibid., 149.  
106 Ibid., 150.  
107 Holk H. Dengel, Darul Islam dan Kartosuwirjo: Langkah Perwujudan Angan-Angan yang Gagal 
(Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1995), 157.  
 43 
 
‘Islamism’ that is capable and has the power to arrest the flow of Communism and 
annihilate it.”108 Meanwhile, Kartosoewirjo argued, Nationalism was not an ideology: 
 
Nationalism, which has become the foundation, the basis and the 
orientation of the Negara Republik Indonesia, is not an ideology per se 
like Islamism or Communism. Rather, it represents only a certain level of 
‘love and affection’ of a certain people for themselves and the land of 
their birth.109  
 
Kartosoewirjo continued, “Only Islamism, as an ideology and world system [stelsel 
dunia] is capable of overcoming problems that may occur as a result of the arrival of the 
Red peril.”110 He concludes that the most efficacious medicine for Indonesia, with all its 
myriad problems, is “If Islamism is made the founding principle of the government and 
state of Indonesia!” Finally, he invites the Republic of Indonesia to change its name to 
“Negara Islam Indonesia”. 
 
The second nota rahasia made many of the same points as the first, and attempted to 
cast the NII as a “friend” of the Republic. It did, however, make a firmer stand on the 
issue of the Republic accepting the existence of the NII as a “fait accompli” and the 
“sacred right of the Muslim Community [Ummat]  of the Indonesian Nation.”111 There 
was also an implied threat that if the Republic would not acknowledge the proclamation 
of the Islamic State of 1949, then, “We cannot take responsibility for the fate of the 
State and the Nation of Indonesia before the court of history and before the court of 
Allah.”112 Taken together, the secret letters betray an isolated and deluded 
Kartosoewirjo, who was obsessed with the fate of Indonesia in the Cold War but, 
having cut himself off from Indonesian political discourse, had very little of substance 
to contribute to the issue. Nevertheless, the letters also demonstrate a willingness to 
negotiate on Kartosoewirjo’s part, which, with the hindsight of the following decade of 
violence, was perhaps not exploited as much as it should have been. 
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Similarly, other efforts at a peaceful settlement were undermined by a combination of 
Darul Islam intransigence and a lack of coherence on the Republican side between those 
who favoured negotiation and those who favoured force. In November 1950 Prime 
Minister Mohammad Natsir announced an amnesty for all irregular troops that had not 
yet joined the republic and were still fighting republican forces. In what B.J. Boland 
describes as a “moving speech”, Natsir broadcast a statement to 
 
“the freedom fighters who have not yet returned to normal life” because 
they “do not yet feel satisfied with the results of the struggle for freedom, 
or are still standing aloof as a result of mutual conflicts during the past 
years of the fight for freedom.” He called on them to abandon their 
guerrilla methods and to devote themselves to the development to the new 
Indonesian state.113  
 
This move did have partial success in that it eventually led to the surrender of Amir 
Fatah, the DI Central Java leader, via the good offices of PSII leader and head of the 
office of religion for Central Java, Kyai Muslich. Natsir also sent Muslich, with the 
same aims, to Kartosoewirjo, who he had known well through PSII. But again, the 
emissary was unsuccessful in making contact, this time Kartosoewirjo rejecting Muslich 
as too lowly ranked to meet someone of his stature, the Imam of the Islamic State and 
that he would only negotiate if the government first acknowledged the Islamic State. 
Muslich, however, was given two letters to take back to Natsir, one of them a personal 
communication in which Kartosoewirjo advised him that as prime minister he had the 
power to add the letter “I” to the end of RI, making it “Republik Islam Indonesia.” If 
Natsir obliged, Kartosoewirjo assured him that he was have his full support.114 As 
Dengel notes, Natsir’s amnesty was a failure in that very few of the total number of 
troops surrendered and it was undermined at the time by a West Java TNI declaration at 
the same time which listed Darul Islam among sixteen banned organisations.115  
 
Another failed attempt at brokering peace was initiated by the GPII and Masyumi 
politican Affandi Ridhwan, who believed the conflict could be solved by integrating the 
guerrillas into the Republic. But when his proposals received no official reaction he 
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decided to negotiate directly with Darul Islam, with the agreement of Deputy Prime 
Minister Prawoto Mangkusasmito. He succeeded in meeting with Kartosoewirjo’s close 
associate and NII minister for foreign and internal affairs, Sanusi Partawidjaja in Darul 
Islam controlled territory. But once in discussion, Partawidjaja repeated the Darul Islam 
precondition that the Republik first acknowledge the Islamic State of Indonesia before 
negotiations. Affandi Ridwan responded that this was impossible and that if Darul Islam 
was desperate for acknowledgement, why do they want it from the Republik, which 
they do not even consider to be an independent state; they would be better off getting 
acknowledgement from the US or Saudi Arabia, he suggested helpfully.116 Eventually 
Partawidjaja dropped the precondition, but, in another example of the incoherence of 
the Republican strategy on Darul Islam, Affandi was ignored by the deputy prime 
minister for several weeks, only to then be arrested and subsequently jailed for aiding 
the enemy.117  
 
At the end of 1949 the Dutch and Indonesians signed the Hague agreement which 
formally transferred sovereignty from the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the 
independent Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI). As an independent 
state, Indonesia was entitled to reform its system of administration, and immediately 
begun to dissolve the Dutch-sponsored federal states in a move to turn the “united 
states” into a unitary Republic of Indonesia. This so-called unitary movement was 
greatly spurred by an attempted coup d’etat in Bandung, and later, Jakarta, in early 1950 
by forces led by Captain Raymond Westerling, commanding de-mobilised Royal 
Netherlands Indies troops along with Dutch troops.118 The unitarians enjoyed rapid 
success and on August 17, 1950 the unitary state of the Indonesian Republic was re-
established, marking the end to the Indonesian war of independence.  
 
Darul Islam, however, did not see developments the same way. It railed against the 
unitary state as a “modern form of colonialism” and as being antithetical to the ideals of 
the revolution.119 But under almost any interpretation the Indonesian Republic was the 
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culmination of the revolution, and if previous federal entities could have been dismissed 
by Darul Islam as the continuation of Dutch colonialism in another form, this was no 
longer possible under a republic now recognised as the newest member of the United 
Nations. Formichi argues that the proclamation of the unitary state in 1950 was a 
particularly devastating blow to the Negara Islam Indonesia because Darul Islam had 
still hoped to have the legitimacy of the NII recognised within the federal system, at 
least in West Java.120  
 
There is some evidence that rather than a rogue operator, Westerling, the Dutch special 
forces commander notorious for his brutal suppression of Republicans in South 
Sulawesi, may have served in a covert capacity for the supreme commander of Dutch 
forces in the Netherlands Indies, Simon H. Spoor, who, according to archival evidence, 
ran his own covert operations, unbeknownst to the Netherlands government.121 In 
Westerling’s autobiography—a cartoonish and self-regarding account of how he, among 
other heroic exploits, brought peace to West Java at the request of the local 
population—he tells of how he first went to Spoor in Jakarta with the proposal of 
forming a self-defense force to defend the independence of West Java in the Federal 
Union. According to Westerling’s account, Spoor gave him tacit approval, saying, “I 
think your present idea is excellent. Of course, I can’t do anything officially. My hands 
are tied. But if you choose to go ahead on your own responsibility….”122 
 
One particularly interesting aspect of Westerling’s involvement as it relates to Darul 
Islam is that not only did the Dutch operative co-opt a range of armed groups active in 
West Java in 1949 into his force, including what he describes as “lost battalions” of the 
Darul Islam movement,123 he appears to have copied the Kartosoewirjo playbook by, 
first, using the guise of establishing local “self-defence” as a means to a more political 
end,124 and second, in realizing the legitimacy that comes from being seen by the local 
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population from which he recruited as a mystically ordained Just Prince (Ratu Adil), 
who it is said in the Joyoboyo prophecies since at least the early 19th century will one 
day return to bring peace and prosperity to the land. Thus, although he candidly states 
that in his recruitment of former Darul Islam troops he was “putting terrorists to work as 
a defence against terrorism,”125 the latter terrorists being the Republican forces, his 
force would adopt the name Armed Forces of the Just Prince (Angkatan Perang Ratu 
Adil). Just like Kartosoewirjo, Westerling is careful to give the impression that such 
mystical significance was bestowed upon him by his followers, yet he admits that, “This 
belief in the fore-ordained success of my mission was too precious an asset to be 
ignored,”126—an admission that might as well have been made by Kartosoewirjo. 
 
Defeating	Darul	Islam	
One of the priorities of Indonesia’s first post-revolution government, led by the 
Masyumi politican, Prime Minister Mohammad Natsir, was to consolidate unification 
by restoring order in rebellion-torn areas and re-absorbing guerrillas into the TNI or 
civilian society. If there was ever a window of opportunity to resolve the Darul Islam 
conflict peacefully it was now, with Natsir’s authority as leader of Masyumi, an Islamist 
party with shared end goals with Darul Islam and, at the time, the largest representation 
in the parliament. Indeed, as Herb Feith evaluated it, Natsir’s government was able to 
achieve considerable success in restoring order. “Thanks in part to good cabinet-army 
relations a number of rebel-bandit groups of old guerrillas were driven out of their 
jungle fastnesses in Sumatra and Java,” he wrote.127 He had also reached an agreement, 
albeit short-lived, with future Darul Islam leader in South Sulawesi, Kahar Muzakar, to 
absorb his troops into the TNI, bringing peace to South Sulawesi. And the Christian 
rebellion under the banner of the “Republic of the South Moluccas” had been quashed.  
 
In 1951 there were other successes. In one of the biggest battle successes of the TNI 
against Darul Islam troops, NII defense minister Oni was killed and justice minister and 
Kartosoewirjo confidante Gozali Tusi was captured. In a separate event, the leader of 
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the Darul Islam in Central Java, the glamorous Amir Fatah surrendered in West Java. 
But the opportunity to nip the movement in the bud had been lost. Darul Islam would 
remain the greatest threat to the Indonesian Republic in its first decade of existence. 
Darul Islam historian Holk Dengel, who was living in Indonesia at the time, observed 
that at nights Darul Islam controlled the roads of West Java and that even on the 
Bandung-Jakarta highway, vehicles had better be off the road by four in the afternoon 
and have entered a city if they wanted to avoid the rebels.128 In the 1950s too Darul 
Islam increased its practice of attacking villages in Republican held territory that were 
perceived as having sided with the Republic. Darul Islam’s hardened attitude towards 
“enemies” was evidenced by its approach to Kiai Jusuf Taudjiri, a former spiritual 
mentor to Kartosoewirjo and someone who had been present at early Darul Islam 
ceremonies. By the late 1940s, however, Kartosoewirjo saw Taudjiri as a traitor after 
the latter had left the Islamic state and rejected the imposition on a NII tax (infaq) on 
people in his village. Consequently, Taudjiri’s pesantren, Darussalam in Cipari, West 
Java, was said to have been attacked 46 times from the late 1940s to late 1950s.129 The 
conflict with Taudjiri peaked in 17 April 1952 when hundreds of Darul Islam troops 
attacked the school, and students forced to defend themselves with only a few old 
firearms.130  
  
If the start of the 1950s was that great opportunity to bring a negotiated end to the Darul 
Islam rebellion, 1953 marked the beginning of a tougher government response to Darul 
Islam. With the formation of the Ali Sastroamidjojo government, for the first time 
Masyumi was left out of the cabinet, marking a decline in the political influence of the 
party most strongly advocating for a peaceful settlement. First Deputy Prime Minister 
Wongsonegoro called for a “final operation” (komando terakhir) against the rebels.131  
 
The period was also marked by deadlock in the constitutional assembly which was 
tasked to write Indonesia’s new democratic constitution but had become divided over 
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the issue of whether the state should be based on Islam or not. The issue had already 
polarised Indonesia’s political elite, with Soekarno drawing criticism from Masyumi 
and other Muslim groups after his 1953 speech in Amuntai which argued strongly 
against an Islamic State. Meanwhile, the Darul Islam insurgency was used by opponents 
of an Islamic State to discredit the Masyumi position as allied with extremism.132 In the 
run up to the 1955 elections to fill the constituent assembly, one Masyumi politician, Isa 
Anshary, said provocatively: "In Indonesia at the present time," he said, "there is a cold 
war between Islam on the one hand and on the other those who call themselves Islamic 
and aren't. The central question is whether the state is to be based on God's law or 
not."133 
 
But the 1955 elections were a disappointment for the Muslim nationalists arguing for an 
Islamic state. They found their vote split between Masyumi, and a newly separate 
Nahdlatul Ulama. Without the ability to form a pro-Islamic state coalition in the 
assembly, Masyumi found their agenda was blocked. Later, the deadlock in the 
assembly provided a pretext for Soekarno to abolish Indonesia’s experiment with 
constitutional democracy in 1959 and return to the 1945 constitution, consolidating his 
own power as president.  
 
1955 was also the year that a regional rebellion in Aceh, led by Daud Beureu’eh, 
merged with Darul Islam under the banner of the Islamic State of Indonesia, marking 
perhaps the rebellion’s most politically significant geographical expansion. As a revered 
independence fighter, Beureu’eh brought with him revolutionary credentials and the 
popular support his movement enjoyed among the Acehnese people.  
 
Despite the support of Beureu’eh, however, in the 1950s Darul Islam’s goal of an 
Islamic state looking increasing distant and the rebellion became increasingly ruthless, 
especially towards civilians. According to Boland, Darul Islam “formed one of the 
greatest worries for the government of the Republic of Indonesia.”134 The rebellion 
encompassed not just mountainous West Java but also parts of Central Java. As 
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mentioned above, rebellions under the rubric of Darul Islam, characterized by local 
concerns, had emerged in South Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and Aceh. The local factors 
causing the rebellions varied, but according to Van Dijk the rebellions shared two 
proximate causes. First, grievance at the ascendancy of the Republican army over 
irregular troops and the attendant disputes over which elements of the irregular forces 
would be demobilized and which would be incorporated into the regular army. Second, 
disaffection with the central government’s increasing control over the provinces.135 In 
Java, the rebellion peaked in the mid- to late 1950s, a time that saw Darul Islam burning 
villages which it deemed had betrayed Islam. According to Holk H. Dengel, who cites 
figures of unknown provenance, the conflict caused considerable destruction and death 
in West Java between 1953 and 1958, with 11,521 people killed, 362,009 houses 
burned, and 1,081,713 people internally displaced.136  
 
It was the emergence the regional rebellions in the latter half of the 1950s, along with 
the decline of constitutional democracy in Indonesia, that hardened Soekarno’s attitude 
toward dissidents and ushered a return of the influence of the military in handling 
rebellions. As Formichi points out, the new climate of repression set the scene for the 
final operations to defeat Darul Islam once and for all.137 It did not help that the so-
called Permesta/PRRI rebellion in West Sumatra had links to Masyumi, which would 
lead Soekarno to ban the party and thus supress a large section of the Muslim 
constituency. Also contributing to a late Soekarno-era climate of repression was an 
assassination attempt on Soekarno in Cikini, Jakarta on 30 November 1957. At an 
official government function snipers failed to hit Soekarno but shot bystanders near 
him; the close call, the closest Soekarno came to being killed in his political career, may 
account for the merciless way he dealt with his old colleague Kartosoewirjo when the 
latter was finally captured in 1962.     
 
The culmination of a hardened military and government approach to resolving Darul 
Islam by force was Operation Annihilate (Gerakan Operasi Penumpasan) in 1959, set 
against the backdrop of Soekarno’s abolition of parliamentary democracy, the return to 
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the 1945 constitution and the beginning of the authoritarian era of “Guided 
Democracy”. The Siliwangi division, which until then had employed a conventional 
“passive-defensive” approach to military strategy, with stationary deployments of 
troops, switched to an “active-offensive” strategy deploying mobile units more suited to 
counter-insurgency.138 Central to the success of the final military push against Darul 
Islam was the employment, in 1960, of the “fence of legs” (pagar betis) tactic in which 
civilians were conscripted to march in rows uphill from the base of Darul Islam 
mountain hideouts, flushing out the rebels by forcing them to choose between capture or 
firing on civilians.  
 
Already devastated by the “fence of legs” operations, Darul Islam was decapitated on 
June 4, 1962 when Kartosoewirjo, along with several of his officers, was captured in a 
valley in a mountainous area of the Bandung regency. The operation was led by a 
company from the Siliwangi Division, who were able to sneak up on a group of forty-
six Darul Islam soldiers at two bivouacs spotted in the valley, one of which sheltered 
the sick and malnourished Imam. A heavy downpour at the time masked the sound of 
the approach troops.139 Captain Ara, the soldier who claimed to have first discovered 
Kartosoewirjo, Ara Suhara, gave an account of the capture of Kartosoewirjo to a local 
journalist in 1979. Captain Ara recalled that he was able to approach Kartosoewirjo’s 
shelter during the firefight that had broken out between the two sides. After briefly 
facing off with two soldiers guarding the entrance to the hut—one was Kartosoewirjo’s 
son Dodo Mohammad Darda and the other his senior lieutenant Aceng Kurnia—Ara 
entered to find only an “old grandfather” wrapped up in a striped blanket.140 
 
The way in which Ara, a Republican army captain, recalled the encounter is a testament 
to the aura of mysticism surrounding Kartosoewirjo. According to Ara, after answering 
to his name, Kartosoewirjo’s first words were, “Three days ago I knew you would be 
coming here, son.” They shook hands and then embraced. Then, Kartosoewirjo asked 
Ara to turn around. With his back to Kartosoewirjo, Ara’s collar was unbuttoned and he 
felt Kartosoewirjo’s cold breath on his neck as the Imam said a mantra and blessed his 
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nape with saliva. Then, in a demonstration of the Imam’s ability to see into the future, 
he offered a pen as a memento to be given to Ara’s son who would be born two days’ 
later. “Give this to your child, the son who will be born,” he said. Before informing his 
commanding officer, Suhanda, that he had found Kartosoewirjo, Captain Ara says he 
noticed the many magical objects hanging in Katosuwiryo’s shelter. It appears he took 
custody of many of them, including a yellow keris (ceremonial dagger) with a pure gold 
scabbard and a hilt set with sparkling diamonds, a black keris, several magic irons (besi 
kuning) and a “Gatutkaca war vest,” covered in Arabic script, Gatutkaca being the 
warlike character in the Mahabharata who possessed a magical vest which enabled him 
to fly. Captain Ara was so moved by his encounter with Kartosoewirjo that he named 
his son “Sekar Ibrahim,” Sekar taken from Kartosoewirjo’s first name and Ibrahim after 
Ibrahim Adjie, his Siliwangi Divison commander who had led the successful military 
defeat of Darul Islam.141  
 
On August 1, 1962, thirty-two of the most senior captured Darul Islam leaders signed a 
Joint Declaration (Ikrar Bersama) in which, in return for amnesty, they renounced the 
movement for an Islamic State and declared their allegiance to the Republic.142 This 
was followed, on August 7, by Kartosoewirjo’s order to his followers to surrender. 
Dictated to his son, Dodo Mohammad Darda, the order read: 
 
To all members of the APNII [Armed Forces of the Islamic State of 
Indonesia] and Jama’atul Mujahidin, wherever they are located, to cease 
fire and end their enmity with TNI/APRI [Armed Forces of the Republic 
of Indonesia] and report themselves to the nearest TNI post, bringing all 
their equipment and documents.143  
 
Later that month Kartosoewirjo was convicted in a special military court in Jakarta of 
subversion and ordering the 1957 assassination attempt on Soekarno. He was sentenced 
to death by firing squad. On August 20 he requested a pardon from Soekarno, but this 
was rejected. 
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On September 12, 1962, Kartosoewirjo, after being granted a final meal with his family 
and time to perform a prayer of forgiveness, drawn and dishevelled he was handcuffed 
and put on a boat by military police. From the boat he was transferred to a military 
landing craft, where he was given a final medical appraisal by a military doctor. He was 
then dressed in a white cloth and more white cloth was tied around his face as a 
blindfold. The landing craft took him to the small uninhabited island of Ubi in the 
Thousand Islands group off the coast of Jakarta. There he was tied to a post and 
executed by a military firing squad. His corpse was ceremonially bathed in the ocean 
and wrapped in a shroud, according to Islamic ritual. A final prayer was made before he 
was buried on the island and the execution post and other implements were burned.144 
Until recently, for fifty years, Kartosoewirjo’s final resting place was unknown. 
Unofficial Darul Islam historian Al Chaidar argues that it was a deliberate strategy of 
Soekarno not to allow Kartosoewirjo to be buried near his home in West Java, in 
accordance with his last wishes. This was because, he writes, “Soekarno feared the 
spiritual power that might emanate from the figure of S.M. Kartosoewirjo in the 
future.”145      
 
Conclusion	
The origins of jihadism in Indonesia can be traced to the radicalising experience of the 
fight for independence against the Dutch: Indonesian jihadists were originally 
revolutionary nationalists. Furthermore, the way in which jihad was expressed by Darul 
Islam drew on the mystical traditions of local Islamic millenarian movements that had 
rebelled against the Dutch in previous eras. For both these reasons, Indonesia’s early 
jihadists were highly territorialised actors, grounded first in the local geography of 
agrarian millenarianism, and second in the vision of a unified Islamic state with borders 
inherited from the Indonesian republic. Yet despite seeking legitimacy from two of 
Indonesia’s most powerful indigenous traditions—revolutionary nationalism and 
Islamic millenarianism—for most Indonesians, Darul Islam never transcended its image 
as an assortment of rebellions at the fringes of Indonesia’s independence movement.  
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These disparate rebellions never overcame the logistical challenge of coordinating their 
institutions and consolidating their territories across the islands of the Indonesian 
archipelago. For the majority of Indonesians, periodic rebellions such as these, whether 
inspired by Islam or something else, had merely frustrated the successful emergence of 
Indonesia on to the world stage. Over time, the Darul Islam movement would become, 
if not quite a footnote to history, a minor event in the story of Indonesia that one could 
be forgiven for skimming over. But as we shall see in the following chapter, Darul 
Islam’s endurance as an underground movement would become one of its defining 
characteristics. Despite Darul Islam members’ ongoing territorial pretentions such 
endurance would from now on manifest in the form of a militant social network—a 
form consonant with the fragmented geography of archipelagic Southeast Asia.  
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3	
REVIVAL	&	REPRESSION	
 
It is difficult to imagine the emergence of a Southeast Asian jihadist assemblage had 
there not been a revival of Indonesia’s Darul Islam movement. The Darul Islam 
rebellion had been crushed and its leader had been eliminated. But S.M. Kartosoewirjo 
lived on in the minds of many as a martyr and pioneer of Islamic statehood. As I have 
argued elsewhere, thanks to the revival of the movement in the 1970s his following 
endured as an “imagined community,” a social network of adherents who see 
themselves as citizens of a still-sovereign Islamic State of Indonesia.146 The protracted 
struggle between this community and the Indonesian state under President Suharto was 
an indispensable part of the historical process that led to regional assemblage. 
 
For Darul Islam diehards, the desperate times after Kartosoewirjo’s death had been 
prophesized by their leader. Three years before his execution, Kartosoewirjo had 
delivered a statement that is now considered to be his last testament. According to Darul 
Islam historians, in 1959, when the rebellion was under enormous military pressure, 
Kartosoewirjo made a rallying cry before his commanders and other officers in the form 
of a prophecy in the Joyoboyo tradition, forecasting a time of hardship—before ultimate 
victory—in which everything will be turned upside down. Reportedly, he said, “I see 
signs of a coming storm that will sweep clean all Mujahid, leaving only a few Mujahid 
who will truly champion and defend the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia, 
as proclaimed on 7 August 1949.” Kartosoewirjo continued, “At the moment this storm 
comes, remember this testament: 
 
Friend will become foe, and foe will become friend. 
Officers will become soldiers, and soldiers will become officers. 
Mudjahid will become non-Mujahid. 
If a Mujahid reneges [on his duty], remember that this is more evil than 
Satan, because he knows the strategy and secrets of our struggle, while 
the enemy does not. 
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If the Imam is incapacitated and you are cut off from your commanders 
and you are left with only a small soldier, then the small soldier must be 
willing to become Imam.  
If the Imam surrenders, shoot him, because that is Satan. If the Imam 
orders to continue the struggle, follow him as a servant of Allah s.w.t. 
If you have lost the conditions of the struggle, continue the struggle as 
long as Pancasila [secularism] still exists, and even if you are left with 
only one tooth, use that one tooth to bite.  
If it is still a time of jihad, remember that safety is a poison.147  
 
Although the authenticity of the prophecy is questionable, the power of its narrative is 
not. Later, while in Republican custody, Kartosoewirjo ordered his remaining followers 
to surrender. Subsequently, however, the prophecy, appealing to Darul Islam’s 
millenarian roots, was seen by many of his followers as having greater force than the 
order to surrender.148  The last testament is the centerpiece of a 1987 publication by 
Darul Islam commander Abdul Fatah Wirananggapati, At-Tibyan (“Exposition”), which 
he hoped would help to reboot the movement. Wirananggapati had been imprisoned 
from 1953 to 1963, after which he was given amnesty and released, having avoided 
signing the Joint Declaration to renounce the struggle. However, he was a controversial 
figure in Darul Islam. Many did not agree that he was, as he claimed, the next in line to 
be Imam. But his central claim—that the Islamic State was still alive and sovereign—
would become a shibboleth for underground Darul Islam militants of the post-
Kartosoewirjo era, and would underpin a revival of the movement during President 
Suharto’s New Order regime, a revival that was sponsored by the regime itself.  
 
The Darul Islam revival would end in failure. The very premise of the movement that 
made it so resilient—the historic Islamic State of Indonesia—made sense during the 
revolution, when territorial control was still contestable, but was no match for Suharto’s 
military regime. Its failure, however, played an integral part in the historical process 
that led to the formation of a regional jihadist assemblage. During this period, a new 
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generation of militants was radicalized, while key leaders of the revival learned the hard 
way that in Suharto’s Indonesia not only was political Islam repressed at the 
parliamentary level by the military and intelligence apparatus, the very same apparatus 
had thoroughly co-opted and penetrated their own underground networks. There was 
scant space for criticism of the regime in any corner of society. As Vincent Boudreau 
argues in his study of New Order repression, the state capitalised on the mass 
extermination of suspected communists in 1965-1966 to keep subsequent civil society 
challenges to the system isolated and unorganised.149 A sense of suffocating repression 
during this period would eventually push militant leaders into exile in Malaysia, where 
they would learn how to exploit transnational space. 
 
In hindsight, also, some of the unsuccessful jihadist operations during this period can be 
seen as trial runs for later successes. In the 1970s, for the first time jihadists sought to 
use Malaysia as a site to mobilise resources for the movement that could not be found 
locally in Indonesia. In the 1980s they made their first amateurish attempt at an attack 
on tourist spots in Bali. But Darul Islam militants showed themselves to be too 
politically compromised, divided and disorganized to present any real threat to the 
Suharto regime. Even as New Order repression of Muslims reached new heights in the 
1980s, Darul Islam was too weak to take advantage of the situation.  
 
Co-opting	Darul	Islam	
Following the defeat of the Darul Islam insurgency, senior Darul Islam militants were 
cultivated by the Siliwangi Division of the Indonesian army, which offered them 
business opportunities in exchange for continued compliance and cooperation.150  
The Siliwangi Division established a patronage relationship with Darul Islam under the 
sympathetic leadership of Siliwangi Commander Ibrahim Adjie. Adjie, like other 
Siliwangi officers, respected the tenacity of the Darul Islam fighters, and placed an 
emphasis on “guidance” (pembinaan) rather than punishment. It was under this policy 
that Siliwangi intervened to reclaim the Kartosoewirjo family land in Malangbong, 
West Java, for the use of the executed leader’s family and descendants. But, over the 
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course of the New Order administration, Siliwangi control of Darul Islam patronage was 
challenged by Suhartos’s shadowy intelligence chief, Ali Moertopo. According to 
General Soemitro (the 1973–74 Kopkamtib Commander who famously clashed with Ali 
Moertopo), rivalry emerged between Siliwangi and Moertopo’s Opsus organization 
over control of Darul Islam after Opsus’s entry into what was considered Siliwangi 
territory. Former Darul Islam members, he says, “at the beginning were managed by 
Kodam Siliwangi so that they would not continue the movement ... but suddenly [they 
were] pulled by Ali Moertopo to Jakarta.”151 Siliwangi appears to have been politically 
outmaneuvered by Moertopo, the latter enjoying a closer personal relationship to 
Suharto.  
 
Ali Moertopo came to prominence after 1965, soon after General Suharto came to 
power after a failed coup by a section of the Indonesian Communist Party triggered 
military-led massacres of suspected communists across the country, causing the deaths 
of an estimated 500,000 people.152 Soekarno and his leftist politics were vanquished as 
Muslim militants in Java were mobilized to take part in the killings. The majority of 
such militants were in fact affiliated with mainstream organizations—the youth wing of 
the Nahdlatul Ulama being the most notorious example. Still, to a largely unknown 
extent, the communist purges also attracted Darul Islam militants, who were already 
virulently anticommunist. They had been primed by Kartosoewirjo, who, as we saw in 
the previous chapter, had sent an apocalyptic secret letter to President Sukarno 
prophesising a “Third World War” between Cold War powers, and warning—with 
some accuracy, as it turned out—of communist preparations to stage a coup d’état. 
Kartosoewirjo had urged the Republic’s leaders to protect the sovereignty of the state 
and referred to his advice in an earlier secret letter, which counselled that there was no 
other way to ensure the security of the Indonesian state and nation other than “if the 
government of the Republic of Indonesia begins now, swiftly and surely, to eradicate 
Communism in every area.” In return for official recognition of the Islamic State, he 
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guaranteed that “the Indonesian Republic would have a friend for life in facing any 
potential [threat] from without and from within, especially in facing Communism.”153  
 
Set against this background, under Suharto’s New Order anti-communism became the 
pretext for an strategic alliance between certain Darul Islam figures and the government. 
Solahudin writes that New Order officials such as the intelligence czar Ali Moertopo 
and Siliwangi commander H.R Dharsono, “sought the help of former DI leaders, like 
Ateng Djaelani, Adah Djaelani, Danu Muhammad Hasan and Dodo Muhammad Darda 
to mobilize former DI soldiers in West Java and Central Java against the PKI.” 
According to Adah Djaelani, Darul Islam members paid for the mobilization 
themselves.154 However, as the institutional “handler” of Darul Islam in West Java, the 
Siliwangi Division found itself in competition for control of the movement with Ali 
Moertopo, who had helped organise early political support for Suharto’s rise to power 
and who is sometimes described as the “architect” of the New Order.155 Moertopo had 
the power and creativity to forge patronage relationships with politically compromised 
figures, often by rehabilitating them in return for their carrying out dubious activities to 
advance regime agendas. He organised such people under the auspices of an ad hoc 
network for clandestine operations known as Opsus (Operasi Khusus, Special 
Operations). Opsus employed elements from a number of revolutionary groups, 
including the PRRI (Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, Revolutionary 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia), the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), and 
Darul Islam.156  
 
Darul Islam figures were likely considered useful to the regime due to their anti-
communist zeal and their willingness to be put to violent purposes. Danu Mohammad 
Hasan, a commander from West Java who had signed the Joint Declaration in 1962, was 
Ali Murtopo’s main point of contact in the movement. Danu was recruited by Opsus 
officer Aloysius Sugiyanto, who, in early 1966 used him and his men to pursue pro-
Sukarno officials who had gone into hiding, suspected of being involved in the 
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attempted coup. According to Sugiyanto, Danu himself led a failed operation to abduct 
Sukarno’s foreign minister and intelligence chief, Dr. Subandrio.157  
 
The revival of the Darul Islam movement more generally, however, was initiated by two 
leaders who believed fervently that Kartosoewirjo’s last wishes were for his followers 
to continue the struggle. In 1968 Aceng Kurnia, a former adjutant to Kartosoewirjo, 
began to recruit a following of Darul Islam leaders based in the West Java city of 
Bandung, while Djaja Sudjadi, former Islamic State of Indonesia minister for finance, 
recruited a local following in the former Darul Islam stronghold of Garut. They both 
began reviving contacts with Darul Islam leaders outside Java, notably with Gaos 
Taufik in North Sumatra and Daud Beureu’eh, the former Republican governor of 
Aceh, who had joined Darul Islam in 1953 in reaction to Aceh’s forced merger with the 
province of North Sumatra.158 Also in 1968, a rank-and-file member, Ridwan, and his 
associates, established a ten-member study group to advance the argument that 
surrender in 1962 had been a mistake and that the struggle should continue. Ridwan’s 
revivalist efforts were frustrated by recriminations over who was responsible for the 
1962 defeat and the reluctance of some veterans to commit to action without clear 
approval from their former senior commanders. But, fatefully, they did secure the 
support of one former commander, Danu Mohammad Hasan, the same commander who 
had been co-opted by Ali Moertopo into the Suharto regime’s anti-communist 
operations. 
 
Controversially, Danu Mohammad Hasan would become the central figure of the Darul 
Islam revival. He was at the centre of two decisive events that shaped the movement 
during the New Order period, helping the government to co-opt the movement and 
ultimately to crush its revival when it felt it had lost control of the militants. First, in 
1970, he and other Darul Islam leaders signed what would be the founding document of 
the Darul Islam–New Order relationship. Known as the Second Declaration (Ikrar 
Kedua), the document is a statement by four Darul Islam leaders, comprised of three 
points: (1) a reaffirmation of the first 1962 Joint Declaration and a pledge of loyalty to 
the Indonesian Republic; (2) a resolution to not enter or affiliate with a political party—
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a clause that would preclude affiliation with any group other than Golkar, which the 
regime classified as above party politics; and (3) an affirmation of willingness to remain 
under the aegis of and to become a force for the government. The statement, dated 
October 28, 1970, was signed in Bandung by Danu Mohammad Hasan, Hadji Zainoel 
Abidin, Ateng Djaelani Setiawan, and one of Kartosoewirjo’s sons, Tahmid Rahmat 
Basuki.159 In the trial of another Darul Islam leader, one of the signatories, Ateng, 
would later testify that the Second Declaration was the brainchild of Pitut Soeharto, Ali 
Moertopo’s Opsus officer responsible for operations involving Islamic organisations.160 
 
Second, in 1971 Danu Muhammad Hasan hosted Darul Islam’s first post-Kartosoewirjo 
reunion at his residence on Gang Madrosah in Bandung. Danu made no secret of the 
fact that he worked for the state intelligence agency Bakin, and even persuaded others to 
allow the agency to sponsor the event. Senior figures leading the revival spoke at the 
event, including Djaja Sudjadi and a leader from Central Java, Haji Ismail Pranoto, 
known as Hispran. According to one account, 250,000 rupiah was made available for 
the function not by Bakin but by Opsus.161  
 
The reunion was a great success in recreating a sense of community among Darul Islam 
militants. Hundreds of members attended from across the country over three days from 
April 24–26. It was also a success for the regime, which sought to co-opt the movement 
in support of Golkar at the upcoming national elections on July 3, 1971. Two members 
of the military establishment were there to monitor activites: Colonel Dadang of the 
Siliwangi Command and Colonel Pitut Soeharto of Opsus.162 In a 2001 interview with 
Darul Islam Magazine, Ridwan, who was a member of the reunion committee, 
addressed the charge that at the 1971 reunion Darul Islam had been co-opted by the 
Suharto regime. He claimed that the arrangement was meant to be mutually 
beneficial.163  
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– So this means the NII [Islamic State of Indonesia] was being used by 
intelligence?  
– Yes. Even Pitut Suharto attended then and gave a speech entitled “NII 
Supports Golkar.” Thus, since then it has been popular to say that the NII 
was used by Bakin.  
– If it is clear they were being used, why did the mujahideen stay quiet?  
– Actually, from the beginning we wanted to use Bakin. We needed 
support for the movement. We didn’t have funding, and support from the 
Muslim community [ummat] was less than total, so at the time we used 
Bakin.  
– What about the mujahideen, didn’t they protest?  
– No one protested. Because at that time we saw Bakin as a protector and 
as an aid to security.  
 
From 1971 Danu Muhaamad Hasan’s residence on Gang Madrosah would become the 
unofficial headquarters of the Darul Islam revival, hosting numerous meetings and 
swearing-in ceremonies. How did the New Order regime co-opt a weak but rebellious 
movement like Darul Islam so easily? Part of the answer is that this was the politics of 
manipulation and patronage in which intelligence chief Ali Moertopo was an expert. It 
also appears that Moertopo had gained some trust within the movement by suggesting 
that he himself was a Darul Islam sympathizer. Such a claim, however unlikely, appears 
to have rested on Moertopo’s former role as a fighter with the Hizbullah guerrilla army 
during the revolution. The precise nature of Moertopo’s relationship with Hizbullah is 
unclear, but his identification with the group was part of the public image he cultivated 
at the time. Moertopo may have further bolstered his credibility with Darul Islam by 
allowing it to be believed he would ultimately support Indonesia becoming an Islamic 
state.164 Later, in a speech as Information Minister at the opening of a mosque in 1980, 
Moertopo addressed these impressions and clarified his position on Darul Islam. He 
said it is true that he was a member of Hizbullah, but he claimed that this fact had been 
“exploited by some people.” 
 
Yes, of course: because he is a child of Hizbullah he must agree with an 
Islamic state. But if you want to know, at the time of the “Proclamation of 
the Islamic State” in the jungle near the West Java/Central Java border, I 
was the only one who raised his voice at the proclamation ceremony. 
Amir Fattah was still alive, Gozali was still alive, they were all still alive. 
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I said: “I do not agree!” I followed the Republic which I proclaimed; I 
don’t want to be involved in an Islamic state.165    
 
Moertopo went on to warn that turning Indonesia into an Islamic state would not bring 
peace to the country but would spark civil war among rival factions. “As long as people 
still think of Islam as a political force,” he concludes, “this world will not be safe.” 
 
Moertopo’s main agenda in sponsoring the Darul Islam was to use the group to engineer 
a victory for Golkar in the general elections of July 3, 1971. Many in the government, 
including Moertopo, were pessimistic about Golkar’s prospects at what would be the 
first general elections since Suharto had seized power in 1966. The electoral vehicle 
lacked a genuine support base and faced strong opposition from the traditionalist 
Muslim organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, Revival of the Religious Scholars). 
Moertopo’s strategy, therefore, was to erode the NU vote by establishing a Golkar-
affiliated group that would appeal directly to NU’s traditionalist Muslim constituency. 
To do this he co-opted a small and obscure Muslim group, the Islamic Education 
Advancement League (GUPPI, Gabungan Usaha Perbaikan Pendidikan Islam), an 
association formed in 1950 in West Java to foster pesantren education. In the early 
1970s, under the guidance of close Moertopo associate, Soedjono Hoemardani, GUPPI 
transformed itself from a moribund collaboration of several West Java pesantren to a 
Jakarta-based, nationwide network led by K. H. Sjarifuddin Mohammad Amin, an NU-
affiliated chairman of the religious education directorate in the Department of Religious 
Affairs.  
 
In mid-1970, Pitut Suharto was tasked to co-opt Muslim leaders into GUPPI. According 
to research by Indonesian scholar Heru Cahyono, the operation was backed by large 
financial rewards that would be offered to those who were prepared to cooperate with 
the regime. It appears that significant sums of money were made available through the 
Opsus network to certain figures as inducements to join GUPPI. Cahyono shows how 
some of the most influential kyai (scholar–teachers) in Java were bought off in this way. 
For example, K.H. Tarmudzim, a kyai from East Java who ran a number of schools, had 
initially refused to support Golkar. But he reversed his position after GUPPI offered 
funding to help develop his schools. Tarmudzim was given funding in the order of fifty 
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million rupiah— US$128,205 at the exchange rate of the time. K.H. Ali Maksum, a kyai 
who ran a prominent pesantren of eight hundred students in Yogyakarta, received 
fourteen million rupiah. K.H. Musta’in Romly, the principal of one of Java’s largest 
pesantren, was given fifty million rupiah, along with special credit from the regional 
government for the development of his pesantren.166 According to Cahyono, business 
associates of Soedjono Hoemardani and Ali Moertopo were the sources of such 
largesse. Based on interviews with GUPPI Secretary-General Djamhari and Pitut 
Suharto, in a footnote Cahyono gives a glimpse of how the Opsus operation involving 
GUPPI worked:  
 
GUPPI was a very rich organization. Aside from funds received through 
official requests for government assistance, GUPPI received funds that 
were attained by Soedjono himself. [These funds] were of a large amount 
and greatly exceeded official government assistance. GUPPI was able to 
benefit from Soedjono’s special relationship with Japanese investors. 
Aside from this, contributions could appear spontaneously from 
Soedjono’s “business associates,” friends, or national businessmen. 
Through the influence of the power that was so greatly associated with 
the Soedjono–Ali Moertopo duo, GUPPI could even attain assistance 
from the governor, for example, in making available transportation.167  
 
Although there are few details of Darul Islam followers’ involvement in GUPPI, Pitut 
Suharto conceded to Cahyono that the former militants did play a role. Pitut claimed 
that in part the GUPPI operation was directed at countering radical tendencies within 
the Muslim community. Cahyono paraphrases the rationale at the time:  
 
In order that there not be a recurrence of the Islamic radicalism that until 
now has haunted Indonesian political history, a better approach needs to 
be found ... Therefore an Islamic organization must be cultivated that can 
sustain Islamic aspirations from the various existing streams and 
subsequently be led in a direction that is more modern.168  
 
Before he died in 2011, Pitut gave another rare account of his cooptation of Darul Islam 
elements to Tempo magazine. According to Tempo, “In 1969 he [Pitut] was recruited to 
Special Operations and BAKIN. His task was to ‘neutralize’ NII [Islamic State of 
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Indonesia] members. The aim was to entice the moderates into supporting the New 
Order and to crush those who resisted.” His method, according to the article, was to 
infiltrate the group via Danu Muhammad Hasan, and to distribute money to buy 
influence.169  
 
The regime’s sponsorship of the Darul Islam revival perhaps represents Indonesia’s first 
ever attempt to “deradicalize” religious extremists. Through GUPPI, Ali Moertopo 
sought not only to turn Darul Islam members into loyal supporters of Golkar, but also to 
inculcate in them values of tolerance. This objective was evident at GUPPI’s first 
national conference under regime patronage on January 28, 1971, at which a welcome 
address was given by Soedjono Humardani, and an endorsement by the minister of 
religion, K.H. Moh. Dahlan. Inevitably, Ali Moertopo was on the schedule, speaking on 
the subject of “The Role of Religious Scholars in the Success of Development and 
Elections.”170 But GUPPI Ulama were also treated to stultifying speeches by pro-regime 
Ulama and senior regime officials on the subject of “tolerance”, with titles such as 
“Religious Tolerance in Islam and the Dual Function of the Armed Forces,” by Prof. Dr. 
H. Aboebakar Atjeh,171 and, “The Role of Religious Scholars in Cultivating Religious 
Tolerance and the Participation of Religious Scholars in Defense and National 
Security,” by Lieutenant General Darjatmo. In the latter speech, after expounding on the 
meaning of “tolerance”, Darjatmo urged his audience to remember President Suharto’s 
wise words in 1969 on the commemoration of the Prophet’s birthday (Maulid Nabi), 
that “we must cast far away attitudes of enmity, prejudice, and suspicion and replace 
them with mutual respect.” Still, as Darjatmo argued, it is our mutual obligation to face 
the “primary enemy of the religious, that is, the remnants of atheists/PKI, who continue 
to be a latent danger to the Indonesian community.”172  
 
There is no better example of how Opsus patronage of Darul Islam went awry than in 
the story of one key recruit from this period, Haji Ismail Pranoto, known as Hispran. 
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Hispran was a senior Darul Islam commander famous for being one of the last 
insurgents to descend from the mountains in Central Java in 1967 with a small band of 
Darul Islam soldiers. Instead of surrendering, Hispran had gone on the run in Sumatra, 
avoiding any compromise with the government. Hispran was a speaker at the regime-
sponsored 1971 reunion and became closely associated with Danu Muhammad Hasan 
and the Opsus operation to engineer support for Golkar. But under the cover of working 
for Golkar at the behest of Ali Moertopo, he was also busy recruiting a new generation 
of militants to Darul Islam. So central was he to the Darul Islam revival of the 1970s 
that his role is often described in court documents of the time as that of the “link” or 
“liason” (penghubung). Fatefully, before he would be arrested on subversion charges 
towards the end of the 1970s, Hispran had recruited the two future founders of Jemaah 
Islamiyah, Abdullah Sunkgar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. He personally introduced the 
two to the Darul Islam community, facilitating meetings between them and Tahmid 
Kartosoewirjo, a prominent son of the founder of the Islamic State.173 The New Order 
regime could not have anticipated that, as an indirect result of its machinations, it would 
help to bridge the traditional millenarian jihadism of Indonesia and the modern salafi 
jihadism of the Middle East.   
 
Hispran was recruited into GUPPI as a “pembina” (manager–trainer) on February 18, 
1971—only weeks after GUPPI had officially been made into a Golkar organization.174 
In accordance with the Second Declaration, Darul Islam members were to support 
Golkar in the elections, and Hispran, in his trial testimony, claimed that he had been 
only a loyal servant of the state. He also described his recruitment by Pitut Soeharto:  
 
In the month of October, 1970, that is to say at the time of the Second 
Declaration done in Bandung by friends H. Danu Moh. Hasan, H. Ateng 
Djaelani, Abidin, and Tahmid, I was called to Bandung to meet these 
friends whom until then I had known by name only, and Colonel Pitut 
Suharto. Because Point 2 of the declaration prohibited the joining of a 
political party, it was suggested by Colonel Pitut Suharto [that we should] 
join Golkar. Because we were aware that Golkar aimed to fulfil the 
Revolution of 17 August 1945, we agreed. Then, after that, we returned to 
Brebes with the Second Declaration document, and we reported to 
KODIM [Komando Distrik Militer, District Military Command] Brebes, 
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then we were invited to join Golkar in the form of GUPPI and also invited 
to join the campaign in Central Java and West Java.175  
 
Hispran described his role in GUPPI as that of a preacher (mubalig) and said that at the 
invitation of GUPPI he had given sermons across Java, presumably urging his audience 
to vote Golkar.176  
 
Consistent with the New Order’s organicist philosophy, which conceived of every 
section of society as an integral part of one harmonious “family”, GUPPI was just one 
of an array Golkar-linked corporatist bodies designed, often with direct Moertopo 
intervention, to immobilize opposition to the regime by forcing disparate political 
elements into government-controlled umbrella organizations.177 Darul Islam was one of 
many socio-political groups targeted by Moertopo and his intelligence operatives for 
infiltration and manipulation, a program so broad one of his former associates has 
described it as “overkill.”178 Compiling a sort of Ali Moertopo “hit list” from 1971, 
Tempo Magazine claims in the lead up to the elections he, with Opsus, was responsible 
for the “conditioning” (penggalangan) of more than two hundred organisations, 
including political parties, labour unions, and associations of teachers, students and 
journalists.179  
 
But his work was also part of a particular regime agenda to neutralise the threat of 
political Islam. At the same time as Moertopo was co-opting Darul Islam he was also 
interfering in the mainstream Islamic opposition party, Parmusi (Partai Muslimin 
Indonesia), in order to block leaders critical of the regime and promote others who were 
compliant. During the New Order, just as the PKI, main leftist opposition party, was 
banned, so was Masyumi, the main Islamist party. Parmusi, meant to be the inheritor of 
Masyumi’s constituency, was so thoroughly undermined that it would poll less than six 
per cent of the vote in 1971, a fraction of Masyumi’s previous electoral strength. 
Moertopo was instrumental in the operation to subdue Parmusi with the insertion of his 
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protégé, Joni Naro, as leader of the party in 1970, after the regime had rejected the 
party’s independently chosen leaders.180 As David Bourchier summarises the regime’s 
attitude to Islam at the time:  
 
Theocratic Islam had always worried Soeharto and his predominantly 
abangan and Christian advisers and officer corps. There was a widely 
held assumption among the ruling group that Muslims would use any 
purchase on power to press for an Islamic state, or at least for the 
implementation of the Jakarta Charter requiring the state to enforce 
Muslim religious obligations on believers. Fear of Islamic aspirations had 
been behind the extensive measures taken in the late 1960s and early 
1970s to marginalise and incapacitate the Muslim parties.181 
 
There was another reason why a militant movement like Darul Islam was useful to the 
regime. The New Order, it has been observed, had a complex relationship with 
Indonesia’s underworld, often exploiting politically or legally compromised figures to 
do regime dirty work. As Ian Wilson argues, during the New Order, gangsters had a 
“symbiotic relationship” with the military and political elite, and “were allowed to carry 
out their activities, e.g., protection rackets and control over a particular localized sector 
of the economy, in return for a cut of the profits that would make its way through the 
various levels of the state bureaucracy. Violence and criminality were normalized as 
state practice.”182 Witness the now disgraced former Governor of North Sumatra, who 
while in office told filmmaker Joshua Oppenheimer in The Act of Killing, “We have so 
many gangsters and that’s a good thing. They want the freedom to do things, even if 
they are wrong. But if we know who to work with them, all we have to do is direct 
them.”183 
 
Key Darul Islam figures were beneficiaries of the New Order patronage system. Ken 
Conboy, a Jakarta-based security consultant with direct access to intelligence circles, 
dates New Order patronage of Darul Islam as far back as 1969 when Opsus arranged for 
Darul Islam leaders to receive kerosene distribution rights in Java in return for support 
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for Golkar. According to Conboy, Ateng Djaelani, the veteran Darul Islam commander 
who signed both Joint Declarations, was “ultimately placed in charge of the kerosene 
network allocated by Moertopo.”184 From 1973, until the Komando Jihad affair broke in 
1976, Ateng served as the West Java general chairman of Gapermigas, the Golkar-
affiliated union of private oil and gas traders. Another recipient of kerosene contracts 
was Adah Djaelani (no relation to Ateng), a West Java Darul Islam commander who 
had signed the first Joint Declaration in 1962 but rebuffed the second. Adah was 
director of the kerosene distribution company PT Sawo 11.185 Hispran, in his trial, 
testified openly to the patronage he and other Darul Islam leaders, including Ateng, had 
received from the government: Danu Mohammad Hasan was given a jeep and a driver, 
presumably the same jeep that, according to rumour, Danu was given in the 1960s to 
hunt communists. Hispran claimed he himself had received building contracts for his 
Brebes-based company, CV Sadar. Hispran also claimed to have received a three 
million rupiah grant from Danu Mohammad Hasan for the building of a school.186  
 
Moertopo’s cultivation of Darul Islam and other groups in the lead up to the New 
Order’s first general election appears to have been a success. Golkar won the election 
with a landslide 62.8 per cent of the vote. The largest Muslim party, Nahdlatul Ulama, 
had been successfully contained, coming in second with 18.67 per cent. Parmusi was 
devastated, gaining only 5.36 percent of the vote.187 Both Moertopo and his operative 
Pitut Suharto consolidated their positions within the Golkar executive, with Pitut made 
“secretary for spiritual matters and culture.”188 Moertopo would later credit the victory 
to the vast machinery of the state, including the military, ABRI, and the civil service, 
KORPRI, which were both required to support Golkar. But he also nodded towards his 
more underhand methods: 
 
Some circles are of the opinion that the triumph of Golkar was achieved 
due to the following factors: the availability of funds, the support of 
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officers, particularly from ABRI, the formation of KORPRI within 
various ministries, institutions and firms, and also various forms of 
intimidation. All of this contributed to the triumph of Golkar.189 
 
In 1973 the space for Muslim political parties shrank further still with the imposition of 
a two-party system of political opposition. All Islamic parties were forcibly subsumed 
under the state-controlled United Development Party (PPP), which was dominated, as 
Parmusi had been, by the Ali Moertopo agent Joni Naro. The year also marked the first 
open confrontation between the regime and political Islam, when two bills were 
introduced into parliament, one that would have forced Muslims to be subject to a 
secular marriage law, removing jurisdiction from the religious courts, and a second that 
would have prevented the PPP from outwardly identifying itself as an Islamic party. But 
the government backed down on these measures after widespread public outcry and a 
parliamentary walk out staged by Muslim politicians, the first open defiance of the 
regime in that place since Suharto came to power.190  
 
It was around the same time, in the early 1970s, that the regime developed a worldview 
in which it saw itself as occupying the ideologically moderate middle ground, fending 
off extremists on both the left and the right. In the coded demonology of the New Order, 
the Indonesian state was at threat from the extreme right (ekstrem kanan), referring to 
Islamists, and the extreme left (ekstrem kiri), referring to communists. From 1973 
onwards this demonology, sometimes abbreviated in Indonesian as eka-eki, was 
mirrored in election ballot papers, on which Golkar always featured at the centre as 
number two on the ballot, with the Muslim PPP on the left and the secular nationalist 
PDI on the right. The origins of the binary opposition, however, can be traced at least as 
far back as 1972, when Ali Moertopo, in the seminal New Order treatise The 
Acceleration and Modernization of 25 Years’ Development, wrote of the Indonesian 
military that it is “a fact of history that the armed forces are the guardians and defenders 
of Pancasila from all kinds of deviation and attempts to undermine it either by the 
extreme right or extreme left.”191 The more time that elapsed following the 1960s when 
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the communists had been exterminated, however, the more this demonology might have 
been interpreted as a veiled threat against the only opposition group left standing, i.e., 
the Islamists.  
 
Nevertheless, the state-sponsored revival of Darul Islam continued unabated. The 
Islamic State of Indonesia now had the opportunity to appoint its first imam since 
Kartosoewirjo. This development was the culmination of months of diplomacy and 
negotiation. Several leaders, including Hispran, had traveled to Aceh to urge Daud 
Beureu’eh to consider accepting the position. In September 1973, six key leaders met in 
Jakarta in a house on Jalan Mahoni owned by Romli Yakub, a former Darul Islam 
leader from South Sulawesi.192 Between them they represented the three command areas 
(Komando Perang Wilayah Besar) of Darul Islam’s operations—Sumatra, Sulawesi, and 
Java-Madura. Sumatra was represented by Gaos Taufik, Sulawesi by Ali A. T., and 
Java-Madura by Adah Djaelani. Kartosoewirjo’s former bodyguard, Aceng Kurnia, was 
also present, as was one of Kartosoewirjo’s sons, Dodo Mohammad Darda, and Daud 
Beureu’eh himself. In a historic move a simple command structure was created and 
Daud Beureu’eh was installed as the new imam of the Islamic State of Indonesia.193  
 
But not all Darul Islam leaders agreed with reviving the movement under state 
sponsorship. Two prominent men, Djaja Sujadi and Kadar Solihat, had from the outset 
resisted moves that they saw as compromising Darul Islam by becoming too close to the 
New Order authorities. At the 1971 reunion in Bandung they had opposed Opsus 
sponsorship.194 In 1975 they broke ties with the Darul Islam mainstream to form a 
breakaway group, Djaja Sujadi anointing himself imam. The Sujadi faction styled itself 
on the doctrine of what they termed jihad fillah, meaning non-violent jihad. This was in 
opposition to the faction led by Adah Djaelani, which did not eschew violence and 
followed the traditional Darul Islam doctrine of jihad fisabilillah or “jihad in the way of 
God.”  
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In 1975 Djaja Sujadi wrote a treatise titled “Notes on Jihad” in which he argued that, 
before Kartosoewirjo was captured in 1962 the imam had given the order for “jihad 
fillah” subsequent to his final command ordering his troops to surrender.195 But by 
Qur’anic analogy, Sudjadi made it clear that non-violent jihad was a temporary change 
of strategy until Darul Islam was is a stronger position. He explained that “Jihad Fillah 
obtained in the early period of Mecca, that is, in a place in which there was no 
separation between safe areas and infidel areas, between right and wrong, between 
friend and foe. Thus the base of God’s truth and justice became what was kept within by 
every Mujahidin personally.”196 Thus it was a stance taken for the safety of the faithful 
during a time of “jahiliyah, injustice and idolatry”. Like Aceng Kurnia, Sudjadi cited 
the Qur’anic precedent of the Hudaibiyah Agreement to argue for a period of 
rebuilding. “Behind the defeat”, he wrote, “the Hudaibiyah agreement gave room and 
opportunity for the prophet to make preparations to continue to struggle, primarily in 
order to achieve victory over Mecca.”197 
 
Nevertheless, most Darul Islam leaders were less cautious and continued to 
reconsolidate the Islamic State under the cover of working for Opsus. In December 
1975, a meeting was called at the house of Danu Mohammad Hasan to receive Gaos 
Taufik from Sumatra. There Taufik, acting as envoy for Daud Beureu’eh, delivered a 
written order by Beureu’eh, acting as imam, to form a fighting front, or Barisan fi 
Sabilillah. Ateng Djaelani, who had read the letter, described the order as one that called 
for the organization to  
 
... immediately form a Barisan fi Sabilillah in accordance with the Islamic 
State of Indonesia statement No. 1/KPSI, complete with personnel. In 
hope that God Almighty blesses all our efforts towards the ideal of 
victory for the Islamic State of Indonesia.198  
 
Danu Mohammad Hasan spurred these efforts by claiming that Ali Moertopo was 
supporting them and would provide weapons for troops if Darul Islam first organized its 
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personnel. Ridwan recalls they were told, “what’s important is that we prepare the 
organizational structure as fully as possible.”199  
 
During this period Darul Islam militants remained captured by their past as a 
millenarian-inspired nationalist insurgency. They continued to organise as 
representatives of an Islamic State seeking to control its rightful territory, despite that 
fact that the war was over and the New Order military apparatus enjoyed near-complete 
control. Consequently, the leadership structure they sought to put in place mirrored the 
territorial command structure of the Republic, and drew heavily from traditional Darul 
Islam areas in Java. At the top of the structure was Daud Beureu’eh as Imam and all-
Indonesia Military Commander (Komandan Perang Seluruh Indonesia, KPSI). The top 
territorial command level was the Greater Region War Command (Komando Perang 
Wilayah Besar, KPWB), consisting of Java (and Madura), Sulawesi, and Sumatra. Most 
new positions in the command hierarchy appear to have been created in Java (known as 
KPWB I), where the 1976 recruiting was focused, to the relative neglect of Sulawesi 
(KPWB II) and Sumatra (KPWB III). The Commander (Panglima) of Java was Danu 
Mohammad Hasan. The Deputy Commander was Hispran. At the provincial level were 
nine Regional Commands (Komandan Wilayah, KW). The commander for Central Java 
(KW II) was Hispran. His deputy was a new recruit with a background in the Hizbullah 
militia during the revolution, Haji Faleh.200 One of Faleh’s sons, later known as Abu 
Rusydan, would emerge in the 1990s as a member of Jemaah Islamiyah, and go on to 
serve as its de facto leader post-Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.  
 
In Hispran’s activities, also, we see just how focused the Darul Islam revival was on re-
establishing its territory, as a hierarchical and centralised state, despite how vulnerable 
to detection and arrest this approach left the movement. In Central and East Java, 
Hispran attempted to recruit office bearers to form an Islamic State structure at all levels 
below the provincial, drawing on old Darul Islam and Hizbullah contacts. 
Representatives or commanders were sought at the district (kabupaten), subdistrict 
(kecamatan), and village (desa) level. Most new recruits were sent to be formally 
inducted at Danu Mohammad Hasan’s house in Bandung, which was referred to as the 
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“center” (pusat).201 There, often in the presence of Hispran and other Darul Islam 
leaders, recruits would recite an oath (bai’at) that they willing to sacrifice their body 
and soul to 
 
defend the existence of the Islamic State of Indonesia in order that Islamic 
Law applies comprehensively and most broadly among the Islamic 
Community of the Indonesian Nation in Indonesia.202  
 
When Hispran was eventually arrested for attempting to re-establish the Islamic state, 
one of the objects in his possession was a typescript of the Islamic State oath of 
allegiance. He was also found in possession of an old typescript of a statement released 
on September 7, 1950, by Kartosoewirjo as Imam of the government of the Islamic 
State of Indonesia. The document lays out one of the leader’s more extreme visions, 
providing guidance in the case of an anticipated World War III and global revolution. It 
is perhaps the same vision that motivated Hispran to fight for the Islamic State despite it 
being under New Order “occupation”. Kartosoewirjo states that as others powers sought 
to establish themselves amid the chaos and conflict, it would be obligatory for Muslims 
to wage jihad to consolidate the Islamic State of Indonesia, even if this meant starting 
from a negara basis (Madinah Indonesia), or further still, an Islamic Government 
(Daulatul-Islamiyah). In the case that neither are achieved, however, Kartosoewirjo 
states that Muslims are forbidden from living under the occupation of another state with 
a system other than Islamic law and should therefore “exterminate all the infidels until 
they are eradicated and the State Granted by God is firmly established on Indonesian 
land. Or die a martyr in Holy War!”203  
 
Komando	Jihad	
It was only towards the end of the 1970s that the state-sponsored revival of Darul Islam 
began to produce unintended consequences for the New Order. After a number of small-
scale attacks by militants, and amid concern within the military that Ali Moertopo had 
lost control of Darul Islam, the regime’s peak internal security apparatus, known as 
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Kopkamtib, began a crackdown on the militants, who were often accused of being 
members of a group the regime called “Komando Jihad”. Although critics of the regime 
suspected that Komando Jihad was a fabrication, the name can in fact be traced to Gaos 
Taufik, an old Darul Islam leader who had recruited a small group of young men in 
Sumatera for an operation by that name. Darul Islam members outside Sumatra did not 
recognize the name when they were later labelled with it by the authorities, but in 
interrogations for the Hispran trial in 1978, Taufik and his followers made frequent 
mention of Komando Jihad. In his unpublished memoirs written in 2000, West Javanese 
Darul Islam leader Kang Edi is adamant that Komando Jihad was not the product of 
government manipulation, explaining it this way:  
 
The Komando Jihad incident is often said to be [the result of] a 
manipulation by Ali Moertopo. At the meeting between Gaos Taufik and 
Danu Mohammad Hasan, there was an agreement to organize a revolution 
under the order of the second Imam of the Islamic State of Indonesia. So 
there was no involvement by Ali Moertopo in the Komando Jihad 
movement in Sumatra.204  
 
Taufik had started recruiting militants in the early 1970s. One of those he inducted into 
Darul Islam who had no prior family background in the movement was Timsar Zubil, 
who he tasked to carry out acts of sabotage against the regime. Timsar would later 
describe these attacks as “shock therapy” for what he saw as a dissolute New Order 
society.205 By 1975, Komando Jihad comprised around eight men, including Timsar, 
under the command of an elder member, Agus Sulaeman. In early 1975 six of the men 
travelled to Jakarta to undergo a fifteen-day crash course in bomb-making at the home 
of a Darul Islam veteran from Sulawesi, arranged by Ali A. T. On his return to Medan, 
Timsar Zubil procured explosives for his planned attacks by tapping into the Darul 
Islam network and finding a supplier in Abdul Qadir Baraja, a Darul Islam veteran 
based in Lampung.206  
 
Also in 1975, the Komando Jihad militants attempted to garner foreign support for their 
jihad via a connection in Malaysia. Although this episode prefigures the networking that 
                                                
204 Unpublished memoirs by Kang Edi, February 17, 2000, 17. 
205 Interview with Timsar Zubil, Jakarta, November 25, 2006.  
206 Timsar Zubil, interrogation deposition in Hispran case.  
 76 
 
would occur in the 1980s and lead to a regional jihadist assemblage, in the 1970s the 
focus was solely on gaining material support for the Islamic State of Indonesia. As such, 
the Malaysian expedition was carried out like a diplomatic mission. A two-man 
delegation of Rifai Ahmad (the Lampung representative of Hispran’s company, CV 
Sadar) and Dainuri Saleh travelled to Malaysia to request support from the Libyan 
embassy.207 The delegation was followed separately by a visit from Islamic State imam 
Daud Beureu’eh, bearing a letter in Arabic addressed to Libyan president Muammar 
Qaddafi. According to Dainuri Saleh, the letter, conceived by Gaos Taufik but signed 
by Daud Beureu’eh as imam, referred to the “DI/TII struggle since 1949 until now to 
uphold the establishment of Islamic Law and the Islamic State of Indonesia” and 
requested “material and financial aid, especially firearms.”208 Rifai Ahmad would later 
testify that they had hoped Libya would grant them 300,000 modern weapons, valued at 
US $12 billion—a loan that was to have been repaid “after the Islamic State of 
Indonesia had gained independence through destroying the communists.”209 The 
delegation also sought the help of Daud Beureu’eh’s Malaysian grandson-in-law, Sanusi 
Juned, a London-educated banker and prominent activist in the United Malays National 
Organization (UMNO), who later became minister for agriculture in the Mahathir 
government. But at a meeting with the delegation in a mosque in Penang, Juned rejected 
Darul Islam requests and the basis that certain conditions for aid were not yet satisfied, 
one of which was civil unrest in Indonesia.210  
 
After the failure of the Malaysian option, the operatives raised funds locally by robbing 
a number of businesses in Sumatra. Then they began their acts of sabotage. In June 
1976, one Komando Jihad member, Anwar Jeri, threw a grenade during a Qur’an 
reading competition in North Sumatra, with the aim of creating tension between the 
Muslim and Christian communities. The grenade failed to detonate.211 Following this, 
the Komando Jihad militants carried out a number of small-scale bombing operations in 
North and West Sumatra. Timsar Zubil coordinated operations to bomb the Immanuel 
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Hospital, a Baptist hospital in Bukittinggi, and the Nurul Iman mosque in Padang, the 
latter seen as a target because it was built by the government.212 The Immanuel bomb 
failed to explode and was discovered by hospital staff.213 The mosque bomb, however, 
exploded on November 11, damaging the building only.214 On Christmas Day, 
synchronized bombings were carried out in Medan targeting two churches (one 
Methodist, the other Catholic), a cinema, and a bar. It is unclear if there were any 
casualties in these attacks; Timsar Zubil claims that they were designed only to shock 
the government into action against the growth of sinful behavior during the New 
Order.215 
 
Although the bombings inflicted few casualties, Komando Jihad would come to 
symbolise for the New Order the zombie-like return of the existential threat of Darul 
Islam and the “extreme right.” Around the time of the bombings the Indonesian 
military’s territorial command in Java began to take action against what they feared was 
a revitalised Darul Islam, broken free of its Opsus masters. Acting on intelligence 
reports about recruitment activities, and concerned about the security of the 1977 
general election, Siliwangi commander Himawan Soetanto sent out a letter of invitation 
to Darul Islam leaders to attend a meeting at Siliwangi headquarters in Bandung on 
November 1, 1976. Soetanto sought to remind them of their commitments to support the 
Republic and the Pancasila under the terms of the 1962 Joint Declaration and to provide 
guidance to the Darul Islam community “so that they would not make a return to 
extremism.” Soetanto was surprised by how well the meeting was attended, taking it as 
proof that Darul Islam survived as a community. He was further surprised that Hispran 
himself attended the meeting, given Hispran’s reputation as one of the more aggressive 
Darul Islam veterans. Hispran, for his part, denied he had been organising against the 
state.216 Indicative of the double lives some Darul Islam revivalists at the time were 
living—as both clients of regime and fighters for an Islamic state—when Hispran was 
eventually arrested he was found carrying both the Darul Islam documents he appeared 
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to be using in his recruitment drive (the oath, the Kartosoewirjo statement) and key 
Siliwangi documents, including the November 1 invitation letter.217 
 
The following year, Hispran was arrested on January 8 on one of his recruitment drives 
in East Java. Apparently Siliwangi and the other territorial commands were not 
convinced that Opsus had full control of Darul Islam and, with the spectre of Komando 
Jihad looming over the upcoming elections, the scene was set for a security crackdown. 
By this time also, two former Darul Islam leaders close to the Siliwangi command who 
were known for their early surrender and betrayal of the movement in 1962, Ateng 
Djaelani and Zaenal Abidin, had reported the revival to the Siliwangi commander.218 
Timsar Zubil was arrested shortly after Hispran. In June, Chief of the Kopkamtib, 
Admiral Sudomo, reported that seven hundred arrests of Komando Jihad suspects had 
been made.219   
 
The cost to younger militants, like Timsar Zubil, of working with Darul Islam veterans 
who were compromised by their association with the regime, would not be lost on 
subsequent generations of Indonesian jihadists. But Darul Islam was also compromised 
by its failure to adapt to New Order Indonesia, in which it was no longer possible to 
survive as a territorially based insurgency. What we see in the 1970s revival is a still 
highly territorialised movement, localised in the traditional Darul Islam areas of rural 
Java, Sumatra and South Sulawesi. Darul Islam’s ability to conjure its revolutionary 
nationalist past as Indonesia’s original and sovereign Islamic state-in-waiting was (and 
remains) its main strength. However, its preoccupation  with territory and hierarchy 
made it an easy target for the Suharto regime. Indeed, the spectre of a “shadow state” or 
“state within a state”, appears to have been one of the most intriguing and alarming 
aspects of the revival to the military authorities at the time. One exchange between 
Hispran and his interrogators is illustrative of this concern:  
 
Is it true that with the formation of tools or instruments that represent a 
body or institution, that is to say, a Prime Minister ... Internal Affairs 
Minister ... Chief of the Java and Madura Command ... along with your 
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formation of the leadership for Commands in the areas of Kediri and 
Bojonegoro, along with District Commands in Lamongan, Tuban, 
Nganjuk, Blitar ... that it means an already established Shadow State, the 
Islamic State of Indonesia?  
[Hispran:] Yes, that’s correct. 
In other words, established a State within a State?  
[Hispran:] Yes, that’s correct.220  
 
The Komando Jihad arrests have often been interpreted by observers of New Order 
Indonesia as another example of the regime manufacturing a false threat as a pretext to 
punish its political enemies. Indeed, raising the spectre of militant Islam was a 
convenient way for the regime to stigmatize Mulsim opponents and political Islam more 
generally. The timing of the arrests, in the approach to the 1977 general election, 
contributed to the sense of public suspicion. As Damien Kingsbury in his Politics of 
Indonesia observes, “It was widely believed that the Komando Jihad did not actually 
exist, but was a fabrication by the armed forces for the purposes of tightening its 
political control.”221 But even at the time the government was, in fact, prepared to admit 
that the label they were using was a potential source of confusion. As Tempo magazine 
noted, “Komando Jihad, according to [Attorney General] Ali Said, is actually a term for 
a variety of extremist movements whose membership is led by former leaders of Darul 
Islam/Islamic Army of Indonesia.”222  
 
The mass arrests of so-called Komando Jihad suspects was the biggest setback for Darul 
Islam since 1962 and would remain the largest government operation against militant 
Islamists until the arrests of Jemaah Islamiyah suspects following the Bali bombings of 
2002. They would also set the background for an even more repressive period to come 
in the 1980s. But the arrests and trials were also a major setback for political Islam and 
peaceful Muslim opposition to the regime. Coming in the late 1970s, they marked the 
first widespread repression of political Islam during the New Order, the culmination of 
years of tension between the secular military regime and its Muslim critics. Hundreds of 
people, perhaps up to one thousand suspected Muslim extremists, were arrested, many 
of them with no connection to Darul Islam. In a 1985 statement, Amnesty International 
wrote:  
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It is believed that blanket accusation of involvement in Komando Jihad 
may have been used by the Indonesian government to detain many 
Muslim activists who merely had been critical of the government's 
policies and voiced their discontent without using or advocating 
violence.223  
 
The demonstration by the regime that it was prepared to treat the “extreme right” with 
the same severity that it dealt with the “extreme left” was a credible and powerful threat 
to mainstream Muslim society. Not only were Muslims activists lumped together with 
their communist rivals, they were subject to the very same unfair legal process. Just as 
with the communists, the Komando Jihad detainees were arrested by Kopkamtib, the 
military command that had been established to lead the crackdown on the communists 
just days after the coup, on October 10, 1965. Just as with the communists who were 
not summarily executed, Kopkamtib arrested and deposed the Komando Jihad 
detainees, before they were placed on trial under Indonesia’s 1963 anti-subversion law. 
As Amnesty International described it in a 1997 report, “The Anti-subversion Law is 
the harshest of the repressive legislation available to the Indonesian Government to 
silence its alleged opponents.” Under the law cases were easy to bring given the vague 
wording of the legislation, which criminalised anything deemed to run counter to 
Pancasila ideology and the 1945 constitution. Sentencing provisions ranged from life in 
prison to death. As Amnesty International explains in a paper on the subversion law, 
acquittals were extremely rare: 
 
Subversion trials routinely fall short of international standards for fair 
trials. In most cases they are little more than show trials. Fundamental to 
this is the lack of independence of the judiciary in Indonesia…. Even 
where the system provides formal guarantees of autonomy and 
impartiality, these are routinely undermined, particularly by the 
military.224 
 
In his analysis of the Komando Jihad trials, noted jurist Busjro Muqoddas describes a 
law enforcement system that was fatally flawed and unfair from start to finish. “The 
judicial process in the Komando Jihad cases during the New Order administration,” he 
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writes, “was not independent or transparent, and can be described as a miscarriage of 
justice.”225 Based on multiple interviews with Komando Jihad detainees, Muqoddas 
concludes that the interrogation depositions were characterized by violence by the 
military investigators toward the detainees.226 One of the detainees, Nuri Sularsono, 
who was sentenced to five years’ prison, was highlighted by Amnesty International in 
its 1985 report as a possible victim of torture. In a 2006 interview with Nuri, Busjro 
Muqoddas notes him admitting that at the time of his arrest, “I was passionate about 
how to uphold Islamic law. It was an opportunity to fight for the enforcement of Islamic 
law and to die a martyr.” But he alleges that he only confessed to his subversion charge 
after being told by a military officer that a confession would make the torture stop. 
During interrogation he had been hit in the face with a chair and hit from behind with a 
piece of wood embedded with nails.227  
 
Some of the harshest treatment was reserved for the two most high-profile Darul Islam 
leaders swept up in the revival of the movement, Danu Muhammad Hasan and Haji 
Ismail Pranoto. This was the case despite the fact that they had both claimed to have 
been working for Indonesian military intelligence. Indeed, it is plausible that their 
treatment was harsh precisely because they embarrassed the government by detailing 
their intelligence links, and by unsuccessfully attempting to call, as they did, both Ali 
Moertopo and Pitut Soeharto to testify at their trials.  
 
The most mysterious case is that of Danu, who, although detained in 1977, unlike other 
Komando Jihad detainees spent years in extra-judicial detention before going on trial in 
late 1983. At trial Danu appeared confident that his intelligence connections would 
protect him. When one of the judges read out his profession as “farmer”, Danu sought to 
correct the record to reflect the fact that he worked for the government. As quoted by 
Tempo Magazine, Danu interjected, “I’m not a trader or a farmer, I’m an assistant to 
BAKIN [military intelligence].” However, Tempo observes, Danu was unable to 
produce his BAKIN identity card for the judges.228  In 1984, Danu was finally convicted 
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of subversion and sentenced to fifteen years’ jail, minus time served in extra-judicial 
custody.229 In circumstances that are still unclear, however, Danu was released early, in 
1986, but died surrounded by family only a day later. 
 
Hispran, also arrested in 1977, was almost certainly tortured during interrogation, 
evidence of which his trial lawyer bravely attempted to elicit during direct examination. 
His lawyer asked him if he wore a hearing aid before his arrest. Hispran said he did not. 
But when his lawyer asked the follow-up question of why he now wears a hearing aid, 
the chief judge disallowed the question on the basis of relevance.230 Prosecutors 
requested the death penalty for Hispran on the basis that he had “overturned, 
undermined or corrupted the Pancasila State Ideology or the State Course of the 
Republic of Indonesia.” Hispran, however, was sentenced to life—far longer than most 
Komando Jihad prisoners, who received between five and twenty years’ in prison. The 
panel of judges concluded: “Although [the defendant’s actions] have not yet caused the 
sacrifice of life or property, they could endanger the life or threaten the life of the State 
or its instruments and undermine its ideology.”231 He only avoided the firing squad due 
to the judges’ finding that his crimes had been mitigated by his “contribution to making 
the 1971 General Election a success for the New Order.”232 Hispran died in prison in the 
mid-1990s, only a few years before the anti-subversion law would be one of the first 
instruments of state power overturned by Indonesia’s post-Suharto movement for 
democratic reform.  
 
The public suspicion surrounding Komando Jihad has always been that the regime 
concocted the threat of militant Islam in order to discredit political Islam, especially in 
the lead up to the 1977 elections. The overwhelming evidence, however, is consistent 
with the more complicated circumstances of the special operations arm of the regime, 
led by Ali Moertopo, co-opting and cultivating Darul Islam, Darul Islam taking 
advantage of this new patronage relationship to revive its vision of an Islamic state, 
until, finally, the arm of the regime responsible for territorial security, Kopkamtib, acted 
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to crush the revival. Such circumstances were hinted at the time by Attorney General 
Ismail Saleh, who admitted to Tempo Magazine in 1983 that ex-Darul Islam members 
had indeed been sponsored and given “guidance” by the government. “Under the pretext 
of being loyal to and cooperating with the government,” he said, “the help they received 
was used to arrange contacts, and organise their forces to establish NII [Islamic State of 
Indonesia].”233 
 
Nevertheless, the timing of Komando Jihad was convenient and the regime was quick to 
exploit news linking Islam and extremism for its own political purposes. For example, 
in April 1977, two weeks before the general election, a front page article in the main 
Bandung newspaper, Pikiran Rakyat, announced: “10,000 ex-DI/TII [Darul 
Islam/Islamic Army of Indonesia] Join Golkar.” Although the number was likely an 
exaggeration, according to military and Golkar officials, former Darul Islam leaders in 
their traditional stronghold of Tasikmalaya, West Java, had come together to sign a 
statement rejecting Komando Jihad. Two of the former leaders, M. Budiyarto and 
Ajengan Mubarok, were quoted as saying that instead of being stirred up by disruptive 
elements, “we are better off uniting behind the New Order to achieve development.”234   
 
Needless to say, Golkar easily won the 1977 election, amid fear and suspicion, with 62 
per cent of the vote, the same margin it had won by in 1971. Events surrounding the 
election would set the pattern for continued suspicion and repression of regime 
opponents. Without the regime-sponsored revival of Darul Islam in the 1970s, the New 
Order would not have been able to so easily use the spectre of extremism to discredit 
political Islam, as it did, through the 1980s. The Komando Jihad controversy ushered in 
darker, more repressive, times for Muslim activists and politicians that would persist 
until Suharto’s rapprochement with Islam in the early 1990s. For some, including 
Hispran recruits and future Jemaah Islamiyah founders Abdullah Sungkar and Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir, the experience of Hispran and others would demonstrate that there was 
no possibility of compromise with the system. Hispran had been right when, in his 
personal notebook, he had crafted this statement of purpose and battle cry: 
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The struggle of Islam through the parliament has been closed down. The 
ideology of Islam has been erased. There is no other path than the path of 
revolution. Don’t try to oppose it. Whoever opposes it will be 
destroyed.235  
 
Peak	New	Order		
The Komando Jihad affair hardened regime attitudes to Islam. The following decade 
would be marked by tensions centred on efforts to use Pancasila ideology as a weapon 
against Islamists and other opponents of the regime. Already, in 1978, Suharto began 
developing an elaborate system of Pancasila indoctrination which would culminate in 
the so-called P4 program to “upgrade” Pancasila. Notably, the materials for P4 
specifically cited Darul Islam, among other rebellions, as evidence of the need to 
reinforce Pancasila ideology.236 During this period, Suharto’s increasing lack of 
tolerance for political Islam elicited protest not just from the Muslim community at 
large but—for the first time since his rise to power—from a large section of the political 
elite. The problem for critics of the New Order, however, was that the regime was at the 
height of its repressive powers. For its own part, Darul Islam had been left fractured and 
demoralized in the aftermath of the mass arrests. But this did not stop some sections of 
the network from conducting violent attacks, including a plot to bomb tourist sites in 
Bali—a primitive prefiguring of the mass-casualty attacks on the island in 2002 and 
2005.  
 
This period coincides with the political influence of what David Jenkins describes as 
Suharto’s “inner core group”—an inner circle of high-ranking military and intelligence 
officials who had a proclivity for taking a practical and even Machiavellian approach to 
neutralizing enemies, especially those presenting the threat of political Islam. Jenkins 
continues: 
 
And, having identified political Islam as the major threat to such a 
society, they felt justified in employing all the means at their disposal, 
including the resources of the state intelligence services, to divide and 
discredit the Muslim groupings. In doing so they seemed to have the full 
support of the president.237   
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The first major episode in undermining the power of political Islam had come in 1973 
when both of the main Muslim political streams—the modernists and the 
traditionalists—were obliged to merge into the electorally unconvincing United 
Development Party (PPP), under a leadership imposed by, and largely servile to, the 
government. This had followed from an early Suharto decision in 1967 to maintain the 
Soekarno ban on the Masyumi party. Many Muslims, who saw their constituency as a 
natural anti-communist ally of the New Order regime, had expected Suharto to reverse 
the ban. But Masyumi remained forbidden, thus continuing the political 
disenfranchisement of a large section of the modernist Muslim community. Under the 
New Order, political Islam was seen as a threat to regime control and something to be 
neutralized.  
 
The second major episode came in the early 1980s with the policy to impose Pancasila 
as the sole basis (asas tunggal) for all social and political groups.  
 
The effort to use the religiously neutral and Javanese-inspired philosophy as a bulwark 
against political Islam continues a theme in Indonesian politics which can be traced to 
the constitutional disputes of the 1940s and 1950s over the basis of the state and how 
much Islam should be accorded special status as the majority religion of the nation. The 
effort to establish Pancasila was dramatically escalated by Suharto in the 1980s, when 
what Francois Raillon terms the “bipolar relationship” between the New Order and 
militant Islam, and Suharto appeared to be developing Pancasila into “a shield to be 
used against radical Islam.”238 
 
The tone for such a clash was set by Suharto in a controversial speech at Pekanbaru in 
March 1980, in which he strongly implied that Islam was a threat to Pancasila and the 
nation; he asserted that the armed forces would be used to safeguard them both. The 
speech crystallized concerns in among the elite and led directly to an elite dissident 
movement calling itself the Petition of Fifty—a coalition of former senior military 
generals and political and civil society leaders. The concern that the Pancasila was 
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being turned against Islam was thus a mainstream one and far from just the province of 
radical Muslims. General Nasution, one of the signatories to the petition, exemplified 
the sense of elite indignation at the speech. 
 
Ninety percent of the Indonesian people are Muslims. It was our mutual 
understanding from the start that having Islamic aspirations does not 
mean that one doubts the Pancasila; indeed, with a religious mind the 
followers can understand the ethics and morals of Pancasila. Bung Karno 
and Bung Hatta explained this on many occasions.239  
 
Whereas the Pancasila controversy preoccupied mainstream Islamic organizations and 
members of the political class, paradoxically it was seen rather ambivalently in Darul 
Islam circles. Much of the network stood aloof from the controversy, just as DI had 
ignored the debate in the 1950s over the Jakarta Charter, as if it were something 
occurring in a distant foreign land. However the controversy led to a particularly 
dangerous convergence of interests between elite critics of the regime and some Darul 
Islam militants. It is unclear how the two sides found each other, but perhaps it should 
not be surprising that a section of the political elite hoping to overthrow Suharto sought 
to use Darul Islam operatives for the purposes of political violence, just as the Suharto 
regime itself had used Darul Islam against its predecessors.  
 
The coup plot was masterminded by H.M. Sanusi, a Petition of Fifty signatory who had 
been Minister for Industry and Handicraft in the first cabinet under Suharto as acting 
president in 1966. Sanusi, along with his collaborators, had been inspired by the Iranian 
revolution of 1979 and believed that the time had come for an Indonesian revolution to 
replace Suharto with a ruling coalition he termed NASABRI—denoting nationalists, 
Islamists and the military.  
 
Sanusi collaborated with Mursalin Dahlan, a Darul Islam member and central figure in 
the Islamic revival in the city of Bandung in the late 1970s. Dahlan, a preacher with a 
Muhammadiyah background, was known as a founder of the Pesantren Kilat 
(“Lightening Pesantren”) movement going by the acronym LP3K. Pesantren Kilat was a 
form of short-course training that aimed to indoctrinate students against the onslaught of 
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secularizing tendencies in society and the state school system.240 Sanusi met Dahlan 
through a Jakarta-based group of Muslim dissidents who were interested in acting on 
the political critique of the Petition of Fifty. According to Dahlan and other witnesses, 
Sanusi proposed to them a plan for Suharto’s removal which he called “Phases of 
Revolution” (“Fase-Fase Revolusi”) and which was ostensibly modeled on the Iranian 
revolution. As Dahlan told interrogators, “Phase after phase of the aforementioned 
Indonesian Revolution was aligned with the phases of the revolution in Iran that had 
succeeded in toppling the regime of the Shah.”241  
 
The first phase was the assassination of Suharto, unless he could not be made to go into 
exile, as had Shah Reza Pahlavi. Intermediate phases involved establishing a transitional 
government drawn from the ranks of the Petition of Fifty. The mobilization of the 
masses, with the help of militant youth from the Darul Islam network, would lead to the 
establishment of a NASABRI ruling coalition. The final phase imagined a democratic 
Islamist system: “If in Iran they established an Islamic State, then in Indonesia we will 
apply “Total Islam” [Islam Kaffah], Sanusi told Dahlan.242       
 
Dahlan was tapped as the coordinator of the various DI groupings around the country. 
Support for the revolution would primarily come from DI members in Solo and 
Yogyakarta, under the leadership of future Jemaah Islamiyah founder Abdullah Sungkar 
and Ir. Syahirul Alim respectively. Dahlan’s main contacts in Central Java were with 
the young DI members in Yogyakarta who he played a role in recruiting through his 
Pesantren Kilat and the Muslim youth movement he was part of, Badan Komunikasi 
Pemuda Mesdjid (Communication Body for Mosque Youth). Figures such as the 
preachers Muchliansyah, Fihirudin, and his younger brother Irfan Awwas were 
prominent in the plan just as they were in Darul Islam. The Yogyakarta group were 
active preachers and recruiters in Sungkar’s usroh movement, usroh being a reference 
to small the study circles that had been used by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to 
recruit members, but they had also breathed new life into the movement more broadly 
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by publishing a radical magazine, Ar-Risalah (later Al-Ikhwan) from their base at the 
Sudirman mosque in Yogyakarta. Al-Risalah, a photocopied samizdat publication, 
featured news of dissident activities and protests against the Suharto regime from a 
revolutionary Islamist perspective. A typical edition would print a letter from the 
Petition of Fifty movement alongside the writings of seminal foreign Islamist thinkers 
such as Abul A’la Maududi, Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al-Banna.  
 
Ar-Risalah was also notable for publishing reports of activist activity that, for the first 
time since Kartosoewirjo, created a record of revolutionary activity. One edition, for 
example, describes a convention held by Sanusi along with other speakers recognizable 
as members of the Phases of Revolution plot, including the putative Imam, Syahirul 
Alim. Describing Sanusi’s appearance at the event, the anonymous Ar-Risalah author 
writes, “As he reached the pulpit the atmosphere became heated with the cries of 
‘Allahu Akbar,’” and, according to the report, as a consequence of the crowd’s agitation 
the organizers were forced to relocate the meeting to the forecourt of the mosque.243 
 
In one meeting in December 1982 in the editorial office of Ar-Risalah Sanusi and DI 
members from Yogyakarta, Solo and East Java discussed their upcoming activities. 
According to Dahlan, Sanusi said there would be a Grand Assembly (Apel Akbar) in 
Jakarta by the end of the month as the first phase of the revolution. The plan was that 
Muslim youth from outside Jakarta would be bussed in and assembled at the National 
Monument (Monas), under the guise of attending a national art festival that would be 
held there. From Monas, according to Sanusi, the masses would attack the nearby 
Presidential Palace and easily bring down the president, “like a ripe Durian”.244  
 
In his speech to the group, Sanusi said Suharto had become a dictator. “He has strayed 
far from the pure commitments of the New Order, deviated from the Pancasila and the 
constitution, enriched himself beyond reason and acts alone, not able to take advice 
from anyone.”245  
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In the case that the Grand Assembly failed, Sanusi had provided money for the Plan B: 
a plot to assassinate Suharto by bombing his vehicle as it made its daily journey 
bringing the president from his home on Jalan Cendana to his office at the presidential 
palace. According to witness statements at the time and Darul Islam folklore since, the 
assassination plot was led by Mursalin Dahlan and a small secret team of operatives 
who were bound by an own oath of allegiance.246 One of its members was Nur Iman, a 
DI member from Bandung who was given Rp. 500,000 by Sanusi to procure explosives 
and survey the route. Again, the action was meant to take place by the end of the year or 
early 1983 by the latest. Dahlan in fact hoped that the Grand Assembly could be 
synchronized with the assassination, so that “before the cock crows on 1983 a new 
cabinet can be announced.”247 Sanusi was asked if Muslim leaders in Jakarta like former 
prime minister Mohammad Natsir should be informed of the plot. Appearing to answer 
in the negative, Sanusi said, “Natsir clearly wouldn’t agree with the plan but if we 
succeed of course he would give a smile of relief and we would invite him to fill one of 
the [government] vacancies later.”248 
 
Throughout 1982, however, despite Sansusi’s generous financing it was said of him that 
“If he is asked for money in connection with blowing up the president he would give 
any amount but for anything else it’s very difficult.”249 But the assassination squad 
made little progress. Their main obstacle was a lack of technical capability. In preparing 
the bomb the remote-detonating device repeatedly failed to work, and on one occasion a 
bomb exploded by accident.250 Consequently, in December 1982 Nur Iman reported the 
failures to Sanusi and suggested that instead of a remote-controlled bomb, the attack 
should be made with some kind of rocket. Sanusi immediately agreed to the idea and 
gave Nur Iman Rp. 4 million and a contact in Malaysia. In early January Nur Iman 
travelled to Malaysia and met with someone who said he could sell them the rocket. But 
again, despite the largesse of Sanusi the plan would not come to fruition, just as the 
Grand Assembly had never eventuated.  
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These failures would ultimately spur another bomb plot by Darul Islam members who 
had lost faith in Dahlan and begun to see him as someone who “can only talk big but 
never does anything concrete.”251 This time it was associates of Syahirul Alim in 
Yogyakarta, who with the sponsorship of Sanusi, plotted to assassinate Suharto at the 
ceremony to open the newly renovated Borobudur temple on February 23, 1983. Instead 
of Mursalin Dahlan they would work with Muhammad Jabir, a Darul Islam veteran 
from Sulawesi who had helped the Komando Jihad bombers in the mid-1970s  produce 
primitive time-bombs that were used to attack churches in North Sumatra.  
 
With their preparations made, on the day of the twenty-third several of the plotters, 
including Syahirul Alim gathered at a house owned by Sanusi on Cipinang street in 
Jakarta to listen to the state radio broadcast of the opening ceremony at Borobudur, in 
anticipation of the attack that would spark the revolution. The ceremony, however, was 
broadcast without incident. Around midday the hapless Sanusi arrived at the house to 
ask why nothing had happened. According to witness accounts, Syahirul Alim replied 
that that “Allah has not yet destined President Suharto to die.” To which Sanusi 
answered, “Don’t ever give up.”252  
  
The idea to target the newly refurbished Borobudur—for Islamist militants a symbol of 
the Suharto regime’s privileging of pre-Islamic religion—appears to have inspired a 
successful attack on the temple by Muhammad Achwan, a Pesantren Kilat organizer 
from Malang who had been present at the planning meetings with Sanusi in Yogyakarta. 
Achwan, however, was sponsored in his attack by a militant from Ambon, Husein Ali 
Al-Habsyi, a blind preacher of Arabic descent who had been more inspired than most by 
the Iranian Revolution. Al-Habsyi had converted to Shi’ism and advocated, in a study 
circle that he led in Malang, that oppressed Indonesian Muslims should accept as their 
Imam the leader of the Iranian revolution, Ruhollah Khomeini.253 Although this view 
was at odds with Darul Islam, Darul Islam members like Achwan and Abdul Qadir 
Baraja were prepared to collaborate in anti-Suharto attacks.  
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Al-Habsyi and his group were motivated by conspiracy theories centering on Suharto 
regime corruption and alleged secret government “Christianisation” policies. In 
particular they were driven by a desire to hit back after the Tanjung Priok massacre of 
September 1984, in which government soldiers had shot at and killed dozens of Muslim 
protesters. Furthermore, as we will see below, for militant Muslims like Al-Habsyi, by 
late 1984 Tanjung Priok had taken on meaning as a symbol of the regime’s repression 
of Muslims. Anger over the incident had fused with anger over the imposition of the 
Pancasila. Worse still, in early and mid-December, the mainstream Muslim 
organizations Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama had acquiesced and accepted 
Pancasila as their “sole foundation.” When articulating his motive for his attacks, Al-
Habsyi named all these events in one breath, even naming NU chairman Abdurrahman 
Wahid and other Muslim leaders who had “shut their mouths” in the face of government 
pressure.254 
 
Al-Habsyi’s first two bombings came later in the month, on Christmas Eve in Malang. 
Pipe bombs were detonated in the Geredja Katolik Sasana Budya and Seminari Alkitab 
Asia Tenggara, damaging the buildings but not drawing any casualties. A more 
successful attack by the group came on January 21, 1985 when several stupas at the top 
of the Borobudur temple outside Yogykarta were damaged, again by simple time 
bombs. The only attack by the group that led to fatalities was in fact accidental. In early 
1985 members of the group made survey trips to Bali look for targets in the tourism 
industry. They settled on the Nusa Dua Hotel and a number of small motels in Kuta. On 
March 15 four members of the group, including Hussein Al-Habsyi’s younger brother 
Abdul Kadir Al-Habsyi, boarded a bus from Malang to Bali with several pipe bombs in 
their luggage. En route through the East Javanese town of Banyuwangi, however, one of 
the bombs exploded prematurely, sending the bus crashing into a house. Seven 
passengers were killed, three of them members of the Al-Habsyi group. The following 
day Al-Habsyi was arrested and the Malang group unravelled in the hands of the 
authorities.   
 
Notably, almost a decade after the Komando Jihad attacks of the 1970s, Darul Islam 
was no more capable or sophisticated in its bombing operations. Just as in the 1970s, 
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the explosive used in attacks appears to have been dynamite sourced from the fishing 
industry and fashioned into small scale time bombs by operatives with only ad hoc 
training. Consequently, despite the exuberance of the “mosque youth” in Yogyakarta 
and Malang and the managerial experience of their patron, H.M Sanusi, and the post-
Khomeini fever of Al-Habsyi and all of the above, Indonesia never saw its version of 
the Iranian Revolution. Instead, despite a rise in grievances in the Muslim community, 
militants were unable to take advantage of a moment of genuine protest. Marred by poor 
leadership and organisation, and emerging from networks that were well-known to the 
authorities, the militants’ attacks were dismal failures, both technically and tactically.  
 
Tanjung	Priok	and	further	repression	
The culmination of the conflict between the New Order and Islam came on September 
12, 1984 in the aforementioned shooting of civilian protesters in the port district of 
Tanjung Priok. The proximate cause of the unrest was a dispute between a mosque and 
the local military authorities over notices that were posted on an exterior wall of the 
building. The notices urged children to attend school and mosque and women to wear 
the headscarf (jilbab). The mosque had refused to take down the notices and accused a 
local soldier of removing the notices himself by soaking them in water from a gutter. 
The soldier was also accused of entering the mosque without removing his shoes, a 
charge which the soldier denied. Protests against the actions of the solider and the 
authorities were provoked by local radical preachers, most notably Amir Biki, who had 
a history of challenging the authorities. According to one report, he gave a speech to a 
crowd on September 12, immediately prior to the violence, in which he brandished a 
dagger, and threatened a bloodbath if his demands were not met. He also issued a 
critique of various government policies that he considered anti-Islam, including the bill 
on mass organizations (RUU Ormas), which would impose the Pancasila ideology and 
had been adopted only three weeks’ earlier by the PPP.255  
 
Sermons and speeches against the government were nothing new in Tanjung Priok, and 
the New Order authorities, who had increasingly placed mosques under surveillance, 
knew it. According to an official source quoted by Tempo magazine, “Since 1983, the 
atmosphere in Tanjung Priok had already started to heat up, especially in the speeches 
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and study circles (pengajian) in several mosques. The issue that was raised most often 
was that of Pancasila as the sole foundation.”256 According to a “high-ranking official,” 
also quoted by Tempo, the authorities not only knew about the tensions in Tanjung 
Priok, but had allowed them to ventilate there: “It’s like someone smoking. The ash, of 
course, can’t be dropped just anywhere. The ash must be put in an ashtray. Well, 
Tanjung Priok was in fact deliberately made into an ‘ashtray,’ a place to channel 
emotions.”257   
 
These Tempo sources are partially corroborated by evidence found in surveillance audio 
recordings of sermons given by Abdul Qadir Djaelani—one of the preachers accused of 
provoking the unrest—and submitted as evidence in his trial in 1985. One recording 
shows that Djaelani was being monitored by the authorities as early as 1983; in another, 
made as late as June 9, 1984 at a mosque in Tanjung Priok, Djaelani is heard repeatedly 
denouncing the Pancasila-as-sole-foundation policy to the supportive cries of the 
congregation.258  
 
Compounding Muslim suspicions toward the government, these controversies coincided 
with the zenith of the career of Benny Moerdani. A military intelligence officer and well 
known Christian, Moerdani, having been made chief of the armed forces in 1983, 
continued to grow in political influence through this period. At a press conference on 
September 13, Benny Moerdani, in his role as Kopkamtib, warned the Indonesian 
community in stentorian tones to be vigilant of rogue individuals (oknum oknum) who 
may threaten the security and unity of the nation. The Catholic Moerdani asserted that 
the unrest in Tanjung Priok was clearly the work of a group of people who had 
“misused the doctrines of a certain religion and a place of worship to provoke the 
community of the faithful and school children.”259  
 
The Tanjung Priok incident triggered a crackdown on radical preachers across Jakarta 
and beyond. Oversight of Mosque sermons was increased and ABRI increased its 
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diplomacy vis-à-vis the Muslim community in an effort to assuage the concerns of—if 
not co-opt—its leaders. For example, in Surabaya on October 8 the East Java military 
command held a conference of ulama from across Java to explain the Tanjung Priok 
incident. After screening a video message from Benny Moerdani, the East Java area 
commander told the ulama that his troops were prepared for any eventuality, but “in that 
preparedness we must be assisted by the ulama.”260  
 
Leading the charge to meet Muslim leaders and visit mosques was Try Sutrisno, the 
Jakarta area military commander, know to be a santri himself and occasionally serve as 
the prayer leader (imam) at Friday prayers. In a Tempo cover article on the military’s 
diplomacy with the Muslim community, which featured Sutrisno on the cover wearing a 
kopiah and kefayah, the general was quoted telling a congregation at the Al-Makmur 
mosque in Tanah Abang, “No preachers [kiai] have been arrested. Those arrested are 
people who have broken Indonesian law.” Speaking at the inauguration of the Al-
Barokah mosque, Sutrisno reassured the congregation, “In this nation of Pancasila, there 
is no intention to persecute (memusuhi) Islam.”261    
 
In the aftermath of the violence at Tanjung Priok, preachers and congregationalists 
alike, with no connection to Tanjung Priok, were arrested, giving the impression in 
Muslim communities that the government was exploiting the incident as an opportunity 
to punish regime dissidents. Regional authorities also attempted to control the content 
of sermons and “dakwah”. Commenting on the ban instituted by the regent of 
Tasikmalaya on dakwah which is against “Pancasila and the 1945 constitution, and 
obstructs the path of national development and disturbs political stability,” Religious 
Affairs minister Munawir Sjadzali said that “with the Priok incident, I suppose regional 
authorities are choosing preachers who they know so as to maintain order and peace in 
their regions.” Indeed, the Tasikmalaya regent was reported to say, “I don’t want the 
Tanjung Priok incident to reoccur in Tasikmalaya. As such, I took immediate action.”262 
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On October 4, 1984—less than a month after the Tanjung Priok incident—bombs 
exploded in the predominantly ethnic Chinese area of central Jakarta. Two of the bombs 
targeted separate branches of a Chinese-owned bank, BCA, and a third bomb targeted a 
store in the shopping area of Glodok—Jakarta’s “Chinatown”. Although the bombs 
were amateurishly made and deployed, the third explosion nevertheless killed the store 
owner, Go Tjun Hien and a security guard, Effendi. The first of the BCA bombs caused 
no casualties; the second exploded in the hands of Jayadi, one of the bombing suspects, 
leaving him with serious injuries.263 
 
Coming in the midst of an ongoing conflict between Islam and the state, naturally 
suspicion might have fallen on Darul Islam for perpetrating the attacks. But 
counterintuitive as it may be, the Tanjung Priok massacre and the push to impose 
Pancasila had less impact in traditional Darul Islam circles than it did in radicalizing 
more mainstream Muslims. This was because the Pancasila policy, by definition, only 
applied to mainstream organizations which accepted the legitimacy of the Republican 
state. Darul Islam, however, long alienated from the mainstream, had never given such 
acceptance. On the Pancasila-as-sole-foundation controversy, former Darul Islam youth 
leader Nur Hidayat observes, “Our people considered it the problem of a neighbouring 
state, so we didn’t care about the sole foundation issue. That has to be underlined.”264   
 
Rather than radicalizing Darul Islam, the New Order drive to inculcate Pancasila 
radicalized a section of the political elite, represented by the Petition of Fifty 
signatories. It drove dissident but populist Muslim preachers in Tanjung Priok towards 
violent means of confrontation. From Benny Moerdani’s initial press conference the day 
after Tanjung Priok it was clear that dissident preachers would be held accountable for 
the violence. Moerdani went so far as to name three preachers, who, on the day of the 
incident had allegedly provoked the crowd with fiery speeches. These were the 
aforementioned Amir Biki, who was one of those shot dead, Syarifin Maloko S.H., and 
Muhammad Nasir (a preacher who shared a name with the former prime minister). 
Following the BCA bombings, several senior government critics were arrested and tried 
for subversion. These included the former secretary of ASEAN and Siliwangi general 
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who had helped Soeharto assume power, H.R. Dharsono, and the populist preachers 
A.M. Fatwa and Abdul Qadir Djaelani. Critics suspected that the government was 
exploiting the unrest in Priok and the bombings to punish prominent government critics.  
 
In August 1985 A.M Fatwa, Abdul Qadir Djaelani and H.R. Dharsono were brought to 
trial. According to a source quoted by Tempo, 
 
Dharsono and Fatwa have been put in the same category as Abdul Qadir 
Djaelani and Toni Ardie and associates who were considered to be 
“provocateurs” [“tukang kipas”], who had helped to ignite the Tanjung 
Priok incident. 
 
Dharsono, a prominent member of the Petition of Fifty, countered that he and his 
petition colleagues were different. But his comments were also an illustration of how 
Soeharto’s policy towards Islam had united otherwise divergent anti-government 
elements: 
 
They are a group of preachers, whereas we are not. Fatwa is indeed also a 
preacher. Our similarity centers on the sole foundation issue. This doesn’t 
mean we are anti-Pancasila, but [anti] the sole foundation. The difference 
is that they use sermons and speeches and we use the Petition of Fifty.    
 
The preachers were all accused of making statements in sermons which undermined the 
government, making them guilty of subversion. But Dharsono and A.M Fatwa were 
also accused of hosting a meeting a week following Tanjung Priok in which a group of 
Muslim youths were present. According to the prosecutor, the youths discussed a range 
of actions to be taken in response to Tanjung Priok, including bombings, and that these 
discussions ultimately led to the BCA bank attacks. Fatwa and Dharsono were charged 
with abetting the bombings by their presence at the meeting. During the meeting, held 
in a prayer hall adjacent to the residence of A.M. Fatwa, Dharsono allegedly said, “The 
Tanjung Priok incident has created widespread dissatisfaction among the people, and 
this should be capitalized on for the struggle. Let’s not stop at this point, there should be 
a continuation.”265   
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The evidence of Dharsono and A.M Fatwa’s involvement in the bombings was slight. 
The prospect, however, of hitherto non-violent Muslim politicians turning to violent 
tactics raises the issue of the different responses in the Muslim community to New 
Order repression and political exclusion. The literature on the causal links between 
political repression and Islamist radicalization is scant and, at best, inconclusive.266 But 
it is plausible that some mainstream or at least non-violent Muslim figures adopted 
violent jihadist agendas in response to incidents like Tanjung Priok, the forced adoption 
of Pancasila, and the general perception that the regime was persecuting Muslims. 
Indeed, by maintaining the ban on Masyumi and prohibiting independent Muslim 
political parties, the regime likely drove some in the rising modernist Muslim urban 
class over to the jihadist cause.   
 
However, while there is strong evidence from other countries that indiscriminate and 
tyrannical repression provokes increased militancy among Islamist groups (consider 
Algeria and Egypt in the 1990s), as Shadi Hamid observes, such extremes are rare. Most 
autocrats in the Muslim world prefer a less arduous and risky combination of carrots 
and sticks to suppress their political opponents. “It is usually preferable to employ low 
to moderate levels of repression,” Hamid argues, “and to use political incentives and the 
threat of sanction to co-opt and divide opponents.”267 In the face of selective repression 
and political exclusion, a common response is to simply withdraw from the political 
sphere or political competition with the regime.268 Hamid refers to this  effect as “forced 
moderation”. Indeed, forced moderation was the overwhelming consequence for most 
Muslim critics of the New Order regime, who withdrew from formal politics, perhaps in 
hope of avoiding both cooptation and repression of their organisations. Leading the way 
in this response was Nahdlatul Ulama, which, in 1984, formally withdrew from party 
politics in order to focus on its social and educational roles. Shortly thereafter, NU 
became the first Islamic mass organization to adopt Pancasila as its “sole basis”. 
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Conclusion	
The revival of Darul Islam under the New Order regime saw the reestablishment of long 
dormant networks of jihadists motivated to violently oppose the state. But the revival 
was fundamentally unstable, based, paradoxically, on accepting co-optation by the state. 
Although the movement sought to act in its own right and to throw off the shackles of 
regime co-optation, having allowed state sponsorship and patronage from the outset of 
the revival, movement militants were highly vulnerable to surveillance and arrest. Thus, 
during the 1970s Darul Islam found itself exploited and out-maneuvered by the state at 
every turn. In the 1980s Darul Islam did little better for itself. Its attacks against the 
state were poorly planned and executed, and reflected a lack of technical capability. 
Meanwhile, aloof from mainstream politics, Darul Islam was unable to capitalize on a 
high level of grievance in the Muslim community at the perceived victimization of 
Muslims by the Suharto regime. Ultimately, a weak jihadist movement was defeated by 
effective state co-optation and repression.  
 
Moreover, mainstream political Islam was also repressed by the Suharto regime, a fact 
that was not lost on militants such as Hispran, and, as we shall see in the following 
chapter, his recruit, Abdullah Sungkar. The regime, therefore, was successful in 
blocking two channels of opposition at the same time: the peaceful and the militant. 
Many Muslim political activists simply withdrew from formal politics, like those of 
Nahdlatul Ulama, to focus on apolitical cultural activities and proselytizing. But for a 
section of the Darul Islam movement, New Order repression was so overwhelming that 
it was motivated to seek refuge in neighbouring Malaysia. This initial push factor would 
trigger a process of transnationalisation leading to regional assemblage that would later 
be instrumental in the rise of global jihadism in Southeast Asia.  
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4	
DETERRITORIALIZATION	
 
The Darul Islam revival of the 1970s might have had no lasting consequences had it not 
served to bridge the traditional jihadism of Darul Islam with the modern salafi jihadism 
of what would later emerge as Jemaah Islamiyah. As we have seen, during the revival 
Hispran recruited two radical preachers from Central Java, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir, inducting the preachers into the Darul Islam community. Crucially, 
Sungkar and Ba’asyir, just like their senior colleague Hispran, would conclude that 
there was no space for formal Islamic opposition in Suharto’s Indonesia. Now, via 
Darul Islam, Sungkar and Ba’asyir would get their first taste of violent jihadism. It was 
the preachers’ response to the problem of political exclusion that would change the 
course not just of Indonesian jihadism, but jihadism in the region. They sought safe 
haven in Malaysia, where they continued to develop a following, now on both sides of 
the border with Indonesia. Thus we can see them as key initial agents in the process of 
transnationalisation and regional assemblage. But, as we shall see in this chapter, even 
before exile in Malaysia, Sungkar had done much to transnationalise the movement in 
terms of its ideology and organization.  
 
Abdullah Sungkar would emerge as the most charismatic Darul Islam leader since 
Kartosoewirjo. But unlike previous leaders, who had kept themselves in rustic isolation, 
Sungkar was attuned to developments in global Muslim politics and international 
affairs. Through his skill in adapting new ideas from the Middle East and elsewhere, 
before he even left for Malaysia, Abdullah Sungkar began to modernize and 
deterritorialize Darul Islam, bringing it more in tune with the salafist and Muslim 
Brotherhood ideas emerging from the Middle East. He accepted the obvious: that the 
battle for Kartosoewirjo’s Islamic State was no longer possible in New Order Indonesia, 
in which almost every inch of territory was subject to regime surveillance and 
repression. So he sought to rebuild the movement for an Islamic state from the ground 
up, starting with small study groups and focusing on developing a community or 
jemaah.  
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But even with this more strategic approach, he and Ba’asyir would not last long in 
1980s Indonesia. It is likely that even without Abdullah Sungkar, New Order repression 
of Islamists in the 1970s and 1980s would have pushed some jihadists into exile. But 
the process of political exclusion that would culminate in regional assemblage was 
greatly enhanced by the entrepreneurial leadership of Sungkar, who, well before his 
arrival in Malaysia was looking beyond the horizon of Indonesia. 
 
A	new	leader	emerges	
The key to understanding Abdullah Sungkar’s transformation of Indonesian jihadism is 
to realize that he came to the movement as an outsider. His family had no Darul Islam 
background but instead was connected to Muslim world at large. Sungkar’s mother was 
a local Javanese but his father had emigrated to Indonesia from the Hadramaut region of 
Yemen. Given his father’s lack of Indonesian or Javanese, Sungkar grew up speaking 
Arabic.269 He became a member of the Union for Reformation and Guidance, 
commonly known as al-Irsyad, an organization for Indonesian Muslims of Arab 
descent. Politically, he became aligned with the modernist camp as a member of 
Masyumi, the Muslim political party and movement which had been barred from 
electoral politics under the Suharto regime. Along with other disenfranchised Masyumi 
members he was an early follower of the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council 
(Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII) and a supporter of its leader, Muhammad 
Natsir, the former prime minister and Masyumi politician. Natsir had established DDII 
in 1967 with an inward focus on religious proselytizing (dakwah) as a lower-profile 
alternative to political competition given that he and Masyumi remained banned from 
politics under the Suharto regime.270 Yet, as Martin van Bruinessen remarks, under the 
leadership of Natsir, “the most charismatic puritan Muslim leader there ever was,” DDII 
became “one of the most important voices of dissent in New Order Indonesia.”271  
 
Sungkar’s radicalization, then, came via two main influences—the traditionalist Hispran 
and the modernist Muhammad Natsir. Both of these men were sharp critics, in their 
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different ways, of the exclusion of Muslims from the political process. It was the fusion 
of the different approaches represented by Hispran and Natsir that produced in Sungkar 
an original and potent new approach to opposing Suharto.  
 
Yet Sungkar’s dominant personal influence was always his mentor Natsir, who 
according to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, was his “idol.”272 Indeed, Sungkar appears to have 
taken after the older man, with his educated critique of secular politics and his 
charismatic persona. Given this background it is hard to imagine Sungkar would have 
joined the Darul Islam, a movement that, in contrast to Natsir, countenanced violence 
against the state, if Indonesia at the time had tolerated a peaceful Islamist opposition 
party. As Sidney Jones first observed:  
 
It is questionable whether a man like Abdullah Sungkar, JI’s founder, 
would have made common cause with DI if the New Order government 
had allowed a party like Masyumi, the largest Muslim party before its 
banning by Sukarno in 1960, or any party headed by Mohammad Natsir, 
to function freely.273  
 
Before he was introduced to Darul Islam, Abdullah Sungkar became known in Central 
Java in the late 1960s as an outspoken and eloquent itinerant preacher, highly critical of 
the Suharto regime. He came to prominence through his regular thirty-minute sermons 
delivered at the Surakarta Grand Mosque and for helping to establish, with Ba’asyir in 
1969, Radio Dakwah Islamiyah Surakarta (RADIS), a pirate radio station that was 
eventually shut down by the local authorities on account of its anti-government content. 
For the time, their broadcasts were uncommonly provocative. In one instance, Ba’asyir 
riffed on life under the Suharto regime, reportedly saying, “We Indonesians live as if we 
were riding an air-conditioned bus. It’s all cool and comfortable but we are actually 
heading towards hell. And the driver is ... Suharto!”274  
 
In the early 1970s Sungkar and Ba’asyir were under the political influence of 
Muhammad Natsir when his Dewan Dakwah increasingly adopted a puritanical 
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approach to Islamic theology, due in large part to growing Saudi influence. Such 
influence sought to purify Islam of the accretions of local traditions, return to the key 
scriptures, the Qur’an and Hadith. DDII activists promoted in the community public 
expressions of piety, narrowly construed, and highly inflected by Arab culture—
expressions designed to distinguish the pious from ostensibly less pious Muslims. For 
example, the wearing of the hijab for women, gender segregation, and Arabic language 
forms of address were all encouraged. At this time DDII became the main conduit for 
Saudi funding of Islamic education in Indonesia, via the World Islamic League.275  
 
In 1970 Sungkar was made assistant chairman of the Solo branch of Dewan Dakwah 
and in 1972 he and Ba’asyir founded the Al-Mukmin pesantren, eventually located in 
Ngruki, near Solo. Along with their puritanism, the Ngruki founders were also 
modernist preachers who saw themselves as offering their students a modern 
curriculum, up to date with advances in science and education. Thus, Ngruki’s Arabic 
program was modeled on the program taught at Gontor, one of the most prestigious 
religious schools in Java (and the school where Abu Bakar Ba’asyir himself had been a 
distinguished student). Likewise, Ngruki’s Islamic law program was based on the 
program taught by Persatuan Islam (Islamic Association) at their pesantren in Bangil, a 
school renowned for its puritanical modernism.276    
 
According to Ba’asyir and sources close to Ngruki, in the mid-1970s, preceding 
Ba’asyir and Sungkar’s recruitment into Darul Islam, the pair attempted to form an 
underground movement to promote the adoption of Islamic law by teaching followers to 
model their lives on the actions of the Prophet.277 As Muhammad had spread Islam by 
first forming a congregation (or jama’ah) of followers, so they decided to turn away 
from Islamic political parties and mass organizations like DDII and towards forming 
their own tightly knit following. To this end they approached twelve Muslim preachers 
in Solo to help form a congregation that would serve as the seed of a new movement. 
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But none of the twelve men approached would commit to an organization which, no 
doubt, would have risked becoming a target of repression.278  
 
It was only in late 1976, after the failure of their attempt to start an underground 
movement of their own, that Sungkar and Ba’asyir joined Darul Islam. Since the mid-
1970s the pair had been visited by Hispran, the Central Java DI leader, in the course of 
the latter’s efforts to revive Darul Islam in the province. Sungkar and Ba’asyir were 
both inducted into Darul Islam in December 1976, with Sunkgar made leader for the 
Surakarta area, and Ba’asyir his deputy.279 According to Ba’asyir, the oath-swearing 
ceremony was conducted by Hispran himself, even though they would subsequently 
deny this.280 Sungkar’s decision to join Indonesia’s oldest militant Islamic movement, 
mystical and backward looking, was at odds with his natural alliance with modernist 
Muslim critics of the New Order. On hearing of Sungkar’s move, DDII leader 
Muhammad Natsir demanded that Sungkar choose his allegiance: either Darul Islam or 
Dewan Dakwah—but not both. In the early1950s, Natsir, as prime minister and  
Masyumi chairman, had agreed with the goal of an Islamic state but had vigorously 
opposed Darul Islam’s violent methods. But Sungkar, by the time he joined Darul 
Islam, appears to have given up on peaceful mainstream politics. He relinquished his 
position in DDII without noticeable regret.281 Within Darul Islam, Sungkar and Ba’asyir 
quickly emerged as two of the movement’s most industrious and dynamic activists. 
Their efforts to recruit students in Central Java continued apace, only now under the 
auspices of the Islamic State of Indonesia. 
 
Sungkar’s	radicalization	
Although Abdullah Sungkar might be described as a radical preacher from early on, it 
was only as a member of Darul Islam that he appears to have been drawn into the 
periphery of episodes of violent confrontation with the state. In 1977, Sungkar was 
detained for a month by Kopkamtib for using his sermons to encourage voters to 
boycott the general election, an offense in New Order Indonesia. The following 
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November both Sungkar and Ba’asyir were detained on charges of subversion, part of 
the wider military crackdown on what the regime called “Komando Jihad.” It was 
alleged that they had made anti-government statements in their sermons and had refused 
to honour the Indonesian flag at their Ngruki pesantren. The case against them would 
turn, however, on the claim that the radical clerics had become members of the Islamic 
State of Indonesia, a charge they denied.282 
 
Given access to the wide Darul Islam network, Sungkar had gone from being a rising 
star on the dissident landscape in Java to having access to an Indonesia-wide network of 
potential collaborators and recruits. By 1977 he had been made regional commander for 
the Solo area and was regularly attending Darul Islam meetings.283 Sungkar spent most 
of 1978 evading the military authorities after they had called him to account for a 
sermon in which he had criticized Pancasila. He was finally arrested late that year in the 
midst of an ongoing crackdown on Darul Islam followers in Central Java which had 
seen many of his recruits and peers also arrested. This period of “mass arrests,” which, 
as we saw in the previous chapter, ended the Darul Islam revival, was perhaps the most 
traumatic period for the movement during the New Order.  
 
In Central Java, one Darul Islam response to the arrests, when members were not on the 
run, was to strike back against government informants who were suspected of 
compromising the movement. The recourse to violence was led by two formidable 
members of a newly created Darul Islam “Special Forces” (Pasukan Khusus) unit, 
Warman and Farid Ghozali. The unit had been established by the new Islamic State of 
Indonesia imam, Adah Djaelani, to serve as a kind of praetorian guard which would 
protect Djaelani personally, as well as carry out certain dangerous or risky operations. 
Such operations included those deemed to constitute fa’i, a Qur’anic term for the “spoils 
of war” but here used to describe robberies conducted to generate funds for the 
movement, and assassinations of members who had betrayed the Islamic State of 
Indonesia. Warman, especially, was a renowned bandit, having conducted a string of 
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armed robberies in his previous base of South Sumatra before successfully fleeing the 
region and finding refuge in Central Java.284 
 
To avenge the arrest of Sungkar, on January 11, 1979 Warman, Ghozali and two other 
prominent members close to Sungkar, Hasan Bauw and Abdullah Umar, talked their 
way into the home of Drs. Parmanto. After gaining entry, Warman allegedly fired 
several bullets from a pistol at Parmanto, killing him. Not long after the murder the 
authorities arrested more Darul Islam members, this time very close to home. A raid on 
Farid Ghozali house was carried out, in which Ghozali was shot dead.  
This time there were rumours that Hasan Bauw, the Darul Islam commander for 
Yogyakarta, had informed on Ghozali. Again motivated by revenge, Warman and his 
associates murdered Hasan Bauw.  
 
The Warman murders in January 1979 were followed by a series of fa’i operations. In 
February Warman and other special forces personnel stole over Rp. 4 million from an 
Islamic university in Yogyakarta, in an attack in which they fired a weapon at a 
university cashier. Following this they conducted an armed robbery of a night bus, 
netting an unknown sum of money. An armed robbery of a gold trader in Majenang 
produced money and goods worth Rp. 11 million. Finally, in late 1979, and not long 
after the failed robbery of a teacher training college in Malang, Warman and several of 
his associates were arrested. Warman, however, was able to escape detention and 
remain on the run for almost two years. On July 23, 1981 he was found hiding in a 
village near Bandung, where he was killed by the authorities while attempting to flee. In 
explanation of Warman’s earlier escape from custody, Kopkamtib commander Admiral 
Sudomo indulged the popular mystique which had come to shroud what the newspapers 
had called Kasus Teror Warman. “The security [at the prison] was strong and 
comprehensive,” he said, “but that kind of person has the power to hypnotize.”285 
 
Darul Islam’s violent turn in Central Java appears to have been a symptom of the 
controversial leadership of veteran Darul Islam commander, Adah Djaelani. Djaelani 
had been jockeying for power since at least 1975 when Darul Islam moderates, Djadja 
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Sudjadi and Kadar Solihat, had formed a breakaway group that they called Jihad Fillah. 
The presence of the Jihad Fillah faction, with the possibility that Djadja Sudjadi was 
attempting to claim the Darul Islam imamate for himself, only intensified the rivalry 
between the two veteran commanders. According to Djaelani, from 1978 his and 
Sudjadi’s faction competed over the same recruitment base in the Darul Islam heartland 
of West Java, leading to mutual animosities and betrayals. In response, Djaelani said in 
his trial in 1983, he ordered that Sudjadi be legally sanctioned with some kind of 
punishment—kidnapping, for example. However, only months later, he claimed, did he 
learn that Sudjadi had been shot dead.286 
 
But another, more popular, version of Sudjadi’s death has it as an assassination. It is 
claimed that Djaelani misled Darul Islam elder Ajengan Masduki into sanctioning 
Sudjadi’s assassination by asking him what, according to Islamic law, should happen if 
there are two people who claim to be the rightful imam. Masduki allegedly  responded 
that the legal approach would be to consider one imam false, the punishment for which 
would be death. Masduki, however, was unaware he was being manipulated into giving 
approval for the application of the death penalty to a senior Darul Islam fighter.287  
 
Sudjadi and his son-in-law were shot dead in the living room of their home on January 
17, 1979, by a group of unidentified assailants. It is likely that the killing was yet 
another special forces operation, as Tahmid Kartosoewirjo suggested to a court in 
1983.288 Sudjadi’s wife told reporters that in the days before the attack, senior Darul 
Islam leaders had made visits to press Sudjadi to rejoin the mainstream of the 
movement, code for accepting Adah Djaelani’s leadership. Since rejecting their 
entreaties, she said, he had been nervously awaiting the consequences.289  
 
The Sudjadi assassination can been seen as marking the beginning of the short-lived 
reign (until August 1981) of Adah Djaelani, which was characterized by Darul Islam’s 
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much more casual propensity for deploying violence against individuals. Later that year, 
on July 1, 1979, Adah was formally appointed as the new Imam of the Islamic State of 
Indonesia in what some senior Darul Islam figures later described as a “bloodless 
coup.”290 It is not clear where Abdullah Sungkar stood on Adah Djaelani’s controversial 
leadership. But it is noteworthy that prior to his joining Darul Islam the Solo-based 
preacher appears to have been associated with only non-violent dissident activities. 
Association with Darul Islam changed that fact, and thus played the most decisive role 
in the radicalization of Abdullah Sungkar’s ideology. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, in the early 1980s Sungkar was drawn into Mursalin Dahlan’s Phases of 
Revolution plot. From these formative years on, Sungkar would be committed to the 
violent overthrow of the state.    
 
Sungkar	at	trial	
While Sungkar’s early experience in Darul Islam drew him into violent jihadism, it was 
his and Ba’asyir’s trial for subversion in 1982 that established him as one of the most 
powerful critics of the Suharto regime. Sungkar, according to his closest confidante of 
many years, could not be bothered to write but could speak in a way enchanted 
audiences.291 Thus he was as suited to the show trial and he was to the pulpit. Sungkar’s 
defense statement, published in edited form that same year by Ar-Risalah Press, 
constitutes one of the most articulate dissident critiques of the New Order by anyone of 
the period. Sungkar’s court performance also marked him out as a powerful next-
generation Darul Islam ideologue, at a time when the organization was ideologically 
adrift.  
 
To appreciate how Sungkar was able to mount such a stinging public attack on the 
government in a climate in which political speech was highly circumscribed, and to 
register something of the impact of the event, it is useful to first consider the place of 
court trials at that time in Indonesia. In New Order Indonesia, court trials were sites of 
“contentious performances,” in the metaphor of sociologist Charles Tilly. Tilly defines 
contentious performances as “learned and historically grounded performances” in which 
actors make claims that bear on the interests of other actors in ways that improvise on a 
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“shared script.”292 As Tilly explains, “In a given time and place, people learn a limited 
number of claim-making performances, then mostly stick with those performances 
when the time to make claims arrives.”293  
 
Paradoxically, in New Order Indonesia oral and written defense statements at trials 
(pledoi) were an opportunity for dissidents to criticize the regime, air grievances, and 
make public allegations. Courts were relatively open platforms for such political speech, 
despite their being an expression of state power in which the verdict was almost always 
pre-determined. For example, in his 1978 subversion trial, mystic and former 
Agriculture Department functionary, Sawito Kartowibowo, launched a series of 
sensational and unheard of claims of corruption and misconduct, directed at the Suharto 
regime, claims subsequently reported in the press.294 In a 1979 trial for insulting the 
president, student leader Heri Akhmadi gave an eloquent and searching critique of the 
New Order regime; his defense statement was later published by the Cornell Southeast 
Asia Program.295 As Ariel Heryanto observes in his study of a number of trials under 
the New Order, “the importance of many political trials … lies in the fact that they 
allowed an open confrontation between the agents of the state and their critics,” a 
confrontation in which, he notes in the cases that he considered, “the final outcome of 
the case gave the ruling regime a victory in legal terms but an expensive symbolic 
defeat in political terms.”296   
 
In Indonesia, show trials in which the “show” is subverted by dissidents into a claim-
making performance trace their tradition back to the defense statement made by the 
country’s future present Soekarno before a Dutch colonial judge in Bandung in 1930. 
Soekarno’s critique of the colonial authorities was later published by the Soekarno 
government under the title Indonesia Menggugat (Indonesia Accuses), a publication 
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which subsequently entered the Indonesian nationalist canon.297 The Indonesia 
Menggugat tradition, echoing Emile Zola’s 19th century cry at official injustice in his 
article, “J’Accuse!”, regularly inspires critics, most of them on the page rather that in 
the dock, to cast their formal critiques in the idiom of an “accusation.” Thus Sawito’s 
defense statement at his appeal to the Jakarta High Court in 1982 was titled Pancasila 
Menggugat (Pancasila Accuses).298  
 
Following in this tradition, Sungkar’s defense statement is a panoramic critique of the 
Suharto regime and its human rights record, set out in the vocabulary of Indonesian law 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He is not afraid accuse the authorities 
of torturing him and other Darul Islam detainees, nor to impugn the independence of the 
prosecutor, whom he accuses of being under the control of Kopkamtib, an 
“unconstitutional institution”—an accurate description for the Suharto-established 
apparatus which had effectively granted permanent martial law powers to the 
Indonesian military.  
 
Sungkar’s critique of the political system under Suharto was just as dauntless. Of 
significance for theories linking political exclusion to radicalization, Sungkar explicitly 
makes the case that he had been radicalized by the exclusion of Muslims like him from 
the political process in Indonesia. He targets what he calls the “hijacking” of previously 
independent organizations, including Islamic organizations, by New Order intelligence 
operations. He notes that with rigged elections and no independent political 
organizations, Muslims, such as the DDII leader Muhammad Natsir, have been forced 
to abandon the political stage, and to limit themselves to proselytizing, or dakwah, a 
path which he himself has been forced to follow. But now, he observes, the regime is 
trying to control dakwah too—a reference to regime attempts to control speech within 
the mosque. Preachers in mosques are “forced to follow the opinions and thoughts of 
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the authorities,” Sungkar claims, “until soon they will not allow religious interpretations 
based on pure religious teachings.”299 
 
For Sungkar the solution to such a political impasse is to restrict oneself purely to 
matters of Islamic law as it is revealed in the Qur’an and Hadith, and according to the 
“opinions of all the major religious scholars acknowledged by the Muslim community 
around the world.” Sungkar then cites writings that are “distributed widely throughout 
the country, in magazines and other publications.” His list of publications, however, 
reveals that his reading consisted of material far from what might be considered 
mainstream Islamic scholarship. Indeed, most of his reading was radical Islamist canon. 
It includes the 13th century scholar, Taqiyudin Ibnu Taimiyah, the militant Pakistani 
ideologue, Abu A’la Al Maududi, and the dissident Muslim Brotherhood figure, Sayyid 
Qutb—authors now considered foundational in the development of Salafi-Jihadist 
ideology.  
 
Sungkar then draws on Maududi and Qutb to argue that Pancasila is incompatible with 
Islam. Furthermore, he argues that to consider Pancasila as the sole foundation of the 
law is to set it against Allah, who should instead be the sole source of law. Therefore, 
adhering to Pancasila is a form of idol worship—a sin which makes the one who 
commits it an idolater (syirik), who “will not be absolved by Allah, and will be tortured 
in hell for eternity.”300 
 
The recourse to Islamic law and the sovereignty of God was the centerpiece of Sayyid 
Qutb’s remedy for injustice and corruption in Egypt under the secular rule of Gamal 
Abdel Nasser.301 It was a remedy Qutb himself borrowed from Maududi, who also 
railed against secular authority on the basis that it contravened the principle of tauhid, 
the unity of God and His authority. Qutb coined the term tauhid hakimiyah to express 
the precept that unity must be maintained when it came to law and governance and also 
that any deviation from such unity, say, in the passing of legislation which does not 
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have a basis in the Qur’an, would be considered a breach of unity and thus a form of 
idolatry or polytheism.302     
 
Sungkar’s defiant and ideological defense statement stands in stark contrast to that of 
Hispran, his Darul Islam recruiter, who was tried in 1978. Hispran’s densely 
handwritten defense statement is a pusillanimous screed in which he pretends to have 
long-since renounced the Islamic State of Indonesia, blames his Darul Islam colleagues 
for being the true leaders of the revival, and begs for forgiveness from the government 
and its security apparatus—the rulers of a state based on the Pancasila, which, in stark 
contrast to Sungkar, he is keen to affirm, beseeching his judges to agree that “a state 
which is based on the Pancasila is a state which is inspired by the one true God and 
humanitarianism … [and thus] will surely treat me justly.”303 For all his remorse and 
conciliation, Hispran was sentenced to life in prison, one of the longest prison sentences 
of any Darul Islam convict.  
 
By contrast, Abdullah Sungkar, who explicitly rejected the law on Pancasila as the state 
ideology—not just in his sermons but also before his judges—was sentenced, along 
with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, to nine years’ prison. They were both released, however, on 
September 9, 1982, not long after the close of their trial, when the Central Java High 
Court reduced their sentence to three years and ten months—a period less than the time 
they had already served in pre- and post-trial detention.  
 
Nevertheless, two years’ later, on February 11, 1985, at the appeal of the prosecutor the 
initial nine-year sentence was reinstated. But before Sungkar and Ba’asyir could be re-
arrested to serve the balance of their prison time, they fled the country. According to 
their lawyer, Rustamadji, immediately prior to their disappearance, his clients had 
become concerned after they were served a summons by both the prosecutor’s office 
and the Surakarta court, at the same time as the security services stepped up their 
presence outside the Ngruki boarding school. The chairman of the Ngruki foundation 
revealed that sometime in February, Sungkar and Ba’asyir had in fact resigned from 
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their positions at the school, ostensibly in order to free themselves to serve the 
remainder of their prison sentence.304 
 
Just as Ariel Heryanto observes in his own study of political trials during the New 
Order, the trial of Sungkar and Ba’asyir may have resulted in jail time for the 
defendants, but it hardly advantaged the regime. On the one hand the defendants 
ultimately evaded the final verdict (the verdict was annulled by the time Sungkar and 
Ba’asyir returned from exile). On the other, their defense statements, published by the 
mosque youth behind Ar-Risalah magazine, enhanced Sungkar’s charismatic authority 
and served as inspiration for his followers. As I note later, Sungkar’s trial performance 
would serve as required reading for his usroh recruits, exposing them not just to the 
thinking of Sungkar but also to that of foreign radical Islamists.   
 
The	origins	of	Salafi	Jihadism	in	Indonesia	
When Abdullah Sungkar established the guidelines for Jemaah Islamiyah in the mid-
1990s he created perhaps the first Southeast Asian jihadist group explicitly dedicated, 
according to its constitution, to the Salafi method.305 Salafi jihadism has since become a 
popular descriptor for some groups that grew out of the Arab response to the war in 
Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, most notably al-Qaeda. Yet, as Thomas 
Hegghammer has shown, groups described as Salafi jihadist do not represent a coherent 
set of beliefs or doctrines.306 Following Hegghammer, I suggest understanding 
Salafism, a puritanical impulse originating in Saudi Arabia, as a cultural influence 
which inflects and influences a range of jihadist groups to varying degrees. In 
combination with influences from the Muslim Brotherhood, and dissident brotherhood 
figures like Sayyid Qutb, Salafism can be seen as contributing to a broadly defined 
jihadist ideology and culture, the dominant culture among militant Islamist groups 
today. The problem with Salafi jihadism as a category of groups, as Hegghammer 
argues, is that it does not necessarily tell us what a group’s immediate targets or 
significant goals might be.  
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I consider Abdullah Sungkar’s introduction of Salafi culture to Indonesian jihadism as 
having paved the way for the movement’s territorial transnationalization by first 
transnationalizing its culture and ideology. In terms of his thinking, before he ever left 
Indonesia Sungkar had already transcended the confines of Darul Islam tradition and 
adopted militant Islamist ideas that put in him in the ideological company of jihadists 
elsewhere in the Muslim world.  
 
However, due to the lack of clarity in the way the term is used, there is some debate as 
to how far back one can trace Salafi jihadism in Indonesia. One prominent Indonesian 
scholar argues that such ideas can be traced to the very beginning of the Darul Islam 
movement. In his book NII Sampai JI: Salafy Jihadisme di Indonesia (From NII to JI: 
Salafi Jihadism in Indonesia), the researcher and former journalist, Solahudin, claims 
that aspects of Salafi jihadism were developed independently in Darul Islam as early as 
the 1950s, so that “the school of thought associated with the ideology of Al-Qaeda in 
fact resembles teachings followed by Darul Islam members in the past.”307 This claim 
centers on Darul Islam’s early use of the concept of takfir—declaring one’s Muslim 
enemies apostate and thus legitimate targets of jihad, a practice for which some Salafi 
jihadi groups are notorious. Solahudin points to the criminal code of the Islamic State of 
Indonesia, published in 1949, to show that Darul Islam practiced takfir by sharply 
dividing Indonesians into those it considered genuine Muslims and those it considered 
infidels (kafir). Indeed, the code enshrines such a dichotomy under the rubrics “Umat 
Muslimin” (the Muslim Community, which lived under Darul Islam control) and “Umat 
Kafirin” (the Infidel Community, which lived under Republican “occupation”).  
 
There are, however, two problems with identifying Darul Islam’s early use of takfir 
with Salafi jihadism. First, as Hegghammer observes, takfir is a pejorative term and, 
historically, Salafi jihadi groups have been accused of “takfirism” for political reasons, 
predominantly by Arab governments that have sought to delegitimize those groups with 
an unattractive label. Takfirism, moreover, is not an identifiable doctrine and the 
adjective takfiri is not used as by jihadists as a self-appellation. Rather, as Hegghammer 
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notes, in Islam, excommunicating one’s Muslim enemies has traditionally been done by 
different groups, to varying degrees, and for different purposes.308 Takfirism is thus a 
standard tactic of Muslim extremists.309  
 
Second, Darul Islam’s early use of takfir came in the context of an insurgency against 
the Indonesian Republic, and during a war of independence against the Dutch. It is true 
that its penal code refers to the “Infidel Community” as those under republican 
sovereignty, but this description comes under an article headed “Wartime Islamic Law” 
(“Hukum Islam dalam Masa Perang”). As the wartime context from which Darul Islam 
emerged receded into the past, so did its use of takfirism. If takfirism was used later, it 
was deployed in a much more limited way to refer to Suharto or his regime—a practice 
not limited to Salafi jihadists—and it was not applied to the community at large.   
 
Nevertheless, Solahudin does unearth an early example of an idea from militant Islamist 
reformers in the Middle East that had found its way to Darul Islam. He observes the 
similarity between the concept of tauhid hakimiyah, formulated by Sayyid Qutb to 
signify the sovereignty of God’s law (the rejection of which leads a Muslim to be 
designated an infidel) to the concept of tauhid mulkiyah, formulated by the Darul Islam 
ideologue Aceng Kurnia, sometime in the 1970s. Tauhid mulkiyah was intended to refer 
to the kingdom (from “Malik,” the Arabic for “King,”) of God on Earth, and by analogy 
the government of God, which of course applies Islamic law. Such a kingdom was 
intended to be a reference to, and legitimization of, Darul Islam’s Islamic State of 
Indonesia, a rejection of which could also result in one being considered an infidel.310 
According to Solahudin, Aceng Kurnia developed the concept after reading Indonesian 
translations of Sayyid Qutb and Abu A’la Maududi in the 1970s, in particular Qutb’s 
Milestones.311 And while Kurnia’s elaboration of tauhid was “relatively original,” 
Solahudin writes that, “this was a DI version of the doctrine of tauhid that was 
increasingly similar to the Salafi jihadi version of tauhid hakimiyah.”312 Indeed, in 
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Sayyid Khatab’s research on the linguistic origins of Qutb’s hakimiyah, he finds that the 
Arabic term mulk is equivalent to the term hakimiyyah in denoting sovereignty:  
 
[T]he term hakimiyyah is synonymous with the term mulk (dominion, 
power, rule, supreme power of authority)…. In dictionary terms ‘The 
malik is the sovereign’. This is one of the ninety-nine special attributes of 
Allah. He is the Dominion of the Heavens and earth. He is the King, the 
Ruler of Mankind. This means that the hakim (sovereign) is the malik 
(sovereign) and that the hukm (sovereignty) is synonymous with the mulk 
(sovereignty).  
 
Aceng Kurnia’s coinage of tauhid mulkiyah, being linguistically synonymous with 
Qutb’s hakimiyyah, clearly does betray the influence of Qutb, and via Qutb, Maududi, 
both now Salafi jihadi icons. According to Solahudin, the concept of mulkiyah was used 
by Darul Islam to justify excommunication (takfir) of Muslims who did not accept 
Darul Islam, similar to the way it is used by modern Salafi jihadi groups.313  
 
On the basis of Darul Islam’s use of concepts such as these, Solahudin argues that Salafi 
jihadi-like ideas indigenous to Darul Islam provided a receptive context for the foreign 
diffusion of Salafi jihadism to Indonesia. However, one could also argue that Darul 
Islam’s doctrinal innovation of tauhid mulkiyah appears to adapt a popular Qutbist 
concept in the service of defending Darul Islam’s long-held central doctrine: the 
continuing existence of Kartosoewirjo’s Islamic State of Indonesia. While Qutb’s 
concept of sovereignty served to make the case for the creation of an Islamic state, 
Kurnia’s “kingdom” made the case for the reversion to Darul Islam’s Islamic State of 
1949. As Solahudin states,  
 
In Aceng Kurnia’s view, the manifestation of the institution of mulkiyah 
Allah in Indonesia is the Islamic State of Indonesia…. DI’s defeat in 1962 
does not erase its institutional status of mulkiyah. It still exists, although 
NII for the time being is unable to establish Islamic law in Indonesia.314  
 
In other words, with tauhid mulkiyah, Kurnia had confected a jurisprudential argument 
for Kartosoewirjo’s Islamic State. Thus Qutbist thought inspired a new articulation of 
Darul Islam’s traditional ideology, rather than the adoption of Salafi jihadism as we 
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would now recognize it. Furthermore, even if tauhid mulkiyah did “give birth to a takfiri 
stance in DI/TII,” as Solahudin argues,315 takfirsm does not seem to have dominated 
Darul Islam thinking in the way that is has the groups in the Middle East who have been 
labeled as such. He points to some evidence post-Aceng Kurnia that takfir was used in 
Darul Islam to justify fa’i operations against Muslims classified as apostates.316 But the 
use of takfir against large populations does not appear to have been a common practice 
in Darul Islam. As with many other groups in Islamic history, the use of takfir in Darul 
Islam appears to have been more limited and specifically targeted.317  
 
Such issues of interpretation notwithstanding, Solahudin shows that even before the rise 
of Abdullah Sungkar concepts from foreign Islamist thinkers were beginning to filter 
through to Darul Islam ideologues. Selective adoption of Qubt can be seen in the 
writings of another senior figure, Ules Sudjai, the Darul Islam special forces chief under 
the leadership of Adah Djaelani. In a tract he wrote in 1981 titled “A Brief History of 
the Islamic Fundamentalist Movement in Indonesia,” there is evidence of reading 
beyond traditional Darul Islam sources. Sudjai rails against Pancasila and the New 
Order restrictions on dakwah but he does so using a Qubtist vocabulary. He repeatedly 
describes the Suharto regime as a “jahiliyah” government run by “thogut”. Jahiliyah, 
the Qur’anic term denoting “pre-Islamic” times of barbarism and ignorance was adapted 
by Sayyid Qutb and applied to Egyptian society under the secular nationalist 
government of Gamal Abdul Nasir, which Qutb so vehemently opposed. Thogut, which 
traditionally referred to a pre- or anti-Islamic idol, was fashioned by Qutb into an 
epithet to describe any tyrannical, non-Islamic, authority.318 Echoing Qutb, Sudjai 
opposes what he sees as secular rule in Indonesia on Qur’anic grounds. “The rogues of 
this jahiliyah government,” he writes, “are thogut who place themselves on a level with 
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Allah SWT, that is to say, feel they have the sovereignty to make laws and ordinances 
outside of the noble Qur’an.”319  
 
Also echoing Qutb, Sudjai asserts that according to the Qur’an and the Sunnah, 
Indonesia today is “inhabited by two types of community which are directly opposed to 
one another.” On one side there is what he describes as the jahiliyah community 
(“masyarakat jahiliyah”), which exists under the rule of the New Order; on the other, 
the Muslim community (“masyarakat Islam”). Sudjai’s writing also betrays the 
influence of modernist militant thought in its preoccupation with purifying the faith of 
unwarranted innovations not found in the Qur’an or Sunnah, known as bid’ah. In his 
critique of the jahiliyah community he finds their creed “full of fictions [khurafat], 
additional beliefs,” and their devotions “mixed with bid’ah that is very corrupting.”320  
 
In emphasizing the purification of faith and the rejection of mysticism, Sudjai’s writing 
indeed reflects the influence of puritanical Salafism. But in Sudjai, Salafism is 
combined with Darul Islam nationalist mythology, resulting in a curious contradiction 
between the purifying and anti-mystical purpose of Salafist doctrine and the mystical 
and millenarian tradition of Darul Islam and its founder, S.M. Kartosoewirjo. While 
Sudjai’s screed rails against innovations, his entire historical narrative is an apologia for 
Kartosoewirjo’s Islamic State of Indonesia.  Nevertheless, his work confirms that from 
the early 1980s Darul Islam thinkers came under the influence of Salafist thought from 
the Middle East. Gradually, from this time, reformers in Darul Islam would seek to 
cleanse its ideology of what they considered to be its unfashionable Javanese 
millenarian and mystical past.  
 
Foreign influence would not, however, change Darul Islam’s obsession with statehood 
and territory. As Sudjai argues, the existence of Kartosoewirjo’s Islamic State was to be 
the premise for jihad. Thus the main focus of organizing should be on the “territorial 
institutions” of the state, “civil as well as military.” Harking back to traditional Darul 
Islam notions of territory and sovereignty, Sudjai writes that territory is secured by 
building upon the bases of the movement. What is meant by this, he clarifies, is “control 
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of people, land and property; or territorial control.”321 “On Indonesian soil,” he 
concludes, “in reality there operates two rival governments. First: the jahiliyah 
government (above ground), and second: the Islamic government (that remains entirely 
underground).”322  
 
It fell to Abdullah Sungkar, a new recruit from a non-Darul Islam background, to 
pioneer a militant Islamist culture in Indonesia that was recognizably Salafi jihadi. 
Indeed, Sungkar appears to have been more thoroughly influenced by Qutb, the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Salafist thought than he was by any Darul Islam doctrine. No doubt 
this was due to the fact that his original institutional home, DDII, had been largely 
responsible for translating and publishing such Salafist and Brotherhood literature, 
making it widely available in Indonesia from the 1970s.323  
 
Sungkar’s ideology can be seen in the anti-Pancasila argument he prosecuted in his trial, 
which he developed further in a series of eloquent sermons given in late 1984 and early 
1985. The sermons, preserved in cassette recordings, provide a snapshot of his political 
thinking just prior to his going into exile. Strikingly, he spends just as much time 
denouncing what he considers examples of bid’ah (unwarranted innovations) in 
Javanese culture as he does the Suharto regime. He vehemently condemns the practice 
of celebrating birthdays, which he describes as a Christian ritual. He warns his audience 
against the traditional practice of tahlilan—the ritual of gathering to praise God at 
intervals after a person’s death in order to safeguard their spirit. Likewise, he targets 
Shi’ism and Western education as un-Islamic deviations which must be eradicated from 
Indonesian society.324 
 
Another influence on Sungkar appears to have been Ahmad Hassan, the founder of the 
Islamic Union (Persis), who advocated transnational pan-Islamism and rejected 
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nationalism and its attributes.325 Sungkar, too, mocked the very concept of nationalism, 
a stance that put him at odds with Darul Islam’s nationalist ideology. In one sermon, 
Sungkar’s mocking tone draws laughter from the audience:  
 
Why is there now a belief that our country [negara] is this country and 
that this country is owned by our people [bangsa]? And no one can rule it 
except our own people. Because of that there must be an assembly to 
create legislation and laws. Please! This is real idolatry, my brothers.326   
 
Sungkar’s salafist traits would become more prominent over time, especially in 
Malaysia, where he began to cite the puritanical Arab preacher Muhammad bin Abd al-
Wahhab, whose teachings have official status in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, just as Darul 
Islam influenced Sungkar in a jihadist direction, so Sungkar influenced Darul Islam in a 
Salafist direction. However, Sungkar’s impatience with Darul Islam’s failure to update 
its ideology and culture quickly enough would culminate in his founding of the 
breakaway group Jemaah Islamiyah.  
 
Usroh	
Sungkar was not just the pioneer of Salafi jihadism in Indonesia. In the 1980s he was 
also one of the early promotors of small study circles or usroh, the organizational 
system of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Usroh, the Arabic for “family,” were 
closely knit study circles of between seven to ten members, formed to cultivate 
members’ piety at the same time as to constitute the building blocks of a movement to 
Islamize society. In Egypt, Richard P. Mitchell described the usroh model as “the real 
basis of the power of the Society of the Muslim Brothers,” after it was adopted in 
1943.327 In Hasan al-Banna’s vision the tightly knit but hierarchically controlled usroh 
were for purposes of indoctrination, so that members were not just loyal to the 
organization but loyal to the faith. According to Mitchell, although the ultimate goal of 
the Brotherhood was total transformation of society or revolution, the “whole spirit of 
the Society … [was to believe] that the problems of Egyptian or Islamic reform could 
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never be solved unless individual Egyptians or Muslims were first rehabilitated or 
reformed.”328 Thus the usroh placed a great deal of emphasis on training its members in 
personal piety, on praying together and on providing one another with social support.   
 
Usroh appears to have entered Indonesian Muslim thought in the early 1980s through 
campus missionary organizations. Some trace its origins in time and place to the Salman 
mosque at the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB). One account is that mosque 
imam Imaduddin Abdurrahim brought the first translations of Muslim Brotherhood 
writings—books by Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb published in Malaysia—back to 
Indonesia, along with them the concept of usroh. Imaduddin pioneered his own study 
group system, Latihan Mujahid Dakwah, which became “the spark for the rise of 
Islamisation on the campuses,” according to a survey of the “mosque youth” 
phenomenon.329 Another account notes that “the Salman Mosque ITB is recorded as the 
pioneer in developing the usroh system.”330  
 
Directly emerging from the dakwah program at the Salman mosque was the Badan 
Koordinasi Pemuda Mesjid (BKPM) which took the “mosque youth” concept and made 
it a national movement. Although BKPM was pioneered by Salam mosque youth like 
Toto Tasmara, its first chairman, from the outset it was heavily influenced by radical 
streams of thought, and figures like Mursalin Dahlan, also one of the Salman mosque 
cadres who later, under Darul Islam influence, would use BKPM as a base for recruiting 
young militants from around the country with the goal of Islamic revolution, as we saw 
in the previous chapter.  
 
Sungkar’s adoption of usroh was another significant step in modernizing Indonesian 
jihadism into a movement that reflected foreign trends in militant Islamism. In their 
small circles, these Sungkar followers would be somewhat aloof from the traditional 
Darul Islam member, potentially a way to avoid conflict with the state. But just an in 
Egypt, the usroh were about creating an enduring network based on mutual social 
support.  
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One of Sungkar’s recruiters, Budi Santosa, explained to an Indonesian prosecutor how a 
study group would be arranged. At a local mosque, at the conclusion of a general study 
session the most diligent students would be approached, cultivated and eventually asked 
to join an usroh.331 At an early usroh meeting the new member would be given a 
manual which served as the primary text for the group. Then, according to Santosa, it 
would be explained that  
 
Usroh is an organization based on the Muslim family, which is bound by 
mutual recognition, knowledge, Muslims helping each other … they have 
to help each other until they constitute a Muslim family, [and] from a 
Muslim family until [they constitute] a Muslim society that is blessed by 
Allah [diridloi Allah], that is, a society that has faith in God’s Law so that 
Islam will be realized comprehensively in Indonesia.332 
 
In an usroh manual found in the case file of Wiyono alias M. Sidiq, a thirty-three-year-
old goldsmith living in Solo, members were given detailed instructions on the purpose 
of the group and how to conduct their weekly activities. Under the rubric of 
“brotherhood” members were to adhere to the following instructions: 
 
• Visit members who are sick 
• Assist members who need help 
• Offer congratulations to members who achieve a success 
• Offer condolences in death 
• Give compensation/benefits to family members who suffer 
hardship 
• Strengthen the ties of friendship333 
 
In Sungkar’s usroh, as in the Muslim Brotherhood, the penultimate stage of the 
movement, the purpose of all the study and education (tarbiyah), was jihad. “Without 
jihad,” the manual states, “the objectives of knowledge and education are made 
meaningless because jihad is the climax of the process of developing the character of 
the Muslim.”334 Another section indicates that jihad is interpreted broadly to include 
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“Jihad in education,” “Jihad with body and soul for the greatness of Islam,” and “Jihad 
in politics.”335 While these objectives sound innocuous enough, in case there were any 
doubt that the usroh promoted radical ideas, the list of reading recommendations directs 
members to books by al-Maududi and Sayyid Qutb.336   
 
The transnational diffusion of Muslim Brotherhood thought to Indonesia at this 
juncture, in the mid-1980s, appears to have been very much an incomplete process, 
mediated by the writings that had been translated into Indonesian from the original 
Arabic, and published as whole books, or as in the case of the usroh, edited into 
pamphlets to be photocopied and circulated to members. Working with what was 
available to him, Sungkar thus created his own jihadist fusion. He took the spirit of 
Kartosoewirjo’s jihad against the secular Republic, the puritanism of the Salafis, and the 
cell structure and recruitment practices of the Brotherhood to form his own unique 
synthesis. But he was not just borrowing, he was also adapting, rejecting ideas that he 
disagreed with. We have seen that he rejected Darul Islam’s nationalism. But he also 
explicitly rejected the Muslim Brotherhood’s accommodation of parliamentary politics, 
which he considered illegitimate.337  
 
Statements the usroh recruits later gave to the authorities reflected Sungkar’s 
ideological bricolage at the time. Fragmentary and sometimes contradictory influences 
were underpinned by a loyalty to Sungkar and desire to live according to Islamic law. 
When it came to political readings, recruits commonly referred to three sources of 
influence: Ar-Risalah/Al-Ikhwan, the underground magazine produced by the 
Yogyakata mosque youth; Yaum Al-Quds, a magazine distributed freely to Ngruki by 
the Iranian embassy; and Perjalanan Hukum Di Indonesia: Sebuah Gugatan, the edited 
volume of Ba’asyir and Sungkar’s defense statements at their 1982 trial.338  
 
Budi Santosa, the deputy usroh coordinator for Surakarta, gives an enlightening account 
of what these texts meant to him. Al-Ikhwan, he says, contains examples of the 
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government’s weaknesses, “and with knowing the government’s weaknesses it will 
increase the zeal for syari’ah Islam.” Yaum Al-Quds, he explains, relates Iranian 
Muslims’ zeal for struggle, “and the success of their struggle will also inspire [our] 
enthusiasm, in the hope we can succeed like Iran.” Finally, of Perjalanan Hukum, he 
says, by understanding the weakness of the rule of law in Indonesia, “automatically we 
know also the weakness of man-made law.”339   
 
Budi Santosa, like other recruits, told the authorities that the usroh taught that to respect 
the Indonesian flag, a piece of cloth, constituted kemusyrikan, or idol-worship. Another 
recruit, Wayono Syafei, a thirty-four-year-old teacher at an Islamic boarding school 
(madrasah) in Sukoharjo, spoke of reading material which taught that the jemaah 
(community) is anti-nationalist and that “the jemaah will enter heaven but nationalism 
will enter hell.”340 But how was this anti-nationalism reconciled with the legacy of 
religious nationalism bestowed by Kartosoewirjo and his Islamic State? How did 
recruits see the red-over-white Darul Islam flag with its crescent moon and star? 
Moreover, how was Sungkar and Ba’asyir’s increasingly puritanical Salafism 
reconciled with the Shiite Islam propagated by the Iranian embassy, Shiism being 
anathema to Salafism?  
 
The answer, perhaps, is that the synthesis Sungkar sought to cultivate in his followers 
was a work in progress. New ideas were allowed to agglomerate in the service of 
inspiring a fresh movement of dissident youth loyal to Sungkar and Ba’asyir. A kind of 
bricolage ideology inspired the usroh youth. At this time also, the name Jemaah 
Islamiyah appears in court documents interchangeably with “usroh”. 341 Sungkar’s 
recruits, even at this early stage, appear to have been followers of Sungkar’s movement, 
whatever one called it, more than they were “citizens” of Darul Islam’s Islamic State.  
 
In his recruitment during the height of the repression of the 1980s, Sungkar had thus 
already begun to play a longer, more strategic game of resistance to the Indonesian 
state. He consolidated his forces and turned toward private religious study, years before 
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he would leave Darul Islam to establish Jemaah Islamiyah. He distanced himself from 
the risky and under-resourced acts of rebellion conducted by Darul Islam activists. For 
these purposes, the Brotherhood’s usroh system may have been a particular inspiration. 
As Mitchell observes, although the revolutionary and violent potential of the 
Brotherhood apparatus was the source of much consternation for the Egyptian 
government, in their statements al-Banna and his replacement, Hudaybi, rejected drastic 
measures against the state. Although they were somewhat ambiguous as to their stance 
on revolution, they emphasized the need to socialize the principles of Brotherhood 
teachings gradually, through the usroh system, before society would be ready for 
political change. This point, Mitchell observes,  
 
remained the essence of the official position throughout Banna’s time and 
especially in Hudaybi’s: the principal role of the Society was to be one of 
education (tarbiyyah) of the people to the truth; ‘when the people have 
been Islamized, a truly Muslim nation will naturally evolve.’342  
 
Sungkar’s turn to usroh, however, did not save his recruits from eventual detection and 
arrest by the Indonesian authorities. Far from being the ideal cell structure in which the 
connections between groups up and down the hierarchy were limited in order to prevent 
easy disruption, Sungkar’s usroh movement was highly centralized with at least group 
leaders required to swear an oath (bai’at) to Ba’asyir or Sungkar and to attend meetings 
at Ngruki to report their activities.343 But the price of greater control over recruits was 
easy detection. In the early to mid-1980s, hundreds of Sungkar’s followers would be 
arrested and detained by the authorities.344  
 
Conclusion	
During the 1970s and early 1980s, the Darul Islam movement was thoroughly out-
maneuvered and disrupted by a Suharto regime that saw political Islam as its greatest 
threat. Its poorly planned and resourced conspiracies against the Indonesian state only  
ended in failure and more repression. For Islamists more generally, caught between 
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cooptation and repression, there was little hope at the time for organized opposition to 
the New Order. 
 
In this bleak political climate Abdullah Sungkar rose to the fore as an innovative, 
articulate, and charismatic Islamist leader and thinker. By introducing his own Salafi 
jihadist synthesis of Middle Eastern and Indonesian ideology, he transformed 
Indonesian jihadist thinking. He also sought to consolidate a resistance movement, 
developing cadres through training, avoiding confrontation with the state now for the 
promise of jihad in the future.  
 
In recruiting his own following and forging his own ideology, Sungkar’s served to 
deterritorialize Indonesian jihadism by discarding its fixation on Kartosoewirjo’s 
Islamic State. The organizational names he began to use during this period, such as 
usroh and Jemaah Islamiyah (the study-circle-as-family and the Muslim Community), 
unlike those of Darul Islam, were flexible concepts and universal models of Islamic 
organization, open to Muslims of any country and background. Thus, even before he 
went into exile, Sungkar prepared the way ideologically for a jihadist movement that 
would transcend Indonesia and align its followers with jihadist movements elsewhere in 
the Muslim world. This ideological rescaling of Indonesian jihadism prefigured its 
geographical rescaling, and was an important early stage in the process leading to 
regional assemblage.  
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5	
NEXUS		
 
Depending on where you live, to escape your immediate circumstances you might “run 
for the hills.” Hill tribes in mainland Southeast Asia, as James Scott illustrates in The 
Art of Not Being Governed, preserve societies that elude the authority of the modern 
state.345 In the fragmented world of island Southeast Asia, however, you might just as 
easily run for the seas. Such was the course of Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar 
Ba’asyir, who in 1985 smuggled themselves onto a boat and sailed across the Malacca 
Strait to Malaysia.  
 
In seeking to evade repression in Indonesia they led the transnationalization of 
Indonesian jihadism. In studies of civil war and insurgency, it is commonly observed 
that while rebels are able to evade the power of the state by crossing to a neighbouring 
country, states themselves are radically constrained by the internationally recognized 
borders that contain them. In Rebels Without Borders, Idean Salehyan notes that as a 
consequence of such asymmetry, “in a large share of civil conflicts, rebels seek 
resources and mobilization opportunities outside the territory of the state—and rebellion 
becomes transnational.”346 Even better if the neighbouring location is close enough to 
facilitate coordination of the movement back home.   
 
There is no indication that Sungkar ever intended to create a region-wide network of 
Southeast Asia jihadists. His emigration was caused by the “push factor” of Indonesian 
repression and after emigrating he remained focused on overthrowing Suharto and 
establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia. But I argue that where Sungkar fled to was 
decisive in shaping his movement and contributing to a process of regional assemblage. 
Sungkar moved from inland Java, at the edge of the Southeast Asian archipelago, to an 
area near the historical centre of the Malay world, located at the tip of peninsula 
Malaysia—an area that I call the “Malacca hinterland” (see map). In doing so, Sungkar 
effectively shifted the headquarters of his movement to a historic zone of cosmopolitan 
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convergence where in earlier times Sultans and European colonisers alike sought a 
strategic base from which to control their regional networks.  
 
Over time, Sungkar’s movement would form the main network in an assemblage shaped 
by the fluid geography of maritime Southeast Asia—a disparate seascape that lends 
itself not to territorially based insurgencies like Darul Islam, but to the formation of 
amorphous and distributed political networks like the great Srivijaya empire of the 8th 
century, which spanned the Malacca Strait and reached remote islands beyond. 
Sungkar’s network also spanned the strait, connecting his persecuted followers in Java 
with his new recruits in Malaysia. From there the network would expand further still, 
spurred by the rapidly modernising and Islamising international hub that was Malaysia 
of the 1980s and 1990s.   
 
Hijrah	
In 1985 Sungkar and Ba’asyir escaped Suharto’s Indonesia with some help, some luck 
and a little misdirection. According to Adung (alias Sunarto), Sungkar’s aid who was 
designated leader of the escape plot (Amir Perjalanan), on March 3, the morning after 
the summons to attend court to hear the outcome of their appeal process, Sungkar called 
a briefing at Ngruki to inform his staff that he would be attending court and that he 
would accept the judge’s decision. He told his staff to prepare for the possibility that he 
and Ba’asyir would be sent to jail again. Prior to his announcement, however, in a 
discussion with their inner circle, Sungkar and Ba’asyir were advised that they should 
not obey an infidel court; they should evade the authorities, or at the very least let the 
authorities come to Ngruki and take them by force, as this would be more principled in 
the eyes of God.347 They settled on a strategy of evasion, imagined in Islamic idiom as a 
hijrah or “flight,” which, on the model of Muhammad according to the Qur’an, 
indicates a temporary strategic withdrawal. Malaysia not yet on the horizon, their 
objective was to safely escape Central Java.  
 
Adung’s first and most important task as hijrah organiser was to divert the covert 
intelligence operatives who were thick on the ground around the pesantren and who 
were known to tail Sungkar everywhere he went. A safe house owned by one of their 
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followers in a non-descript side street in Solo was designated. Then, Adung followed 
Sungkar as he left Ngruki to visit his wife across town to say farewell. While Sungkar 
said goodbye to his family, Adung kept lookout, monitoring the operatives who had 
followed them. By way of a third-person courier he sent a note to Sungkar to take the 
main road back to Ngruki on his way home. When Sungkar eventually departed, Adung 
followed and then overtook him, while the operatives followed further behind, 
presumably expecting Sungkar to return to the pesantren. But suddenly, at a 
predetermined point Adung pulled off into a side street and into the safe house, Sungkar 
closely following him. Later that day Ba’asyir came with a car and his driver. That 
evening, says Adung, they were blessed by a heavy downpour, which obscured their 
escape to the highway that would take them to the provincial capital of Semarang. In 
Semarang they changed cars, leaving Ba’asyir’s driver to return to Solo, and continued 
on to Jakarta, taking a circuitous route through the West Java capital of Bandung.348 
 
While hiding out in Jakarta news reached them of the fallout from their escape. They 
heard that the courtroom had been packed with onlookers and members of the security 
services awaiting their arrival. On realizing that Sungkar and Ba’asyir had failed to 
attend, officers were sent directly to Ngruki to conduct a search of the premises and, 
according to Adung, his own home was raided and “turned inside out.”349 The three 
would spend the next six weeks laying low Jakarta, while the authorities, expecting 
Sungkar to appear in Surabaya for one of his scheduled sermons, focused their manhunt 
on the wrong city. While hiding in Jakarta Sungkar spent some of the time recording 
sermons to cassette tapes to be distributed underground, in conscious emulation of 
Ayatollah Khomeini, whose recorded critiques of the Shah had helped to mobilize 
supporters and prepare the ground for revolution in Iran in 1979.350  
 
Apparently it was during this time in Jakarta that Sungkar and Ba’asyir began to 
consider seeking refuge in Malaysia. The idea came from Sungkar’s idol, Muhammad 
Natsir. Although they had parted ways organizationally, Sungkar and Natsir had 
remained close personally. Natsir also offered to help them find safe passage from 
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Indonesia to Malaysia, drawing on his network of contacts in both countries.   Sungkar 
accepted, and immediately, others wanted to join him. Around ten other militants would 
take part in the initial emigration, spurred by the post-Tanjung Priok massacre 
crackdown on Islamist preachers. The most notable of these included the Mosque Youth 
Communication Body (BKPM) activists, Abu Jibril and Muchliansyah, both of whom 
would go on to become important figures in Jemaah Islamiyah.351 
 
On March 10, Sungkar, Ba’asyir and a small party, including Adung and two guides 
paid for by Natsir, left Jakarta for Malaysia. They planned to reach their destination via 
one of the illicit routes across the Malacca Strait commonly used by smugglers and 
migrant workers. First, from the port of Merak, they caught a ferry from Java to 
Sumatra. Then, in convoy, they went north by road through the Sumatra countryside in 
the direction of the strait, buying food along the way and stopping to eat only when they 
found an isolated section of forest.352 By evening they had reached the port of Tanjung 
Balai on the North Sumatera coast, facing the Malacca Strait. While they gathered at a 
local hotel, their guides hired a traditional boat (prau) with an outboard motor. That 
evening the group boarded the prau and set sail for Malaysia. It is hard to ascertain the 
names of all the passengers on the trip, but Sungkar and Ba’asyir appear to have been 
joined by a surprisingly diverse bunch of Muslim opposition activists. They included 
Hilmi Bakar Almascaty, well known in post-Suharto Indonesia as a leader of the 
vigilante group, Islamic Defenders Front, and Abdullah Hehamahua, a Muslim student 
leader who in 2013 would serve as a member of the advisory board of Indonesia’s anti-
corruption commission.353 Adung recalls that just before dawn prayers, after a troubled 
journey during which the motor of the prau repeatedly failed, they reached Pulau Ketam 
in Malaysia, a small underdeveloped island located off Port Klang, Malaysia’s busiest 
sea port. The group was wet and seasick. But Natsir had arranged for them to be met 
with transport and a change of dry clothes. After a short trip to Bandar Baru Bangi, a 
town on the outskirts of the Malaysian capital, Kuala Lumpur, they were ensconced in a 
safe house.  
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After a month of hiding in Bandar Baru Bangi most of the group were able to obtain 
Malaysian identity cards with new names, making their hijrah complete. In Malaysia, 
Abdullah Sungkar would be known as Abdul Halim bin Ali and Ba’asyir as Abdus 
Somad. According to Ba’asyir, it was Muhammad Natsir’s close connection with future 
Malaysian deputy prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim, then a senior minister in the 
Mahathir government, that allowed them to settle in Malaysia so easily, and to be 
granted residency visas. Supporting the Indonesian dissidents was also convenient 
politics at that time in Malaysia. Prime Minister Mahathir, for his part, was keen to be 
seen as pro-Islam so as to not be out-flanked by Islamist opposition party, PAS. At the 
same time, he was happy to undermine Suharto, his regional rival.354 “In fact,” says 
Ba’asyir, in explanation of the fortunate political circumstances, “at that time, according 
to Dato’ Anwar Ibrahim, the Malaysian government would close its eyes to our arrival 
but in principle give us some leeway because back then the Malaysian government and 
Mahathir were not in agreement with Suharto.”355  
 
Although their emigration to Malaysia was seamless, and might now be seen as an 
obvious move, at the time it was not quite inevitable that Sungkar and Ba’asyir would 
reposition their movement to the strategic Malacca hinterland. Muhammad Natsir, the 
person who had first suggested and then arranged the emigration, had in fact proposed 
that Sungkar and Ba’asyir only pass through Malaysia before going into exile in Saudi 
Arabia. Saudi, he reasoned, was further from Indonesia and thus safer from the Suharto 
regime. Also, Abdullah Sungkar spoke fluent Arabic and had extended family in the 
country. But the pair were more concerned with building their movement against 
Suharto than with their own safety. So they chose to live in nearby Malaysia, trading 
safety in return for ease of communication and coordination with Indonesia. As Ba’asyir 
recalls: 
 
Indeed the late Muhammad Natsir suggested we live in Saudi because 
there it’s safer and further away. But we decided to choose Malaysia. Our 
reasoning was that we could continue our struggle against the sole basis 
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[secular Pancasila ideology] … and that we could stay in touch with our 
brothers in Indonesia, the distance not being so far.356  
 
Having settled on Malaysia, again it was Muhammad Natsir, via his contacts, who 
introduced the duo to a suitable Malaysian host: Hashim Ghani, an outspoken Salafi 
preacher who led the Ittiba Us Sunnah madrasah, just outside the small rural town of 
Kuala Pilah, about an hour south of Kuala Lumpur, in the state of Negeri Sembilan. 
Conveniently, Negeri Sembilan, where both Sungkar and Ba’asyir would live through 
to the 1990s, placed them in the south of the Malay peninsula, within easy reach of both 
the national capital airport and the coastal sea ports, lying, as it does, in the hinterland of 
Malacca. Singapore, the modern-day inheritor of Malacca’s status as the region’s 
preeminent commercial hub, lies not far south of this hinterland. With the emigration of 
Sungkar, Ba’asyir and others to this area in the mid-1980s, the centre of the Indonesian 
jihadist movement was effectively transplanted to a zone of cosmopolitan hubs that 
have been strategic locations in the region’s political and trading networks at least since 
the time when local Sultans clashed with Portuguese and Dutch colonisers.  
 
But it is not clear how much, if at all, Sungkar and Ba’asyir were conscious of having 
relocated to a space that would allow them to network across the region more easily. 
More parochially, they appear to have been attracted to Kuala Pilah by the presence of 
Ittiba Us Sunnah founder Hashim Ghani’s Salafism and welcoming pan-Islamism. 
Ghani, a student of the Egyptian reformist scholar Muhammad Abduh, and closely 
aligned with the puritanical Indonesian teacher Ahmad Hassan, has declared his goal 
was to “support the concept of Salafism based on the Qur’an and the Sunnah in this 
country especially and also in the struggle of salafi colleagues around the world 
generally.”357  
 
Salafism, furthermore, had a long history in Kuala Pilah. In the 1930s the town had 
emerged as the Malaysian base for modernist Islamic scholars from West Sumatra, 
followers of what was known in those years as the “Kaum Muda” (Young Group) 
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movement.358 These reformist ulama were influenced by Egyptian salafism to purify 
Malaysian Islam from what they saw as the corruption of the Malay Sultans and other 
traditional Islamic authorities. Ittiba Us Sunnah, which became known for its crash 
courses in Qur’anic translation, has regularly clashed with the local Islamic authorities 
since this time to the very present, with its strict rejection of the adherence to any one of 
the mainstream schools of Islamic thought (mazhab), a practice which it considers 
“deviant and haram.”359  
 
Sungkar and Ba’asyir, also followers of Ahmad Hassan and Salafist doctrine, found 
themselves a local ally in Hashim Ghani, who helped them to settle into their adopted 
country. His son, Hazim Ghani explains, “We were sympathetic to them because they 
were fugitives, hunted by their own government … Lots of people over there [in 
Indonesia] were being disappeared in the middle of the night, killed by the 
government.”360 Hashim Ghani found the Indonesians a house to rent in the Kampung 
Parit, an unassuming village on the edge of Kuala Pilah, and thereafter Ba’asyir and 
Sungkar began to teach occasionally at Ittiba Us Sunnah. Although their teachings, 
combining Salafism with Darul Islam militancy, were rather radical even in that 
context, they found a receptive audience in 1980s Malaysia, where the Muslim 
community held Indonesian Muslim scholars in high regard.361  
 
During this period, the Indonesians introduced a jihadist culture to the Salafist school. 
There, former Jemaah Islamiyah commander, Nasir Abas, first learnt about jihad and 
the heroic struggle of the mujahidin in Afghanistan at the feet of Ba’asyir and Sungkar. 
He recalls how he borrowed or bought books from the Indonesians on the topics of 
“jihad law” and the “jihad stories of the prophet Muhammad.”362 According to Abas, 
while Sungkar and Ba’asyir promoted the cause of foreigners joining the Afghan jihad 
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(something he would later do), Hasyim Ghani was of the view that the obligation to 
wage jihad in Afghanistan was already fulfilled by the Afghan people.363  
 
Malaysia’s	nexus	position	
Indonesian jihadists sought out Malaysia as a safe haven, which, due to the region’s 
fluid borders, would allow easy access back to Indonesia. But as a place of modernizing 
and highly networked cities, located on a peninsula that extends so far southwards that it 
is spatially both of the mainland and of the archipelago, Malaysia would serve as the 
perfect nexus with neighboring countries and the world beyond. Social movements are 
inevitably influenced by the places they inhabit. In his survey of the geography of social 
movements, Paul Routledge argues for the importance of geographical context, given 
the central role place plays in shaping the claims, identities and capacities of political 
actors.364 In the case of Malaysia, it introduced Indonesian jihadists to the Muslim 
world at large, reorienting them from their narrow national outlook to an international, 
pan-Islamist one. Accordingly, their political grievances would shift scale too: from the 
imposition of Pancasila secularism in Indonesia to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
In many ways, Malaysia was a transnational space ideally suited to growing the region’s 
first transnational jihadist movement.   
 
One of the early ways in which Indonesian jihadism was changed by its new geography 
was the induction of Malaysians into Darul Islam—the first non-Indonesians to join a 
group. After settling in Malaysia, Sungkar and Ba’asyir obtained a license to preach, 
known in Malaysia as a tauliah, and began proselytizing widely in the peninsula at 
mosques and surau (prayer halls). Ba’asyir recalls that he and Sungkar offered students 
a two-track system of pengajian or Islamic study. The first track was a public study 
group (pengajian umum), conducted openly at mosques, in which the topics were “just 
the light stuff” and which served as the preachers’ entre into the local community. The 
second track was a private, special group (pengajian khusus), in which more radical 
material would be covered, ideally leading to the recruitment of those students who 
seemed the most enthusiastic. “In the special study group,” according to Ba’asyir, “we 
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conducted a kind of caderization [recruitment of a cadre] in order to sow consciousness 
of jihad.” They were so successful, claims Ba’asyir, in attracting “Malaysian youth with 
jihadi consciousness” that some of these recruits “went on to Afghanistan and much else 
besides.”365  
 
Recruitment success in Malaysia was welcome, but it was Sungkar’s efforts to maintain 
his following in Indonesia at the same time that created a truly transnational movement. 
To this end, Muzahar Muhtar (alias Taslim), one of the passengers on Sungkar’s hijrah, 
was designated the “silah” (link) between the community in Malaysia and the 
communities in Indonesia (mostly in Jakarta and Central Java). His jobs included 
guiding those who would make the illicit journey over land and water from Indonesia to 
Malaysia and couriering messages back and forth.  
 
In an unlucky turn of events for the movement, however, Muhtar was arrested by the 
Indonesian authorities in 1986. He was arrested in connection with a crime committed 
by two members of the Sungkar network, former gangsters, who had murdered another 
member over a debt. It was only in the course of interrogating Muhtar that the 
Indonesian authorities discovered he was part of a network of Indonesian Muslim 
militants that had spread to Malaysia. When asked by the authorities why Sungkar and 
his followers had fled to Malaysia, Muhtar gave three reasons. First, he said that 
Sungkar, Ba’asyir, Abu Jibril and other leaders had felt they were hunted by the 
authorities in Indonesia. Second, they sought to work in Malaysia to accumulate funds 
for Darul Islam. Third, Muhtar claimed, they intended to organise some kind of physical 
force.366  
 
Although Muhtar’s account must be treated with care given that it was likely produced 
under duress, it provides a valuable sense of the political atmosphere of the time for 
Sungkar and other Muslim activsts. It serves as a reminder that the Suharto regime 
crackdown on radical Muslims in the 1980s helped to displace a significant part of the 
Indonesian militant movement to Malaysia. Sungkar and Ba’asyir were not the only 
Muslims seeking refuge from the Indonesian authorities. A sizable radical fringe of the 
                                                
365 Anonymous interview with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, 2004.  
366 Berta Acara Pemeriksaan Muzahar Muhtar alias Musa, Section 3, p. 6.  
 135 
 
Muslim community in Indonesia, including “mosque youth” activists, radical preachers, 
and others simply caught up in the repression following the Tanjun Priok incident of 
1984, were under pressure or on the run, and many of them found their way to Malaysia 
in the mid- to late 1980s.  
 
Muhtar’s second point, the accumulation of funds, indicates an additional reason that 
Malaysia was an attractive safe haven for Indonesian jihadists. Just as Malaysia drew 
Indonesian migrant workers due to its higher-wage jobs and more highly valued 
currency, so it attracted jihadists seeking to raise money, not just for their families, but 
also for the movement. As an example of how fundraising was conducted, Muzahar 
Muhtar tells his interrogators of Asmadi Ali Usman, a Malaysian building contractor 
who was a sympathizer of Darul Islam. Usman organised with Sungkar to provide 
labouring jobs for a number of Indonesian brothers, who were to be brought across the 
strait by Muhtar.367 In the 1990s, as we shall see, Malaysia’s role as a region for fund-
raising would become central to Jemaah Islamiyah’s territorial strategy.   
 
Muhtar’s third point appears to be a reference to Sungkar’s aforementioned strategic 
“long game”: to avoid conflict with the Suharto regime in the present in favour of 
building a force to challenge it in the future. Thus Sungkar encouraged his recruits to 
acquire military training, characterised as the religious duty of i’dad, or preparation. 
Such an agenda was conveniently served by the war against the Soviet Union that was 
unfolding in the mid-1980s in Afghanistan. Moreover, it appears to have been another 
consequence of the relocation to Malaysia that Indonesian jihadists became readily 
involved, early on, in the Afghanistan “jihad.” But also early on, from their position in 
Malaysia, they saw options for military training closer to home in Southeast Asia. 
 
Not long after their arrival in Malaysia, Sungkar and Ba’asyir began to explore sending 
students for overseas jihad and training. The interrogation of Syaroni (alias Ahmad 
Hikmat), a Jakarta gangster and Darul Islam recruit who sought refuge in Malaysia after 
the murder that had accidentally exposed the network, records early observations that 
foreign military training had become a priority for the Indonesian exiles. Having 
returned to Jakarta and been arrested for the murder, Syaroni told the Indonesian 
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authorities that in Malaysia Abdullah Sungkar conducted regular dawn study circles 
(pengajian subuh), which dealt with the following two issues: first, the Islamic State of 
Indonesia must continue the struggle against the Indonesian Republic, because the latter 
was not based on “pure Islamic law”; and second, [the need to] “send Islamic State of 
Indonesia members to Moro [Southern Philippines], Afghanistan, Pattani [Southern 
Thailand], and elsewhere along with the need to assist the struggle for Islam in those 
Muslim countries.”368  
 
Ba’asyir himself confirms that early on the opportunity for military training was 
associated not just with Afghanistan but also with conflict zones in Southeast Asia. 
Asked why people were sent for training in Afghanistan, Ba’asyir says that it was due to 
Sungkar’s understanding of the “obligations of jihad and i’dad.” Although military 
training was primarily to prepare for the fight in Indonesia, according to Ba’asyir, 
Sungkar emphasised that i’dad may have wider, more regional, applications. “I’dad can 
be applied to jihad anywhere,” he said. “[That is,] wherever jihad might be possible, for 
example in the Southern Philippines … or in Thailand.”369 
 
Although it would be some years before Darul Islam would send militants to the 
Southern Philippines, the experience of exile in Malaysia caused a historic shift in 
Indonesian jihadism towards greater pan-Islamist identification and transnational action. 
Coincidentally, the Indonesians found themselves in a Malaysia of the 1980s that was 
beset by two globalising trends not seen in Indonesia to the same extent. First, rising 
pan-Islamism. Second, Malaysia’s drive to position itself as a rapidly globalising and 
modernising regional centre, in competition with Singapore as a regional transportation 
and communication hub. Located centrally in the archipelago, Malaysia was connected 
to Singapore by a causeway, and to the major capitals of the Muslim world by frequent 
air travel.  
 
Add to this context the greatest pan-Islamist cause of the 20th century, the war against 
the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. For Muhsin Ashin, a Darul Islam member who 
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travelled by boat with Sungkar and Ba’asyir and who stayed with them in Bandar Baru 
Bangar, it was living in Malaysia at such a historical juncture that widened his horizons: 
 
When we were in Malaysia by chance the issue of the Afghan Mujahidin 
was real and hot and became an idiom of struggle. There they had a plan, 
the conditions and the will to access the network, and the information in 
order to go over there [to Afghanistan], so only in Malaysia was all that 
conceived.370  
    
Sidney Jones also notes the significance of Malaysia as a transnational space for 
jihadists, observing that Malaysia during the 1980s was much more open to 
international influences than Indonesia: “Malaysia under Mahathir was outward-
looking, rhetorically anti-Western, and open to virtually every Muslim guerrilla group 
and liberation movement in the world. It helped that any Muslim could enter the country 
without a visa.”371 Indeed, Malaysia played for Darul Islam almost exactly the same role 
as it did for the Free Aceh Movement, at almost exactly the same point in history. As 
Ed Aspinall summarizes it in his definitive study of the Aceh rebellion, for Acehnese 
rebels, “Malaysia provided a place of refuge; a source of finances, weapons and 
recruits; and a window onto the wider world.”372   
 
In fact, Malaysia was a haven for militants from conflict zones across the region, 
including Southern Thailand, the Southern Philippines and Aceh. For the Acehnese 
rebels, a movement that has its origins in a local Darul Islam uprising in Aceh in the 
1950s, Malaysia was a site of resource mobilization that sustained the movement during 
the 1980s, when the New Order was at the height of its power over Aceh.373 The Aceh 
conflict, and in a lesser way, Darul Islam under Sungkar, recalls the thesis of Idean 
Salehyan that neighbouring countries typically play a significant role in sustaining 
cross-border conflict, a pattern Salehyan observers most commonly in cases of civil 
war.374 Antje Missbach observes this phenomenon in her work on the Acehnese 
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diaspora. She concludes that the Acehnese diaspora, headquarted in Sweden but located 
predominantly in Malaysia, played both a role in prolonging the conflict, and, 
ultimately, in ending it.375 The Free Aceh Movement (GAM), just like Darul Islam, 
experienced Malaysia as a transformative transnational space. Missbach observes that 
Malaysia, “as the main hub from which the Acehnese moved to other places, carrying 
the germs of diasporicity with them – was the birthplace of the Acehnese diaspora.”376 
Indeed, with the presence of the Free Aceh Movement and Darul Islam in Malaysia, the 
Soeharto regime was fortunate that the two movements kept a distance from one 
another. GAM was in fact a regional exception to the pattern of Muslim militant 
movements increasingly turning towards pan-Islamist ideology at end of the twentieth 
century. Under the leadership of Hassan di Tiro, GAM had moved instead in a more 
secular direction, playing down Islamic identity as part of a strategy to seek Western 
support for Acehnese independence.377  
 
The broadening of Darul Islam horizons appears to have shifted the movement towards 
a more militant pan-Islamist way of conceptualising its struggle. Malaysia, provided a 
shortcut in this process, serving as a “bridge” to the global ummah. The dual functions 
played by Malaysia as both safe haven and bridge to the wider Muslim world is 
captured in the recollections of Abdullah Hehamahua, a militant who fled Indonesian on 
the same boat that carried Ba’asyir and Sungkar in 1985. He emphasises that at the time 
Muslim activists in Jakarta and Java, just like their counterparts in Aceh, were on the 
back foot, especially since the crackdown following the Tanjung Priok massacre: 
 
After that incident [Tanjung Priok], there were mass arrests of preachers 
and Muslim activists. Because the situation wasn’t conducive, I along 
with several friends fled [“berhijrah”] to Malaysia with the aim of 
continuing our struggle. Together with friends we networked with 
Muslim fighters from the other side of the world who had gathered in that 
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neighbouring country. At that time Malaysia was very welcoming to the 
downtrodden of the Muslim world.378  
 
In the 1980s, Malaysian government policy contributed to this sympathetic 
environment. At a time when Suharto’s Indonesia was repressing Muslim preachers, 
Malaysia, under the leadership of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and in response to 
the global revival of Islam since the Iranian revolution, was going through a process of 
Islamic revival. In the 1980s Mahathir created a new bureaucracy, the Department of 
Islamic Development, Islamized the education system, created an international Islamic 
university, and in 1984 created Malaysia’s first Islamic bank. Thus, Joseph Liow 
concludes: 
 
Mahathir assumed office in July, 1981, as the Islamic resurgence reached 
its peak internationally with the success of the Iranian Revolution and the 
increasing popularity (at least in the Muslim world) of the Afghan 
Mujahideen resistance against Soviet occupation. Mahathir reacted 
immediately to this changing environment by making a conscious 
decision to Islamize the government.379 
 
Mahathir Islamized Malaysia’s foreign policy, too. As Shanti Nair observes, throughout 
the 1980s Malaysia “sought to identify itself with international Muslim issues and as an 
activist member of the global Islamic community. Both Government and UMNO 
rhetoric increasingly referred to Malaysia as an Islamic nation and to UMNO itself as 
the third largest Islamic party in the world.”380    
 
Likewise, Nair observes that the Muslim youth movement in Malaysia was deeply 
affected by the mood of Islamic revivalism and international Muslim solidarity. The 
Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement, ABIM, was at the forefront of such efforts, with 
its leader Anwar Ibrahim becoming an increasingly well-known figure in foreign 
political circles. Anwar had been recruited into the government in 1982 as part of the 
Mahathir’s Islamization program. It was in his capacity as a minister that we have 
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already seen his assistance to Sungkar and Ba’asyir in their relocation to Malaysia. But 
even before then, he and ABIM were dedicated to foreign Muslim causes. The ABIM 
organ, Risalah, according to Nair, “accorded great attention to Islamic developments 
outside Malaysia—issues such as the fate of the oppressed Muslim minorities in the 
Soviet Union, China, Thailand and the Philippines….”381 Citing press reports at the 
time, Nair notes that Anwar Ibrahim was reported to have made a visit to the Afghan 
border in 1980 to deliver M$50,000 to the rebels and demand publicly that the 
Malaysian government send troops and volunteers to support the mujahidin.382  
 
Just as in Sungkar’s flight to Malaysia, Sungkar’s mentor Muhammad Natsir played a 
crucial brokerage role in connecting Sungkar to the wider Muslim world. Crucially, it 
appears to have been Natsir’s former personal secretary, Abdul Wahid Kadungga, then 
based in the Netherlands, who in 1985 travelled to Pakistan and Afghanistan to meet 
with the mujahidin and then, subsequently went via Malaysia to visit Sungkar and 
Ba’asyir on his way to Indonesia. Although Kadungga was a DDII activist, he also had 
strong Darul Islam credentials as a son-in-law of the leader of the Darul Islam rebellion 
in South Sulawesi in the 1950s, Kahar Muzakkar. According to one account, in 
Afghanistan or Pakistan Kadungga had met with some of the key jihadists, including 
Abdullah Azzam and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. In Malaysia he brought with him the news 
that Azzam had opened an office, the Maktab Al-Khidmat (Services Bureau), which 
facilitated the recruitment of foreign fighters to the jihad in Afghanistan. He added that 
Sayyaf had collaborated with Azzam to open a program of military training (tadrib 
askary) specifically for foreigners. According to this account, the news was met 
enthusiastically by Sungkar, who at that moment decided to send cadre to Afghanistan 
as a way of strengthening his movement.383  
 
Subsequently, Ba’asyir and Sungkar made a trip to pave the way for a Darul Islam 
military training program in South Asia. Again, Muhammad Natsir was a key broker of 
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their transnational relationships. With a letter of introduction penned by Natsir, the pair 
were able to meet with the former Saudi ambassador to Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur and 
secure renewable visas to Saudi Arabia, free of charge. Their intention was to seek 
funding for Southeast Asian mujahidin from wealthy Saudi philanthropists, just as the 
Afghan mujahidin had done. But before reaching Saudi, they made a stopover in 
Karachi, Pakistan to strike a deal with the mujahidin commander who was most likely 
to host foreign fighters. In Ba’asyir’s recollection of it, they emphasised the desire to 
contribute to the jihad in Afghanistan, as opposed to their primary motive, which was 
more parochial. According to Ba’asyir:  
 
Before Saudi, we stopped over in Karachi to meet Sheikh Abdul Rasul 
Sayyaf until we succeeded in discussing our doing something to help the 
cause. We would send some mujahidin to Afghanisan to wage jihad over 
there to assist the jihadi struggle.384  
 
Ba’asyir was asked if meeting Sayyaf did anything to change his thinking at the time. 
His answer was that, “after meeting with Sheikh Sayyaf of course our determination to 
wage jihad was greater.” In addition to this inspiration, it appears the deal included an 
agreement that Sayyaf would fund the in-country costs of training in 
Pakistan/Afghanistan through his wealthy Saudi donors: 
 
According to my understanding, at the time of the discussion we got one 
agreement: we can continuously send mujahidin over there and the cost 
will be assumed by Sheikh Sayyaf. So, with Sheikh Sayyaf’s assistance 
from the Arabs, Ustad Abdullah [Sungkar] was assisted in sending 
brothers to wage jihad in Afghanistan and to get military training.385  
 
With a deal struck with Sayyaf, the pair went on to Saudi Arabia where they once again 
fell back on Muhammad Natsir’s international contacts, as they were met off the plane 
by an Indonesian student and member of DDII who was studying at a Saudi university. 
Then they quickly established a base in the capital Riyadh, staying as guests at the 
office of Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami (World Muslim League), of which Natsir was a 
deputy chair. With the help of a nephew of Sungkar’s, Ali Fauzir, a Saudi Arabian 
citizen, Sungkar and Ba’asyir met with important ulema and wealthy donors and 
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philanthropists. Aside from meetings with leaders of the Rabitat, including the head of 
its Riyadh branch, Ba’asyir recalls a dinner with Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah bin 
Baz, the leading Salafi cleric and future Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia. Bin Baz, says 
Ba’asyir, sympathised with their plight as political refugees from Indonesia: “He 
advised us that there’s no need to be upset because what we have experienced was the 
path (sirat) followed by the Prophet and his disciples.”386  
 
Sungkar and Ba’asyir’s first Saudi funding trip was highly successful. All told, they 
spent three months in Saudi Arabia, enough time to network widely and perform a 
pilgrimage to Mecca. And above all, recalls Ba’asyir, their fundraising campaign was 
successful enough that they could afford to send between twenty and thirty men for 
training with Sayyaf.387  
 
Sending Southeast Asian jihadists to the conflict in Afghanistan started as a rather 
parochial exercise: Darul Islam recruits, mostly, were tasked primarily to train for the 
distant goal of toppling the Suharto regime. Generally, recruits sent for training in South 
Asia came from networks inside Indonesia, transited through Sungkar’s base in 
Malaysia, where they would be briefed, before arriving in Pakistan, where they would 
be based. From Pakistan they then had access to the military battlefield in neighbouring 
Afghanistan. In Malaysia, according to Solahudin, “Sungkar usually explained to them 
that they were being sent to Afghanistan not to fight the Soviet Union but to undergo 
tadrib askary (military training) in order that the skills they acquire may be used to 
wage jihad in Indonesia.” Recruits were given aliases, typically a Muslim patronymic or 
kunya beginning with “Abu”, meaning “father of”—usually not referring to an actual 
son but instead chosen to indicate an attribute (eg. Abu Jihad to denote “Father of 
Jihad”). They were also encouraged to hide their Indonesian nationality by claiming to 
be Filipino. Crucially, recruits were required to swear an oath in order to cement their 
loyalty to Darul Islam and Sungkar.388  
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What would become known as the “first class” of recruits sent to Afghanistan included 
Zulkarnen (alias Arif Sunarso), who would go on to become Jemaah Islamiyah’s 
military commander. Others were the future key operatives Achmad Roichan alias Saad, 
Marzuki (alias Raja Husen), Syawal Yasin, Mohamad Faiq, and Idris (alias Solahudin). 
Being sent to “Afghanistan” in fact meant flying from Kuala Lumpur to Karachi, 
Pakistan, and then travelling to Peshawar in the north east of the country, about an 
hour’s drive from the Afghan border and where Abdullah Azzam’s MAK office was 
located. In these early years of the Afghan jihad, from Peshawar recruits would make 
their way to a camp for Afghan refugees at Pabbi, a short trip east from the regional 
capital, which was also the location of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf’s Ittihad al-Islami training 
camp. As early as 1985 there was an Islamic State of Indonesia representative in place 
at Pabbi to receive Indonesian students, one Abu Utbah, apparently a member of Rabitat 
al-Alam al-Islami, perhaps another example of how Muhammad Natsir brokered Darul 
Islam’s early transnational expansion.389 Indeed, some even claim that it was largely the 
Rabitat that provided Sungkar the funding for the foreign training program.390 
 
The close parallels between Southeast Asian jihadists, coming via the Malay peninsula, 
and foreign fighters from the Arabian peninsula are striking. Hegghammer notes that the 
foreign fighter recruitment to the jihad in Saudi Arabia began very slowly in the 1980s, 
with one jihadist history mentioning only some sixteen Saudi fighters who had gone to 
Afghanistan prior to 1985. Only from 1985, thanks to the recruitment efforts of Osama 
bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam, did the flow of Saudi jihadists increase.391 Similar to 
Southeast Asia, these foreign fighters appear to have been influenced by a cosmopolitan 
geography that made them more likely to participate in a foreign jihad. According to 
Hegghammer: 
 
One of the few distinguishing features of the early jihadists as a 
population is their geographical origin. The Hijaz region is strongly 
overrepresented, especially among pre-1987 recruits. This is most likely 
because the first movers were Hijazis and because the crucial 
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international Islamist networks were particularly strong in the relatively 
cosmopolitan Mecca-Medina-Jidda triangle.392  
 
It is a remarkable accident of history that Abdullah Sungkar, the father of salafi 
jihadism in the Malay world, was forced into exile in 1985 and landed in a rapidly 
Islamizing Malaysia at precisely the moment when the Afghan jihad began to be 
vigorously sold to the Muslim world.  
 
Even though most Southeast Asian foreign fighters were Indonesian, Nasir Abas, a 
Malaysian, has written most persuasively of how he was motivated to join the jihad by 
the prospect of battlefield glory, even if he knew he might regret the outcome. In his 
memoirs, he writes: 
 
I had already imagined the atmosphere of fighting alongside the Afghan 
mujahidin that I was about to experience and also imagined how to hold a 
firearm and I had begun to feel sad at the possibility that I might not 
return to Malaysia because of being killed on the battlefield.393  
 
Key al-Qaeda operative, Abu Zubaydah, notes in his 1991 diary entry on joining the 
“House of Martyrs”, the Services Bureau, what the atmosphere was like among the 
militants preparing for jihad: 
 
The spiritual atmosphere here is good; youth and elderly have given their 
souls to Almighty God, they traded off life and everything in it for jihad. 
Some came to train for a short period and go back just to be prepared, 
others are here for jihad and until God decides for something to be 
done.394  
 
When Nasir Abbas arrived in Peshawar, however, he was disappointed to find that he 
had to study before he could serve. Recruits like Nasir were required to undergo a three-
year course. By the time Nasir Abbas was sent on military training, the Ittihad al-Islami 
training camp had been moved from Pabbi to Sadda, closer to the Afghanistan border. 
The camp served as a place where Afghan youth were prepared with the skills to 
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continue to fight against the Soviet Union, with the consent of the Pakistani 
government. Trainers, according to Nasir, where typically Afghans who had themselves 
undergone military training in India, and thus they replicated much of the Indian 
curriculum. There were six faculties: Infantry, Engineering, Artillery, Logistics, 
Communications and Cavalry. The Indonesians, however, while not being assigned to 
any one faculty mainly focused on acquiring infantry skills. More specifically, Nasir 
records that the Indonesians, who were grouped together for their classes for language 
reasons, took classes in tactics, map reading, weapons training, and field engineering, 
the latter including “Mine and Destruction,” which covered explosives production and 
emplacement.395  
 
According to Nasir, for the first two years the instructors were Afghans who could 
speak English or Arabic, and their instructions had to be translated by someone who 
knew those languages. After that, from the 3rd class onwards, Indonesians who had 
graduated were tasked with training the newer Darul Islam students. Once they were 
able to institute classes in Bahasa Indonesia, learning was faster because most of the 
Darul Islam recruits had no English and no Arabic. While it is sometimes observed that 
veterans who claim to have trained in “Afghanistan” actually spend most of their time 
in Pakistan, with some of them perhaps having never seen actual combat, Nasir claims 
that his class had the opportunity to engage in live combat during fieldwork practice in 
Khowst, a mountainous province near Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan’s Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas that saw heavy fighting in the mid-1980s.396    
 
The most important contribution of the South Asian experience to Southeast Asian 
jihadism was twofold. First, the military training did serve its purpose in increasing the 
capacity of graduates to deploy violence in the cause of jihad. Most notably, the level of 
sophistication of improvised explosive devices used by Southeast Asian jihadists post-
Afghanistan appears much higher than the pre-Afghanistan period, when, as we saw in 
the preceding chapters, jihadists struggled with poor skills and technology to deploy 
even primitive pipe bombs. The second major contribution is that it connected 
Southeast Asian jihadists with the much broader network of what can be thought of as a 
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loose international community of militant Islamists. This community included some 
strong interpersonal relationships between Southeast Asians and jihadists from 
elsewhere in the world. It facilitated the diffusion of militant pan-Islamist ideology to 
what were hitherto mostly locally oriented Malaysians, Indonesians and Singaporeans. 
Furthermore, this was part of a process which saw local militants from other parts of the 
world develop a global consciousness. The fact that these relationships were created 
face-to-face, and tempered in the fire of battle and hardship meant they were robust 
enough to enable collaboration years in the future. The Afghanistan jihad was the 
crucible from which the global jihadist network, epitomised by al-Qaeda, would 
emerge. As bin Laden deputy Ayman Al-Zawahiri described it in his memoirs, the 
Afghan jihad did not  just prepare the mujahidin for “battle against the superpower that 
now has sole dominance over the globe, namely, the United States,” but  
 
It also gave young Muslim mujahideen—Arabs, Pakistanis, Turks, and 
Muslims from Central and East Asia—a great opportunity to get 
acquainted with each other on the land of Afghan jihad through their 
comradeship-at-arms against the enemies of Islam.397  
 
But not all militants were equally “global.” The Afghanistan jihad created a global 
community of militant Islamists who were diverse in their goals, just they were 
dispersed in terms of geography—what Vahid Brown calls the “Peshawar Diaspora”, 
after the Pakistani border city in which the mujahidin were based. They were attracted 
to the jihad for different reasons. Some were revolutionaries in their home countries 
who had been inspired by the 1984 fatwa by Abdullah Azzam that declared it the 
individual duty of Muslims everywhere to support the jihad against the Soviet Union. 
Some were what Thomas Hegghammer has called “classical jihadists” who were not 
opposed to their home-country governments, and in the case of Saudi Arabians and 
many others, they were in fact supported by their governments for strategic reasons.  
 
Still others, like the Southeast Asians of this study, were supporters of the Afghan jihad, 
and may have flattered themselves with thoughts of their sacrifice, but they were in fact 
preoccupied on military training for the purpose of jihad back home. As Nasir Abbas 
makes clear in his autobiography, despite students sometimes getting to fight in 
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Afghanistan as a holiday excursion, seeing combat was not the purpose of the going to 
Afghanistan. Even on holiday sojourns, participation in fighting against the Soviets was 
highly restricted: 
 
Typically Indonesians who were under Ittihad-e-Islamy were not permitted to 
take part in combat on the front lines (in the infantry). As such they were placed 
at the back, with the artillery forces. This was because there was an order from 
the leader of Ittihad-e-Islamiy, Ustadz Abdur Robbir Rasul Sayyaf, that barred 
them from the infantry…. Because Indonesians who departed Indonesia already 
knew their travel to Afghanistan was for training.398  
 
Even though Southeast Asian jihadists prioritised local rather than global jihad, being 
part of the Peshawar diaspora forged a collective consciousness of what Thomas 
Hegghammer has usefully categorized as “militant pan-Islamism.” In the Afghanistan 
jihad, for the first time Indonesians were thrown together with Filipinos from the Moro 
National Liberation Front, and with Arabs from Saudi Arabia, Libya, Egypt, not to 
mention Afghans and Pakistanis. Furthermore, militant pan-Islamism is able to draw 
support from the mainstream Islamic doctrine of all Muslims being members a supra-
national community, the umma. Thus what emerged in Peshawar was a militant or 
violent form of pan-Islamist identity, with as its central notion that, as Hegghammer has 
it, its proponents would “defend the entire Muslim nation and its territories from non-
Muslim aggression.” Abdullah Azzam was the central author of the doctrine, which 
drew legitimacy from its similarity to traditional notions of jihad in Islam, which 
emphasise jihad for the defense of Muslim territories. Azzam amended this doctrine so 
that the defense of Muslims territories was the individual responsibility, fardu ‘ayn, of 
all Muslims everywhere. According to Hegghammer, 
 
Azzam argued that non-Muslim infringement of Muslim territory 
demanded the immediate military involvement of all able Muslim men in 
defence of the said territory, wherever its location.399 
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Hegghammer describes militant pan-Islamism as a kind of “macro-nationalism,” which, 
like other nationalisms, creates a sense of shared identity and consciousness and thus 
can serve as a powerful mobilizing force. As Hegghammer elaborates:  
 
It is indeed possible to view pan-Islamism as a macro- nationalism 
centred on the imagined community of the umma, which is defined by 
religion and to some extent by language (Arabic having a special status in 
Islam). Although the Muslim nation is by definition aterritorial – the 
umma is wherever Muslims are – pan-Islamists have a clear sense of what 
constitutes Muslim territory, namely all lands once ruled by Muslims, 
from Andalucia in the West to Indonesia in the East.400  
 
In 1984 Abdullah Azzam set the basis for militant pan-Islamism with a declaration, in 
his book published that year, The Defence of Muslim Lands. As Hegghammer notes, the 
fatwa was a deviation from the mainstream interpretation of jihad in that it argued that it 
was an individual duty of all Muslims to defend Islam in all territorial battles, and was 
thus controversial, but over time, and with the successes in the war against the Soviets, 
the doctrine began to gain currency in the Arabic speaking countries.401  
 
In Southeast Asia and among Darul Islam members, however, Azzam’s 1984 fatwa, 
coming before Southeast Asians were networked with the Peshawar diaspora, hardly 
rates a mention. But the ideology of militant pan-Islamism is significant because it 
paved the way for a more radical variant of pan-Islamism to emerge in the 1990s: global 
jihadism, developed by Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa to target the far 
enemy, as we consider in more detail later, was diffused through the Peshawar diaspora, 
including to DI and JI members, who debated the decree vigorously. How a minority of 
those members would act on global jihadist ideology, taking advantage of the Southeast 
Asian jihadist assemblage they were a part of, would change the face of regional 
security in the 2000s. 
 
Furthermore, if it was only a minority of Southeast Asian jihadists who would sign up 
to global jihad (just as it was a minority of the jihadist community in other parts of the 
world) this minority made up for lack of numbers with ideological fervour. It was in the 
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Peshawar diaspora that some Southeast Asians first met central global jihadi figures like 
Osama bin Laden and Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, creating the strong social ties that 
would bind jihadists from different localities to the same extreme ideology. Some of 
them, most notably 2002 Bali bomber Ali Ghufron (alias Mukhlas), would speak 
glowingly of their association with bin Laden, who was particularly admired for his 
willingness to suffer on the front lines of the jihad, despite being from a wealthy and 
elite family in Saudi Arabia. Of meeting bin Laden in Afghanistan Mukhlas writes, “At 
that moment I had the conviction that Allah had blessed my life….When I see him it is 
as if I have been introduced to one of the companions of the Prophet….”402   
 
In 1987, a twenty-two day battle against the Soviets for control of the town of Jaji, a key 
entry point for mujahidin travelling from Pakistan to Afghanistan, was a turning point in 
the jihadis’ favour and a crucible for relationships between leading figures of the jihad 
and certain Indonesians who would go on to become jihadi leaders back home. Ahmad 
Roichan (alias Saad), future JI defacto leader Thoriqudin (alias Abu Rusydan) and 
Mukhlas are all said to have taken part in the battle, alongside future 9/11 architects 
Osama bin Laden and Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, a young Ibnul Khattab, future leader 
of global jihadists in the Caucuses and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf himself.403  
 
Mukhlas recalled the battle with wide-eyed excitement. As quoted by the ICG in 2003, 
he said,  
 
In 1987 I met Sheikh Osama bin Laden in Joji, Afghanistan, when it was 
being attacked by Russia; the snow was two metres high….When the 
mujahidin went on attack, I went with them, and it was Osama bin Laden 
who … led the mujahidin.404 
 
Mukhlas’s enjoyment of jihad suggests the world of fantasy and fetish. Attempting to 
explain it to a BBC interviewer, he said, “Perhaps it's the sort of pleasure that can’t be 
understood by those who’ve never experienced it. I’ve had a wife, I’ve had that first 
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night and the like, but it’s not as pleasurable as war. War is very pleasurable.”405     
Although it is probably the case that there were different styles of thinking about 
waging jihad in Afghanistan, it is not uncommon, as Solahudin shows, to find Darul 
Islam members who, although expressly sent to acquire skills for jihad back home, were 
dying for a chance to become martyrs in a major jihad. In an interview with Solahudin, 
one Indonesian Afghanistan alumnus seconded Mukhlas’s use of the word “enjoyment”: 
 
It’s true what Mukhlas says about the enjoyment of the battlefield being 
difficult to express in words. I cried tears of sadness when I wasn’t 
chosen to be sent into battle. Aside from that, on the battlefield the 
distance between the gates of heaven and ourself is truly close. And the 
only way we can enter heaven is by syahadah [bearing witness, i.e., dying 
as a martyr]. Once I was very envious when one of my friends from 
Ngruki called Jamaludin was martyred after hitting a mine. I would 
always pray for it to be my turn to be martyred.406  
 
Although the battle of Jaji was only one small defeat for the Russians in their slow 
retreat from Afghanistan, for the foreign mujahidin it did much to establish their 
reputation for courage, even though the battle was coordinated more by Sayyaf, who 
was the Afghan warlord who dominated that area, than bin Laden. Jaji, or the battle of 
the Lion’s Den, the Maasada, as bin Laden had named his base there (drawing on his 
nickname, the Lion) also served as the basis for much of the self-serving myth of the 
foreign mujahidin, or Arab Afghans as they came to be known, as having defeated the 
Soviet Empire through the will of God. In his history of al-Qaeda and 9/11, Lawrence 
Wright describes the impact of the victory at Jaji thus: 
 
In the heightened religious atmosphere among the men following bin Laden, 
however, there was a dizzying sense that they were living in a supernatural 
world, in which reality knelt before faith. For them, the encounter at the Lion's 
Den became the foundation of the myth that they defeated the superpower. 
Within a few years the entire Soviet empire fell to pieces—dead of the wound 
the Muslims inflicted in Afghanistan, the jihadis believed. By then they had 
created the vanguard that was to carry the battle forward. Al-Qaeda was 
conceived in the marriage of these assumptions: Faith is stronger than weapons 
or nations, and the ticket to enter the sacred zone where such miracles occur is 
the willingness to die.407  
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In 1990, with the end of the jihad against the Soviets the previous year, Darul Islam, 
with the help of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, was able to establish its own training camp inside 
Afghanistan at Torkham, on the Khyber Pass, the main supply route between Pakistan 
and Afghanistan. By 1992 Sayyaf had relocated his camp to Kabul, but Afghanistan was 
slipping into civil war and an increasingly inhospitable place for foreign jihadi training. 
This period, however, also saw Darul Islam expand its networking with jihadists from 
other parts of the world. Darul Islam brothers were sent on short courses to an Egyptian-
run camp in northern Khost, courtesy of an agreement with the leaders of the camp, who 
were from the Egyptian militant group Gama’a Islamiyya.408 Nasir Abas and a small 
number of senior Darul Islam figures even appear to have in turn served as instructors at 
the camp, training a group of Kashmiri militants.409 
 
The exposure to local Egyptian jihadists would prove influential in the development of 
Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia. According to Nasir Abas, Darul Islam, on meeting 
its Egyptian counterparts, saw itself as sharing Gama’a Islamiyya’s plight in being 
oppressed at home by a tyrannical secular ruler.410 Moreover, the central Gama’a 
Islamiyya text, Mithaq al-Amal al-Islami (The Manifesto of Islamic Activism) appears to 
have provided to a guide when Jemaah Islamiyah came to re-orienting its own ideology 
away from its Darul Islam past, to focus not on an Islamic state as the organising 
principle of the movement but on the establishment of an exclusive congregation or 
jema’ah.411  
 
Thus it is not a coincidence that only three years after sharing training facilities with 
Egyptians from Gama’a Islamiyya, that the new organization that Abdullah Sungkar 
founded used that same name, only to become known by a slightly different 
transliteration of the Arabic. Gama’a Islamiyya was led by the “Blind Sheikh” Oman 
Abdurrahman who would be imprisoned in the US for his role in the first World Trade 
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Center attack in 1993. But the militant group, just like Sungkar and his JI, was in fact 
primarily focused on overthrowing their kafir local rulers, in order to establish an 
Islamic caliphate. Similarly, Gama’a Islamiyya rejected nationalism, which it associated 
with the secularism of the post-colonial nation state championed by the likes of former 
Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. We can conclude, therefore, that direct 
influence from Egyptian jihadists furthered the process of deterritorialising Indonesian 
jihadism away from its Darul Islam past and towards its transnational Jemaah Islamiyah 
future. Militant pan-Islamism, as an ideology that orients its proponents to a 
transnational scale and territorial flexibility, was the perfect ideational fit with the 
emerging Southeast Asian jihadist assemblage.  
 
The end of the Afghan jihad left foreign fighters at an ideological crossroads. All of 
them had become more international thinkers and actors by virtue of the war. But they 
did not all share the same priorities for future jihad. Broadly speaking, the jihadist 
diaspora was split according to three categories. First, there were the Gulf Arabs who 
had been mobilized for Azzam’s classical jihad in defense of Muslim lands and who 
had been supported by states such as Saudi Arabia. These jihadists were naturally 
attracted to subsequent classical jihads such as took place in Bosnia and Chechnya in 
the 1990s. Second, there were the socio-revolutionary groups such as Gama’a Islamiyya 
who sought to return to their homelands to overthrow their local regimes, in GI’s case 
Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak. Third, there were those who had had reached Peshawar as a 
member of one camp or another, but post-war began to drift towards global jihadism 
and to see the US as the primary enemy, under the ideological entrepreneurship of 
Osama bin Laden. Some of these global jihadists were Southeast Asians; others were 
from elsewhere but would come to know the region well. 
 
Conclusion	
The decision to choose Malaysia as the “land of exile” (bumi hijrah) from which, in 
emulation of the prophet, Sungkar would return victorious, was a momentous one. At 
that historical juncture, a rapidly Islamizing and modernizing Malaysia was uniquely 
placed in the region to open the movement to a new world beyond the realm of 
Indonesian repression. The movement became transnational in its membership and 
operations, and increasingly pan-Islamist in its outlook. This pan-Islamism was fueled 
by the experience of the Afghan jihad, the historic crucible of militant pan-Islamism, 
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which coincided neatly with the exile of Sungkar and his circle in 1985. Fatefully, 
international contacts made during this period among the Peshawar diaspora in Pakistan 
would later bring global jihadist ideology to the region.  
 
But before the rise of global jihad, the Malacca hinterland in Malaysia emerged as a 
base from which Southeast Asian jihadists could assemble contacts, locations and 
materials across the region, a process that would culminate in the region’s first 
transnational jihadist group, Jemaah Islamiyah. It is difficult to imagine the emergence 
of a Southeast Asian jihadist assemblage if the movement’s most charismatic and 
dynamic leaders had been marooned in Arabia.   
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6	
REGIONAL	ASSEMBLAGE		
 
For millennia the island world of Southeast Asia has been seen by outsiders as remote 
and hidden. Fragments at the edge of Eurasia—the largest landmass on a watery 
planet—the region lies in the shadow of the great civilizations of India and China. In 
more recent times it has been acknowledged by archaeologists and historians as a global 
hub of diverse cultures. Thus the historic maritime silk route, linking China to India, the 
Middle East and Europe is now recognised as just as important as its more famous 
terrestrial counterpart. Maritime Southeast Asia, in other words, is not just a peripheral 
zone of fragmentation, it is also a unique zone of assemblage.  
 
For the global jihadist on the run, being remote but globally connected is a virtue. It is 
for this reason that a space that was geopolitically peripheral became central to the rise 
of global jihadism. The architects of global jihad would become familiar with Southeast 
Asia’s airports and jungles, its cosmopolitan cities and its isolated camps. In the 1990s 
these foreign jihadists would discover that their Filipino, Malaysian, Indonesian, and 
Singaporean brothers could help them to operate across the region with ease. Invisible 
to most people, a regional jihadist assemblage was at their disposal. The only question 
was what, exactly, to do with it.    
 
Malacca	hinterland		
Jemaah Islamiyah, Southeast Asia’s first transnational terrorist group, was established 
in a highly networked yet largely rural area that I have called the Malacca hinterland. 
This hinterland is an area at the narrow southern tip of the Malay peninsula, and mostly 
falls under the administration of the Malaysian states of Negeri Sembilan and Johor. It 
lies beyond the historic port town of Malacca, famous as the capital of a great Sultanate 
of 1400–1511 CE which was a cosmopolitan entrepot at the centre of a regional trading 
network, subsequently conquered by the Portuguese. It is a space of contrasts. It is both 
inland and close to the sea. It is both rural village surrounded by plantations and 
highway between two ambitious regional capitals, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. It is 
both quiet and conservative and connected and outward-looking. Strategically, as the 
Imperial Japanese Army knew in World War Two, it is the land bridge that connects 
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mainland and island Southeast Asia. Today, Jemaah Islamiyah members, most of whom 
are Indonesian, might forget that this is where their organisation emerged and grew for 
fourteen formative years. But, in contrast to Darul Islam, its agrarian and backward-
looking parent, JI bears the marks of an organisation that was formed in this historic 
sub-region of international hubs that emerged, as Srivijaya had before it, to capture the 
flow of trade through the Strait of Malacca.  
 
It is easy to overlook JI’s Malacca hinterland origins because, as an underground 
organisation, it never had a central “office”. Consonant with the deep geopolitical 
structure of the region, JI grew as a distributed network, with its leaders, camps and 
affiliated schools scattered over maritime Southeast Asia. Although JI was a network 
without a geographical centre it was still shaped by the places in which it was clustered, 
like the hinterland, where its leadership was based. Eventually, JI would form a Central 
Command Council (Majelis Qiyadah Markaziyah), composed of officeholders 
appointed by the leader, or Amir. As Nasir Abas concludes, “There is no fixed place as 
an administrative office for the Central Command Council, so wherever the Leader 
(Amir Jamaah) is located is the area where the Council can meet, if needed.”412      
 
Even in the Malacca hinterland JI’s presence emerged across various sites. After 
branching out from their initial host, Hashim Ghani at Kuala Pilah, Abdullah Sungkar 
moved to live in a small town not far away, Simpang Durian, and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir 
likewise moved to the neighbouring town of Serting Ulu. Both towns, still within the 
state of Negeri Sembilan, were in close proximity to Kuala Pilah and so allowed the two 
leaders to continue their practice of attending Friday prayers with Hashim Ghani at his 
Ittiba Sunnah school.413 Meanwhile, Sungkar and another senior figure who had joined 
Sungkar when he fled, Abu Jibril (alias Fihiruddin), had succeeded in obtaining a 
Malaysian permit to preach, known as a Tauliyah. Both became known as itinerant 
preachers in the hinterland. They gave sermons at mosques across the countryside and 
secretly recruited Malaysian followers. Abu Jibil, who lived in Banting, closer to Kuala 
Lumpur, also had access to urban congregations. According to his close usroh 
movement friend Irfan Awwas, Jibril was often invited to teach a Qur’an study group at 
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the Indonesian embassy and to teach at the houses of upper-class women in Kuala 
Lumpur. He even became a staff teacher for the congregation at the Malaysian Ministry 
of Finance at a time when Anwar Ibrahim was Finance Minister.414 
 
Until 1991 Sungkar’s young acolytes—local Malaysians and those Indonesians who 
came to him from across the Malacca Strait—had only the option of attending religious 
instruction at Ittiba Sunnah. From that year, however, they could join Luqmanul Hakim, 
a new boarding school in the town of Ulu Tiram, Johor, a brief drive across the 
causeway from Singapore. Luqmanul Hakim was the result of a collaboration between 
Sungkar and Abdul Latif Haron Embong, a former student of Hashim Ghani and now a 
salafi preacher with his own small congregation in Ulu Tiram. Due to his strategic 
location at the southern tip of peninsula Malaysia, Latif”s sermons attracted students 
from nearby Singapore.415 Latif and one of his followers, Jaafar Anwarul, who was a 
local businessman, drove the project, after being recruited into one of Sungkar’s special 
study circles (pengajian khusus). Anwarul donated a plot of land he owned in Ulu 
Tiram for the school. He would later tell Malaysian television, presumably under the 
close watch of the police, what had motivated him: 
 
When I saw that there were many children around the area, I thought they 
were illiterate in religion and a number of them were school dropouts. 
Probably they did not know how to read the Quran. I also thought that 
probably the children did not have a chance to go to a government school. 
So I was very happy that a madrasah could be built, where I could get the 
children together and enrich their knowledge and at the same time I could 
perform a good deed.416 
 
The reality, however, was much more interesting. Luqmanul Hakim, more than any 
other site in the emerging jihadist assemblage, would come to reflect the way that the 
political geography of Malaysia and the Malacca hinterland had transnationalised and 
modernised Sunkar’s movement. Although Ngruki, the school Sungkar founded in Java, 
is more famous today, it was Luqmanul Hakim that assembled teachers and recruits 
from a religious education background in Indonesia with Malaysian and Singaporean 
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recruits, often from a technical or applied science background. Luqmanul Hakim 
became the main transit point for Southeast Asian jihadists from Indonesia, Singapore 
and Malaysia travelling to the jihad in Afghanistan. The result was a jihadist culture that 
was both more radical, more cosmopolitan, and ultimately more dangerous. Many of 
these recruits would form the core of the fighters prepared to take up global jihad 
against the West in Southeast Asia. They included the school principal himself, future 
2002 Bali Bombing mastermind, Mukhlas (alias Ali Gufron), and a group of students 
from the nearby Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, which included the future bombers 
Noordin Top and Azhari Husein.  
 
According to Ba’asyir, the Malaysians who initiated Luqmanul Hakim sought to 
prioritise two educational agendas. First, to provide Islamic education that was 
“cleansed of bidah”—that is, free from Islamic rituals that Salafist Muslims consider to 
be deviant innovations. Second, “to inspire children with a passion for jihad.”417 Under 
the leadership of Sungkar and Ba’asyir’s star student from Ngruki, Mukhlas, Luqmanul 
Hakim was designed not just a school catering for children from kindergarten to high 
school age, but as the centre of a village, named Kampung Rabbani (Divine Village), to 
which followers could relocate with their families to live a more pure Islamic lifestyle. 
According to Mukhlas’s philosophy, an Islamic boarding school can represent a 
“Miniature Islamic Government” (Miniatur Pemerintahan Islam), if it is well-managed. 
Under Mukhlas, this meant a regime even more puritanical than that of his alma mater, 
Ngruki, which he criticised for its tolerance of mixed-gender classrooms, singing, and 
other worldly sins. At Luqmanul Hakim all music and television was prohibited. For 
women, a veil covering the face (niqab) was obligatory. Segregation of the sexes was 
strictly enforced. “The desire,” writes Mukhlas, “was to make our village our 
heaven.”418  
 
There is no record in Malaysia before 2000 of Sungkar or any of his Darul Islam 
followers running afoul of the law enforcement authorities, as they had in Indonesia. In 
an Islamising Malaysia, comfortable with the jihad in Afghanistan, there was a much 
more permissive environment. Such radical puritanism and insularity at Kampung 
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Rabbani, however, does appear to have irritated the local Islamic authorities, just as 
Ittiba Us Sunnah had irritated the Islamic authorities in Negeri Sembilan. In January 
1993 the national newspaper, Utusan Malaysia, reported that a man in his forties, 
probably a reference to Abdul Latif, had been arrested by the Johor Islamic authorities 
in Ulu Tiram for teaching religion without a permit and for using a house as a religious 
site without permission. Sixteen of his followers were also arrested. The article notes 
that the same man had been arrested for the same reason in 1991.419 But aside from the 
occasional slap over the wrist for breaches regarding the administration of Islamic 
affairs, it appears that the growth of a local jihadist community did not concern the 
Malaysian government.   
 
Jemaah	Islamiyah	
The combined changes in the jihadist movement brought about by Sungkar’s 
introduction of Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist ideas and the shift from a national to a 
transnational scale had their culmination in the establishment of Jemaah Islamiyah in 
1993. By this time, Sungkar could be said to have formed a distinct faction within Darul 
Islam that had travelled a long way from the broader movement’s traditional and 
revolutionary nationalist jihadism. In many ways, Sungkar had been an awkward recruit 
to Darul Islam. His increasingly puritanical Salafism put him at odds with Darul Islam’s 
tradition of Javanese mysticism and millenarianism. His critique of nationalism was in 
tension with Darul Islam’s own nationalist beginnings. His principled and sophisticated 
opposition to the Suharto regime was in striking contrast to the compromise and co-
optation that characterised the Darul Islam leaders who came before him. Indeed, 
Sungkar’s political style appears to owe much more to the mentor he idolised, former 
prime minister Muhammad Natsir, than to Darul Islam’s Kartosoewirjo.  
 
We might even question how committed Sungkar was to Darul Islam in the first place, 
other than as a vehicle for his own ambitions. One of his former students, Muhammad 
Nursalim, has gone so far as to claim that Sungkar created Jemaah Islamiyah in the 
1970s prior to his joining Darul Islam. In his master’s thesis based on interviews with 
Sungkar associates in and around Ngruki, Nursalim writes, “In the 1970s Abdullah 
Sungkar felt the need to form a jama’ah [congregation or community] as an 
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organization for the Islamic struggle.” He discussed the issue with several like-minded 
preachers in Solo. One of these preachers then formed a jama’ah, and Abu Bakar 
Ba’asyir was in favour of joining it, but “at the advice of Abdullah Sungkar and 
considering the credibility of the leader, the plan was aborted.” Later, “considering the 
importance of a jama’ah for dakwah, Abdullah Sungkar established a Jama’ah. This 
new organization was called Jama’ah Islamiyah.” Nursalim continues:  
 
The problem arose of what would serve as the parent organization for this 
newly established jama’ah. Because, if only a jama’ah is formed, and 
later it is encroached on by a competing jama’ah, surely an efficacious 
movement, which is so yearned for, will not come to pass. Because of this 
and various considerations, Jama’ah Islamiyah led by Abdullah Sungkar 
united with Jama’ah NII [Negara Islam Indonesia].420  
 
A variation on this account is given by Ba’asyir, who talks of an aborted attempt to start 
their own group in Solo, prior to 1976, when they joined Darul Islam. According to 
Ba’asyir, several dissident preachers in Solo were contacted about forming a new 
organization, but none were prepared to subject themselves to the risk of government 
persecution. There is no mention, however, of any kind of “merger”.421 A look at early 
court documents from the period covering the trials of Sungkar, Ba’asyir and their 
associates does reveal that “Jemaah Islamiyah” was a name that was associated with the 
Ngruki pair, and at trial this name was sometimes used interchangeably with “Komando 
Jihad” and “Negara Islam Indonesia”.422 It is possible that Sungkar, who was highly 
attuned to political developments in the Muslim world, adopted the name after seeing its 
use by the Egyptian university student movement of the 1970s that would cohere into 
the notorious miltant organisation of the 1980s and 90s.423 Suffice it to say, even prior 
to his encounter with Darul Islam, Sungkar was a radical and entrepreneurial leader in 
the making.  
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The date of the establishment of the group formally known as Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah 
is typically given as January 1, 1993. The break with Darul Islam, known in jihadist 
circles as the infisol (Arabic for “separation”), is usually explained in one of two ways, 
both centring on a breakdown in the relationship between Abdullah Sungkar, by then 
the most powerful leader in the movement, and Ajengan Masduki, the titular head of the 
Islamic State of Indonesia. Generally, Sungkar’s supporters claim that Sungkar broke 
with Masduki over the latter’s mystical tendencies, which jarred with Sungkar’s 
Salafism. Masduki supporters, on the other hand, reject the charge of mysticism and 
claim that the dispute centred on allegations that Sungkar had mishandled Darul Islam 
money. Although the issues of mysticism and money do appear to provide the backdrop 
to the infisol, closer inspection reveals that the primary cause of the split was a different 
approach to the issue of territory.  
 
From its outset, JI transcended Darul Islam’s obsession with the fixed and bounded 
territory of the Indonesian state by creating commands to cover areas beyond Indonesia 
and at a transnational scale. Initially, this meant two areas of coverage: Mantiqi I, led by 
Hambali, covering Malaysia and Singapore and Mantiqi II, led by Abdullah Anshori, 
covering Indonesia. Although more Mantiqis would be added later, these two would 
form the core of the organisation. That the first Mantiqi covered not the fatherland of 
Indonesia but the new areas of Malaysia and Singapore reflected the shift of the centre 
of gravity of the movement from inland Java to the cosmopolitan Malacca hinterland. 
(Hambali’s Mantiqi I post placed him in a powerful strategic position to take the 
movement in a global jihadist direction, as we shall see later.) In further contrast to 
Darul Islam, the territoriality of Jemaah Islamiyah was not fixed and bounded, but 
relational, regional and open to expansion through recruitment of new members. As 
Nasir Abas is careful to emphasise, “Mantiqi meant area [wilayah], that is to say, the 
area of Islamic proselytization of Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah, it did not mean an area of 
control.”424  Thus JI embodied the process of rescaling and reterritorialization of the 
movement that had begun with Abdullah Sungkar’s emigration to Malaysia.  
 
Although JI’s stated long-term objective was to transform Indonesia into an Islamic 
state, and in the even longer-term, to form a larger caliphate, in the here-and-now it 
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sought to break out of Darul Islam’s “territorial trap” and to operate in a way that was in 
tune with the facts on the ground, and the facts of the ground: that is, an area of 
operations, both archipelagic and transnational, that lent itself not to defending bounded 
territory but to establishing fluid and flexible networks of recruits across an assemblage 
of fragmented spaces. As Ash Amin has described it for organisations in an age of 
globalisation, establishing “nodal power” is more important than “territorial power.” 
That is to say, “Exercising nodal power and aligning networks at large in one’s own 
interest, rather than […] exercising territorial power (unless one has access to the core 
sources such as control over the means of coercion and enrolment, as do some powerful 
regions and states).”425   
 
Primary sources from the time of the group’s founding are scarce, but Abdullah 
Sungkar can be heard talking about the break with Darul Islam in a low-fidelity, 
undated audio recording made sometime in the mid- to late 1990s.426 Sungkar says that 
his main difference with the elders of Darul Islam was over the issue of the 
organisation’s “commandment system” (stelsel komandemen, in the Dutch terminology 
used by the movement) and the existence of the State—a reference to Darul Islam’s 
Islamic State of Indonesia. Since Sungkar’s exile in Malaysia the Darul Islam leadership 
in Indonesia, including Ajengan Masduki, had continued to act as if Kartosoewirjo’s 
Islamic State still existed, with its territorially based system of commanders and other 
office-bearers designed to mirror the Indonesian republic, even as the movement could 
barely keep itself out of jail. But Darul Islam’s pretentions to territorial control were 
unrealistic. In Sungkar’s words: 
 
The problem is, without de facto control, the commandment system 
cannot be enforced…. Essentially, the commandment system can only be 
implemented within a state, and that state must have authority.427  
 
                                                
425 Ash Amin, “Regions unbound: Towards a new politics of place,” Geografiska Annaler, 86 B (2004): 
36. 
426 Ustadz Abdullah Sungkar Tentang Infishalz, n.d., 
https://archive.org/details/UstadzAbdullahSungkarTentangInfishalz 
427 Ibid. 
 162 
 
The solution, he argues, is to “return to the jemaah.” That is, he explains, to build a 
congregation based in the community at large, just like the Prophet himself who began 
his proselytizing with a jemaah in Mecca. 
 
The infisol as a reaction against Darul Islam’s out-of-date obsession with territory is 
expanded on by Ba’asyir, who explains that the separation was triggered by “requests 
that didn’t make any sense” on the part of Masduki. For example, Masduki commanded 
Sungkar to place Islamic State of Indonesia ambassadors in foreign countries, such as 
Pakistan, even though this would be difficult to achieve and, in Sungkar’s view, expose 
the group’s foreign activities to the authorities. Such requests, in Ba’asyir’s recollection, 
served as the impetus to discard Darul Islam’s territorial baggage altogether:  
 
Ustad Abdullah Sungkar began to think, Let’s not have jemaah DI acting 
like NII at a time when it had territory [wilayah], because DI has no 
territory…. Now that it has no territory anymore, Ustad was of the 
opinion that NII should return to the jemaah, while keeping the aim of 
establishing a Daulah Islamiyah [Islamic state] with the method [manhaj] 
of dawah-wal-jihad [proselytization and jihad], but not in the form of the 
NII.428  
 
The proximate cause of the separation, then, was the failure of a sclerotic Darul Islam 
leadership to adapt to the reality of Indonesia under the consolidated military 
dictatorship of Suharto. Tellingly, from the separation onwards, Sungkar and Ba’asyir 
used the Arabic term Daulah Islamiyah to label their vision of an Islamic state so as to 
not confuse it with Darul Islam’s now obsolete Negara Islam Indonesia. They would 
continue to respect Kartosoewirjo’s legacy, but they would no longer be bound by it.  
 
Abdurrahman Ayub, a former senior JI leader in Australia who was present at post 
infisol meetings in Malaysia in 1993 recalls how the separation led to rancorous debates 
among the jemaah, including in the distant outposts of the network, such as Tawao and 
Sandakan in East Malaysia. At one meeting in Serting Ulu, Sungkar, Ba’asyir, Abu 
Jibril had a heated debate with representatives of Ajengan Masduki, Abu Haris (alias 
Abdul Hak) and Muhyiddin. According to Abdurrahman, Sungkar offended Muhyiddin 
by stating that NII does not exist. Muhyiddin responded with words to the effect of, 
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“I’m very offended, it’s not so long ago that I can recall the proclamation [of the Islamic 
State]. I’m very offended that someone would say NII doesn’t exist.” At this point, 
Abdurrahman recalls that he interjected to ask Muhyiddin which he thought was larger, 
the Islamic State of Indonesia or the Ottoman Caliphate. Muhyiddin replied that the 
Caliphate was larger. “And you would concede that the Caliphate fell in 1924?” he 
asked. Muhyiddin agreed. “So then why can’t you accept that the NII has also fallen?” 
he said.  
 
The Jemaah Islamiyah that Sungkar created replaced Darul Islam’s mystical and 
nationalist traditions with an explicitly Salafist method and obsession with preparations 
for jihad, defined in narrow military terms. If Sungkar had not been directly influenced 
by the emergence of salafi jihadism in the student movement in Egypt in the 1970s, in 
the 1990s he clearly modelled JI on its Egyptian namesake, Gama’a Islamiyya, at the 
time perhaps the largest salafi jihadist organization anywhere in the world. It is not 
known how much direct contact Sungkar had with senior GI figures in Pakistan, but 
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir acknowledges that he was directly influenced by Gama’a 
Islamiyah. The 1989 Gama’a Islamiyyah text Mitsaq Amal Islami, according to 
Ba’asyir, was adopted as a manual for the new organization such that Jemaah Islamiyah 
was “the same as, and of the same source as, Gama’a Islamiyya Egypt.” Thus JI was 
“from the start exactly the same as Gama’a Islamiyaa Egypt and a lot was taken from its 
writings.”429  
 
In Mitsaq Amal Islami Sungkar found a more flexible organisational model based on 
grassroots organising to replace the Darul Islam model, which fixated on maintaining a 
state apparatus and a claim to bounded territory. A subsection titled “Through the 
Community” (“Melalui Jama’ah”) lays out the jurisprudential case for the community or 
congregation as the correct organizing principle of any truly Islamic movement. As it 
concludes, following the citation of a number of relevant Qur’anic verses and Hadith: 
 
All this is sufficient as a reason and a cause to compel us to adopt the 
jama’ah as the method of struggle and to choose the jama’ah as the only 
way to obey Allah and His Messenger.430  
                                                
429 Anonymous interview with Ba’asyir, 2004. 
430 Ibrahim et. al., Mitsaq Amal Islami, 203.  
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Through its writings, GI Egypt furnished Sungkar with an argument, based in Islamic 
jurisprudence (fiqh), for making the community or congregation (the jamaah) the 
organisational basis of the movement. This argument supported what had been 
Sungkar’s inclination all along, that is, to build a movement up from the grassroots 
through the proselytization of jihad (dawah-wal-jihad) rather than from the top down 
through Darul Islam. In fact, the common JI line that the organisation was about 
“returning to the jemaah” had multiple meanings: it could refer to a return to the way of 
the prophet in Mecca, as Sungkar and Ba’asyir liked to say, but it could also refer to the 
1970s when, as we have seen, Sungkar and his followers first began to use the name 
Jemaah Islamiyah.   
 
Thus the creation of Jemaah Islamiyah proceeded on the basis that Darul Islam could no 
longer could lay claim to territory (wilaya). Acting head of JI, Abu Rusydan, described 
the move this way in a 2007 interview with the Indonesian news magazine Gatra: 
 
On 1 January 1993, when we separated from the NII, the most 
fundamental reason was that we wanted to think concretely. If we start 
from the “Islamic State of Indonesia,” then the conditions can no longer 
be met. So we tried to return to al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah, the Muslim 
community.  
 
[Gatra:] Does that mean abandoning the ideal of an Islamic state?  
 
The ideal of an Islamic State is not gone. What’s gone is the starting point 
that we still have an “Islamic State.” When we were in the NII, we still 
followed the Islamic State. By separating from the NII, JI was thinking 
from square one. Our starting point would now be with the jamaah.431  
 
Although it was accurate of Rusydan to say that the idea of an Islamic state was not 
gone, the new organization of Jemaah Islamiyah bore the imprint of a Salafist 
organization that rejected nationalism and the nation-state in principle and placed an 
emphasis, as had Gama’a Islamiyya, on establishing a caliphate not bound by the 
secular borders of the territorial nation-state. In 1996 this principle was codified in the 
General Struggle Guidelines of Jemaah Islamiyah. Authored by the “Central Leadership 
Council,” this was the founding document of the new organization. The organization’s 
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declared purpose was to establish an Islamic state, using the term Daulah Islamiyah, 
this state was to be “the basis for reestablishing a Caliphate in the way of the Prophet.”  
 
Most JI recruits were Indonesians who continued to be Indonesia-centric in their 
outlook. This was true even if the notion of an Islamic state as a stage on the path to a 
caliphate had long been in the background of Darul Islam thinking, just as a caliphate is 
an ideal politiy for many Islamist movements inspired by early Islamic history. Yet the 
reference to a caliphate in the JI constitution reflected the fact that the leadership was 
now based in the transnational and cosmopolitan space of the Malacca hinterland. A 
singular nation-state was no longer a large enough territorial vision to accommodate the 
movement. Non-Indonesian members, in particular, were more likely to envision a 
future Islamic polity in transnational, caliphate terms. Interviews with arrested JI 
members in Singapore revealed that they wished to expand JI’s original vision of an 
Indonesian Islamic state to encompass an archipelagic caliphate or Daulah Islamiyah 
Nusantara, taking in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, and with time, Singapore 
and Brunei.432 The concept of a regional caliphate, even if a distant dream, was the 
logical political conclusion of the emerging regional jihadist assemblage.  
 
It was only in 1997 that JI expanded its Mantiqi system to cover the four areas that 
taken together would see the group described as a truly regional Southeast Asian 
organisation. The two new Mantiqis represented a further implicit challenge to the 
region’s sovereign territorial borders. Mantiqi III, led by Abu Tholut (alias Mustapha) 
would combine areas of eastern Indonesia, including Sulawesi, with Sabah in eastern 
Malaysia and Mindanao in the southern Philippines. An emerging Mantiqi IV, led by 
Abdurrahim Ayub, would cover Australia, as if to demonstrate that Jemaah Islamiyah 
would not be bound by conventional notions of what constitutes “the region.” In 
seeking to clarify the Mantiqi system, Nasir Abas, who would eventually became the 
head of Mantiqi III, writes “it did not represent the delimitation of an area that will 
become an Islamic State,” but served rather “the administration of proselytization and 
territorial management.”433 
                                                
432 See Republic of Singapore, “White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of 
Terrorism” (Singapore: Ministry of Home Affairs, January 7, 2003). 
433 Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 121. 
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The formation of Mantiqi III, which centred on the tri-border area of Malaysia, 
Indonesia and the southern Philippines, indicated the significance of this space in the 
emerging regional assemblage. In the early 1990s Sungkar tasked a Malaysian, Usman 
Sani, to recruit a network in the area in the Malaysian state of Sabah. Usman Sani who 
was from Sabah himself, had come under the influence of Sungkar in Negeri Sembilan. 
Following Sungkar’s orders, Sani established himself in the Sabah capital, Sandakan, 
from where he was able to recruit about 60 members to what was then still Darul Islam, 
although after the infisol this network would later convert to Jemaah Islamiyah.434 Some 
of these Sabah members would become prominent wives in the movement, most 
notably Noralwizah Lee, who became the wife of Hambali and who would go on to 
acquire weapons training in Afghanistan.   
 
But this was not the first Darul Islam community in Sabah. The network built upon a 
pre-existing Darul Islam community that had fled to the island of Borneo, of which 
Sabah is a part, from South Sulawesi in the early 1960s. These Darul Islam members 
were followers of Kahar Muzakkar, whose rebellion was being crushed by Indonesian 
republican forces at the time. Some fleeing Darul Islam members from South Sulawesi 
ended up in Sabah, were they lived in communities that continued to venerate Kahar 
Muzakkar and the Islamic State of Indonesia. For example, Ummu Husna, a Sabah 
resident who was recruited by Usman Sani and became the wife of Nasir Abas, traces 
her family origins to South Sulawesi. “Her father,” according to a report, “was one of 
the members of the Darul Islam Kahar Muzakkar movement that came from Enrikang, 
South Sulawesi, in 1962 by boat to the waters off Sandakan.”435  
 
Sabah, however, is but one, albeit important, part of the tri-border zone, an area located 
at the centre of archipelagic Southeast Asia that became a convergence space for 
jihadists in the 1990s, in defiance of nation-state boundaries—a position it holds to this 
day.436 This remote and undergoverned borderland facilitated jihadists from different 
                                                
434 “Laporan Kerja Lapangan Darul Islam Sabah” (unpublished manuscript, ca. 2007), 3. 
435 Ibid., 3n10. 
436 I borrow the concept of “convergence space” from Paul Routledge, “Convergence Space: process 
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nations, groups and networks to collaborate and engage in multi-scalar operations, 
making it one of the most strategic components of the regional jihadist assemblage.  
 
Just like the region of the Malacca strait, centuries of history demonstrate the triborder 
area to be at a strategic location favourable to political assemblage. The area emerged as 
a regional commercial power under the Sulu Sultanate in the 18th century, in part due to 
its central geographical position in the Sulu archipelago, a small island chain which is 
located almost precisely at the centre of what is now the tri-border. “The Sulu 
archipelago,” writes James Warren, “bridged two worlds [China and India] and lay at 
the most strategic point for the maritime trade of the nineteenth century.”437 If you look 
closely at almost any map of Southeast Asia, you can see that the historical capital of 
the Sulu Sultanate, the tiny island of Jolo, lies at the centre of the larger archipelago, at 
a point roughly equidistant from the Eurasian landmass in the north and the continent of 
Australian in the south. Jolo is also centrally located between the two largest islands of 
the tri-border area: Borneo, the third largest island in the world, and Mindanao, the 
second largest island of the Philippines. The Sulu Sultanate formed the central 
component of an assemblage that incorporated the wider area, a relationship 
underpinned by centuries of inter-insular trade by local seafaring communities. Warren 
describes this larger area of economic influence with the Sulu archipelago at its centre 
as the “Sulu Zone”. “In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,” he argues,  
 
there existed in the zone comprising the Sulu archipelago, the northeast 
coast of Borneo, the foreland of southern Mindanao, and the western 
coast of Celebes [Sulawesi] a loosely integrated political system that 
embraced island and coastal populace, maritime, nomadic fishermen, and 
slash and burn agriculturalists of the coastal rim and interior foothills.438  
 
Thus, Warren concludes, “The power of the Southeast Asian maritime world 
represented by Aceh in the seventieth century and Johor in the eighteenth century [both 
located on the Malacca strait] is continued in the Sulu Sultanate until the eve of the 
twentieth century.”439 Although the Sulu Zone has declined in commercial significance, 
the traditional patterns of trade and commerce, facilitated by local seafarers, has 
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438 Ibid., xxi. 
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continued regardless of the imposition of the Philippine-Malaysia-Indonesia borders. In 
recent decades, the routinized practice of what would now be called “border 
transgression” has combined with under-governance to allow the emergence of a 
jihadist convergence space. The significance of the zone was not lost on regional 
jihadists, like JI’s Nasir Abas, who became head of Mantiqi III covering the tri-border. 
In his autobiography, Abas notes:  
 
The area of Sabah Malaysia, East Kalimantan Indonesia and North 
Sulawesi function as a crossing route. The traditional crossing route 
became the main route that we used, because the local people there had 
mastered so well the illegal route.440    
 
In the 1990s, due to undergoverance and the rise of local militant Islamist groups, 
Mindanao in the Southern Philippines emerged as an important component in the 
regional jihadist assemblage. In 1984 the Moro Islamic Liberation Front splintered from 
the Moro National Liberation Front, and began to champion an Islamic state in 
Mindanao, taking the conflict in an Islamist and jihadist direction. In 1992 the Abu 
Sayyaf Group also splintered from the MNLF. Led by Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, 
who had fought in Afghanistan, embedded within the broader struggle for an ethnic 
Muslim homeland in Mindanao. Collaboration between Jemaah Islamiyah, MILF and 
Abu Sayyaf militants in Mindanao was the most important expansion of the regional 
assemblage since the move from Indonesia to the Malacca hinterland. Contacts with 
Philippine jihadists appear to have had their origins in the Afghan war, when they met 
at the Sayyaf training camp at Sadda, and according to Nasir Abas, the Moros allowed 
the Darul Islam jihadists to say they were Filipino in order to hide their identities.441 
First contact in Mindanao itself, however, was pioneered by Darul Islam. In 1991 five 
militants then under the direction of Ajengan Masduki, went on a sort of study tour to 
visit the MILF in Mindanao. The five were all Indonesian, and included Hambali (prior 
to his close association with Abdullah Sungkar) and Akram (one of the few senior 
militants who would not join Sungkar in JI).442  
 
                                                
440 Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 129.  
441 Ibid., 141.  
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It was not until after the civil war and the rise of the Taliban in 1992 forced JI to 
abandon its Torkham training camp that Sungkar, now flying the flag of Jemaah 
Islamiyah, cultivated the Moro Islamic Liberation Front as a collaborator in jihad and 
military training (i’dad askari). In 1994 Zulkarnaen, JI’s head of military affairs, 
ordered five members to go to Mindanao to help train MILF soldiers. Zulkarnaen had 
formed a formed a close relationship with MILF commander Hasyim Salamat in 
Pakistan in the 1980s, and the MILF had benefited from JI military training in the 
Afghan camps.443 Most of the five reached Mindanao by boat, island hopping through 
the Sulu archipelago. From Sandakan, in Malaysian Borneo, they sailed to the 
Philippine island of Tawi-Tawi and then on to Zamboanga on the island of Mindanao. 
From Zamboangao they sailed to Cotabatu, before making their way over land to the 
MILF base camp, Abu Bakar.  
 
One of the five, Nasir Abas, took charge of the military training, eventually relocating 
to a nearby piece of jungle just north of the MILF camp, which he cleared with the help 
of sixty Filipinos with machetes, and named Camp Hudaibiyah. He modelled the camp 
on the military training academies of the Afghan jihad. Abas, due to his Afghanistan 
training, was a gifted weapons instructor experienced with a range of weapons, 
including grenade launchers, mortars, small arms and anti-tank weapons. Camp 
Hudaibiyah became one of three smaller administrative units within Mantiqi III. 
According to Nasir Abas, Mantiqi III was directed towards becoming a “Military 
Support Area” for JI. Abas writes: 
 
The meaning of a Military Support Area is an area that can be used for an 
Academy of Military Education and Training and short-term Military 
Courses, and also as an area that has the potential to become a source of 
military strength.444 
 
The southern Philippines within Mantiqi III, Abas observes, would become the primary 
source of military supplies for JI because  
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all throughout my experience in that area it was so easy to obtain 
equipment, ammunition, weapons and explosives with detonators, as long 
as you have enough money and the agreement of the local seller. 
Moreover, crossing the border between the two countries, that is, 
Indonesia and the Philippines, was still relatively safe to do illegally.445   
 
Indeed, shortly after Abas’s arrival in Mindanao he observed the MILF receive a 
massive shipment of arms on a boat from Vietnam, which had crossed the South China 
Sea to dock at Cotabatu. The shipment included rocket-propelled grenades, mortars and 
large .50 calibre guns, which were carried over land to Camp Abu Bakar.446  
 
Although Camp Hudaibiyah was originally established to train the MILF, over time it 
became JI’s main training facility for its own recruits. Effectively, JI had moved its 
military training from Afghanistan to the Philippines, to which travel would be more 
convenient and much less costly. We can see the move as a major step in the slow 
gathering of a regional assemblage. The students who trained there came from across 
the archipelago. Largely, they were Filipinos, Indonesians, Malaysians and 
Singaporeans. By one account, 111 Indonesian militants were trained at Camp 
Hudaibiyah between 1994 and 2000, before the camp was replaced by another JI camp, 
Jabal Qubal, after Hudaibiyah and Camp Abu Bakar were overrun by the Philippines 
military.447 
 
Origins	of	global	jihadism	in	Southeast	Asia	
In the end of 1994, two developments in the annals of jihadist history had occurred 
simultaneously in Southeast Asia. These developments would occur completely 
independent of each other, but quickly converge and later culminate in the rise of global 
jihadism and the attacks of September 11. The first was the growth of a regional jihadist 
assemblage in Southeast Asia. According to assemblage theory, assemblages, formed 
through recurrent processes at a particular scale, may be more or less coherent and 
territorialized.448 By late 1994 one organization, Jemaah Islamiyah, could now boast a 
                                                
445 Ibid., 130-131.  
446 Nasir Abas, interview notes, January 2004.  
447 Muhammad Tito Karnavian, Explaining Islamist Insurgencies: The Case of Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyyah 
and the Radicalisation of the Poso Conflict, 2000–2007 (London: Imperial College Press, 2015), 5.  
448 Manuel De Landa, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2006), 14-19.  
 171 
 
permanent presence in each the three major states of the Malay Archipelago: Indonesia, 
Malaysia and the Philippines. JI, with its regional network, was central to a process 
which assembled jihadists across a number of networks and organizations—MILF, Abu 
Sayyaf, and Darul Islam—into a loose regional formation. The second was the 
relocation to the Philippines of Ramzi Yousef, the freelance pioneer of global jihad, 
who chose to base himself in Manila after his bombing of the World Trade Centre in 
1993.   
 
Yousef and his uncle, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, were influential members of the Arab 
Afghan mujahidin community, the transnational assemblage of foreign fighters better 
described as the Peshawar diaspora. Although they were connected to Osama bin 
Laden’s al-Qaeda organization, which had formed in 1988, they were known for their 
organizational independence.449 Yousef shared bin Laden’s view that after the fall of the 
Soviet Union the next target should be the other remaining superpower, the US. But in 
Yousef’s case, as a Pakistani with Palestinian heritage, his primary grievance was US 
support for the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Due to his organizational independence, 
however, in order to carry out attacks he was reliant on the interpersonal networks he 
could forge for individual operations. Yousef had become a hero in some jihadist circles 
for his attempt to blow up the World Trade Centre in 1993, which came close executing 
its plan of toppling one tower into the other, drawing on the network of mujahidin 
originally connected by Abdullah Azzam’s Afghan Services Bureau, which stretched to 
New York.450  
 
The day following the World Trade Centre attack, Yousef took a flight out of the United 
States undetected. But the local operatives who he used in the operation, many of them 
associated with JI’s Egyptian namesake, Gama’a Islamiyah, were quickly arrested. Soon 
the FBI was hunting Yousef in his native Pakistan. Pakistan, to make matters worse for 
Yousef, was now no longer so hospitable to jihadists. In January 1993 the Pakistan 
government had announced that the mujahidin offices would be closed and there would 
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be greater scrutiny of foreigners’ visas.451 Afghanistan had descended into civil war. 
The next great classical jihad to defend Muslim land would emerge in Bosnia, to which 
many of the mujahidin who did not want to return to their home countries travelled in 
the 1990s. What Yousef wanted, however, was a safe base from which to continue his 
violent jihad against the US. Somewhere remote from the manhunt for him in Pakistan 
and far away from the unrest in the region generally. It is for this reason, among others, 
that he looked towards Southeast Asia.  
 
Southeast Asia became the region most important to the emergence of global jihadism 
after Afghanistan-Pakistan thanks to it being both a space that is remote from the rest of 
the Muslim world and one that, in the 1990s, was rapidly globalizing. Yousef had begun 
travelling there in the early 1990s, and as early as 1992 had developed a relationship 
with the Abu Sayyaf Group, travelling to the latter’s camp on the island of Basilan in 
the Sulu archipelago. According to the Philippines police, it was Yousef who first 
contacted the ASG via its leader Janjalani, who he knew him from a military training 
camp in Libya. (They may have also been aware of each other through the Peshawar 
diaspora.) Their reconnection in the Philippines was brokered by Osama bin Laden’s 
brother-in-law, Mohommad Jamal Khalifa, who ran the Philippine branch of the Saudi 
charity, the International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO), that is alleged to have 
been channeling funds to the ASG, funds allegedly originating from Bin Laden.452 
Khalifa’s precise involvement as a financier of Yousef, not to mention a range of other 
individuals and groups, remains a topic of some mystery and intrigue, but was 
summarized matter-of-factly in a 2005 US diplomatic cable on “Islamic NGOs in the 
Philippines”:  
 
The International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO)—a subsidiary of the 
Saudi-based and funded Muslim World League (MWL)—was active here 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Operated by Usama Bin Laden's 
brother-in-law, Saudi businessman Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, and with 
links to captured al-Qaeda lieutenant Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the 
IIRO served as a legal front to conceal the transfer of al-Qaeda funding 
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and materiel to the Abu Sayyaf Group and possibly other insurgents or 
terrorists operating in the Philippines.453 
 
Although he had been travelling to the Philippines in the early part of the decade, it was 
only in late 1994 that Yousef decided to make Southeast Asia his base for global jihad. 
The information on why Yousef chose the region is limited, but the context he faced is 
relatively clear. At the time he was being hunted by the US, which had put a $2 million 
dollar bounty on his head. He was the most wanted terrorist in the world. There were 
obvious places he might have sought refuge. In 1992 Osama bin Laden had left civil 
war-torn Afghanistan for the shelter of the rogue Islamist state of Sudan under the 
regime of the mercurial Hasan al-Turabi. The previous most wanted terrorist in the 
world, Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, known as Carol the Jackal, had also found safe haven in 
Sudan, although in August 1994 the regime sold him out to Western intelligence and he 
was bundled off to France for trial. But Sudan was growing increasing isolated from the 
international community for its role in harbouring militants, a process that would lead to 
crippling sanctions being imposed on it in 1996. Meanwhile, the countries of the so-
called “Asian miracle” in East and Southeast Asia were heading the opposite direction. 
They were undergoing the most rapid industrialization and globalization in human 
history. Southeast Asia was both remote from the troubles of the rest of the Muslim 
world and growing increasingly globally integrated. It was, perhaps, the least likely 
place the US authorities would be looking.  
 
Yousef’s decision to move to Southeast Asia was described to FBI interrogators by one 
of his closest colleagues, Abdul Hakim Murad, who was arrested in the Philippines and 
jailed in the US alongside Yousef for his role in the World Trade Centre attack. 
According to the interrogation report: 
 
MURAD advised that RAMZI told him that he travelled around Southeast 
Asia, i.e., Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Philippines, to find a 
permanent residence because he believed the FBI was actively searching 
for him in Karachi. Murad said that RAMZI concluded that the Manila 
area was acceptable because the cost of living is reasonable.454  
 
                                                
453 U.S. Embassy, Manila, “Islamic NGOs in the Philippines,” May 23, 2005.  
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05MANILA2356_a.html 
454 FBI interrogation of Abdul Hakim Murad, FD-302, 12-13 April, 1995, 17.  
 174 
 
In a report the Philippines police made after they arrested Murad, Murad spoke about 
why Yousef had specifically chosen the Philippines as his base. According to the report: 
 
BASIT [Ramzi Yousef] had travelled in Asia specifically in Singapore, 
Hongkong and the Philippines looking for a place wherein the standard of 
living is considerably low. Thus, he had chosen the Philippines to be his 
base country in Asia because of the low standard of living. Likewise, it is 
the only country in Asia wherein he contacted and had a formal meeting 
with fellow Muslim extremists.455 
 
Going by the scarce information available, then, Ramzi Yousef, on the run after the first 
World Trade Centre attack, chose to relocate to a geographically peripheral part of the 
world where it would not be expensive to live, and where he would be able to 
collaborate with locally based jihadists, some of whom he may have been acquainted 
with from foreign training camps. But whether or not he realized it when he made his 
move, he would also find himself in a Southeast Asia at the peak of its “miracle” 
economic growth. Based on the rapid industrialization of the 1970s and 1980s, Ramzi’s 
arrival in the region coincided with a massive expansion of commercial air travel. 
Annual air traffic for the Asia Pacific grew above ten percent for ten years from 1985-
1995, led by the international sector. The rapid growth was such that by 1996 two of 
Southeast’s airports, Singapore’s Changi and Bangkok’s Don Muang, ranked in the top 
ten airports in the world by number of passengers. 456 Broadly speaking, the only part of 
the world with more air travel than East Asia was Western Europe. The air travel boom 
was remarked on by a US Federal Aviation Administration director based at 
Singapore’s Changi airport in 1993: “The growth of aviation in this part of the world is 
incredible. I've been here since 1988 and just by looking out the window, watching the 
increase in flights, I can tell how fast aviation is moving in this region. It's like an 
engine heating up.”457 Furthermore, due to unequal agreements signed by Southeast 
Asian countries with the US carriers in previous decades, the US airliners enjoyed 
liberal arrangements to operate in the region, in competition with local carriers. The US 
was in fact driving even greater liberalization, towards an “open skies” policy, an 
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agenda some countries, such as the Philippines, sought to at least postpone. Thus, US 
airliners like Northwest Airlines and United Airlines were frequent fliers in the region, 
which they saw as a major growth area.458 The dominance of US airliners in Southeast 
Asia was such that the New York Times commented on the disparity bluntly. “Now, the 
reasons for the concern of Asian airlines is clear every day at major airports across this 
continent,” a correspondent wrote. “It is possible for an American traveler to visit every 
major Asian business center on a single trip without flying on an Asian airline.”459  
 
Although Ramzi had access to the ungoverned territory of the Abu Sayyaf in the remote 
Sulu archipelago, it is notable that he based himself in the region’s most rapidly 
emerging cosmopolitan megacity, Metropolitan Manila, which by 1990 had a 
population of over fifteen million people in its extended region.460 Assemblage thinking 
sensitizes us to the significance of, among other things, the global city, because the 
assemblage is theorized as a coming together of both social and material elements. 
Thus, one of the significant dimensions of an assemblage may be its technological 
components. In an assemblage, as Aihwa Ong describes it, “the proliferation of 
technologies across the world produces systems that mix technology, politics, and 
actors in diverse configurations that do not follow given scales or political 
mappings.”461 Philippine police documents on the investigation of Yousef’s activities in 
this period indicate he and his associates’ regular air travel in and out of—and 
between—the region’s capital city airports. Some of the routes they frequented, like 
Singapore-Hongkong, were, by the mid-1990s, among the most travelled air routes in 
the world, with more passengers than London-Paris.462 It was in this both geopolitically 
peripheral and rapidly globalizing space that the vision for the attacks of 9/11 was 
conceived. In his definitive account of the rise of al-Qaeda, Lawrence Wright paints an 
evocative picture of this period: 
 
                                                
458 “Asians Seek To Restrict U.S. Airlines,” New York Times, July 10, 1993. 
459 Ibid.   
460 Peter J. Rimmer, Howard W. Dick, The City in Southeast Asia: Patterns, Processes and Policy 
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 89.  
461 Aihwa Ong, “Ecologies Of Expertise: Assembling Flows, Managing Citizenship” in Aihwa Ong & 
Stephen J. Collier, eds., Global assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological  
Problems (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 338. 
462 Ibid., 137.  
 176 
 
Yousef flew back to Pakistan, and soon after that, he moved to Manila. 
There he began concocting extraordinary schemes to blow up a dozen 
American airliners simultaneously, to assassinate Pope John Paul II and 
President Bill Clinton, and to crash a private plane into CIA headquarters. 
It is interesting to note, at this early date, the longing on the part of the 
Islamists to accomplish complex, highly symbolic attacks that were 
unlike anything ever achieved by any other terrorist group. Theatre is 
always a feature of terror, and these were terrorists whose dramatic 
ambition was unrivaled.463  
 
The scheme to blow up eleven United Airlines airplanes in quick succession over the 
Pacific before they reached the US came to be known as the Bojinka or Manila Air plot. 
“Project Bojinka” was the name given to the plot set out in one of the computer files 
found on a laptop computer at the Josefa apartment. An account by Rafael Garcia, the 
computer analyst who was asked to access the files and summarize their contents, 
reveals the extent to which the plot was based on the cell’s reconnaissance of the East 
and Southeast Asian air transport network:  
 
This was a plot to blow up 11 airlines over the Pacific Ocean, all in a 48-
hour period. The planes would have come from Seoul, Hong Kong, 
Taipei, Tokyo, Bangkok, Singapore, and Manila. Even the airlines and 
the specific flight numbers had been chosen. There was a document 
where calculations had been made on how to set the timers on the bomb 
to be placed on each flight so that they would explode within a set 
time.464 
 
The Bojinka plot was only discovered by the Philippine authorities by accident. The 
lead police investigator, Senior Superintendent Rodolfo Mendoza, described the 
investigation, which was triggered by “a simple accident at Room 603 of the Dona 
Josefa Apartment along Quirino Avenene, Malate, Manila”: 
 
Some residents complained of an “explosion” and the smell of acrid 
fumes coming from Room 603. The Fire Department and the police were 
called in by the apartment security to check on the origin of the smoke. 
When the firemen arrived, they checked the room which was registered to 
one Javy Asweta HADAD and discovered that there was really no fire but 
that the fumes came from a chemical reaction/explosion. [The Philippine 
authorities] conducted a surreptitious entry on the room which resulted in 
the recovery of a laptop computer and paraphernalia for the manufacture 
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of improvised explosive devices. A stake-out was conducted … and on 07 
January 1995, one of the occupants of the room came back to the room 
and he was immediately arrested. He was identified as one Abdul Hakim 
Ali Hasmid MURAD @ ABDUL MURAD, a Pakistani national around 
26 years of age.465   
 
In addition to the Bojinka plot, the Philippines authorities discovered plans to 
assassinate Pope John Paul II, who was due to visit Manila in January 1995. But the 
main innovations in attack methodology discovered in the apartment related to 
airplanes. In this regard, although Ramzi Yousef was the leader of the cell and 
entrepreneur of violence without many rivals, Senior Superintendent Mendoza’s 
interrogations of the cell suspects persuaded him that it was Abdul Hakim Murad who 
had dreamt up the most significant innovations, drawing on his experience as a trained 
pilot.  
 
Murad and Yousef, both from Pakistanis families, were childhood friends who grew up 
together in Kuwait. After high school they both left Kuwait, gravitating back to 
Pakistan but also both seeking training overseas. In 1990 Murad was a student at a flight 
school in Metro Manila.466 In the early 1990s Murad travelled to the US where he 
trained at flight schools in New York City, Texas and North Carolina, eventually 
gaining his commercial pilot license.467 Murad was in flight training in the US when 
Yousef carried out the first World Trade Center attack in February 1993. According to 
Mendoza, while Yousef was the mastermind of the attack, the target had been suggested 
by Murad. “According to Murad,” Mendoza writes, 
 
Yousef asked him to recommend a good target for bombing in the U.S. in 
1993 because he was then studying in the U.S. and Yousef had just 
undergone a six-months explosives training in Jallalabad, Afghanistan…. 
Murad recommended the World Trade Center in New York City because 
it was the commercial center in the U.S. Thus it was the subject of 
Yousef’s bombing attack in February 1993.468   
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But this was not Murad’s greatest contribution to the development of global jihadism. 
Murad also had the idea of using a commercial airplane to carry out a suicide attack 
against the CIA headquarters in Virginia. In the annals of jihadist history, it was Murad 
and Yousef’s time together in the apartment they shared in Manila, where they 
assembled the concepts, exploits and weapons of global jihad against the West, where 
the idea of using planes as missiles was first conceived. As summarized by Mendoza 
from the original debriefing report of Murad on January 20, 1995:469 
 
The idea of attacking the CIA headquarters as conceptualized by Murad was 
discussed by them in the Philippines in December 1994. They discussed the 
viability of suicide attacks and the need to have people die as martyrs to promote 
the cause. Murad came out with the idea of dive-crashing a commercial aircraft 
at the CIA headquarters in Virginia during a casual conversation with Yousef. 
There was no specific plan for its execution. Murad’s idea is that he will board 
any American commercial aircraft pretending to be an ordinary passenger. Then 
he will hijack said aircraft, control its cockpit and dive-crash it at the CIA 
headquarters. There will be no bomb or any explosive that he will use in its 
execution. It is simply a suicidal mission that he is very much willing to 
execute.470  
 
These very first imaginings of jihad on a grand and global scale went beyond the 
classical jihad to defend Muslim lands, fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s and Bosnia 
in the 1990s. They were a jihadist mutation and escalation that sought to fight a 
perceived worldwide array of enemies of Islam on multiple fronts, all at once, with 
symbolic and mass-casualty acts of terrorism. It was a vision of jihad born not of the 
rustic battlefield but of the globalized city. Yousef sought to claim these attacks in the 
name of “The Liberation Army,” as he did for the World Trade Center bombing when 
he called the New York Police Department from JFK airport before casually flying out 
of the country. The Liberation Army saw France and Great Britain among its global 
enemies too.471 But the army did not exist, not beyond Yousef’s ability to assemble an 
ad hoc cell of operatives.   
 
Of course, Yousef and Murad were not the first terrorists to plot attacks using 
commercial aircraft. According to David Rapoport’s famous “waves of terrorism” 
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thesis, aircraft hijackings were a common motif of the third wave, which is most closely 
associated with the likes of Carlos the Jackal and other leftist-styled revolutionaries who 
adopted the Palestinian cause in the 1970s.472 Yet these aviation attacks were typically a 
form of hostage-taking designed to control the movement of a certain group of people in 
a dramatic way in order to publicize the cause and extract concessions through 
negotiation. The tactical innovation of the Yousef cell was to use existing technology 
for something completely, horrifically new: to turn a commercial aircraft and its 
passengers into a weapon of war deployed to maximize casualties. This innovation 
appears as a hybridization of the foregoing tactic of international hijackings in the name 
of the Palestinian struggle with the brutal warfare of the Afghan jihad, which sought not 
to negotiate with but to destroy a superpower.  
 
Once Yousef, Murad and Khalid Sheikh Muhammad had the insight that a devastating 
new weapon could be created by simply reimagining the use of existing technology, it is 
plausible that they had begun to consider the many potential targets vulnerable to such a 
weapon. Rafael Garcia, the Filipino computer analyst, recalls that, separate from the 
Bojinka plot, the cell had indeed considered a plan to fly planes into multiple US 
targets: 
 
Then we found another document that discussed a second alternative to 
crash the 11 planes into selected targets in the United States instead of 
just blowing them up in the air. These included the CIA headquarters in 
Langley, Virginia; the World Trade Center in New York; the Sears Tower 
in Chicago; the TransAmerica Tower in San Francisco; and the White 
House in Washington, DC. Murad himself was to fly the plane that would 
be crashed into the CIA headquarters.473 
 
By the time Yousef and his associates fled the Philippines they had thoroughly tested 
the aviation security system in Southeast Asia. Yousef specialized in making chemical 
bombs with simple timing devices that could pass undetected through airport metal 
detectors. But his tests were not without loss of life. As a trial, he took Philippines 
Airlines Flight 434 to the Philippines city of Cebu, planted a bomb under one of the 
seats, before disembarking for the plane’s onward flight to Tokyo. On December 11, 
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1994, the small explosive device detonated mid-air under a Japanese passenger, killing 
him and injuring ten others, and sabotaging the plane’s controls. The flight was forced 
to make an emergency landing in Okinawa. The targeting of a local, Southeast Asian 
airline for the trial would have suited Yousef, lessening the risk of international scrutiny 
during his preparations for the primary attacks. Perhaps to that end also, the following 
day someone called the Associated Press office in Manila to claim the attack in the 
name of Abu Sayyaf.474 Indeed, the bombing was not connected to “international 
terrorism” until the findings of the Philippine police investigation into the Bojinka plot 
filtered out the following year.    
 
Looking back at the mid-1990s, it is difficult to think of another part of the world that 
offered an assemblage of elements more suited to the advent of global jihadism than 
rapidly globalizing Southeast Asia. At the time, Bin Laden and his al-Qaeda associates 
were isolated in impoverished Sudan. Afghanistan was in civil war. Algerian jihadists 
were mired in a bloody conflict with a military dictatorship. Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 
conflict with Yugoslavia was, akin to Afghanistan before it, a classical jihad to secure 
Muslim land, but without the glamour of a superpower adversary. Meanwhile, 
Southeast Asia assembled a number of components in a unique combination. The Asian 
economic miracle, not yet exposed by the 1998 financial crisis, had provided the 
region’s capitals the modern and globally connected infrastructure required for the 
accelerated pace and extended reach of global jihad. The region was experiencing an 
aviation boom such that it offered a ready supply of commercial aircraft to experiment 
with tactically and, potentially, to weaponize. Finally, and crucially, it was home to a 
preexisting assemblage of jihadists which, once tapped in to, offered a range of 
capabilities, from safe haven and training camps in the remote undergoverned spaces of 
the archipelago to resource mobilization in the regions’ globalizing cities.  
 
Global	Jihad	meets	Jemaah	Islamiyah			
In his interrogation by the Philippine police, Abdul Hakim Murad was categorical in 
stating that the only militant group Ramzi Yousef had contact with in Southeast Asia 
was Abu Sayyaf. Murad also denied any knowledge of Yousef’s connections with 
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Islamic charities, and thus any knowledge of the funding relationship with Osama bin 
Laden, via the latter’s brother-in-law, Jamal Khalifa.475 The investigation, however, had 
revealed not just a connection to bin Laden financing but also the existence of a foreign 
export trading company, Konsojya, perhaps also to channel funds to the Yousef cell and 
as a pretext for its operatives to travel across the region.  
 
Konsojaya SDN BHD was incorporated in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on June 2, 1994. Its 
board of directors was a mix of local Malaysian businessmen, members of the Yousef 
cell, and members of Jemaah Islamiyah. Wali Khan Amin Shah, the Afghani, was on 
the board, as was Riduan bin Isomuddin (alias Hambali) and his wife from Sabah, 
Noralwizah Lee.476 As this point in time, however, neither the authorities in the 
Philippines nor Malaysia had identified the growing presence of Jemaah Islamiyah. 
Crucially, then, they were unaware that the Yousef cell, more than linking up with just 
one local militant group, had in fact embedded itself in an assemblage of jihadists, 
composed primarily of Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah, an assemblage that gave the 
group operational reach across archipelagic Southeast Asia.   
 
Although Yousef himself was based primarily in Manila, the totality of evidence 
indicates that the Bojinka plot was a Southeast Asian operation. In this regard, Jemaah 
Islamiyah provided assistance to the group in Malaysia that was directed from the top 
and went beyond Hambali and Konsojaya. In 1994 JI Amir Abdullah Sungkar 
instructed Mantiqi I treasurer Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana to rent a safe house in Kuala 
Lumpur for use by two members of the Yousef cell, Wali Khan Amin Shah and 
Mohanad Shabana. Without being told the purpose of their visit, Faiz was to see to 
anything else the men might need while in Malaysia. Not long after his arrival, Wali 
Khan asked how he could acquire a large quantity of syringes. Faiz directed him to his 
younger brother Fatih, who lived in Singapore, a regional hub for medical services. 
There Wali Khan succeeded in purchasing 500 syringes. Recalling the episode, one of 
Wali Khan’s JI hosts says that back then he had no idea syringes can be fashioned into 
detonators for improvised explosives.477 Sometime later, Faiz checked on the safe house 
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to find the door unlocked and the house abandoned. Inside he discovered there had been 
a fire in the kitchen and the basin in the bathroom had been dismantled. According to 
the JI host, “I thought, these Arab guys, they are so rough. They don’t know how to use 
this equipment or what?” “Only later on,” he says, “did I realize what they were doing 
in the apartment – that they could be preparing bombs.”478 As we have seen, this would 
not be the last time that a Yousef cell bomb maker sets fire to an apartment.  
 
The Yousef cell’s main base, then, was the so-called “bomb factory” Ramzi Yousef 
established in Manila. But the cell also attempted to source bomb components, and to at 
least test them, in Malaysia. This fact, along with the wide-ranging casing of flights 
conducted by cell members across the region, points to the conclusion that Bojinka was 
a Southeast Asian aviation-based attack. The alternative name for the plot, “Manila 
Air,” fatally overlooks the regional scale of the aborted operation.    
 
When Wali Khan was arrested after the second fire in Manila, naturally he fled south 
towards the support network of jihadist assemblage, ending up in Malaysia again. He 
was arrested by Malaysian police almost a year later after he was found working as a 
restaurant proprietor on the Malaysian resort island of Langkawi.479 Ramzi Yousef was 
eventually arrested in Pakistan. Both, along with the pilot Abdul Hakim Murad, were 
tried and jailed in the US, where they remain in prison. 
 
In and of itself, the Bojinka operation was a failure. In hindsight, however, before it was 
exposed, the operation taught its operatives a number of key lessons. First among these 
lessons was that a large-scale aviation-based attack launched from Southeast Asia was 
possible, given the prevailing air transport infrastructure and the opportunity to integrate 
with a regional jihadist assemblage. On a personal front, the operation appears to have 
established a close working relationship between Yousef cell’s most important 
operative still at large, Khalid Sheikh Muhammad and Jemaah Islamiya’s Hambali. 
According to Ken Conboy, based on a reading of some of the Hambali CIA 
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interrogation transcripts, Abdullah Sungkar had made Hambali JI’s main liaison with 
the Yousef cell.480  
 
From a traditional Darul Islam background, Hambali hailed from the small village of 
Pamokolan in West Java. Despite this provincial background, from around the time of 
Bojinka, Hambali embarked on an odyssey which would make him JI’s most travelled 
operative, serving as the group’s principal liaison with foreign jihadists.481 In 1996 he 
played host again to Khalid Sheikh Muhammad during the latter’s trip to Malaysia and 
Indonesia.482 Later the same year Khalid Sheikh Muhammad reciprocated by inviting 
Hambali to Afghanistan. In Afghanistan he spent three or four days meeting with 
Osama bin Laden, at the conclusion of which the two informally agreed to work 
together on “targets of mutual interest,” according to a footnote in Khalid Sheikh 
Muhammad’s Guantanamo Bay file.483 Osama bin Laden, who at least in part, financed 
Bojinka, had recently relocated from Sudan to Afghanistan to live under the protection 
of the Taliban. Later, in 1996, he would issue his first significant fatwa, calling for 
attacks on the US military in the Arabian peninsula, which he saw as occupying Islam’s 
holiest cities.  
 
Conclusion	
In light of the Bojinka plot and with the benefit of hindsight, 9/11 can be seen as the 
culmination of six years’ development by trial and error that began in Southeast Asia in 
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1994.484 The continuity between Bojinka and 9/11 was rather downplayed, however, by 
the official US government 9/11 Commission Report. Nevertheless, the report mentions 
that Khalid Sheikh Muhammad had undergone a process of “learning” from previous 
plots:  
KSM claims that the earlier bombing of the World Trade Center taught him that 
bombs and explosives could be problematic, and that he needed to graduate to a 
more novel form of attack. He maintains that he and Yousef began thinking 
about using aircraft as weapons while working on the Manila air/Bojinka plot, 
and speculated about striking the World Trade Center and CIA headquarters as 
early as 1995.485 
 
To appreciate the full significance of the origins of 9/11, then, we must consider how, to 
a great extent, the 9/11 operation centred on the same key actors, relationships, 
infrastructure and vision as Bojinka, something we do in the following chapter. 
Critically, as we shall see, 9/11 drew on a multiplicity of functions and inputs across the 
very same diverse Southeast Asian jihadist assemblage. In this way, for Khalid Sheikh 
Muhammad the region presented the opportunity of a vast mobilization space for global 
jihad.  
 
Critically, the execution of 9/11 would rely on the fact that the regional assemblage 
within which the Bojinka plot was embedded had not been detected by anyone. The 
failure to identify the involvement of Jemaah Islamiyah or the significance of Hambali 
is illustrated in a network diagram of the plot produced by the Philippine police, shown 
in figure 1. The Abu Sayyaf Group is the only Southeast Asian jihadist organization 
represented in connection with Bojinka.  
 
To be fair, it is not clear how much the authorities in the Philippines and Malaysia had 
been able to cooperate in the mid-1990s to understand a transnational threat that, at the 
time, no was one expecting to see emerge in a Southeast Asia more peaceful and 
prosperous than ever in its modern history. The Malaysian authorities concede that after 
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the arrest of Wali Khan Amin Shah and his handover to the Americans there was no 
follow up investigation into Hambali.486 Consequently, the presence of Jemaah 
Islamiyah in Malaysia would remain undetected until 2000, when the 9/11 attack was 
already under way. At that time, Hambali, largely due to his relationship with Khalid 
Sheikh Muhammad that had been deepened by the Bojinka experience, would serve as 
the most important broker connecting al-Qaeda to Southeast Asian jihadists. For both of 
these men, the dark vision and grand promise of the Bojinka plot remained alive.  
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Figure 1. Philippines National Police diagram derived from the Bojinka investigation  
(Peter Lance) 
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7	
REGIONAL	JIHAD	
 
In the wake of the attacks of September 11 it was perhaps inevitable that the discovery 
of Jemaah Islamiyah in late 2001—a hitherto unheard of Southeast Asian terrorist 
group—would be seen through the prism of al-Qaeda. Terrorism experts rushed to press 
with claims that the two were in fact the same organization. Zachary Abuza in his 
Militant Islam in Southeast Asia described Jemaah Islamiyah as al-Qaeda’s “regional 
arm”.487 Likewise, Rohan Gunaratna in Inside Al Qaeda described JI as “Al Qaeda’s 
Asian arm,”488 and went so far as to criticise Australian intelligence officials who “did 
not believe that JI was under Al Qaeda control.”489 
 
More skeptical area and country specialists sought to show that Jemaah Islamiyah was 
very much a local organization with deep Indonesian roots and an autonomous 
character. In a series of investigative reports, the International Crisis Group unearthed 
JI’s origins in the indigenous Darul Islam movement.490 From this perspective, al-Qaeda 
plays a peripheral role to that of Indonesia-centric jihadists largely motivated by local 
drivers including, above all, the desire to impose Islamic law within an Islamic state in 
Indonesia. 
 
The academic debate over the importance of local versus global factors was paralleled 
in jihadist networks, with actors emphasizing one scale over the other depending on 
their own position in the network or their own particular experience. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the architect of the 9/11 attacks, Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, took a global, 
top-down perspective, with himself positioned at the top. Thus Egyptian journalist 
Yosri Fouda, who in 2002 found and interviewed KSM at length before his capture, 
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reflects the jihadist’s ego-centrism when he writes that the planner of 9/11 was capable 
of organising multiple operational theatres while preparing his main attack: 
 
[KSM] retained his close links in the Far East and started building a large 
regional network, based on four territorial organisations: Malaysia, 
Singapore and southern Thailand; Indonesia, except for Sulawesi and 
Kalimantan; the southern Philippines, the eastern Malaysian states of 
Sarawak and Sabah, Kalimantan and Sulawesi, Borneo and Brunei; and 
Irian Jaya and Australia.491 
 
The global versus local debate, however, overlooks the most significant development in 
militant Islamism in Southeast Asia at the turn of the 20th century: mobilization at the 
regional scale. Regional jihad, as it might be called, emerged from an assemblage of 
both global and local jihadists—often in close cooperation with one another and very 
rarely in open conflict—gathered loosely, discursively, on the basis of a militant pan-
Islamist consensus that Islam needs defending from its existential enemies, both 
religious and secular. Regional jihad coincided with the high point of coherence for the 
regional jihadist assemblage that we have traced over time and space since the mid-
1980s.  
 
It is a measure of the distributed and heterogeneous quality of the assemblage that the 
militants embedded within it often disagreed over whether it was more important to 
fight local enemies or global, Western, ones. Such disagreement illustrates a central 
quality of assemblages: their coherence may be challenged by their own internal debates 
and contradictions.492 A significant minority of highly mobile and motivated jihadists, 
however, exploited the regional assemblage of human and material resources, safe 
havens, training camps, conflict zones, and transportation networks, in order to wage 
violent jihad against both local and global targets. With access to the Southeast Asian 
assemblage, entrepreneurial global jihadists who prioritized attacking the US—like 
KSM and Hambali—were able to transcend organizational and territorial borders in 
order to mobilize attacks in the region despite the fact that for many jihadist foot 
soldiers, especially those in Indonesia, local concerns remained the priority.  
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Critically, the mobilization of the regional assemblage for attacks against the US and its 
allies continued the process begun with the Bojinka plot in the mid-1990s. I argue that it 
was the human and material mobilization opportunities presented by the Southeast 
Asian jihadist assemblage, opportunities discovered during the Bojinka plot, that drew 
al-Qaeda into close alliance with Jemaah Islamiyah. Indeed, jihad in the mid-1990s and 
early 2000s shared common elements: both featured a prominent  personal connection 
between Khalid Sheikh Muhammad and Hambali, two relatively autonomous brokers 
and entrepreneurs of violence; and both enjoyed the financial support of Osama bin 
Laden.  
 
During this period, the Southeast Asian assemblage greatly extended the geographical 
reach of al-Qaeda’s global attacks and brought mass casualty terrorism, like that of the 
2002 Bali bombings, to the region for the first time. Rather than focus on the Bali 
bombings, here I examine a number of operations, some of them less well known 
because they were planned but never executed, in order to illustrate certain aspects of 
how the assemblage worked in practice. As we shall see, such was the importance of 
Southeast Asia to the mobilization of global jihad, the region played a central role in the 
planning phase of the 9/11 attacks and came very close to being the launch pad for a 
second, Southeast Asian-led, “9/11.” 
 
The	Rise	of	Global	Jihad	
On February 23, 1998, Osama bin Laden, in a statement that the orientalist scholar 
Bernard Lewis described as “a magnificent piece of eloquent, at times even poetic 
Arabic prose,”493 declared a “World Islamic Front” under the banner of “Jihad against 
Jews and Crusaders”. Notwithstanding bin Laden’s lack of jurisprudential 
qualifications, the statement contained a ruling, or fatwa, which declared it the 
individual duty of all Muslims to “kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and 
military” and to do this “in any country in which it is possible to do it.”494 
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The timing of the 1998 fatwa saw Jemaah Islamiyah at a crossroads. In Indonesia, 
President Suharto was forced to resign amid riots and protests in May that year. His 
regime, which had chased the group’s leaders into self-exile, was disintegrating. 
Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir anticipated their homecomings, as 
opportunity began to open in Indonesia for an array of new political players. 
 
The coincidence of the fatwa and the fall of Suharto provoked a debate within JI about 
strategic priorities: to what extent should the organization support bin Laden’s radical 
global agenda when real political change was now possible in Indonesia? How should 
solidarities be prioritized: the Muslim community at home or the Muslim community of 
the world, the ummah? Jemaah Islamiyah was not alone in facing the local versus global 
dilemma. In light of bin Laden’s call to global jihad, jihadist groups around the world 
had been prompted to reconsider their objectives. According to Fawaz Gerges, the 
international jihadist movement became divided between nationalists who favoured 
local jihad and transnationalists who favoured global jihad. The overwhelming majority, 
however, sided with the nationalists and rejected al-Qaeda’s global war against America 
on the strategic grounds that it was unlikely to be successful.495 
 
Sungkar and Ba’asyir found themselves in an invidious position. As much as they were 
set on the fight for an Islamic state in Indonesia, years in exile in the Malacca hinterland 
had transnationalised their organization to an extent they had never anticipated nor 
intended. In early 1998, perhaps just prior to the bin Laden fatwa, they were two of a 
procession of jihadist leaders who visited Afghanistan to meet with bin Laden and 
discuss his proposal for a united jihadist front.496 Others who made the same pilgrimage 
included Rifa’i Ahmad Taha, a leader of JI’s Egyptian namesake, Gama’a Islamiyya, 
who went so far as to co-sign bin Laden’s February 23 statement. The fallout from the 
fatwa, however, was so great that Gama’a Islamiyya later forced Ahmad to rescind his 
support. The 1998 fatwa was so controversial, Gerges observes, that it even divided al-
Qaeda leader Ayam al-Zawahiri’s own Islamic Jihad organization.497 
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The position ultimately taken by Sungkar and Ba’asyir reflected the conflicted nature of 
the local versus global debate in the jihadist community. Following their visit to 
Afghanistan they settled into an ambiguous position of supporting the fatwa in principle 
but doing very little to further it in practice. In a letter from Malaysia dated August 3, 
1998, they disseminated the call to jihad against America through the Darul Islam 
network, now a constellation of factions but still Indonesia’s most extensive network of 
Muslim militants, and thus a large part of the regional assemblage. Bin Laden’s 
message, they wrote, is that “the most important obligation for the Muslim community 
now, after faith, is to work hard to free the Arabian Peninsula from the grip of Allah’s 
enemy, America (Jews and Christians).” Consistent with the spirit of the fatwa, “this 
struggle should be prioritized over others,” the letter said.498 The argument thus 
accurately represented what is now seen as a turn-of-millennium mutation in jihadist 
ideology and strategy, led by al-Qaeda. That is, a transition from targeting the “near 
enemy” (local “infidel” regimes) to the “far enemy” (the United States and its allies). 
Southeast Asian jihadists had been exposed to global jihad already, and earlier than 
most, from their collaboration with Ramzi Yousef and the Bojinka operatives. But they 
were a small cell on the fringe the broader movement. Al-Qaeda sought to make global 
jihad mainstream.    
 
This shift to the global embodied a realist logic: defeating the American hegemon at the 
heart of the Islamic world was the best way to advance Muslim causes elsewhere. Or as 
the JI leaders said, relating what bin Laden had put to them: 
 
If the Arabian Peninsula, as the source of Islam and the holy place of 
Mecca, can be freed from the grip of infidel America, its land as well as 
its wealth, then God willing the struggle to establish Islam around the 
world will be smoother. Most probably one of the causes of the deadlock 
and difficulty in establishing Islam everywhere now is that the Arabian 
Peninsula is still trampled by the impure feet of American infidels.499 
 
Although Sungkar and Ba’asyir faithfully reported bin Laden’s message, their letter 
notably avoided giving any formal endorsement of the fatwa, much less an undertaking 
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that JI itself would take part in the global jihad. They did, however, agree to facilitate 
the travel of anyone who wished to join bin Laden in Kandahar where, they wrote, he 
was in the process of forming a World Islamic Jihad Front (Jabhah Jihadiyah Alam 
Islami) to fight America. 
 
It was on the basis of this qualified support for the 1998 fatwa at the senior levels of JI 
that a close working relationship between the group and al-Qaeda was forged. The 
following year JI began sending members for training in Bin Laden’s camps in 
Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Abdullah Sungkar had the Mantiqi heads read the fatwa to 
their members during the group’s regular study circles. Some members were 
enthusiastic about the fatwa, but others, especially in the more insular JI and Darul 
Islam homelands of Java disagreed with it on strategic grounds. These local jihadists 
pointed to the opinion of Moro Islamic Liberation Front leader Salamat Hasyim, who 
was not about to subordinate his vision of a Bangsamoro homeland to Osama bin 
Laden’s global agenda. Hasyim reportedly said diplomatically, “The fatwa is good, but 
it’s impossible to apply in Mindanao because the situation is unsuitable.”500   
 
Nasir Abas recalls that as the head of JI in Sabah, Malaysia, he was ordered to have the 
Arabic text of the fatwa read aloud and translated for the benefit of those whose Arabic 
was limited. Abas says he refused to follow the order because he disagreed with 
designating civilians as legitimate targets; it is not known if any other JI leaders took 
such a principled stand.501 The Mantiqi I chief Hambali, coming from his experience 
with the Bojinka plot, was galvanized by the fatwa. He searched out the original Arabic 
text on the Internet, had it translated, and distributed it to his Mantiqi I subordinates.502 
 
Not long after Hambali played a central role in establishing, in early 1999, a training 
program for JI members to be undertaken in al-Qaeda camps, after training in the 
Philippines had become increasingly unfeasible due to pushback from the Philippine 
army. Abdullah Sungkar sent Hambali to Karachi to meet Khalid Sheikh Muhammad to 
see what options for training were available. With KSM’s help, soon formal training ties 
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with al-Qaeda were established, with JI recruits to be sent to al-Qaeda’s Al-Faruq camp 
in Afghanistan. The program was designed to facilitate small numbers of JI members in 
acquiring highly specialized military skills, including urban warfare and bomb-
making.503 Later the same year, Hambali and one of his closest associates, Faiz Abu 
Bakar Bafana, brought the first two JI students, Zaini Zakaria and Zamzuri, to 
Kandahar, the location of Al Faruq. Both were Malaysians and, as would become useful 
later, one of the two, Zakaria, had trained to fly single-engine aircraft. 
 
Despite such cooperation with al-Qaeda, it is striking how much JI, generally speaking, 
became divided along territorial lines between the internationally oriented, Malaysia-
based members of Mantiqi I—many of whom now saw themselves in a strategic 
alliance with al-Qaeda against the US—and the Indonesia-based members of Mantiqi II, 
who were focused on local developments and political opportunities in Indonesia. 
Senior Mantiqi II leaders such as Abu Rusydan and Achmad Roichan made two 
arguments against the 1998 fatwa. First, they said that the priority was jihad against the 
local apostate regime, the Indonesian government, because this followed the example of 
the prophet who fought his local enemies first, before spreading Islam beyond the 
Arabian Peninsula. Second, they said that jihad required proper military preparation, or 
i’dad (training), and JI was not yet prepared. They argued that just as prayer cannot be 
offered before ablutions, jihad cannot be undertaken before i’dad.504 In the Darul Islam 
community there was a common view that the vigorous US response to the bombing of 
its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the first attack since the Bin Laden fatwa, was an 
illustration of the folly of jihad against America. In retaliation for the embassy 
bombings, on August 20, 1998, the US had launched cruise missiles at al-Qaeda camps 
in Afghanistan, killing dozens of militants. Veteran Darul Islam leader Gaos Taufik 
observed that if Darul Islam was still too weak to fight the Indonesian state, as he 
believed it was, they would be crazy to take on America.505 Indeed, the doctrine of out-
of-area global jihad was such a radical departure from the foregoing tradition of 
classical jihad in defense of Muslim land that it sparked similar controversy even within 
al-Qaeda itself. According to Vahid Brown, in the period prior to 9/11 the internal 
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divisions over the decision to wage jihad against the United States were so great they 
“severely degraded al-Qa’ida’s organizational capacity.”506 
 
Torn between the local and the global, Jemaah Islamiyah experienced a moment of 
ideological drift when, as senior Mantiqi I leader Abu Rusydan has described it, the 
ideological direction of the organization was “still up in the air.”507 But the outbreak in 
1999 of communal violence between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia’s eastern 
provinces saw action paper over ideological division. In January 1999 rival Muslim and 
Christian gangs clashed in the streets of Ambon. The following year the fighting spread 
to the town of Poso in Central Sulawesi. The scale of inter-religious conflict was 
unprecedented in modern Indonesian history and led to a rise in communal tensions 
across the country, doing much to destabilize the administration of Indonesia’s first 
democratically elected president, Abdurrahman Wahid. For many Jemaah Islamiyah 
members and other politically militant Muslims, Ambon and Poso represented 
legitimate defensive jihads to protect the local Muslim community from Christian 
attacks.508 
 
Initially, Abdullah Sungkar, ever the conservative, was non-committal about Ambon. 
He suspected that the fighting was more a communal conflict than a classical defensive 
jihad. According to one account, he only shifted his position after word from Osama bin 
Laden. The JI cleric Mukhlas, who was travelling to Afghanistan, was asked to seek bin 
Laden’s opinion on Ambon. Bin Laden’s reply was that to protect Islamic interests JI 
should take action. Such was the esteem bin Laden was held in, “that’s when we 
decided we needed to be involved,” a senior Mantiqi I member has said.509 But JI had 
already fallen behind other militant groups in capitalizing on the conflict. Since the start 
of the fighting Ambon had become a magnet for jihadists across Indonesia, including 
previously nonviolent salafis—most notably  Laskar Jihad, led by Jafar Umar Thalib—
and new Darul Islam splinter groups. One of the most active groups was Mujahidin 
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Kompak, a military offshoot of a Kompak (Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat 
Krisis), the aid and development arm of Dewan Dakwah. Mujahidin Kompak recruited 
Jemaah Islamiyah members to the conflict who were impatient with the lack of action 
from the JI heirarchy. JI had been missing a golden opportunity for proselytizing and 
recruitment. The circumspect leaders of Mantiqi II had also been reluctant to engage in 
armed jihad within Indonesia’s borders. During a visit to Jakarta, Abdullah Sungkar, 
having taken his cue from Bin Laden, confronted senior Mantiqi II leader Achmad 
Roichan about why they were taking so long to act. Roichan responded that JI was not 
yet ready, that it needed to do more education and training to build up its social base 
before engaging in jihad. By now Sungkar was himself impatient with such an 
approach.510  
 
Ultimately there would be much more consensus around local jihad in Indonesia than 
global jihad against the West. But, on the whole, mobilization around local conflict 
zones in Indonesia would grow the assemblage available global jihadists, who, like 
Hambali, knew that one field of battle could be a gateway to the other. In Poso, more 
than anywhere else in Indonesia, JI hoped that by consolidating its presence, centered 
on Tanah Runtuh in Poso city, it could establish sufficient territory for a safe base 
(qoidah aminah), a prerequisite for building an Islamic state.511 With this vision, the 
conflict in Poso united both local and global jihadists.512 
 
Hambali	takes	charge	
In the 1990s Abdullah Sungkar, a strategic thinker who had retreated from Indonesia 
rather than face the heavy repression of the 1980s, emphasized the need to prepare the 
ground for an Islamic state and to avoid taking military action prematurely. Once, when 
he was asked about the need for jihad, he cited hadith and answered, “Don’t ask for 
jihad when it is not due. We fear when it is due you will be the one to run away.”513 On 
regime change in Indonesia, Australian JI member Jack Roche remembers Sungkar’s 
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long-game approach: “I don’t think it’s going to happen in my lifetime and quite 
possibly in the generation after me, but one day, insyallah….”514 As we have seen, this 
stance did not stop JI from assisting in the Bojinka plot. But on the whole, most of the 
1990s had been rather quiet in Indonesia at a time when other jihadist groups around the 
world, including Gama’a Islamiyyah in Egypt and even Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines 
had been actively attacking the local infidel regime.  
 
Hambali, however, was not patient like Sungkar. During the course of the 1990s he 
appears to have become an efficient and disciplined jihadist entrepreneur, able to 
marshal jihadist actors and materials from across the assemblage into ad hoc cells 
capable of conducting violent attacks. Mukhlas, who first met Hambali in Malaysia in 
the 1980s, would later describe his character as that of “just an ordinary person,” not at 
all like his fearsome image in the media. Yet he was also, Mukhlas acknowledged, a 
“dynamic entrepreneur and trader.”515 Typically, his attacks defied organizational and 
territorial boundaries, much to the irritation of some senior JI figures. There was 
jealously towards Hambali, too, at the elevated status he enjoyed as a result of his close 
relationship with al-Qaeda. As the leader of Mantiqi I, he was already in charge of the 
wealthiest division of JI.  But al-Qaeda give him access to even greater resources, 
sponsoring specific attacks if Hambali requested it. According to Indonesian counter-
terrorism chief Tito Karnavian, who interviewed Hambali about the process in 
Guantanamo Bay, “Hambali as head of Mantiqi I, would submit a proposal via secret 
communication channels, usually by e-mail, about a plan for an operation or attack with 
details about the amount of funding needed. If it was approved, al-Qaeda would send 
the funds by courier.”516 Despite Jemaah Islamiyah’s pretentions to military command 
and control, Hambali sidestepped these seniors with impunity. In the late 1990s, 
drawing on his knowledge of the assemblage and building on his experience with 
Bojinka, Hambali led a number of joint Jemaah Islamiyah-al-Qaeda operations in 
Southeast Asia.  
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His first scheme was an ultimately unsuccessful plot to attack Western targets in 
Singapore in 1999. This, as it transpired, was Hambali’s only global jihadist plot for 
which a now ailing Sungkar would still be alive. Tellingly, during the initial planning 
phase of the operation Hambali kept Abdullah Sungkar in the dark, exploiting the fact 
that Sungkar had undergone a heart operation in June of that year and was in now 
failing health.517 Sungkar’s death in late 1999 and his replacement as amir by Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir only further emboldened Hambali. Ba’asyir, a much less commanding 
leader than Sungkar, appears to have given Hambali free reign to wage jihad against 
Western and local targets as he saw fit, allowing him to organize and execute operations 
outside JI’s formal command structure, in collaboration with al-Qaeda. To that end 
Hambali set about forming special operations units, kept secret from the broader JI 
membership, trained in bomb-making and prepared to strike US targets.518 
 
Ba’asyir appears to have been kept abreast of Hambali’s operations, if not their precise 
details. In Ba’asyir’s view the phase of forbearance under the previous amir was over 
and now was the time for action. According to Hashim bin Abas, in early 2000 in Kuala 
Lumpur Ba’asyir issued a religious edict or fatwa in which he declared “that our 
Jammah [community] has to conduct dakwah [proselytizing] and jihad (waging war or 
qital) concurrently.” Hashim recalls that Hambali, interpreting the jihad component of 
the ruling, ordered him to set up a team of twelve recruits to prepare for unspecified 
operations.519 
 
In an early example of how Hambali mobilized components from across the assemblage 
to wage jihad at a regional scale, in May 2000 he directed Imam Samudra, a fiery 
Indonesian and veteran of Afghanistan who was under his command in Malaysia, to 
attack Christians in Indonesia in retaliation for the violence against Muslims in Ambon. 
The operation would reach across islands, transgressing nation-state boundaries, 
territorial command boundaries within JI, and the boundary between mainland and 
archipelagic Southeast Asia. Explosives for the attack were sourced from Southern 
Thailand and smuggled across the border to the Malaysian state of Kelantan, which 
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borders the southern Thai province of Narathiwat. There they were stored at a new JI 
boarding school, known as Lukmanul Hakiem Kelantan. From Kelantan, a Singaporean 
JI member transported the explosives south, down through the Malaysian peninsula into 
the Malacca hinterland, stopping at JI’s Lukmanul Hakiem school in Ulu Tiram. From 
Ulu Tiram it was a short drive to the Johor Strait separating Malaysia from Singapore, 
from where the operative took a forty-five minute boat trip to the small Indonesian 
island of Batam, located just south of Singapore. From Batam, Imam Samudra shipped 
the explosives to the adjacent Indonesian island of Sumatera, within JI’s Mantiqi II.520 
There, unbeknownst to JI’s Mantiqi II leader, Abdullah Anshori, Samudra homed in on 
soft Christian targets.   
 
On May 28 a bomb exploded in a Protestant church in Medan and in a Catholic church 
on Jl. Pemuda, Medan, the following day. No one was killed but dozens of churchgoers 
were injured because the first bomb was timed to explode during Sunday prayers. Imam 
Samudra circulated an email taking responsibility for the attack. He claimed to have 
discovered a conspiracy by a Christian Army to turn Medan into a second Ambon; the 
bombings, he said, were both a warning to Christians and revenge for Christian crimes 
against Muslims in Ambon. “Oh Allah,” he wrote, “give us the ability and strength to 
explode more infidel headquarters that camouflage themselves as churches.”521 
 
In the first conscious effort to assemble jihadists at the regional scale, Hambali and his 
mostly Malaysian and Singaporean associates sought to create an umbrella organization 
for regional jihad in Southeast Asia. In 2000, leading Mantiqi I operatives convened and 
hosted a series of meetings in Malaysia of what they called the Rabitatul Muhahidin 
(Mujahidin League), to which militants from across the region were invited. The guest 
list included militants from the Abu Sayyaf and MILF in the southern Philippines, 
Jemaah Salafi in southern Thailand, the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation in Burma, 
and a group formed by Malaysian veterans of Afghanistan-Pakistan in 1996 who called 
themselves the Malaysian Mujahdin Group (Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia, KMM).  
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The KMM was a small underground group of jihadists who saw themselves as militant 
defenders of the mainstream Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), with which they were 
politically aligned. The KMM filled a niche for Malaysian jihadists who did not want to 
be seen as disloyal to PAS clerics by joining rival organization, such as JI, led by, 
foreign, Indonesian clerics. However, in another telling example of how the assemblage 
effect militated against the usefulness of neat organizational charts, in the late 1990s a 
number of KMM members had become radicalized by senior JI cleric Abu Jibril. In 
2000, under the influence of Hambali, they took part in attacks in Malaysia against 
“infidel” targets. In late 2000 KMM members assassinated a local Christian politician, 
Joe Ferdandez. The assassination was followed by attacks on Christian and Hindu 
places of worship. These attacks, carried out in collaboration with JI members, not only 
ran counter to KMM’s original purpose but also defied JI’s Mantiqi command structure, 
in which Malaysia was meant to be preserved as a refuge and area for fundraising.522 
Jihadists from KMM would go on to take part in al-Qaeda led operations too, as we 
shall see below.    
 
As for the Mujahidin League, it served to enhance jihadist cooperation across the 
assemblage at the time, despite never consolidating into an enduring institution. At its 
second meeting, in June 2000, the league facilitated an ambitious bombing operating 
that fully exploited the region as a fluid mobilization space. Chaired by Abu Bakar 
Ba’asyir himself, the second meeting took place just as the MILF’s massive Camp Abu 
Bakar headquarters had fallen to the Philippines armed forces after months of 
bombardment. Consequently, JI had been forced to retreat from its training outpost, 
Camp Hudaibiyah, which had then been overrun by government troops. In response to 
these setbacks, the league passed a resolution to retaliate against the Philippines 
government. A bombing operation was then put together in record speed. The operation 
was overseen by the Jemaah Islamiyah member who at the time was the most active in 
the Philippines, Fathur Rahman al-Gozi. Al-Gozi, who was 29, had spent much of his 
twenties training in bomb-making in Darul Islam’s Torkham camp in Afghanistan and, 
later, in Mindanao with the MILF. On August 1 a remotely detonated car bomb 
exploded outside the residence of the Philippines ambassador in Jakarta, just as the 
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ambassador, Leonides Caday, was leaving in his black Mercedes. A bystander and a 
guard were killed and several others were injured. Caday was seriously injured but 
survived the attack.  
 
Some analysts might cast the Rabitatul Mujahidin as a failure because it ultimately did 
not unite the disparate Muslim militant groups of Southeast Asia into a stable and 
enduring coalition. But that would miss the point. The league was just one, admittedly 
rather symbolic, manifestation of the long process of jihadist assembling and 
reassembling across space and time in Southeast Asia. As a number of assemblage 
thinkers have argued, “the key starting point of an assemblage-based analysis of the 
social [is] to understand assembling as an ongoing process of forming and sustaining 
associations between diverse constituents.”523 But such associations are provisional; just 
as assemblages cohere, they can also disperse. As Anderson and McFarlane put it, 
“relations may change, new elements may enter, alliances may be broken, new 
conjunctions may be fostered.”524 The process underlying the Mujahidin League 
assembled operatives, resources and targets from multiple locations across the three 
main countries of archipelagic Southeast Asia—Indonesia, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines—and would likely have facilitated an attack on the Philippines, regardless 
of whether there was an institutionalized league or not.  
 
Sometime in November 2000, Mantiqi I members convened what would turn out to be 
the third and final Mujahidin League meeting. At this meeting, held in the Malaysian 
border state of Perak, it was agreed to assist Osama bin Laden in carrying out his fatwa 
to attack the US.525 A senior Mantiqi I member present at the meeting described the 
thinking at the time: 
 
Somebody went to see Osama, I think it was Hambali. And he [Osama] 
brought out a map that showed all the Western military forces 
surrounding the Arabian peninsula – [like] a hand coming. Then Osama 
came to the conclusion that their interests are to capture the whole of 
Muslim land. So that’s why Osama came to that fatwa. And we felt that it 
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was true, so JI, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, basically agreed to the attack on 
American interests, either military or civilian.526 
 
Indonesia-centric members of Jemaah Islamiyah have since disputed the level of 
support for the bin Laden fatwa within JI. But Mantiqi I members claim that at the time, 
most JI leaders were in agreement with the fatwa and that Hambali and his associates 
had license to carry out attacks against the US across the region. According to the senior 
Mantiqi I member, “Most of the top personal of JI knew that this Rabitatul Mujahidin 
had agreed to the fatwa. Basically it means we can have operations across all these 
members’ [countries] if we wanted to attack Western interests.527 
 
Meanwhile, Mantiqi I continued its program against Christian churches, hoping to stoke 
religious conflict in Indonesia and ignite a wave of retaliation against the Christian 
community. Hambali convened a meeting of key Mantiqi operatives at the office of 
MNZ Associates, an auditing firm part-owned by Mantiqi I secretary Zulkepli bin 
Marzuki. In attendance were Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana, Mukhlas, Imam Samudra, 
Yazid Sufaat, Azhari and Candra Nasrullah. The group agreed to bomb churches on 
Christmas Eve simultaneously across ten cities in Indonesia. They would fund the 
operation from a large donation recently made by al-Qaeda and a personal donation 
from Yazid Sufaat, perhaps the most independently wealthy JI member. Sufaat would 
contribute US$10,000 of his own money.528 Hambali asked Faiz and Zulkepli to travel 
with him to meet Abu Bakar Ba’asyir to request the Amir’s approval for the attacks. He 
said he also wanted to get approval for an attack on US military interests in Singapore, a 
plan he described as from “the sheikh” – this honorific being a common way to indicate 
Osama bin Laden.529 
 
If Mantiqi I and Mantiqi II disagreed about the extent of support JI should give for the 
1998 fatwa and global jihad, it appears that the Amir of the organization was indeed 
prepared to give tacit approval to Hambali’s out-of-area operations. In November 
Hambali, Faiz and Zulkepli travelled to Solo and met with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in a 
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hotel near his Ngruki boarding school. Hambali expected he would get JI approval for 
his operations if he was able to source his own funding.530 According to the Indonesian 
police interrogation deposition of Faiz, in Solo Hambali told Ba’asyir, “We have to 
retaliate against the Christians who have killed Muslims in mosques in Ambon, before 
they retaliate against us.”531 Ba’asyir not only agreed to the Christmas Eve attacks but 
also to the Singapore attack with al-Qaeda. In return, he asked Hambali for a donation 
for the JI university Mahad Ali in Solo, a request that Hambali considered a while 
before the brief meeting was brought to an end.532 
 
On Christmas Eve, 2000, bombs exploded in eleven cities across Indonesia, killing 
nineteen people and wounding one hundred and twenty. The death toll would have been 
much higher if many of the bombs had not been so poorly built and failed to detonate. 
In justification of the bombings Hambali later said, “They attacked [Muslims] during Id 
prayers, so we attacked during their festive season”—a reference to the Ambon conflict, 
which had flared on 19 January 1999, the second day of Idul Fitri celebrations, a day 
which came to be known as “Bloody Idul Fitri.”533 But Mantqi I claims at the time of 
Christian churches storing weapons and inciting violence against Muslims were 
unfounded.534  
 
The bombing campaign failed to spark widespread religious violence, much less unite 
Muslims in a jihad against Christians across Indonesia. Instead, it united mainstream 
Muslims and Christians against terrorism, an outcome that much frustrated the bombers. 
To their apparent surprise, the bombings saw them lose popular support, rather than 
gain it.535 Even within JI, Mantiqi I found itself criticized by Mantiqi II members who 
considered the bombings counterproductive and were sceptical of the legal basis for 
attacks against places of worship, such attacks normally being prohibited under Islamic 
law.536 
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The	Rizal	Day	Attacks		
Five days after the Christmas Eve attacks in Indonesia, on December 30, 2000, a joint 
MILF-JI operation bombed various targets across Metropolitan Manila in the 
Philippines in near-simultaneous explosions. Twenty-two people were killed, most of 
them passengers in a Light Rail Transit train cab. Almost 100 others were injured. 
Taken together with the church bombings in Indonesia, the transnational attacks during 
the Christian festive season of 2000 was a stunning display of jihadist geographical 
reach and logistical coordination across the complex terrain of archipelagic Southeast 
Asia. 
 
Like the bombing of the Philippines ambassador in Jakarta, the Rizal Day attacks were 
motivated by the then Estrada government’s ongoing assault against the MILF camp 
Abu Bakar, which had begun earlier in the year. Despite official MILF rejection of JI, 
MILF special forces commander Mukhlis Yunos collaborated with Jemaah Islamiyah 
bomb-maker Fathur Rahman Al-Ghozi in an exchange in which MILF operatives would 
help JI acquire explosives for use in Indonesia and Jemaah Islamiyah would help 
assemble the bombs and finance their deployment. The initial strategy was to spread the 
war in the Southern Philippines to Manila in order to divert the Philippines military 
from its operation in Mindanao, thus easing the pressure on MILF troops.537 
 
The arrival of Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi’s seniors in Manila, however, threatened to 
change the target of the operation. Hambali and Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana arrived on 
December 1 and convened a targeting meeting at which Mukhlis says Hambali himself 
set the direction for the group’s operation. Hambali, he says, was determined to hit 
Israeli and American targets. Following the meeting he led a group which included al-
Ghozi, Mukhlis and other MILF operatives on a casing operation of the US and Israeli 
embassies. It was determined, however, that the targets were too well protected. 
Mukhlis himself overheard the group say that Hambali was convinced that “the US and 
Israel embassies are difficult targets” because of a lack of access to the main building 
and the fact that they were well-fortified structures.538 Eventually, Hambali and Faiz left 
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the Philippines, having “given Saad [al-Ghozi] and Mukhlis a free hand regarding target 
selection on their impending operations.”539 Faiz later testified that following the attack 
al-Ghozi called him from the Philippines with the news that “the job had been done.” 
Faiz was surprised that in the end local targets like the LRT train station had been 
bombed, given that part of the funding for the operation, some US$3,600, had come 
from al-Qaeda.540 
 
The Rizal Day attacks demonstrate the blurred lines between local and global jihad in 
Southeast Asia’s jihadist assemblage. Individuals with ostensibly different interests 
collaborated with one another. The attack targets, ultimately, were decided by a shifting 
and highly contingent process of mobilization, informed by tactical and strategic 
circumstances. Ideologically, the assemblage in its most coherent form drew jihadists 
together around a broad militant pan-Islamist agenda to confront the enemies of Islam, 
whoever they were and wherever they might be. In this way, the local and the global 
scales of conflict were elided into one, Southeast Asian, theatre of operation.  
 
Al-Qaeda	in	Southeast	Asia	
During the “global war on terror,” the precise nature of al-Qaeda’s ‘links’ to Southeast 
Asia were a source of much speculation and some confusion. One high-profile case of a 
foreign fighter in the region centered on the activities of a Spanish militant and leader of 
an al-Qaeda linked cell, Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkasan, and Parlindungan Siregar, an 
Indonesian, previously unknown to the authorities, who had been based in Spain. 
According to court documents produced at the trial of Imad, Siregar facilitated 
paramilitary training for Imad and members of his cell at a camp near the conflict area 
of Poso, in Central Sulawesi.541 Indonesia’s national intelligence agency, BIN, 
apparently was unaware of the training camp before details of the Spanish cell were 
aired in the media. But by that time Parlindungan Siregar was nowhere to be found. The 
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agency determined that the camp had probably shut down shortly after the attacks of 
9/11.542 
 
The most well-known case of a foreign militant in the region with suspected al-Qaeda 
connections was that of Omar al Faruq. In September 2002, on the first anniversary of 
9/11, the United States issued a global code-orange terrorism alert, the second highest 
level of elevation in the alert system, based on intelligence from the interrogation of 
Faruq, a suspected al-Qaeda facilitator who had been based in Indonesia since the late 
1990s. Al-Faruq told his interrogators that he had been in communication with senior 
al-Qaeda figures Abu Zubaydah and Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, who had instructed him to 
prepare “a plan to conduct simultaneous car/truck bomb attacks against U.S. embassies 
in the region to take place” near the first anniversary of the September 11 attacks.543 The 
revelations, published in Time magazine on the week of the anniversary, led to the 
temporary closure of US and other Western embassies across Southeast Asia and the 
cancellation of an event in Jakarta to commemorate the 9/11 attacks.544 
 
Like a handful of other foreign fighters, al-Faruq appears to have been attracted to the 
religious conflict zones that had broken out in Indonesia’s eastern provinces. Al-Faruq 
was involved in a number of training camps in an apparent effort to coordinate and 
strengthen the ranks of Muslim militants active in Poso and Ambon. He apparently 
worked with a Saudi financier called Rashid to run paramilitary training camps, known 
as the “Special Program”. In 2000 they established one camp in the Hitu peninsula of 
Ambon, which attracted instructors from the Middle East. According to Ken Conboy, 
“Between late 2000 and mid-2001, the program was supported by twenty persons, 
including eight Saudis, four Yemenis, and Algerian and a Pakistani,” but most of them 
would visit Indonesia on a short-term basis only.545 In time, Faruq and Rashid helped 
Jemaah Islamiyah establish training camps on the Moluccan islands of Seram and Buru. 
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These separate efforts of transnational collaboration were ad hoc and small-scale, but in 
the wake of 9/11 they prompted feverish reporting in the media about the rise of al-
Qaeda in Southeast Asia. The tone of the initial Time report on al-Faruq – the operative 
with the clearest al-Qaeda credentials – betrays a level of post-9/11 fear and alarmism, 
combined with a common hierarchical analysis of global jihadism in which al-Qaeda 
was an expanding and commanding monolith: 
 
In the late 1990s al-Faruq slipped into Indonesia to take control of al-
Qaeda's operations in Southeast Asia. Across a belt of territory stretching 
from Myanmar (formerly Burma) to eastern Indonesia, radical Islam was 
on the rise, with militants occupying swaths of the region's steamy jungle 
terrain.546 
 
Global jihad in Southeast Asia, however, was not the result of al-Qaeda’s expansion 
into the region in any territorial sense. It was enough that Osama bin Laden and al-
Qaeda had taken the ideological lead by promoting the doctrine of global jihad against 
the West to their allies around the world. For al-Qaeda to mount attacks in the region, 
all that was required was for it to collaborate with a handful of Southeast Asian jihadists 
who were adept at mobilizing the regional assemblage. These joint efforts typically 
relied on money from al-Qaeda combined with the local geographical knowledge and 
logistical capabilities of Jemaah Islamiyah operatives. JI, however, never subordinated 
itself to al-Qaeda and was never its regional “branch.” According to a Mantiqi I 
operative who was one of the primary contacts with al-Qaeda, even at the peak of the 
collaboration, JI maintained its organizational autonomy: 
 
Like a business affiliate, we can ask them for an opinion, but they have no 
authority over us. We are free. We have our own funds, our own men. We 
are independent, like Australia and the US. But when it comes to an 
operation we can join together.547 
 
Two joint bombing operations, in particular, indicate the sophistication of the 
collaboration, despite both operations failing. A detailed analysis of the operations 
illustrates how Southeast Asian jihadists often had to compensate for a lack of local 
resources by mobilizing disparate inputs and functions from across the regional 
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assemblage. Southeast Asian jihadists conducted bombing operations by drawing on a 
variety of elements from different countries and territories, not unlike like a 
multinational corporation constructing a transnational production chain for the first 
time, but with much trial and error.  
 
The first joint operation emerged as a Mantiqi I proposal in mid-1999 in response to 
Osama bin Laden’s fatwa on global jihad the previous year. JI’s Singaporean wakalah 
had suggested the idea of hitting US targets in the city-state, and Hambali, liking the 
idea, sent Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana to Pakistan to seek the support of Khalid Sheikh 
Muhammad. Before leaving Kuala Lumpur for Karachi, Faiz made a farewell visit to an 
ailing Abdullah Sungkar, who was in hospital recovering from heart bypass surgery. 
But Faiz did not mention the plan for an operation with al-Qaeda.548 As mentioned 
above, Sungkar appears to have been kept in the dark on the matter, which suggests that 
Faiz and Hambali were not confident of getting his approval for al-Qaeda attacks in the 
region. Although Sungkar had been prepared to assist the Bojinka plotters some years 
earlier, it is likely that, at the least, he would have had grave strategic concerns about 
conducting mass-casualty global jihadist attacks on targets in Jemaah Islamiyah’s own 
territory. The 1999 Singapore plot stands as the only al-Qaeda attack planned while 
Sungkar was still alive. 
 
In Karachi Faiz was unable to contact Khalid Sheikh Muhammad so he ventured into 
Afghanistan in an attempt to contact someone else in the al-Qaeda leadership. In 
Kandahar he was able to get an audience with the al-Qaeda military chief Muhammad 
Atef. He had brought with him a reconnaissance video JI members in Singapore had 
made of a possible local target: a bus stop at the Yishun Mass Rapid Transit station, 
which was used to shuttle US personnel working at Sembawang wharf, a logistics base 
of the US 7th Fleet. In addition, he had prepared a written assessment of the target. 
 
According to Faiz, after studying these materials Muhammad Atef was positive about 
the operation but said he would need more information on the frequency and number of 
US personnel and information on the presence of any US warships docking at the wharf. 
Faiz, for his part, was concerned about who would execute the attack. “I don’t think we 
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have the suicide bombers,” he told Atef. Atef replied, “We will provide the personnel. 
The money, we will provide. You need only to look for the explosives, the TNT, and 
the transport.”549 
 
Over a year later, in October 2000, al-Qaeda sent an operative, Bandar (Abu Hazim al-
Sha’ir) to Kuala Lumpur. Bandar met with Faiz, who was now able to offer him a full 
report on the naval base at Sembawang, including photographs of the positions of US 
warships, information on the procurement of explosives from the Philippines and an 
analysis of the cost of the operation. But nothing more was done until April the 
following year when Faiz met the Philippines-based operative and JI bomb-maker 
Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi in Kuala Lumpur and gave him US$2,500 to procure 
explosives in the Philippines.550 Meanwhile, in Karachi KSM was on the cusp of 
executing the 9/11 attacks but was determined to deploy operatives for other, concurrent 
operations. He sent Muhammad Monsour Jabarah, a young Canadian of Kuwaiti 
heritage to Malaysia to facilitate an attack that initially targeted the Israeli or US 
embassy in the Philippines, but as it developed it merged with the Singapore plot. 
Jabarah would manage the money for the operation, and act as a guide for, Ahmad 
Sahagi, a non-English speaking suicide operative. KSM gave him an initial US$10,000; 
he had at some point also transferred $10,000 to Faiz in Malaysia. Both al-Qaeda 
operatives had sworn an oath to Osama bin Laden.551 
 
Before leaving for Malaysia, Jabarah met with Hambali at his Karachi apartment for 
further training and preparation specific to operating in Southeast Asia.  Hambali gave 
him his contacts in Kuala Lumpur and advice on where to stay when he arrived. His 
main contact, he was told, would be Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana, although he would 
know him only by the alias Mahmoud.552 According to Hambali’s CIA interrogation, he 
trained Jabarah along with Bandar and a third operative, Abu Muas’ab al-Hashidi, for 
two weeks in Karachi in the basics of operating in Singapore undetected. The training 
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included how to read a local telephone book and how to use the Mass Rapid Transit 
public transport system. He also taught them how they could buy chemicals and 
components for bomb-making on the open market, and sent them on a practice run to 
buy such supplies in Karachi.553 
 
Bandar was the first operative deployed to execute the Singapore plot. Hambali sent 
him off with some ideas for targets based on initial casing conducted by local JI 
operatives: an oil tanker, the US or Israeli embassy, Western airliners. But he was 
instructed to do his own further casing and given the freedom to use his own discretion 
in finalising the target. Hambali instructed him to first make contact with Mahmoud in 
Kuala Lumpur before moving on to Singapore and to keep all email communications 
brief. 554 
 
Jabarah left Pakistan for Kuala Lumpur on 10 September 2011. He had heard rumours 
of a big impending attack and KSM had told him to leave the country before the 11th. 
Jabarah, as it happened, watched the attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon unfold from his hotel room while on a stop-over in Hong Kong. Later, he 
would remark that he was “happy with the success of operation,” which had inspired 
him in his Southeast Asian adventure.555 
 
In Kuala Lumpur Jabarah and Sahagi made contact with Hambali’s right-hand men, 
Faiz and Zulkepli. They were told to meet with Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi in the 
Philippines because al-Ghozi would supply the explosives. In the Philippines al-Ghozi 
told them that he did not yet have enough explosives for the job and would need more 
time and money. He had managed to buy 1.2 tons of TNT from a black-market supplier 
in Cebu, but was looking to acquire a total of 6 tons.556 Al-Ghozi added that the US 
embassy in Manila would make a poor target because it was too highly secured. He took 
Jabarah on a tour of the US and Israeli embassies to illustrate his point, showing just 
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how far back from the road the US embassy was positioned. He wanted, he said, to 
discuss targets with Faiz in Kuala Lumpur. 
 
Not long after the Jabarah and Sahagi’s trip to Manila, the al-Qaeda operatives met with 
Faiz and other local operatives at a McDonald’s restaurant in Kuala Lumpur. Then, 
driving around town in a minivan, Faiz concluded they would case targets in Singapore 
and Jabarah would be put in touch with his brother Fatih, who was based in the city-
state. In October, Jabarah, now travelling alone, flew to Singapore where he met Fatih 
and other local JI members. Al-Ghozi joined them. There they made a casing video of 
various targets, including the Bank of America, Caltex Oil Company, the US and Israeli 
embassies. The video was transferred onto Video CD and labelled “Visiting Singapore 
Sightseeing.”557 Al-Ghozi added to the short list of targets the US naval base at 
Sembawang that had been cased the year before. He gave local JI Fiah member Adnan 
bin Musa US$5,500 in cash to cover the cost of preparations. Back in Malaysia the 
operatives reviewed their options. The plan now called for each target to be allocated 
two tons of TNT which would be mixed with 17 tons of ammonium nitrate purchased 
locally in Singapore. One option was to fashion the explosives into truck bombs.558 But 
they would need much more money to purchase the inputs. Jabarah contacted KSM and 
asked for an additional $50,000. The Malaysian operatives said they would kick in 
$15,000.559 
 
All the while during the planning phase of the Singapore plot the US had been reacting 
to the devastation of 9/11. Hambali was present in Kandahar when US air strikes 
commenced against al-Qaeda targets in Afghanistan; one of those killed was al-Qaeda’s 
military chief, Muhammad Atef. Hambali had met Atef before he was killed, and Atef 
advised him that the Singapore operation should be executed quickly. Hambali then left 
Afghanistan, making his way back to Malaysia. He arrived in the midst of planning for 
the Singapore plot with the financing, operatives and targets all in place. Al-Ghozi, 
however, told the group that it would take one and a half years to smuggle all the 
explosives from the Philippines to Singapore via Indonesia. Hambali replied that 
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Muhammad Atef had said that if the explosives were in the Philippines the attack 
should be executed in the Philippines too, in order that it be carried out quickly. Thus 
the Singapore operation was cancelled. Hambali instructed that the target location 
would be, once more, the Philippines, and that if the US and Israeli embassy were too 
well protected they would just have to find softer targets.560 
 
Not long after the decision to move the operation to the Philippines, Jabarah received an 
email from Zulkepli Marzuki with the subject line “Problem”. Faiz had been arrested on 
a visit to Singapore, along with all the Singapore-based operatives, he reported. Jabarah 
should get out of Malaysia as soon as he could. Acting on this advice, Jabarah and 
Sahagi took a bus to Bangkok, where they briefly met Hambali, who had also sought 
refuge in Thailand as the Special Branch had begun arresting jihadist suspects in 
Malaysia, following the Singapore arrests. It was early January 2002. Nervous that 
Jabarah’s alias, Sammy, was circulating in the media, Hambali surmised that the 
arrested Singaporeans were talking and told Jabarah to get out of the region as quickly 
as possible. Jabarah took a flight to Dubai and then travelled to Oman where he was 
arrested by the local authorities and, as a Canadian citizen, handed over to Canadian 
authorities, who ultimately rendered him to the FBI. Hambali would be arrested over a 
year later, still hiding out in Thailand. 
 
Despite being a failure that ultimately exposed parts of the Southeast Asian jihadist 
assemblage to the authorities for the first time, an examination of the Singapore 
bombing plot illustrates the extent to which global jihadists relied on local operatives 
and resources. What Southeast Asian jihadists lacked in resources in any one location 
they sought to gain by cobbling together resources (money, personnel, vulnerable 
targets, safe havens) from a multiplicity of spaces and places across the region. 
Financing from outside the region, through their links with al-Qaeda, no doubt 
influenced target selection and made it easier for Southeast Asian jihadists to conduct 
attacks.  But just as Southeast Asian jihadists were attracted to al-Qaeda as a source of 
easy cash, al-Qaeda was attracted to Southeast Asia as the location of a loose meta-
network of social and material resources that I have been calling a regional assemblage.   
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The	Jack	Roche	operation	
It is possible to overstate, as well as to understate, the significance of the fact that 
Jemaah Islamiyah’s fourth Mantiqi broke outside of the traditional map of Southeast 
Asia to incorporate Australia. In reality, JI only ever had a small following in Australia, 
perhaps less than fifty people, and as Nasir Abas points out, it was not yet a fully 
formed Mantiqi.561 Australia, given its higher wages, had been primarily thought of as a 
space for fundraising rather than recruitment. Yet the inclusion of Australia is 
illustrative of the flexible approach to regional geography typical of the fluid island 
world of Southeast Asian jihadism. The Australian JI community was made up of 
mostly Indonesian immigrants and headed by the identical Ayub twins, Abdurrahman 
and Abdurrahim, both of whom had experience in Afghanistan. Crucially, it included a 
handful of white Western Jemaah Islamiyah members. Although the number of Jemaah 
Islamiyah in Australia was small their integration within the loose Southeast Asian 
assemblage gave jihadists what social network analysts call “the strength of weak 
ties.”562 Although the connections to Australia may have been few, for jihadists with 
access to the regional assemblage they extended their territorial reach and opened a 
pathway to new resources.563  
 
The second failed joint JI-al-Qaeda operation was coordinated by Hambali in 2000 and 
sought to leverage these weak ties to deploy white operatives in what would have been 
the first attack involving al-Qaeda in a Western country. In this plan, al-Qaeda and JI 
specifically sought Caucasian operatives who could be sent to Afghanistan for training 
and return to Australia, attracting little attention as they formed a cell for bombing 
operations against US and Israeli interests.  
 
Jack Roche, an Anglo-Australian convert to Islam who had joined JI in the late 1990s, 
was chosen to lead and form a cell to conduct attacks in Australia. Roche, a student of 
Indonesian, had already proved himself useful to the group by serving as a translator. In 
July 2000 Roche was sent by Abdurrahin to take instructions of an unspecified nature 
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from Hambali in Malaysia. According to Roche, “Hambali’s idea was to set up a cell in 
Australia that was a lot more committed than the group in general was in Australia.”564 
This entailed a cell that could be trained to conduct bombings. As he recalls in his 
notebook in Indonesian, “First: Abdurrahim said there is a task for me with Hambali in 
Malaysia (a plan from the Afghanistan guys). Second: I met with Hambali and he said 
the same thing. We also spoke about the possibility of doing something to coincide with 
the Olympic Games over there this year.”565  
 
From Malaysia Roche flew to Karachi, Pakistan, where he met with Khalid Sheikh 
Muhammad, who went by the alias Mukhtar, and handed him a letter of introduction 
written by Hambali. During the discussions with Roche, KSM shifted the plan from 
targeting the Olympic Games in a singular attack to targeting Israeli interests in 
Australia with multiple attacks.566 Recalling, under oath, his encounter with the man 
who was at the time planning 9/11, Roche added that KSM was also interested in 
“American airlines to and from Australia.”567  
 
KSM then sent Roche for military training with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, having written 
him a letter of introduction addressed to Abu Abdullah, a kunya used at the time by 
Osama bin Laden. In Afghanistan Roche met briefly with bin Laden, was put through a 
ten-day course in explosives, and personally instructed in covert surveillance tradecraft 
by al-Qaeda security chief Saif al-Adel. Meanwhile, Roche describes how senior al-
Qaeda figures, including military chief Abu Hafs, discussed and finally set the 
parameters of the plot. They decided upon two targets, the Israeli embassy in Canberra 
and a prominent Australian-Israeli businessman in Melbourne. Al-Qaeda, too, was keen 
to leverage JI’s ability to recruit and deploy Caucasian operatives. “They decided,” 
Roche writes, “to receive three white Muslim Australians for training in Afghanistan.” 
Roche himself was made the “coordinator” of the Australian operation.568  
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Roche then returned via Khalid Sheikh Muhammad in Pakistan, who gave him 
US$3250 and a letter for Hambali about what had been agreed. He then flew to 
Malaysia where he met with Hambali and received another US$4750 in al-Qaeda 
money via electronic transfer. Roche then travelled to Indonesia for “cover”, where he 
prepared for his operation in Australia. “In Indonesia,” he writes, “I shaved my beard so 
that when I enter Perth, Australia, the immigration there will only see a normal white 
person!”569 In Australia Roche conducted surveillance of the Israeli embassy in 
Canberra and did some preliminary research on the Jewish businessman. The attacks, 
however, never went ahead. Jack Roche developed cold feet and sought to extract 
himself from the plot. Meanwhile, he had met strong resistance from the Ayub twins 
who ran Mantiqi IV. According to Roche, “They were having problems with coming to 
grips with the fact that I appeared to be Hambali's man in Australia whereas they saw 
me as their man in Australia. They really did want to control the situation.”570 Also, 
both men had decided to settle in Australia and perhaps were not prepared to suffer the 
consequences of being implicated in an attack in what was for them a safe haven.  
 
According to Roche’s testimony, during the dispute over the Australian operation, the 
Ayub twins arranged for him to fly to Indonesia to meet Ba’asyir, who they assumed, 
responding to their complaints, would call off the operation. Instead, Ba’asyir told 
Roche, without wanting to discuss the details, “Whatever Hambali has tasked you to do, 
do it.”571 On returning to Australia and telling the twins what Ba’asyir had said, Roche 
says they were “furious”.572 
 
After months of pressure from the twins against the operation, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir 
called Roche and in Roche’s words said, “Look, whatever it is you’re doing, stop it.”573 
Meanwhile, on four separate occasions Roche attempted to contact the Australian 
authorities to inform them of the plot, but his calls were never returned. The evidence of 
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the first JI-al-Qaeda operation in Australia emerged only two years later, after police 
raids on JI suspects following the Bali bombings of 2002. 
 
The Roche operation demonstrates the geographical reach that the regional assemblage 
offered al-Qaeda at the turn of the century. Once again, highly mobile and relatively 
autonomous jihadists planners and operatives—KSM, Hambali, and Roche—
collaborating with a foreign organization, al-Qaeda, exploited the assemblage to 
mobilize attack plans in defiance not just of nation-state borders, but also of JI’s own 
territorial command structure. The Roche case illustrates how this mobilization process 
relied not just on hierarchical relationships, but, crucially, also on informal and ad hoc 
ties created within the assemblage. Technically, Roche in Mantiqi IV was not under the 
command of Hambali. Indeed, Abdurrahman Ayub, the most senior figure in Mantiqi 
IV, had spent five years in Afghanistan to Hambali’s two, and had the prestige of 
having written al-Qaeda’s manual on knife-fighting.574 Nor was he answerable to al-
Qaeda. Nor did he undergo any special indoctrination process by Hambali or KSM in 
order that he serve them directly. His salafi jihadi ideology was something JI had 
cultivated in him over the preceding years.  He was simply, as he put it, carried away 
with the opportunity of “actually doing something for Islam in Afghanistan.”575 
Illustrating his fervor for action before he had even left Australia, Roche wrote a letter 
to his son in which he made reference to,  
 
The greater sacrifice worthy of the highest reward from Allah that I am 
about to undertake. As Muslims we are obligated to perform jihad to 
uphold the laws of Allah…. As we see today, the disbelievers are now out 
of control and believe that their ways based on inequality, arrogance, et. 
cetera, are right. I hate them for that and need to learn more about how to 
combat them.576 
 
Roche’s raw enthusiasm for action is precisely the quality that Hambali,  waiting for 
him in Malaysia, looked for in a recruit. Later, asked by his CIA interrogators about the 
JI recruitment process, Hambali would tell them that JI’s main recruiters, who included 
Mukhlas and Abu Jibril, sought recruits who demonstrated “enthusiasm and devotion to 
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Islam.”577 Hambali provided a way for such “young guns” to turn their enthusiasm into 
action. Jack Roche, reflecting on Hambali’s influence, describes him not as charismatic 
or charming, but as “efficient.” “He was good at organizing,” Roche says. “He got 
things done.”578 
 
If Roche had not ultimately decided to withdraw from the operation it is likely that he 
would have been able to scrape together sufficient resources to launch some kind of 
attack in Australia, despite the opposition from the Ayub twins. As the judge in his trial 
concluded, “If you had not decided that enough was enough then the conspiracy had 
every chance of successfully being carried out.”579 
 
Returning to the debate that introduces this chapter, on the whole JI and al-Qaeda 
enjoyed a close but ambivalent relationship. Within JI, the notion that global rather than 
local jihad should take precedence was highly controversial—just as it was within al-
Qaeda itself—not to mention within al-Qaeda allies elsewhere in the world, such as 
Islamic Jihad and Gama’a Islamiyya.580  
 
Yet, as we have seen, enterprising jihadists with a fervor for action did not necessarily 
require ideological uniformity across the assemblage in order to exploit its resources to 
prepare attacks. Very occasionally, however, opposition from within the assemblage 
was a decisive factor in preventing an attack. For example, Hambali recounted to his 
CIA interrogators that at the behest of KSM, he and another JI member, Yazid Sufaat, 
had cased potential Western tourist targets in Thailand with the help of mujahidin from 
Thailand’s Malay Muslim deep south. They took video of night clubs in Pattaya and 
Phuket, and of the popular Western tourist strip in Bangkok, Khao San Road. The video 
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According to letters written in 2010 and subsequently captured in Abbottabad, “Bin Laden repeatedly 
prods al-Qaeda’s affiliates to put off their regional ambitions to remain focused on attacking the United 
States.” Greg Miller, “Bin Laden document trove reveals strain on al-Qaeda,” The Washington Post, July 
2, 2011.  
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was then sent back to KSM and al-Qaeda military chief Abu Hafs. But according to 
Hambali, the plot was abandoned after the Jemaah Salafi leader who had attended 
Mujahidin League meetings in Malaysia, Muhammad Haji Jaeming, informed him that 
his group and the leading Salafi preacher in Thailand, Ismael Lutfi Japakia, opposed the 
attacks on tourists. Thus Hambali informed KSM that “the local Thai mujahidin group 
would no longer support the attacks” and “the feasibility research had also finished.”581  
 
Jemaah Salafi members appear to have taken a stand against global jihadist attacks in 
Thailand. It is important to note, however, that as a result of their repeated interactions 
with more radical brethren from neighbouring countries, they did not escape being co-
opted into the regional jihadist assemblage. Consequently, Jemaah Salafi members 
could be mobilized to play a role, perhaps unwittingly, in helping to transfer money 
from Hambali to Mukhlas for the 2002 Bali bombings.582 (For a visualisation of the 
2002 Bali operation from a regional assemblage perspective, see figure 2.) 
 
Southeast	Asia	and	9/11	
So useful was the Southeast Asian assemblage to al-Qaeda that it played a central role 
in the attacks of September 11, reprising the role it had played in the Bojinka plot in the 
1990s, only on a larger scale. Although it is not widely appreciated, Southeast Asian 
jihadists provided significant logistical support for 9/11. As we have seen, it was during 
Bojinka that Hambali met 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Muhammad and the two 
developed a close working relationship. The subsequent JI-al-Qaeda relationship hinged 
much on the trust between these two individuals, who may have connected with each 
other in part on the basis of similar personality traits. Both appear to have been 
impatient planners of attacks against the West, often advancing ambitious and risky 
operations where their colleagues were more cautious. Both were highly geographically 
mobile operatives who fiercely guarded their operational independence from the 
organizations to which they were ostensibly loyal. Both served as brokers connecting 
otherwise separate jihadist organizations and networks. Notably, KSM avoided 
                                                
581 Hambali, CIA interrogation transcript, no. 055, August 22, 2003, 2. 
582 Badan Reserse Kriminal Polri, Berita Acara Pemeriksaan Wan Min bin Wan Mat, August 2, 2004, 15.  
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swearing an oath of allegiance to Osama bin Laden until after 9/11, in order that he 
would be free to plan attacks as he saw fit.583 
 
If we treat the history of the 9/11 operation as one beginning with Bojinka in the 1990s, 
we can see that Southeast Asian jihadists were present at the inception of global jihad 
and its most devastating attack. In 1996, following the failure of the Bojinka, KSM 
travelled to Afghanistan to seek the support of bin Laden for a new plot to hijack ten 
American planes and crash them into targets in the US. At first bin Laden was skeptical 
of such an ambitious plan. But by March or April of 1999 Khalid Sheikh Muhammad 
had persuaded him to support his “planes operation.” KSM now had the full support of 
al-Qaeda.584 Straightaway bin Laden offered KSM four operatives: Abu Bara and 
Tawfiq bin Attash, alias Khallad (both Yemeni nationals) and Nawaf al-Hazmi and 
Khalid al-Midhar (both Saudi Arabians). The Saudi Arabians were recommended 
because, at their own initiative, they had already obtained US visas. KSM planned to 
make up the rest of the operatives from the loyal ranks of Yemenis that constituted bin 
Laden’s security detail.585 But it transpired that the first two Yemenis were unable to 
obtain visas; US authorities were suspicious of young men from Yemen because they 
considered them high risk prospects for overstaying and joining the illegal workforce. 
KSM, who was developing the plot as he went, now modified it to work around the 
problem of the visas. His planes operation would now have two components. The first 
component was the initial plot to crash airplanes into symbolic targets on the American 
mainland; it would employ al-Hazmi, al-Midhar and other suitable candidates from 
Saudi Arabia, as Saudi citizens had no trouble getting US visas. The second component 
was a scaled-down version of the Bojinka plot, to be staged again in Southeast Asia, 
employing the Yemeni operatives. US airliners departing from regional capitals – for 
example, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, Hong Kong – would be exploded mid-air, with 
                                                
583 Peter L. Bergen, The Osama Bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of Al Qaeda's Leader (New York: 
Free Press, 2006), 424. 
584 Anthony Summers & Robbyn Swan, The Eleventh Day: The Full Story of 9/11 and Osama bin Laden 
(New York: Ballantine Books, 2011), 268.  
585 “Substitution for the Testimony of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,” Defense Trial Exhibit 941, United 
States v. Zacarias Moussaoui, July 31, 2006, 5 (hereafter cited as KSM Subst.), 
http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/notablecases/moussaoui/exhibits/defense/941.pdf 
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bombings timed to be simultaneous with the US mainland attacks in order to heighten 
the psychological impact.586 
 
Planning for the Southeast Asia component was facilitated by Hambali, with Jemaah 
Islamiyah operatives playing an even larger supporting role than they did during 
Bojinka, drawing on their knowledge of the region and ready access to its resources. 
Perhaps the earliest al-Qaeda operative to be sent to Southeast Asia in the planning 
phase of 9/11 was the British-raised Indian man, Dhiren Barot (alias Esa al-Hindi). 
According to the 9/11 Commission report, Barot travelled to Malaysia in late 1999, met 
with Hambali and passed him the addresses of two people, one in the US and one in 
South Africa, who he said he could contact if he needed help.587 But the operational 
purpose of Barot’s visit to Malaysia remains unclear. The CIA suspected that the US 
address, possibly in California, may have been that of an al-Qaeda operative pre-
positioned to help the 9/11 hijackers; Hambali, however, claims he did not contact 
anyone at either address nor pass the addresses on to anyone.588 
 
Not long after Dhiren Barot’s departure Hambali received a message from KSM asking 
him to assist Khallad and Abu Bara, the Yemenis who were assigned to the Southeast 
Asian planes operation. Khallad had already planned to visit Malaysia to get a new 
prosthetic limb from the local Endolite clinic, a branch of an international company 
specializing in prosthetics. Two years’ earlier he had lost his lower-right leg in combat 
against the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. He was instructed to use the opportunity 
to case the security on US airlines operating in the region. Khallad and Abu Bara would 
be joined in Kuala Lumpur by the two Saudi operatives preselected for the US planes 
operation, al-Midhar and al-Hazmi.  
 
These two, the first operatives to be deployed to the US for the 9/11 attacks, would 
travel via Malaysia, using Yemeni documents for the first leg of the trip and their Saudi 
passports on the second leg into the US mainland, in order to obscure their prior travel 
                                                
586 Ibid.  
587 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, 
2004, p. 514n4.  
588 9/11 Commission Report, p. 514n4; “Special Report: How a barbershop arrest led to heart of al-
Qaeda's web,” The Observer, November 12, 2006.   
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to Pakistan and Afghanistan.589 Once again, just as we saw with the fugitive Ramzi 
Yousef locating himself in the Philippines for the Bojinka plot, the pioneers of global 
jihad were attracted to Southeast Asia for its perceived geopolitical insignificance. Such 
perceived insignificance, as we have also seen, relied on the fact that the regional 
jihadist assemblage was effectively invisible to the authorities.  
 
Khallad and Abu Bara arrived in Kuala Lumpur in mid-December and checked into a 
hotel near the airport. Hambali met them the following day and brought them to his 
house in Sungai Manggis and also to the Endolite clinic to order Khallad’s prosthesis. 
Khallad, also in late December, took a flight on a US airliner to Bangkok and then on to 
Hong Kong, during which he tested security by smuggling in his carry-on luggage  a 
box-cutter and removing and opening his luggage during the flight. He was noticed by 
neither airport security nor the flight attendants. He returned to Kuala Lumpur where he 
was joined on the 4th and 5th of January by al-Hazmi and then al-Midhar.590 Hambali 
arranged for the four al-Qaeda operatives to stay at a safe house, a condominium owned 
by a wealthy businessman and JI member Yazid Sufaat. Unbeknownst to the al-Qaeda 
and JI operatives who came and went from the safe house, they were under video and 
photographic surveillance by the Malaysian Special Branch, at the request of the Central 
Intelligence Agency. The Malaysians would later be mystified as to why the Americans 
had allowed the hijackers to operate freely in the US.591 This “intelligence failure” 
would be highlighted in the 9/11 Commission Report as an example US intelligence 
agencies’ failure to share information on threats of a transnational scale.592  
 
On the 8th of January the operatives went on their separate paths, al-Midhar and al-
Hazmi flying via Bangkok to Los Angeles and Khallad and Abu Bara returning to 
Pakistan. It was a measure of the close alliance between KSM and Hambali that he 
trusted the latter to host the first operatives deployed for both the 9/11 attacks and the 
                                                
589 9/11 Commission Report, 158.  
590 Ibid., 158-159.  
591 Interview with officer, Special Task Force for Operations and Counter-Terrorism, Royal Malaysian 
Police, February 2011.  
592 9/11 Commission Report, 353-354. 
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Southeast Asia attacks. KSM later described 9/11 as “his dream and life’s work.”593 
Typically, he had a strict approach to operational security which meant that different 
operations were kept compartmentalized from one another. But when it came to 
operations in Southeast Asia, a valuable mobilization space, he appears to have deferred 
to Hambali’s expertise in the region. “Hambali as a rule had to be informed of the 
activities of Al Qaeda operatives in Southeast Asia,” KSM would later tell his 
interrogators.594 
 
Despite the success of Khallad’s casing mission, bin Laden intervened to cancel the 
Southeast Asia operation in April or May 2000, reckoning it would be too difficult to 
synchronize with the US attacks.595 But KSM, a feverish planner, had little time for Bin 
Laden’s emphasis on simplicity. He has said he was “always working on more than one 
operation at a time.”596 In late 2000 or early 2001 he sought to supplement the 9/11 plot 
with a second wave of attacks, which he began preparing in parallel to the first. The 
concept of the second wave was to employ hijackers who had non-Arab passports to fly 
planes into US targets from Southeast Asia, in an attempt to circumvent the increased 
security he anticipated post-9/11. Again, Southeast Asia would be an asset due to its 
apparent insignificance. Planning, however, lagged behind preparations for the first 
wave and only three pilots were identified. The first two were Zacarias Moussaoui, a 
French citizen of Moroccan descent, and Abderraouf Jdey, a Canadian citizen. KSM 
asked Hambali to find him a third pilot from either Malaysia or Indonesia, and in late 
1999 or early 2000 gave him US$ 20,000 to facilitate recruitment and training. Hambali 
recommended Zaini Zakaria, a Malaysian Jemaah Islamiyah member who had been 
among the first to begin training with al-Qaeda in 1999, who already possessed a single-
engine airplane license.597 In mid-2001 Zulkepli Marzuki, the Jemaah Islamiyah 
Mantiqi I secretary, enrolled Zaini Zakaria in pilot training for wide-body commercial 
airliners at a flight school in Sydney, in preparation for the second wave attacks.598 
                                                
593 Department of Defense, “Khalid Shaykh Muhammad,” JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, December 
8, 2006, 11.   
594 KSM Subst., 8 
595 KSM Subst., 9.  
596 KSM Subst., 40.  
597 9/11 Commission Report, 531n161 
598 Interview with Zulkepli Marzuki, February 16, 2011. 
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Also in mid-2000 KSM sent Zacarias Moussaoui to Southeast Asia to seek help from 
Jemaah Islamiyah operatives in enrolling in a flight school. Moussaoui met the Mantiqi 
I treasurer and Hambali confidante Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana, who offered Moussaoui his 
spare room. Moussaoui appeared to be tasked with more than just flight training. That 
night he asked Faiz if he could help him obtain forty tons of ammonium nitrate. Faiz 
said he would see what he could do. Later the same night Moussaoui told Faiz that he 
had once had a dream that he flew a plane and crashed it into the White House. He said 
he told Osama bin Laden about the dream, and bin Laden had replied, “Go ahead.”599 
Moussaoui then asked if Faiz could help him look for flying lessons. The following day 
Faiz drove Moussaoui to the Royal Selangor Flying Club, the same club where he had 
also taken Zaini Zakaria. 
 
Ultimately Moussaoui would find that the cost of flight lessons in Malaysia was 
prohibitively expensive. He decided to look for a flight school in the US instead, where 
he understood lessons were cheaper than in Malaysia. Before leaving the country he 
stayed a few nights in Yazid Sufaat’s condominium, during which he “managed to 
annoy everyone he came in contact with,” according to Hambali. He criticized JI for 
“sitting around and reading the Quran instead of conducting operations.” But Hambali 
considered the operations Moussaoui suggested, such as the kidnapping of a local 
Chinese businessman or robbing of motorists, ridiculous.600 Jemaah Islamiyah did, 
however, purchase ammonium nitrate, assuming that this was a request from KSM. 
Four tons of the material was purchased and stored on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur on 
the assumption that four tons, rather than forty, was the request, and that Moussaoui had 
simply misremembered it. But when Hambali and Faiz were able to reach KSM by 
telephone they were horrified to discover that he had said nothing to Moussaoui about 
ammonium nitrate, and that Moussaoui had been sent to Malaysia only for flight 
training. Hambali complained to KSM that Moussaoui was a troubled character, perhaps 
mentally disturbed, and that they could not trust him. He demanded KSM get him out of 
the country. KSM deferred to his Southeast Asian colleague and recalled Moussaoui to 
                                                
599 Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana, deposition in United States v. Zacarias Moussaoui, March 8, 2006, para. 456.  
600 “Substitution for the Testimony of Riduan Isamuddin (‘Hambali’),” Defense Trial Exhibit 946, United 
States v. Zacarias Moussaoui, July 31, 2006., p. 6 (hereafter Hambali Subst.) 
http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/notablecases/moussaoui/exhibits/defense/946.pdf 
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Pakistan. Hambali observes that they were so keen to see the back of Moussaoui they 
gave him SG$2000 cash for an air ticket after he claimed to have no money of his 
own.601 
 
Jemaah Islamiyah was so rankled by the Moussaoui episode that when Mukhlas visited 
Muhammad later in the year he complained about Moussaoui’s behavior. KSM 
apparently agreed that “there was something wrong with Moussaoui” and he repaid JI’s 
money for the ammonium nitrate and the air ticket.602 With Moussaoui back in Pakistan, 
KSM asked Bin Laden and Muhammad Atef that Moussaoui be pulled from the second 
wave operation. But the al-Qaeda leaders insisted he remain in the operation and the 
planning continue as before. Reluctantly, KSM sent Moussaoui for flight training again, 
this time to the US. Not long afterwards he finally cut ties with Moussaoui after seeing 
the operative’s lax attitude to operational security, now a risk the entire 9/11operation.  
 
Moussaoui was arrested by the US authorities in August 2001 for overstaying his visa, 
after the FBI acted on a tip-off from a suspicious flight instructor at a flight school 
Moussaoui was attending in Minnesota. The instructor had noticed that Moussaoui 
became agitated when the subject of religion came up, and when he asked him what 
religion he belonged to, Moussaoui had raised his voice and said “I am nothing!” 
Moussaoui, the instructor said, had stood out from the other students by paying for his 
$8000 training in 100 dollar bills and by not having a persuasive reason for purchasing 
expensive commercial jet training.603 
 
By the time KSM learnt of Moussaoui’s arrest the 9/11 attacks had been executed and 
the second wave was all but shelved. He would tell his interrogators that he had “no 
idea that the damage of the first attack would be as catastrophic as it was, and he did not 
plan on the US responding to the attacks as fiercely as they did, which led to the next 
phase being postponed.”604 
 
                                                
601 Hambali Subst., 7 
602 Hambali Subst., 7.  
603 Clarence Earl Prevost deposition in United States v. Zacarias Moussaoui, March 9, 2006, para. 757, 
761, http://cryptome.org/usa-v-zm-030906-02.htm 
604 KSM Subst., 39. 
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He did not completely abandon, however, the possibility of a follow-up planes attack on 
the US mainland. In the aftermath of 9/11, spurred by a desire to avenge the US 
invasion of Afghanistan, KSM, in collaboration with Hambali, plotted to attack targets 
that had been long-listed but not included in the first wave of attacks. These included 
the tallest building in the US, the Sears building of Chicago; the tallest building in 
California, the Library Tower in Los Angeles; the White House and an embassy in 
Washington.605  
 
Hambali, acting on a request from bin Laden and KSM, assembled four Malaysians 
from the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia, plus a Malaysian pilot Zaini Zakaria, for an 
attack which they understood to involve hijacking a plane and crashing it into “the 
tallest building in California,” the Library Tower. In late 2001, three team members 
travelled to Kabul and met with Bin Laden and swore allegiance to him.606 According to 
Hambali, KSM appointed Masran bin Arsyad, a Malaysian student studying in Pakistan, 
as leader of the cell and read to him the operational plans. Hambali claims that KSM did 
not tell him any details of the plot, only that “the operation involved hijacking an 
airplane.”607 Following the US invasion of Afghanistan the team fled to Pakistan and 
then made their way back to Southeast Asia. The Library Tower plot ultimately failed, 
but only due to a series of fortuitous events. In January 2002 the cell leader, Masran bin 
Arsyad, was detained at Colombo airport, Sri Lanka, for not declaring a large sum of 
money in his possession—US$ 50,000 in cash, which al-Qaeda had given him for the 
operation. He confessed to the planes operation under interrogation in Malaysia. Zaini 
Zakaria voluntarily turned himself in to the Malaysian police.608 Finally, the two men 
tapped as “muscle” for the operation, who would have been tasked to control the 
hostages, Lillie and Zubair, were arrested while in hiding with Hambali in Thailand in 
August 2003. All three were rendered into US custody and remain in Guantanamo Bay 
prison.  
 
                                                
605 KSM Subst., 41. 
606 US Department of Defense, “Bashir Lap,” JTF-Detainee Assessment, October 13, 2008, 6.  
607 Hambali, CIA interrogation transcript, no. 068, August 26, 2003. 
608 Interview with officer, Special Task Force for Operations and Counter-Terrorism, Royal Malaysian 
Police, December 6, 2010.  
 225 
 
Conclusion	
Jihadist mobilization at the regional scale—cross-cutting local-versus-global, 
organizational, and nation-state boundaries—reached its peak in Southeast Asia at the 
turn of the century. The plots I have examined in this chapter, although understandably 
less well known than the Bali bombings of 2002, illustrate the under-recognized 
capacity of relatively small numbers of jihadists to mobilize people and materials across 
Southeast Asia’s jihadist assemblage. From a threat perspective, understanding the ad 
hoc mobilization of jihadists within an assemblage context is more important than 
understanding the operation of leading figures and formal organizations in isolation. As 
we have seen, despite the historical focus of JI and MILF on their local goals in 
Indonesia and the Philippines respectively, entrepreneurial jihadists were able to exploit 
the Southeast Asian assemblage for their own violent agendas. 
 
The significance of regional jihad has been overlooked in the debate on global versus 
local factors. It may be more convenient to think in terms of hierarchical organizations 
with clear labels, formal structures, and explicit ideological positions. The reality of 
jihadist mobilization, however, was complex, ad hoc, and boundary-defying. In this 
wild ecosystem even the jihadists themselves were not always informed as to how 
attacks were being prepared. Jihadists suffered from problems of imperfect information 
brought on by compartmentalization, need-to-know secrecy, and the communication 
and logistical challenges of operating across a loose, distributed assemblage.  
 
Translated to a social network analysis map, the Southeast Asian jihadist assemblage 
would no doubt prove cumbersome to visualize, appearing as a large and unwieldy 
socio-material network of networks. Yet a regional assemblage approach is necessary if 
we are to understand why a part of the world such as Southeast Asia—relatively remote 
and peaceful, and at the periphery of the Muslim world—became so central to the 
development of 9/11 and the tactic of using commercial planes as missiles, a tactic that 
will forever be the symbol of the rise of global jihad.  
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Figure 2: Although planning and execution of the 2002 Bali bombings centred on 
Indonesia, the operation relied on mobilizing resources from across the regional jihadist 
assemblage.  
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8	
TRANSLOCAL	JIHAD	
 
Until the regional crackdown on terrorism that followed 9/11 and the 2002 Bali 
bombings, a key enabling condition of the Southeast Asian jihadist assemblage was its 
invisibility. The central organisation of the assemblage, Jemaah Islamiyah, was active 
across five countries, connecting jihadists from the Philippines to Australia and almost 
everywhere in between. Separately, and to varying extents, security agencies in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines were aware of the existence of militants in 
their midst. But, confined to their discrete jurisdictions, not only had they failed to see 
how their pieces of the jigsaw joined with the pieces from neighbouring countries, they 
were not aware of the existence of a jigsaw in the first place.  
 
The existence of a transnational jihadist threat in the region appears to have been 
discovered only after intervention from the Central Intelligence Agency. It was as a 
result of the CIA’s request to the Malaysian Special Branch to conduct surveillance on 
the first two 9/11 hijackers in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000 that the Malaysian 
authorities discovered that the al-Qaeda operatives were being hosted by a local militant 
network involving radical preachers from Indonesia.609 But even then, the Jemaah 
Islamiyah network’s reach across the region was fully appreciated only after a series of 
arrests were made in Singapore in late 2001, following the discovery by US forces of 
the surveillance video of Singapore targets amid the rubble of the home of al-Qaeda 
military chief Muhammad Atef in Afghanistan, which had been hit by a US airstrike, 
killing Atef.610 
 
These exposures notwithstanding, amid the deceit and controversy surrounding George 
W. Bush’s War on Terror and the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, it became fashionable in 
certain circles in Southeast Asia to say that Jemaah Islamiyah was the creation of a dark 
conspiracy to discredit Islam and that in a real sense JI “does not exist.” This conspiracy 
                                                
609 Interview with senior officer, Counter-Terrorism Task Force, Royal Malaysian Police, February 18, 
2011.  
610 Republic of Singapore, Ministry of Home Affairs, “Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the threat of 
Terrorism,” January 2003. 
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theory had particular traction in Indonesia given the Suharto regime’s history of 
manipulating the spectre of militant Islam for political purposes in the 1970s and 1980s. 
An effort to debunk the conspiracy theory, however, came from a highly qualified 
source that was frustrated by the public denialism: Jemaah Islamiyah itself. In a rather 
formal and solicitous “Official Statement of Al Jamaah Al Islamiyah,” released to the 
Indonesian media on October 6, 2003, a writer using the pseudonym Ustadz Mu’min 
Mulia sought to answer the “puzzle and the questions” of the Muslim community. “We 
would like to take this opportunity,” the statement begins, “to openly and officially state 
the following: Al Jamaah Al Islamiyah indeed exists….” The statement continues:  
 
The issue of terrorists, talked up by infidel America and its allies … 
directed at Al Jamaah Al Islamiyah especially and at Mujahidin in other 
parts of the world generally, is an effort by them to distance us from the 
body of the Muslim community, to arrest, to imprison, and to kill us.611     
 
But the more Muslims came to understand Jemaah Islamiyah, the more they repudiated 
it. JI’s attacks on civilians, in particular, were met with popular backlash. Recognised as 
a threat by both the public and the authorities, jihadists now found it increasingly 
difficult to mobilize across a weakened and disassembling regional assemblage. In this 
context, rogue Malaysian Jemaah Islamiyah bomber Noordin Muhammad Top, 
constantly on the run from the police, saw his dream of becoming an official al-Qaeda 
affiliate go unfulfilled. But what emerged from this more restrictive regional security 
climate was not a return to early Darul Islam-style agrarian insularity. Rather, I describe 
the less extensive mobilization of this period, in which actors were more reliant on local 
places but still enjoyed cross-border access to resources—sometimes material, 
sometimes only symbolic—as translocal jihad. By “translocal” I seek to capture jihadist 
mobility and exchange at both the transnational and the subnational, local-to-local, 
scale.612 Translocal jihad, finally, covers a hybrid form of Southeast Asian jihadism that 
prioritises the acquisition of local territory by militants who engage with global jihadist 
ideas and images originating from foreign groups such as al-Qaeda and the so-called 
Islamic State. 
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612 Here I am influenced by the survey of translocality as a research perspective by Greiner and 
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The	Decline	of	Regional	Jihad		
Following the Bali bombings of 2002 the security climate in Southeast Asia changed 
rapidly. Counter-terrorism agencies began to catch up to jihadists’ ability to operate 
transnationally and regionally.613 Indonesian and Malaysian police, in collaboration 
with other agencies, kept militants under pressure and on the run. Jihadists in Southeast 
Asia no longer enjoyed the geographical flexibility they once had to operate across the 
region. In addition, global jihadist ideology faced a backlash from within jihadist 
circles. The mainstream of organizations such as JI considered mass-casualty attacks 
counterproductive to the cause, and only encouraging a crackdown that would make 
organizing even harder.614 For both these reasons the jihadist assemblage of the 
preceding years underwent a process of disassembling, rendering mobilization at the 
regional scale more difficult. In Malaysia, a security crackdown employing a strict 
regime of detention without trial under the Internal Security Act closed down the 
Malacca hinterland as a safe haven to Jemaah Islamiyah. In Singapore, the regime, also 
employing a draconian Internal Security Act, was harsher still, in an effort to harden the 
city-state against potential terrorist attacks. As an instructive example, the former 
Jemaah Islamiyah Singapore wakalah chief, Haji Ibrahim bin Haji Maidin—sometimes 
described as the “spiritual leader” of JI in Singapore— was detained and has remained 
in indefinite detention ever since, apparently unmoved by government pressure to 
“deradicalize.”615 Counter-terrorism operations in Australia meant that country was no 
longer viable for JI fundraising. Meanwhile, in Indonesia, the JI heartland, all the senior 
members became hunted by the police. And while travel to Afghanistan-Pakistan was 
still possible, the capture of Hambali in Thailand and Khalid Sheikh Muhammad in 
Pakistan, both in 2003, had removed the strongest personal link to al-Qaeda.  
 
In this period, the baton of global jihad was carried forward by a small number of JI or 
former JI members, many of whom shared in common the fact that they were former 
                                                
613 For an account of Australian-Indonesian cooperation on the Bali bombing investigation, see Greg 
Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2004), 
chap. 1.  
614 Solahudin, The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jema’ah Islamiyah, trans. Dave 
McRae (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2013), 192.  
615 Kumar Ramakrishna, “A Holistic Critique Of Singapore’s Counter-Ideological Program,” CTC 
Sentinel, January 15, 2009.  
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acolytes of Hambali. Foremost among these men was Noordin Mohammad Top, a 
Malaysian JI member who had been director of the Lukmanul Hakiem school in Johor 
Bahru. Almost all al-Qaeda-style attacks in Indonesia since the capture of Hambali in 
2003 were carried out by the JI splinter group led by Noordin, consisting of an ad-hoc 
membership that was formed by recruiting from within the jihadist assemblage.  
 
Noordin followed Hambali’s example of mobilizing resources for jihad from a 
multiplicity of spaces and networks. Organizationally, however, he sought to out-do 
Hambali by gaining formal recognition from al-Qaeda as a Southeast Asian affiliate. 
Noordin’s efforts to identify with al-Qaeda are reflected in the series of name changes 
that his group underwent as he sought to establish its global jihadist credentials, 
beginning with “Thoifah Muqatilah” (Fighting Group) in 2004, alighting on “Tandzim 
Qaedatul-Jihad untuk Gugusan Melayu” (Al-Qaeda in the Malay Archipelago) in 2005 
and concluding with “Al-Qaeda Asia Tenggara” (Al-Qaeda Southeast Asia) in 2009.  
 
Noordin would spend six years on the run in Southeast Asia. According to one insider 
account, his ability to evade capture for so long was due to his recruitment of “cadre 
who were still clean” and thus not already on the police radar.616 In his early years on 
the run he replicated much of the success Hambali had in harnessing resources for jihad 
on a region-wide scale. But as the manhunt drew on he become more and more isolated 
within the borders of Indonesia.  
 
Noordin	strikes	
The first attack by the Noordin group was the bombing of the J.W Mariott hotel in 
Jakarta on August 5, 2003. Coming just before the arrest of Hambali in Thailand later in 
the month, the Marriott attack appeared to confirm to the world Southeast Asia’s 
problem with militant Islamism was entrenched. The attack on the Marriott hotel had its 
genesis in a call by Toni Togar, the head of JI in Medan, North Sumatra, to Noordin 
Top, who was hiding out in Bukittinggi in neighbouring West Sumatra. Togar wanted to 
dispose of explosives leftover from the Christmas 2000 bombings, fearful that 
possession of them could lead to him being arrested in the post-Bali crackdown.617 
                                                
616 Abu Jaisy Al Ghareeb “Kebangkitan Jihad,” 10 
617 Sidney Jones, “Noordin Top’s Group” (unpublished manuscript, 2011), 1.  
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Noordin, however, thought the explosives could be put to more productive use and it 
was the availability of these resources that set the Marriott plot in motion. During the 
planning phase of the Marriott attack Noordin met with and sought guidance from 
senior JI leaders Abu Dujana and Adung (then acting Amir) but refused to be controlled 
by them, styling himself as the “real JI” or, variously, head of its military wing. 
According to Sidney Jones, following the Marriott bombing, “As senior JI figures 
distanced themselves from the attack, he moved toward a separate identity, and by early 
2004, his group was known to others in the jihadi network as ‘Thoifah Muqatilah’, 
roughly translated as ‘fighting group’.”618  
 
The preparation phase of the Marriott attack illustrates how jihadists in the region 
adapted to the tighter security climate. Perhaps more than before, they found they could 
still mount an attack in a major centre like Jakarta if they operated out of smaller, 
relatively isolated towns and cities and other border zones where scrutiny was less 
intense. Thus from Bukittinggi, Noordin, now joined by Azhari and Noordin’s brother-
in-law, moved further south on Sumatra to the city of Bengkulu where they would plan 
the Marriott attack among a small group of JI members who lived there. Most 
operatives for the attack would be Sumatra-based JI members, included the suicide 
bomber, Asmar Latin Sani, who they met in Bengkulu.619  
 
Yet funding for the Marriot attack illustrates that regional and transnational resource 
mobilization was still possible during the War on Terror. One source of funding, like 
most of the operatives themselves, came from Sumatra itself. In May Togar robbed a 
bank in Medan of 113 million rupiah, shooting dead three bank staff in the process. In 
another small town he robbed a money changer. The other source was al-Qaeda contacts 
based in Karachi. The Karachi contacts donated US$ 30,000 through Hambali and his 
son, Rusman Gunawan, also known as Gun Gun. Most of this money was used for the 
renting of a safe house in Jakarta and the purchase of a vehicle.620 In his interrogation 
by CIA officers, Hambali explained how he used Malaysian couriers, one of whom was 
Lillie (a Malaysian involved in a 2nd wave planes operation) to courier the $30,000 to 
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619 International Crisis Group, “Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks,” Asia Report 114 (2006), 2-
3. 
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Noordin Top. Lille couriered the money into Thailand’s deep south where he met Johan, 
a courier from Malaysia, in the border town of Hat Yai. Johan would often travel to Hat 
Yai to pick up money for operations—or in one interesting case, $15,000 to be 
distributed to the families of the militants who had been involved in the Bali 
bombings.621 Despite the stricter security environment, undergoverned border zones 
were still an asset to regional jihadists.   
 
Another undergoverned space that would play a role in the Marriott attack was the 
Sumatran province of Lampung. Lampung, only a short boat ride from West Java is an 
outer island transmigation zone that had been an area of Darul Islam activity since the 
Suharto era. There Noordin assembled his team for the execution of the attack. Head of 
the operation would be Noordin Top himself. He designated the Bali bomber and 
former university lecturer Azhari Hussein as his field commander. Two more junior 
men, Islam and Asmar Latin Sani would be responsible for getting the explosives to 
Jakarta, acquiring a car and renting the safe house. Additionally, Asmar had agreed to 
be the matyr.622  
 
According to an International Crisis Group report on the Noordin network, after the 
planning was completed in Lampung, all four operatives, including Noordin Top, 
relocated to Jakarta and began reconnaissance to select a target. After considering a 
branch of Citibank, and two of Jakarta’s most elite high schools, Jakarta International 
School and Australian International School, the J.W Marriot hotel was selected due to it 
being an American brand name and the ease with which it could be accessed.623 
Security consultant Ken Conboy observes, the JW Marriot was one of the few luxury 
hotels in Jakarta that had a busy and visible café near its lobby. The bombing of the 
Marriot was executed on August 5, 2003. A blue Toyota Kijang, laden with explosives, 
was driven into the taxi rank area of the hotel. After briefly speaking with a security 
guard, Asmar detonated the bomb, killing twelve people and injuring one hundred and 
fifty, most of whom were Indonesian drivers or chauffeurs. Asmar’s severed head was 
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found amid the shattered window glass on the fifth floor of the hotel, helping 
investigators to identify the group responsible.624   
 
The regional jihadist assemblage may have been disrupted, but Noordin proved that a 
small but skilled and mobile group of individuals could continue to aggregate enough 
resources to mount attacks, at least in Indonesia. Moreover, his personal charisma, a 
quality not possessed by Hambali, appeared to allow him to recruit a ready supply of 
suicide bombers.  
 
Australian	Embassy	Bombing.		
The Australian Embassy Bombing, Noordin’s next attack, illustrated his ability to 
transcend Jemaah Islamiyah to tap into Indonesia’s Darul Islam network to form an ad 
hoc group of operatives. Notably, he drew manpower from the West Javanese militant 
group known as Ring Banten, a Darul Islam splinter group led by Kang Jaja, who had 
parted ways with the Darul Islam mainstream in mid-2000 on the basis that it had been 
too passive towards the conflict in Ambon.625 Ring Banten members had also taken part 
in an attack on the Atrium Mall in Jakarta in 2001 and the 2002 Bali bombings.  
 
The Australian embassy bombing relied on Noordin’s collaboration with the leader of 
Kang Jaja’s training camp in Gunung Batu in West Java, Iwan Darmawan, alias Rois. 
Ken Conboy describes the partnership as the perfect match. “Rois had on hand a band 
of jihadis from Ring Banten that were in search of a jihad. Noordin, by contrast, was 
fixated on his anti-Western crusade, but was in need of foot soldiers and a local support 
network.”626 Apparently, shortly after Rois had met with Noordin and been found 
suitable for collaboration on an attack against the West, Rois established a new training 
camp West Java at Gunung Peti in part for the purpose of selecting suicide bombers. 
One of the trainees was a Ring Banten member, Heri Golun, who would eventually be 
chosen as the suicide operative for the embassy attack.  
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Much of the preparation for the embassy bombing took place in August, 2004, with 
Rois taking Heri Golun out of training in West Java and bringing him to Jakarta to meet 
Noordin and Azhari. A white Daihatsu box van was purchased as the vehicle to deliver 
the bomb. By one account Azhari relied on boxes of dynamite that had been sourced 
from a JI contact who had it left over from the conflict in Ambon. This was combined 
with potassium chlorate and sulfur bought from a chemical supply store.627 Eventually, 
Noordin and Azhari had Heri join them in a safe house so they could indoctrinate him 
more intensively for his martyrdom. Rois, meanwhile, began to teach him how to drive. 
On September 9, 2004, Heri Golun drove past the Australian Embassy in the diplomatic 
suburb of Kuningan and detonated a bomb. He was 26, with a wife who was nine 
months pregnant. Ten people were killed and 180 were injured in the blast. After a few 
days, Noordin, Azhari and their accomplices slipped away to a safe house in West Java.  
 
The Australian Embassy attack demonstrated that Southeast Asian jihadists were not 
dependent on funding from al-Qaeda. Noordin appears to have been able to compensate 
for his restricted movement at the transnational scale by increasing his mobilization of 
resources at the local scale. The combination of a focus on local resource mobilization 
and a more explicit global jihadist ideology would characterise the shift to translocal 
jihad. Translocalism, a concept parallel to transnationalism, denotes the space that is 
produced by the creation of local-to-local connections across and between different 
places, whether these connections occur across nation-state borders or within the one 
country. Noordin and Azhari’s embassy attack, as a report by the International Crisis 
Group emphasized, relied upon creating bridges between three distinct networks and 
localities, namely JI’s East Java division, headquartered in Surabaya; JI’s school and 
alumni network, centred on Solo in Central Java; and Ring Banten, the Darul Islam 
offshoot found in West Java.628 Each locality furnished Noordin with a different 
resource. In Solo, access to a place that represents the primary social hub of Indonesia’s 
jihadist network; in Banten, an uneducated, pliable suicide operative from a trusted 
social network; in East Java, reliable accomplices. It was his ability to aggregate and 
mobilize disparate resources from across these three spaces that made Noordin’s 
operation possible.  
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Only with the Australian Embassy bombing did it become clear that Noordin led an 
autonomous JI splinter group. Although now alienated from the JI leadership, his 
isolation, both locally and internationally, opened an opportunity to cultivate a hybrid 
identity that fused al-Qaeda branding and ideology with local resource mobilization. In 
this way, he sought to position himself as the representative of al-Qaeda in the region, 
even if his operations did not rely on al-Qaeda support. According to Peter Mandaville, 
translocality, marked by mobility across space and time, tends to lead to a hybridized 
identity as actors become influenced by multiple geographic spaces and scales. This 
process, Mandaville argues, poses a challenge to the nation-state model, a model which 
is 
 
under threat from a number of ‘distanciating’ processes which disembed 
peoples and cultures from particular territorial locales and spread their 
social relations across space and time. As a result, political identities no 
longer inhabit the exclusive container of the nation-state and must be seen 
as configured in and between multiple political spaces – a condition I 
termed translocality.629  
 
The clearest evidence of Noordin’s affinity with al-Qaeda came in late 2005 when he 
established a website, www.anshar.net, to publicize his group and to publish translated 
jihadist material from al-Qaeda. There for the first time Noordin drew on al-Qaeda as a 
symbolic resource, referring to his group as “Al-Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago” 
(Tanzim Qaedatul-Jihad untuk Gugusan Melayu). The name reflected not only 
Noordin’s hopes for recognition by al-Qaeda, but also the regional scope of his 
aspirations as a jihadist who had emerged not from inland Java but from the Malacca 
hinterland, located at the centre of archipelagic Southeast Asia. Reference to the “Malay 
Archipelago” recalled Jemaah Islamiyah’s alliances with jihadists across the region and 
the attempts to unite them under the banner of the Mujahidin League.  
 
If Noordin had been able to succeeded in creating an archipelagic al-Qaeda-style 
organisation it would have institutionalised the regional approach to global jihadism 
that Hambali had pioneeered before him. Noordin, even more explicitly than Hambali, 
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sought to ground his contribution to global jihad at a regional scale. As the ICG saw it, 
“Noordin clearly aspires to head a tightly organised military machine with cells across 
South East Asia, designed to mount terror attacks on the U.S. and its allies, kafirs, anti-
Islamic governments including Indonesia, and other enemies of Islam.”630 Noordin, 
however, was a long way from being able to form any such machine. A fugitive on the 
run in Indonesia with his bomb-maker accomplice, Azhari Husein, he was much less 
regionally mobile than Hambali had been. Trapped in a restricted geographical space 
their regional jihad came to express itself in the borderless realm of cyberspace. Yet, 
while they were at large Noordin and Azhari were still dangerous. Not long after the 
emergence of the anshar.net website, on October 1, 2005, three Noordin recruits, Salik 
Firdaus, Misno and Aip Hidayat walked into three different cafes in Bali and exploded 
backpack bombs, killing themselves and twenty others and injuring around one hundred 
and fifty bystanders.  
 
Following the Bali II operation a post-bombing analysis emerged that had been written 
by the perpetrators themselves. “The Bali Project” describes the group’s choice of 
tactics, bomb-making materials and other preparations. The analysis demonstrates how 
the attack was prepared by marshalling operatives from a number of sources, of both 
Darul Islam and Jemaah Islamiyah provenance. Just as in the first Bali bombing, the 
attack relied on suicide operatives recruited from the Darul Islam network. Salik 
Firdaus, perhaps the lead suicide bomber in the Bali II attack and the operative who had, 
in turn, recruited the other two bombers, hailed from an old Darul Islam family.631  
 
Although the Bali II attack had been both prepared and executed in one country, 
Indonesia, it was nevertheless a translocal phenomenon. It relied on the cold analytical 
and organisational skills of Noordin and Azhari, both Malaysian university lecturers; 
mobilized suicide operatives from West Java; expressed global jihadist ideology in 
attacking “soft” Western targets in Bali, and in its accompanying propaganda, drew on 
the rich symbolic power of al-Qaeda, in particular that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi of al-
Qaeda in Iraq. Following the bombing, video footage was found showing a masked 
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Noordin lecturing the US and Australia for their perceived crimes and threatening 
retaliation. Other footage showed the three suicide bombers making their final, pre-
mortem statements to the camera.632   
 
Not long after Bali II Indonesian police caught up with Azhari and an accomplice in 
their safe house in the resort town of Batu, near Malang in East Java. After a brief 
shootout in which Azhari was shot and killed, his accomplice, Agus Puryanto, a Darul 
Islam member, blew himself up before he could be arrested. In the evidence collected 
from the Batu safe house was the “Bali Project” document, apparently written as a kind 
of jihadist text book by Azhari. Azhari opens the analysis with the question, “Why 
Bali?” Answer: “Because attacks against them in Bali are attacks with an impact that is 
global. Bali is famous throughout the world, indeed its more well-known than 
Indonesia.” He continues, situating the Bali attack within a global jihadist narrative: 
 
It cannot be denied anymore that the main enemy of Islam is America and 
its allies. America and its allies attack Islam on a global scale, in every 
corner of the world. In Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, Kashmir and the 
Philippines. They bring financial and technical support to apostate rulers 
in order to capture mujahidin in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan and 
Indonesia. Thus they too are attacked throughout the world. Just recently, 
in July 2005 they were attacked in London. Now they are attacked in Bali 
again.633 
 
As a translocal space in itself, Bali connected Noordin’s group to the global jihad 
against the West. As Azhari says, again in answer to the question of Why Bali?, “As 
understood by [Jakarta police chief] Inspector General Firman Gani, terrorists only 
target two primary places in Indonesia, that is, Bali and Jakarta, because it is easier to 
make a psychological impact on the world.”634  
 
Following the rapid police tracing and killing of Azhari and the dismantling of the Bali 
II group there was a lull of four years before the next global jihadist attack in Southeast 
Asia. As Ward points out, while Bali II may have been intended to demonstrate the 
militants’ power in that it was the second such attack on a now fortified Bali, in reality 
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counterterrorism police had the upper hand and were able to keep Noordin and his 
associates on the run in Indonesia so much so that they were unable to execute further 
attacks.635  
 
But despite perhaps the largest manhunt in Indonesian history Noordin remained at 
large, his prestige in militant circles growing the longer he was able to elude the 
authorities. It was later discovered that he had been living for much of the time in 
Cilicap, on the remote south coast of Central Java, where he had married a daughter of 
the JI member who had been protecting him. Meanwhile, Solahudin observes, from 
around 2007 the merits of direct attacks to weaken the enemy, qital nikaya, were “hotly 
debated” in jihadist circles in Indonesia. The debate was heavily influenced by the 
dissemination of the views of Jordanian jihadist scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, 
who argued that direct attacks against the enemy were permissible, but often 
undesirable in that they did not contribute to lasting change. Instead, he advocated 
fighting to seize territory, qital tamkin. The consensus in jihadist circles thus moved 
away from Noordin and his ad hoc cells of jihadists, further isolating him.636  
 
2009	Jakarta	Hotel	Bombings	
At a time when it seemed Noordin’s network had fallen into irrelevancy, without 
warning, on July 17, 2009, bombs exploded near-simultaneously in the J.W. Marriot 
and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta, killing nine people and injuring fifty. The attack 
appeared to target a high-level business meeting, and a number of a prominent 
expatriate businessmen were killed. In August Noordin Top released a statement 
dedicating the attack to his fallen comrade Jabir and writing, “I will never surrender 
before America along with its allies leaves Iraq or other Islamic countries.”637 Noordin 
signed the statement “Amir of Al-Qaeda Indonesia,” indicating his restricted mobility 
with a new al-Qaeda brand, rescaled from the regional to the national level.  
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The bombings appeared to have been coordinated with another plot, thwarted by police, 
which also suggested Noordin’s years restricted to Indonesia had shrunk the scale of his 
thinking. The plot sought to attack the residence of Indonesian president Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono, indicating a shift in targeting from the “far enemy” to the “near 
enemy.”  
 
Yet Noordin had not given up on his vision on an Al-Qaeda affiliate in Southeast Asia, 
with himself as the head. Leading up to the attack, Noordin was in contact with 
Muhammad Jibriel, a well-known jihadi publisher and former student of Noordin’s in 
Malaysia. In 2010 Jibriel was convicted for withholding information relating to the 
2009 hotel bombings. It appears that he had made an unsuccessful trip to Saudi Arabia, 
where his brother was studying, in order to raise funds for Noordin. Correspondence 
between Jibriel and his brother was found on Jibriel’s computer, referring to a 
conversation of his with Noordin in which the later asked him to contact “Ubaid AQ 
Asia” because he was in the process of forming al-Qaeda Asia.638 “Ubaid” was perhaps 
a reference to Abu Ubaidah, a Malaysian who operated across the border in Southern 
Thailand, who liked to refer to himself on his blog as “First General of al-Qaeda, 
Southeast Asia Branch.”639 Abu Ubaidah was an alias of Mohamad Fadzullah Abdul 
Razak, a student in the same faculty as Azhari at Universitas Teknologi Malaysia, the 
university where Azhari first came to know Noordin.640 Around the same time Jibriel 
also appears to have been in contact with al-Qaeda figures in Pakistan, as well as Imam 
Samudra, the imprisoned Bali Bomber, both perhaps in an attempt to raise financing for 
Noordin.641  
 
In the wake of the hotel bombings Noordin was finally tracked to a safe house in Solo, 
Central Java, where, after a dramatic televised siege, he was killed by counterterrorism 
police on September 17, 2009. Although he had been the region’s most wanted terrorist 
for six years, he never did receive the recognition from al-Qaeda that he was so 
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desperate for. Noordin was thus a translocal jihadist whose regional-scale ambitions 
went largely unfulfilled.  
 
This is not to say that al-Qaeda had completely ignored its Southeast Asian brethren. In 
late November 2008, al-Qaeda deputy Ayman Zawahiri issued an audio statement titled 
“The Martyrdom of the Heroes and the Betrayal of the Rulers,” in which he eulogized 
the 2002 Bali bombers Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, Ali Ghufron (alias Mukhlas) and Imam 
Samudra, who had been executed by Indonesian authorities earlier that month. In the 
recording, which features excerpts of interviews with the Bali bombers, Zawahiri 
addresses Indonesian Muslims directly, saying that jihad is now an individual duty for 
all Muslims to rid their lands of Western enemies.642  
 
The	Aceh	Camp		
Following the death of Noordin it was reasonable to argue that the last remaining 
terrorist threat to Western interests in Southeast Asia had been eliminated. Nevertheless, 
the spectre of al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia rose yet again on February 22, 2010, after 
police discovered well-funded jihadist training camp operating in the jungle of 
Indonesia’s Aceh province. The camp was the project of an alliance that included 
former JI splinter group, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, under the leadership of Abu Bakar 
Ba’asyir, along with members of Darul Islam and other groups. Some 120 militants led 
by the fugitive 2002 Bali bomber Dulmatin, gathered under the banner of al-Qaeda on 
Mecca’s Veranda (al-Qaeda Serambi Mekkah; ‘Serambi Mekkah’ is a common 
metonym for Aceh). A video made by the group for fundraising purposes featured a 
black flag emblazoned with the Muslim profession of faith and the seal of Muhammad, 
the same flag flown al-Qaeda affiliates in Iraq and Somalia. But according to one 
member of the group, the use of the al-Qaeda name “was in recognition of Bin Laden’s 
leadership of the global jihad rather than anything more concrete”.643  
 
Just as in Poso, the primary purpose of the camp was to establish a secure base (qoidah 
aminah) from which an Islamic state could be formed, in accordance with the 
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increasingly fashionable strategy of qital tamkin. And if Poso provided an impenetrable 
and remote jungle with a “backdoor” to an ungoverned border zone (the Malay-
Indonesia-Philippines tri-border), so did Aceh, with its proximity to the insurgency in 
Southern Thailand, just across the Malacca Strait. Solahudin observes that such 
favourable political geography was a major attraction for the jihadists: 
 
Aceh’s geography was conducive to a guerrilla campaign. The terrain was hilly 
and covered by tropical forest, with rivers flowing in the valleys, providing a 
perfect place of refuge. GAM [Free Aceh Movement] itself had waged a long 
guerrilla war without ever being defeated by the Indonesian military. Aceh was 
also located close to Southern Thailand meaning it would be easy to forge 
relations with the Patani mujahideen, to gain weapons and cooperate in each 
other’s jihad struggle.644  
 
The Aceh training camp neatly illustrated the extent to which Indonesian jihadism had, 
over the course of time, become globalised. A wholly Indonesian project to establish 
local territory in Aceh was expressed in the idiom of al-Qaeda’s global jihad. Only 
twenty years prior, such a local jihadist project might have been framed only in 
reference to the Islamic State of Indonesia and the spirit of S.M. Kartosoewirjo. In fact, 
just over twenty years before, in 1989, a Darul Islam splinter group led by Nur Hidayat 
had done just that.  Radicalised by New Order repression and feelings of being 
abandoned by Abdullah Sungkar after the latter’s emigration to Malaysia, the group of 
young men sought to establish territory centred on a pesantren in Talangsari, Lampung 
in Sumatera. The group appointed the leader of the pesantren, Warsidi, an old Darul 
Islam fighter, as its imam. Warsidi was motivated by a desire to form what we could 
call a “safe base.” According to a memoir of one of the project participants, he and his 
friends, who were fired by a desire to wage armed jihad against Suharto, still agreed 
with Warsidi on the need to first create a safe area:  
 
For Warsidi, forming an area for emigration [hijrah] as a sterile area in 
which to apply syari’ah Islam in daily life was an important thing. “Even 
if only as wide as the house we live in, the DI [Darul Islam (Abode of 
Islam)] is what we establish,” said Warsidi. We also agreed with Warsidi 
about the need for hijrah first [before jihad]. Even more so after seeing 
the Cihideung and Mount Balak area, we viewed it as a strategic place for 
                                                
644 Solahudin, The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia, 198-199.  
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basic military training for the people we would prepare as a suicide squad 
to attack military targets or vital symbols of the state.645   
 
Warsidi’s project would end in a bloody confrontation with the Indonesian military, in 
which dozens of Muslim youth were killed by heavily armed troops. After the 1984 
Tanjung Prior massacre, the incident at Talangsari would further entrench the Suharto 
regime’s reputation for the violent repression of Muslims and surely served as a 
reminder to Abdullah Sungkar, ensconced in Malaysia, of the need for strategic 
patience.646  
 
The difference between the Talangsari camp and the Aceh camp is twenty years of 
globalisation facilitating what Kathryn Brickell and Ayona Datta refer to as the 
“translocal imagination”647 By appropriating al-Qaeda branding, the Aceh camp 
jihadists—rooted firmly, secretly in a small patch of jungle—imagined themselves in a 
part of a global jihad, even if they enjoyed no direct personal links to al-Qaeda. Perhaps 
not surprising then that the Indonesian police believed the group had been training for a 
“Mumbai-style” attack on Jakarta—a reference to the 2008 attack by Lashkar-e-Taiba 
jihadists in India, starting at the Taj Hotel in Mumbai, in which 164 people were 
killed.648 Thus even more so than Noordin Top in his later years, the Aceh jihadists’ 
groundedness and isolation was informed by a global connectedness made possible by 
the diffusion of global jihadist ideas and images via electronic communications 
technology, especially the internet. The result was a base that merged the local and the 
global into a translocal space of jihad.   
 
ISIS		
The rise of the Islamic State movement, or ISIS, in Southeast Asia, can be seen as 
continuing the pattern of translocalism produced by the jihadist turn towards 
establishing local territory within a global narrative. Islamic State’s declaration of a 
                                                
645 “Talangsari Berdarah” in “Perjalanan Menjadi Seorang Manusia,” (unpublished manuscript, December 
22, 2003), 9.  
646 For a good historical account, see Abdul Syukur, Gerakan usroh di Indonesia: peristiwa lampung 
1989 (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Ombak, 2003). 
647 Katherine Brickell and Ayona Datta, Translocal Geographies: Spaces, Places, Connections (Surrey: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2011), 18.  
648 “Wide prosecution ‘trawl net’ hopes finally to land Bashir,” Jakarta Globe, February 16, 2011.  
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world-wide caliphate on June 29, 2014 galvanised jihadists across the region, even if the 
Jemaah Islamiyah mainstream rejected the move. The Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia 
(MIT), a small militant group based in Poso, Sulawesi, led by Santoso (alias Abu 
Wardah), a former Darul Islam member, became the first group in the region to pledge 
allegiance to Islamic State. Like the Aceh camp before it, MIT sought to connect its 
weak and isolated fight for a safe base in the jungle to global jihad, adopting global 
jihadist iconography along the way.  
 
The influence of the IS agenda in Southeast Asia raises the possibility of a return to a 
wider regional scale of jihad. Southeast Asian jihadists have travelled to Syria and Iraq 
to fight for ISIS under the banner of its Archipelagic Unit (Katibah Nusantara), a mostly 
Malay-speaking group constituted of members from Indonesia, Malaysia, but also the 
Southern Philippines and Singapore. Meanwhile, jihadists in the Southern Philippines 
have formally affiliated with ISIS, with Abu Sayyaf leader, Isnilon Hapilon, appointed 
the Islamic State amir for Southeast Asia.649 Although affiliation with IS is opposed by 
many jihadists in Southeast Asia, the history of regional jihadist assemblage shows that 
ideological discord is not necessarily a barrier to jihadist mobilization across the region. 
Without cooperation between counter-terrorism police in Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines, hyper-mobile actors and efficient organisers—newly inspired by Islamic 
State—may yet again bring regional jihad to Southeast Asia.   
 
Conclusion	
The disruption of the regional jihadist assemblage and the shift from regional to 
translocal jihad was not inevitable. In certain parts of the world where governance is 
weaker there are examples of conflicts diffusing to form “regional conflict complexes,” 
such as in the African Great Lakes region. Regional conflict complexes can become 
entrenched through the mutually reinforcing transnational connections between local 
conflict hotspots.650 In Southeast Asia a worst case scenario along those lines could see 
intense jihadist mobilization in the Southern Philippines spread conflict from the tri-
border area to parts of Malaysia and Indonesia where there are latent religious 
                                                
649 Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Pro-Isis Groups In Mindanao And Their Links To Indonesia 
And Malaysia,” IPAC Report 33 (2016), 1.  
650 Michael Charles Pugh, Neil Cooper, & Jonathan Goodhand, War Economies in a Regional Context: 
Challenges of Transformation (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 24-25.  
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hostilities. At the same time, individual jihadist organisers and entrepreneurs could seize 
the opportunity to reassemble a region-wide constellation of human and material 
resources that has in recent years remained largely in abeyance.  
 
Although such a scenario is unlikely in the foreseeable future, repeatedly in recent 
decades local jihadists in Southeast Asia have demonstrated a capacity to organise 
themselves regionally. Such a capacity is enhanced by greater regional integration and 
communication due to processes of globalisation. Yet this need not be the only trend. A 
general move to integrate and cooperate on the part of Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) countries in the area of counter-terrorism policing would greatly 
limit the opportunities of jihadists with regional aspirations.  
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CONCLUSION	
 
In a survey of the first decade of 21st century jihadism in Indonesia widely circulated on 
jihadi websites in 2011, an author writing under the nom de guerre Abu Jaisy al-
Ghareeb observes that performing the deed of jihad is always shaped by a number of 
local conditions. These conditions include the strength of the enemy, the condition of 
the society, the ease of logistics, and “each country’s geographical conditions.” For 
example, in Afghanistan the advantages are that the enemy’s camps are in the cities, but 
the mujahidin control the mountains. Also, “the border regions are famously free.” 
Meanwhile, in the Philippines and Pattani (Southern Thailand), he writes, territory is 
maintained by using the jungle as a base and the local population for protection. 
“Essentially,” Abu Jaisy concludes, “what we have to understand is that each land of 
jihad [bumi jihad] demands a different strategy and each strategy has its own 
characteristics.”651 
 
In this thesis I have sought to show how Southeast Asia’s unique lands of jihad have 
shaped the emergence of global jihadism in the region. I began this study seeking to 
answer two central interlocking questions. First, why did a local Indonesian jihadist 
movement transform into a transnational movement? Second, why did Jemaah 
Islamiyah, the new organization to emerge from this shift to the transnational scale, 
enter into such close collaboration with al-Qaeda, including collaboration on the attacks 
of September 11? I answered these questions by way of a historical narrative that 
captures, to put it succinctly, the globalization of Southeast Asian jihadism. 
 
In summary, Indonesian jihadism underwent a process of transnationalization, 
beginning in the mid-1980s as a result of overwhelming Suharto regime repression, 
which had the unintended consequence of displacing the movement to the safe haven of 
neighbouring Malaysia, through the emigration of key movement leaders. Then, from 
the transnational space of a rapidly globalizing and Islamizing Malaysia of the 1980s 
and 1990s, the jihadist movement expanded further still to the regional scale, 
connecting militants from the Philippines to Australia. Taken as a whole, I have 
                                                
651 Abu Jaisy Al Ghareeb, “Kebangkitan Jihad di Indonesia” (2011), 4.  
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characterized this emergent web of jihadist actors, organizations and materials, 
grounded in the physical and political geography of Southeast Asia, as a regional 
jihadist assemblage. At the turn of the century, this assemblage enabled entrepreneurial 
jihadist actors to mobilize resources and execute attacks across Southeast Asia on an ad 
hoc basis, without the need to garner ideological uniformity or organizational cohesion 
in support of such attacks. Furthermore, it was access to the mobilization opportunities 
presented by this regional assemblage that drew al-Qaeda into close collaboration with 
Southeast Asian jihadists, facilitating, among other events, the attacks of 9/11 and the 
second wave plot.   
 
This analysis, therefore, transcends both a local focus on the importance of Indonesian 
jihadist actors and a global focus on the importance of al-Qaeda. It elicits what was 
unique about Southeast Asia that caused it to become, for a brief period at the turn of 
the millennium, the most important mobilization space for global jihad outside of 
Afghanistan-Pakistan.  
 
Following the 2002 Bali bombings, police and intelligence counterterrorism measures 
disrupted the Southeast Asia jihadist assemblage, reducing jihadist mobility and forcing 
changes in the way actors exploited space and scale. Generally, we saw a shift away 
from mobilization at the regional scale to what I have called translocal jihad, a scale at 
which jihadists sought to root themselves in local places and territories while enacting 
aspects of global jihadist ideology and imagery, inspired by either al-Qaeda or ISIS. Yet 
despite the decline of regional jihad since the turn of the century, jihadists from 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and neighbouring countries continue to think and 
act regionally. The regional assemblage may be weakened but the making of new 
connections and the revival of old ones could allow entrepreneurial jihadists to launch 
attacks once again at a regional scale. Such a possibility, no doubt, has implications for 
the future security of not just Southeast Asia but the broader Asia-Pacific.  
 
Research	significance	and	future	directions	
Throughout this thesis I have sought to illustrate how jihadism is structured by political 
geography. Responding flexibly to the strictures and opportunities of space and scale, 
jihadists in Southeast Asia adapted their organizations and networks in ways that 
changed the nature of their operations and the threats they posed to societies. An 
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appreciation of such a process raises a number of implications for the study of jihadism 
and terrorism more broadly.  
 
Foremost amongst these implications is that a greater attention to political geography 
might garner insights into the diffusion and endurance of jihadism in other parts of the 
world. Attention to diasporic spaces and safe havens in neighbouring countries might 
help to explain how a local militant network can grow into a transnational network, 
potentially posing a greater threat to a larger geographic area. As this study 
demonstrates, the role of government policy in the diffusion of militancy is critical. 
Suharto regime policies had the unintentional and indirect consequence of creating a 
regionally mobile militant diaspora on Indonesia’s doorstep. Such unintended 
consequences of political geography are important for policy makers to bear in mind 
today when they consider their response to the return to the region of Southeast Asian 
militants freshly skilled and radicalized from the conflicts in Iraq and Syria.   
  
Also from a geographical approach, this thesis has introduced assemblage thinking as a 
novel way to analyze the complexities of jihadist collaboration and mobilization. 
Operationalized at the regional scale, sensitivity to the jihadist assemblage as a unit of 
analysis might bring awareness to other instances of the gathering of cross-border 
militant capabilities that are otherwise obscured by approaches that focus narrowly on 
certain separate groups, organizations or networks. Indeed, an appreciation of the 
potential for disparate networks, materials and spaces to merge into a regional 
assemblage is critical to understanding the threat posed by militants across space. As 
this study has shown, with access to a loose and distributed assemblage, jihadist 
entrepreneurs are able to overcome problems of resource scarcity and ideological 
difference in order to mobilize attacks against their perceived enemies. This is the case 
for jihadism in Southeast Asia, which is embedded in a cluster of Muslim communities 
at the periphery of the Muslim world. Here I have used an assemblage approach to 
explain why al-Qaeda collaborated so closely with Southeast Asian jihadists on 9/11 
and separate joint operations around the same period of time. But an assemblage 
approach is also potentially applicable to other parts of the world in which jihadist 
networks and organisations form a distinct supranational regional pattern. These include 
the Sahel region in North Africa, the Caucuses, the Arabian peninsula, and, of course, 
Afghanistan–Pakistan. Yet each region must be studied in its own right because each 
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has its own particular dynamics. For example, recurrent jihadist activity in Indonesia in 
response to the ongoing persecution of the Rohingga minority in Myanmar is unlikely 
to be paralleled outside of Southeast Asia and cannot be understood simply through the 
lens of global jihad.652 Myanmar-inspired jihadism must be understood within a cross-
border, Southeast Asian context.  
 
Insights about the potential for regional assemblage and regional mobilization are 
particularly relevant to national-level counterterrorism policy. National governments are 
still yet to catch up to a rapidly globalizing environment in which jihadists, among other 
transnational criminal networks, seek to exploit the differences and discrepancies in the 
rule of law between nation states. While it is overly optimistic to hope that countries 
throughout the entire world harmonize their counterterrorism policies, it is reasonable to 
suggest that member states of a regional bloc, in Southeast Asia’s case the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), do more to coordinate and share intelligence on 
regional actors who represent a common threat. As this study has shown, local networks 
that do not necessarily pose a threat to governments may form part of a distributed 
assemblage that is susceptible to mobilization by small numbers of jihadist 
entrepreneurs. This insight must be factored into any assessment of the capacity of 
jihadists to mobilize resources and to mobilize across space.  
 
Similar insights apply, of course, to the world of scholarship in which even the best 
research on Southeast Asian jihadism has been limited by country-specific perspectives. 
In particular, it is important to not see Southeast Asian jihadism solely through the 
prism of the most populous country in the region, Indonesia, even if Indonesian 
jihadists outnumber their counterparts from other countries and even if they themselves 
exhibit an Indonesia-centric bias. As this study has shown, although Indonesia was 
central to the emergence of Southeast Asian jihadism, it was the assemblage of elements 
from spaces beyond Indonesia that caused the region to become so central to the rise of 
global jihad. 
 
Jihadist assemblages, however, may be found at more than just the regional scale. I have 
focused on a regional-scale assemblage because doing so answered the most interesting 
                                                
652 “Indonesia arrests militant planning bomb strike on Myanmar embassy,” Reuters, November 25, 2016. 
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research questions that arose from my fieldwork in Southeast Asia. But the best use of 
assemblage thinking is as a toolkit to analyze aspects of social complexity at a 
multiplicity of scales and spaces. For a long time, research on jihadism has been 
challenged by the problem of how to capture the full complexity of jihadist cooperation 
within an ever-turning kaleidoscope of actors, organizations, networks, and ad hoc 
configurations. Some might remember that early research was so uncertain about the 
formal institutionalization of the group of jihadists surrounding Osama bin Laden that 
the name “al-Qaeda” was sometimes hedged with quotation marks.653 More recent work 
on jihadism, such as Assaf Moghadam’s Nexus of Global Jihad, the most 
comprehensive effort so far to explain jihadist cooperation, has relied on the notion of 
“informal networks.”654 In this context, assemblage thinking, with its attention to the 
formation and dispersion of temporary constellations of actors and other elements, 
provides a new methodological toolkit with which to analyze jihadist collaboration.655 
While far from a “solution” to the problem of collaboration, the growing body of 
literature under the rubric of assemblage theory, especially where it intersects with the 
study of social movements and geography, contains an array of concepts and fresh 
approaches that might enrich our ability to conceptualize the protean social structures of 
assembling and disassembling jihadists.656  
 
Perhaps above all, this study illustrates the flexibility of jihadists in adapting to changes 
in their political geography. Of course, counterterrorism measures, such as those during 
the war on terror, fundamentally reshape the terrain in which jihadists operate. But 
clandestine networks have an ability to adapt quietly and in small enough numbers not 
to be easily detected. As we have seen in the case of Noordin Top, small numbers of 
militants organized in ad hoc groups are capable of executing mass casualty attacks and 
creating a climate of fear, despite the constraints of limited mobility and resources.  
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The enduring geographical flexibility of jihadists in Southeast Asia should remind 
analysts and researchers to consider the various spatial opportunities opening and 
closing to militant networks over time. Some such “opportunity structures” for jihadists 
have been fixtures of Southeast Asia from many years, most notably the undergoverned 
spaces at the southern peripheries of Thailand and the Philippines. Likewise, the 
ungoverned tri-border zone of the Sulu archipelago, situated at the confluence of 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, continues to host some of the most hardened 
jihadists in the region. Other spaces, however, like training camps and bases in remote 
and rugged parts of Indonesia, can rapidly shift location according to changing local 
factors. Still other jihadist spaces may appear for the first time due to changing political 
circumstances. For example, in the event of a process of democratization and 
decentralization in Malaysia similar to Indonesia after the fall of Suharto, jihadists 
across the region would likely look to exploit any emerging gaps and weaknesses in 
governance as opportunities for networking and mobilization. In Malaysia in 2009 we 
saw the ability of a prominent jihadist prison escapee from Singapore, Mas Selamat 
Kastari, to find safe haven within the old Jemaah Islamiyah network in the Malacca 
hinterland, a part of the assemblage that had otherwise been in abeyance.657 Although it 
is not possible to predict micro-, meso-, and macro-level changes in political geography, 
it is important to understand that some militants, like the jihadists of this study—
embedded in local communities but highly mobile—will continue to seek out new 
opportunities across the diverse regional and translocal spaces with which they are 
familiar. 
  
A comprehensive spatial analysis of jihadism, however, must address one critical 
domain that is ever increasing in importance: cyberspace. Already, rapid advances in 
information and communications technology, combined with an atmosphere of 
heightened border and territorial security, has made the ungoverned spaces of the 
Internet one of the most important frontiers of jihadist mobilization. Signs of the 
growing importance of cyberspace can be seen in jihadists’ early adoption of social 
media networks and encrypted chat platforms. Ungoverned spaces in cyberspace may 
be particularly effective for jihadist mobilization if combined with the exploitation of 
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ungoverned physical spaces. Currently, the most popular encrypted chat platform for 
jihadists around the world, including in Southeast Asia, is the Telegram application. But 
the technologies and platforms favoured by jihadists will change over time, as their 
flexible and adaptive use of cyberspace parallels their fluid approach to physical space. 
All this suggests that further research on the virtual spaces of jihad in Southeast Asia is 
warranted. The online realm is particularly relevant in Indonesia, which is emerging as a 
social media powerhouse, driven by high rates of mobile internet connectivity. Indeed, 
new online spaces for jihadist mobilization may emerge in Indonesia and diffuse to the 
region beyond.658  
 
Finally, future research might consider not just how jihadists exploit cyberspace in 
isolation, like the proverbial “lone wolf,” but how their mobility through virtual space 
feeds back upon their mobility through physical space, and vice versa. For such research 
to be most effective, it would integrate the study of jihadism online with the study of 
jihadism across the diverse spaces of the physical world such as the border zones and 
safe havens considered in this thesis. In doing so, we should recognize that all these 
spaces, both old and new, constitute different parts of the same relational world in 
which jihadists assemble. 
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